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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS.¹

J. L. WORLEY.

I. CONDITIONS IMMEDIATELY SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEXAS REVOLUTION, 1836-1837.

(1) *The Debate of 1836 in Parliament.*

England and the Republic of Texas became interested in each other at an early date. On August 5, 1836, only five months after Texas declared her independence, she was the subject of a debate in the British House of Commons in which questions concerning the new republic were considered at some length. Some of the debaters spoke of the aggressive policy of the United States and expressed apprehension of the results to England of the ascendancy which that nation would gain in the Southwest and on the Gulf

¹Most of the materials on which this essay is based are to be found in the manuscript collection entitled "Diplomatic, Consular and Domestic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas," now in the State Library at Austin. Except in cases where the notes indicate otherwise, the letters and papers referred to belong to this collection. Some whose originals do not exist in the collection have been published in *Niles' Register*. For the sake of convenience and economy in printing, the references, instead of being completely distributed to support detailed statements, are, for the most part, grouped in notes at the ends of the paragraphs.

of Mexico if it should annex Texas, of which there seemed some fear. The principal consideration involved, however, was the matter of slavery. England had a treaty with Mexico for the abolition of the slave-trade, and it was feared that if Texas established her independence this trade would be reopened with her. It was England's policy to secure the universal abolition of the trade by treaties with the principal nations of the world. Viscount Palmerston, the foreign secretary, expressed it as his opinion that no doubt need be entertained of the propriety of the conduct of the United States in the matter, and that no action need be taken on the subject of the slave-trade until it was certain that the Texas revolution was successful.¹

2. Rumors of the Sale of Texas by Mexico to England.

In the spring of 1837 an interesting incident took place at Washington. Fairfax Catlett, the secretary of the Texas legation there, who was temporarily in charge of its affairs, was shown a letter to the American State department from M. O. Jones, the American consul at the City of Mexico, in which Jones said that a proposition was before the Mexican Congress to sell Texas to England in order to pay the Mexican debt in England amounting to some sixty-eight million dollars.² Jones added that the measure would probably pass, but said nothing as to whether England had suggested it or concurred in it. Catlett, of course, felt it his duty to write at once to Forsyth, the American secretary of state, asking that the United States prevent any such sale and pointing out that Mexico would be unlikely to make such a proposition unless she had previous assurance that it would be acceptable to England. In his letter, however, he spoke of the United States as the "parent commonwealth" of Texas, and Forsyth was so unwilling to have a letter containing such language among the papers of his department that he persuaded Catlett to take the letter back. Catlett reported that he had been told by Crallé (the Washington editor and relative of Calhoun) that the matter had been proposed to England and rejected by her. Earlier in the year William H. Wharton, then one of the agents of Texas at Washington, had

¹*Niles' Register*, LI 38-40.

²Catlett to Henderson, April 29, 1837.

written to his government that Forsyth had shown him a letter from Andrew Stevenson, United States minister to England, in which Stevenson said that Lord Palmerston had admitted that Mexico had applied to him for aid against Texas, but had said that he had refused the application. Evidently, therefore, there was nothing in the story.¹

Nothing further seems to have come of the incident, but it, as well as the debate of 1836, is instructive as showing the position of the parties at that time: Texas independent of Mexico, but still at war with that country and anxious to become annexed to the United States; Mexico unwilling to recognize her defeat and unfriendly to the United States; England and the United States watchfully jealous of each other. For commercial reasons England befriended Mexico, and was anxious both as Mexico's friend and as the enemy of slavery to keep Texas out of the American Union. The impulse to territorial expansion that has always characterized the American people induced them to desire the annexation of Texas, but the slavery question complicated the matter. The politicians of the Southern States for the most part favored the annexation of Texas because of the existence of slavery in that region, on account of which the admission of Texas would mean the strengthening of the position of slavery in the United States. There came to be a strong movement in the Northern States against annexation for the same reason, and those States were so far successful in securing the adoption of their policy that it was known that Texas could not be admitted into the Union until she secured the recognition of some of the principal European powers.

II. THE MOVEMENT FOR ENGLISH RECOGNITION OF TEXAS, 1837-1842.

1. *The first application by Texas unsuccessful.*

In this state of affairs the Texas government naturally desired the recognition of England as the leading commercial country of the world and the country most deeply interested in the

¹Catlett to Henderson, May 7, 1837.

welfare of Mexico. Early in 1837 English recognition was the subject of communication between the Texas government and its agent at Washington, and the view was advanced that negotiations between Texas and England would arouse the annexationists of the United States to immediate action, lest Texas should become so bound up by treaties with England that annexation would become impossible. On June 20, 1837, President Houston signed a letter accrediting General J. Pinekney Henderson to Lord Palmerston as the diplomatic agent of Texas. Henderson was accredited also to the French government as agent, and he was given credentials as minister to the two countries to be presented when the primary purpose of his mission, the securing of English and French recognition, had been accomplished. He proceeded to London immediately and on October 13 was received by Lord Palmerston. Palmerston appeared to take a lively interest in affairs in Texas, but was doubtful as to the possibility of recognition, which he promised, however, to lay before the cabinet. The matter was put off for some time, but on December 27 Henderson was informed that Texas could not at that time be recognized. The reason assigned for the decision was doubt of the ability of Texas to maintain her independence, but Henderson was led to believe that this was in reality a less potent factor in determining the action of the ministry than the political situation in England, the fact that slavery existed in Texas, and the interest of the English creditors of Mexico which made it undesirable to do anything that would imperil the cordial relations of England and Mexico. England's commerce with Mexico, besides, was important, and the government hesitated to take any step that might force English merchants to divide their market with other countries. Another consideration with the British ministry was the likelihood of the annexation of Texas to the United States. This was frequently brought out in the intercourse of Henderson and Palmerston. Palmerston seemed from his language to consider it unnecessary to recognize the independence of Texas if Texas was soon voluntarily to surrender this independence, but no doubt he gave more thought to the possibility that by recognizing Texas he would remove an obstacle to the annexation of Texas to the United States.

Henderson pressed his application vigorously, but felt assured by the end of the year that recognition was out of the question.¹

2. Establishment of commercial relations—Texas clearances recognized in English ports.

Henderson's next move was to go to France and secure the recognition of the government of Louis Philippe; but before leaving England he made an arrangement with Palmerston by which commerce could be carried on between the ports of England and Texas. The Texas government wished to negotiate a commercial treaty with England, but the English government, unwilling to give Texas the recognition that this would involve, found a means by which it could evade the question of recognition and trade with Texas without a commercial treaty. After much delay Palmerston notified Henderson that for purposes of trade Texas, until she should be recognized either by Mexico or by England herself, would be treated as a part of Mexico, and that vessels under the Texas flag or with clearances from Texas custom-houses would be admitted into English ports under the terms of the commercial treaty between England and Mexico, in spite of the fact that their papers would show on their face that they were issued by the authorities of Texas and not of Mexico. The arrangement was rather peculiar and, from the Texas standpoint at least, undignified, and Henderson seems to have felt some chagrin at it; but the temper of Lord Palmerston toward him was such that any concession was a matter of congratulation on Henderson's part.²

3. British Claims and Demands Upon Texas.

(1) *The cases of the Eliza Russell and the Little Penn.*—At this period occurred an episode which added interest to the relations of the governments of England and Texas and on one occasion at least threatened to destroy their friendship. Texas was

¹Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837; Wharton to Rusk, Feb. 12, 1837; Hunt to Henderson, Apr. 15, 1837; Houston to Palmerston, June 20, 1837; Irion to Henderson, June 25, 1837; Henderson to Irion, June 25, Oct. 14, and Dec. 22, 1837, and Jan. 5, 1838.

²Henderson to Irion, Jan. 5, 1837, and Jan. 30, and Apr. 12, 1838.

maintaining a small fleet under the command of Captain H. L. Thompson in the Gulf of Campeachy to prey on Mexican commerce. The British schooner *Little Penn*, bound from Liverpool to Tabasco in Yucatán, ran aground on the Alacranes, a shoal on the Yucatán coast, in the summer of 1837. Her cargo was owned by F. de Lizardi and Co., a house with offices in England and Mexico, and was consigned to a Mexican citizen. As it was found impossible to save the *Little Penn*, the consignees and the Mexican authorities at Campeachy sent out two Mexican vessels, the *Paz* and the *Abispa*, to rescue her cargo. These two vessels were loaded with the greater part of the cargo of the *Little Penn*. The *Paz* made her way safely to Campeachy, but the *Abispa* fell into the hands of the *Brutus* and *Invincible*, two of the Texas vessels cruising in the neighborhood. As Captain Thompson found the *Abispa* to be a Mexican vessel and was shown no papers indicating that the cargo was other than Mexican goods, he sent her into Matagorda, Texas, where the vessel and cargo were condemned as prize. It was claimed, and apparently with truth, that the officers of the *Brutus* and *Invincible* boarded the wreck of the *Little Penn* and stripped her of everything of value found on board.¹ From these facts Lizardi and Co. submitted to the British government their claim against Texas for damages to the extent of some £3640. On August 3, a few days after the capture of the *Abispa*, the Texas vessels chased and captured the British schooner *Eliza Russell*, bound from Liverpool to Sisal, Mexico, owned and commanded by Captain Joseph Russell, with a miscellaneous cargo of merchandise, part of which was consigned to Mexicans at their own risk. This vessel was taken as a prize off the Campeachy coast and sent to Galveston. On her arrival there she was released by order of the executive government, but by storms that arose at the time she was delayed and injured, so that Captain Russell presented to the British government his claim for some £865 damages caused by the detention. The Texas government at once acknowledged that it was at fault in the case of the *Eliza Russell*, and R. A. Irion, the secretary of state, directed Henderson to express to Lord Palmerston his regrets at the occurrence and to assure him that Russell would receive compensation for his injuries. Palmerston

¹See extract from records of navy department of Texas filed with letter of Elliott to Terrell, Dec. 13, 1842.

brought the *Little Penn* claim to Henderson's attention in January, 1838. The Texas government at all times asserted its willingness to settle all just claims against it, but for one reason or another it postponed a long time the settlement of these two claims. President Houston promised to recommend an appropriation to pay the amount asked by Captain Russell, but Congress delayed action because Russell neglected the advice of the Texas government to maintain an agent in Texas to deal with Congress directly. Various objections were raised to the payment of the *Little Penn* claim. The facts that the evidence upon which it was based was Mexican, that the claimants, Lizardi and Co., were really a Mexican house even though they had an office in England, and that the case had already been decided against them by a Texas prize court, were among these objections. The scruples of the government could hardly have been lessened by its extreme poverty, or by the fact that, as Lizardi and Co. were agents in London for the Mexican government, a payment to them was felt to be almost equivalent to a payment to the enemy themselves. The two claims were at first pressed vigorously by the British government. In October, 1839, Lord Palmerston became so impatient on the subject that he wrote a forcible letter to Henderson in which he said that "under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government would be justified in sending out a Ship of War to Texas" with instructions "to take all necessary measures for enforcing the payment of the claims," but he said the government was always "anxious to avoid the employment of compulsory measures," and had therefore determined "to make one more application on these matters, through you, to the Texian authorities." This letter drew forth a protest from Henderson, but the Texas Congress made an appropriation for the payment of Captain Russell; for some reason, however, the appropriation was allowed to lapse, and payment was not finally made until September, 1843, more than six years after the injury took place. The *Little Penn* claim seems never to have been paid by Texas, for the last obtainable reference to the subject is a letter dated February 22, 1845, in which the secretary of state of the republic sets forth the grounds on which the refusal of Texas to pay the claim had been based. In fact, by this time the zeal of the British government in the cause had waned, and there was no longer any fear of "compulsory measures" on the part of

England. The claims were indeed small in amount and never of any great significance in determining the relations of the two countries, except that they probably added to the unfriendliness with which the Melbourne ministry for a time looked upon Texas; but the incidents occupy so large a part of the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries that they are deserving of some notice.¹

(2) *Empresario claims.*—Several claims to lands in Texas were presented during the same period. In August, 1839, James Ogilvy laid claim for himself, as assignee of the *empresario* grant of Manuel Bangs and for the Scottish heirs of Doctor James Grant, to some four hundred *sitios* of land in the Rio Grande country. The grants had been forfeited for non-fulfillment of their terms, but he claimed the non-fulfillment was caused by the breaking out of war between Texas and Mexico. These claims were referred to in general terms by Palmerston in a letter of October 23, 1839, in which he also mentions the case of certain British subjects resident in Texas who had been driven from their homes and rendered destitute by the war and who were then living in abject poverty in New Orleans and Matamoras. Henderson gave Palmerston very little encouragement as to these refugees, saying they must have been among the persons who deserted Texas in her hour of need and so could have no valid claim. The *empresario* claims continued to come in. In February, 1843, Charles Elliot, the British *chargé d'affaires*, laid before the Texas government the claim of John Charles Beales, a British subject, to large tracts of land on the Colorado, Nueces, and Arkansas Rivers and on the Rio Grande. Beales claimed, like Ogilvy, that, though his grants had been declared forfeited by the Texas government for non-fulfillment of the conditions, under which he was, among other things, to bring a certain number of colonists into Texas, this non-fulfillment was caused solely by the outbreak of the Texas revolution. He had spent large sums of money in the effort to fulfill these con-

¹Henderson to Irion, Nov. 5, 1837, and Jan. 30, and Mar. 8, 1838; Thompson to the secretary of the navy, Aug. 29, 1837; Irion to Henderson, Aug. 23, 1837, and Nov. 28, 1838; Henderson to Palmerston, Oct. 30, 1839; Palmerston to Henderson, Oct. 23, 1839; Elliot to Terrell, Dec. 13, 1842; Elliot to Jones, Aug. 17, 1843; Jones to Elliot, Sep. 4, 1843; Smith to Elliot, Feb. 22, 1845.

ditions, and would have been successful but for the reason given. He claimed also that under the Texas land laws the courts were unable to entertain a suit brought by him to recover the grants. In September, 1842, the claims of Cotesworth and Pryor, George O'Gorman, and D. E. Egerton, similar to that of Beales, were submitted to the Texas government. Some correspondence on the subject of these various claims followed, in which the Texas government denied that the courts were not open for the claimants to obtain redress in the ordinary way. Some discussion arose also as to the reservation in the original grants of the power to revoke them at the pleasure of the grantor. The claims at best had no more than an equitable standing, and they were not favorably looked upon by the Texas government because of the long period that was allowed to elapse before they were presented to the government, and because no record of the grants was to be found in the Texas land office. Indeed the British *chargé d'affaires* prosecuted the claims in a rather lukewarm manner, and finally admitted in October, 1843, that the evidence upon which they were based was insufficient, and that he did not think the British government would wish the Beales claim, at any rate, to be pushed until it was better substantiated. Since the subject does not arise again in the diplomatic correspondence of the Republic, the claims must have been dropped at this point. As the Texas government pointed out, though the claims were for very large tracts of land, the grants upon which they were based would all have expired under their own terms shortly after the outbreaks of the revolution, if not before, so that the losses sustained by the claimants as a result of the forfeitures must have been insignificant, if they existed at all.¹

(3) *Claims for British negroes held in Texas.*—Early in 1840 Commander Joseph Hamilton of the British navy arrived in Texas with credentials from E. Murray Macgregor, governor of the Windward Islands, addressed to "His Excellency the President or Officer Administering the Government of Texas," empowering him to demand of Texas and to identify and recover certain British

¹Ogilvy to Pakenham, Aug. 20, 1839 (two letters); Palmerston to Henderson, Oct. 23, 1839; Henderson to Palmerston, Oct. 30, 1839; Elliott to Jones, Sep. 30, 1842, and Feb. 4, Aug. 17, and Oct. 28, 1843; Jones to Elliott, Sep. 19, 1843.

negroes supposed to be detained in slavery in that republic. One of the negroes in question was said to have been sold from among the crew of a British vessel in 1833 or 1834, and several others had been unlawfully introduced into Texas by John Taylor of Barbados. When Hamilton closed his mission on April 21, 1840, he was able to report that he had recovered five of the negroes he was seeking. The exertions of the Texas government in his behalf seem to have been satisfactory, for about a year later Lord Palmerston wrote to President Lamar expressing the thanks of Lord John Russell, the colonial secretary, for a letter written to Russell in October, 1840, on the subject.¹

4. Failure of Henderson's mission.

When General Henderson went to Paris in 1838 he took with him letters of introduction from Palmerston to Earl Granville, the British ambassador at Paris, through whom he was able to keep informed as to Palmerston's attitude in the matter of recognizing Texas. Having obtained French recognition and negotiated a commercial treaty with France, he returned to Texas, but stopped in London long enough to see Lord Palmerston and to ascertain that the English government was still unwilling to go the length of recognition. By this time Texas and the United States had become somewhat piqued by England's delay in the matter. Christopher Hughes, who represented the United States at Stockholm, interested himself personally relative thereto, and spoke a good word for Texas to Lord Palmerston. Cass, the United States minister at Paris, corresponded with Henderson and advised him to secure the recognition of as many Continental powers as possible, and so to force England into recognition by the strength of European public opinion. Henderson spoke of the possibility of inducing England to grant recognition by laying discriminating duties upon her commodities, but the Texas government seems to have been wise enough to understand the undesirability of a commercial war with that country, except as a last resort.²

¹Macgregor to Lamar, Dec. 26, 1839, and accompanying document marked "D"; Palmerston to Lamar, Apr. 8, 1841.

²Henderson to Irion, Apr. 12, 1838; Hughes to Jones, June 10, 1839; Henderson to Burnet, Aug. 5, and Oct. 11, 1839.

5. *Recognition secured.*

(1) *Treaties signed by Palmerston and Hamilton.*—In December, 1839, General James Hamilton of South Carolina, who had manifested a deep interest in Texas, and who was at this time engaged in an effort to sell the bonds of the republic to American and European capitalists, was sent to England as Texas agent to secure recognition, with authority to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with England, to treat under British mediation for peace with Mexico and for the establishing of the Texas-Mexican boundary, and to come to an agreement with the British holders of Mexican bonds. He appears first to have gone to France and then to the Netherlands and Belgium, to which countries he was also accredited. On July 28, 1840, Hamilton wrote from The Hague that he had seen Lord Palmerston, who said unofficially that if Hamilton would come to England after attending to his other business he would be willing to take up with him the matter of recognition and a commercial treaty. On November 6 he reported that he and Palmerston had agreed on a treaty of commerce and navigation which was to be signed shortly. On November 13 the treaty was signed by Palmerston and Hamilton at London. It made the customary provisions for the carrying on of commerce between the two countries. Each of the two, in the matter of import duties and the like, was to have the privileges granted to the most favored nation. For the first eight years of the duration of the treaty vessels owned and commanded by Texas citizens and manned by a crew of whom at least three-fourths should be Texas citizens were entitled to be considered as Texas vessels under the treaty, whether built in Texas or not. The treaty was to continue for eight years, and was to be effective thereafter until terminated by either party on twelve months' notice.¹ On November 14 Palmerston and Hamilton signed a convention providing that England should offer her mediation between Texas and Mexico, and that, if within six months of this offer Mexico should conclude a treaty of peace with Texas, then Texas should assume one million pounds sterling of the Mexican foreign debt contracted prior to January 1, 1835. The details of this transfer of the debt were to be ar-

¹This treaty may be found in Gammel's *Laws of Texas* (Austin, 1898), II 880-885.

ranged between Mexico and Texas. The ratifications of the convention were to be exchanged at London within nine months. By this treaty it was hoped that Texas might enlist in her behalf the interest of the Mexican bondholders, who had theretofore been antagonistic to Texas because by her revolt she weakened Mexico financially. Thus it was thought by the Texans that England's mediation might be stimulated; while, on the other hand, the assumption of the million pounds of debt was held out as a bribe to the Mexican government and a salve to the wounded pride of the Mexican people. At the same time a third treaty was signed, for the suppression of the African slave-trade. It was England's policy at this period to have the slave-trade branded as piracy by treaties contracted with all the principal powers of the world, and Lord Palmerston insisted on negotiating such a treaty with Hamilton, to whom, apparently as well as to the Texas people in general, it was very unpalatable. The treaty designated certain waters in which vessels of the British navy that had received authority for the purpose from the Texas government might search Texas vessels and, if they were found to be engaged in the slave-trade, take them to designate ports for condemnation, and corresponding authority was given to the Texas navy. It may seem strange that England should have insisted on making such a treaty with Texas, considering the improbability that Texas vessels would for some time at least engage in any considerable numbers in the slave-trade or in any other trade. Palmerston's conduct in the matter was probably explained for the most part by a desire to justify his recognition of Texas; for antislavery feeling was strong in England at the time, and Palmerston felt that he could not afford to grant recognition to Texas until she should make some concession to it. It is possible also that he looked forward to a time when Texas would have a merchant marine large enough to make such a treaty desirable, and he saw that the present weakness of Texas which made such a treaty almost useless also made it easily obtainable; while the strength which she might later attain would make the treaty desirable but also difficult to be secured. And he seems to have had another and more immediate reason for his policy. The British government was anxious to conclude such a treaty with the United States. The United States, while desiring

the abolition of the African slave-trade, was unwilling to grant to another power the right to search American vessels. England hoped that by getting the assent of as many other powers as possible to similar arrangements she might be able to force the United States government to surrender its prejudices and give its assent also. In this way the treaty with Texas, even though unimportant in itself, was considered important in its bearing on the relations of England and the United States.¹

(2) *Reasons for offering recognition at this time.*—Palmerston's reasons for recognizing Texas when he did are not altogether clear. Such uncertainty as he had entertained concerning the ability of Texas to maintain her independence was by this time no doubt resolved. The action of the United States, France, and the Netherlands in granting recognition gave Texas a secure place as a nation, and so destroyed one of Palmerston's main reasons for declining to recognize her. England wished, for political and commercial reasons, to hold a position of influence in the Texas situation, and to continue to hold this position it was necessary that England should now follow suit in recognizing Texas and henceforth deal with her as an independent power.² England's policy was, as has been said, to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States. Texas, when she first was recognized by the United States, had applied for annexation also; but the Van Buren administration, for political reasons and from a fear of taking action that might put Texas in a false position, had declined to consider the proposition at that time. Thus at the period of Hamilton's mission annexation was not a live issue, and Palmerston felt that if recognition must come, which now appeared to be the case, it had best come at such a time as this, when it would seem to give least encouragement to the annexation impulse.

(3) *Exchange of ratifications postponed and delayed.*—The three treaties were at once sent to Texas for ratification. The commercial treaty and the treaty for mediation were sent out by Arthur Ikin, and they were immediately ratified by the Texas

¹Hamilton to Lipscomb, July 28, 1840, and Jan. 4, 1841; Burnet to Hamilton, Dec. 23, 1839; Hamilton to Jones, Feb. 18, 1842; Hamilton to Lamar, Nov. 6, 1840; Gammel, *Laws of Texas*, II 886-904.

²Smith to Jones, June 3, 1842.

government and were returned to England, where the ratifications were to be exchanged. Hamilton for some reason did not send to Texas the treaty in regard to the slave-trade until January, 1841, when Albert T. Burnley, who was his associate as financial agent of Texas, left Europe. Thus it did not reach Texas until the adjournment of Congress, and the Senate did not act on it until January, 1842. In the meantime Lord Palmerston, who apparently suspected that the Texas government was attempting sharp practice toward him, insisted on delaying action until the ratifications of all three treaties could be exchanged at one time. Thus, although the treaties by which England proposed to recognize Texas were signed in the fall of 1840, the recognition was not finally consummated until the summer of 1842. This disappointed Hamilton, who held a commission as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to England, but who until the recognition finally took place could be received only as a mere diplomatic agent. Before recognition was actually realized his mission had come to a close. The offense to Hamilton's dignity was not the only inconvenience that Texas suffered as a result of the delay in recognition. For by this time a consul of London had been appointed in the person of Arthur Ikin, and, as he could be granted no *exequatur* so long as his country was unrecognized by the British government, he was for some time unable to perform his consular functions. After finishing the negotiations in England Hamilton returned to the Continent, where he stayed for the greater part of the time during the remainder of his mission; and meanwhile, although Ikin was left in charge of Texas affairs in London, relations between England and Texas were at a standstill. Hamilton hoped that the Texas cause might be advanced by the fall of the Melbourne ministry, which was now clearly about to give way; but the Peel ministry, by which it was succeeded, with the Earl of Aberdeen as foreign secretary, was equally obdurate in its refusal to put either the commercial treaty or that for mediation into effect without the treaty for the suppression of the slave-trade. The ratifications were all, under the terms of the treaties themselves, to be exchanged at London within nine months of the date of signature, but Hamilton signed with Aberdeen a protocol by which

the date for the exchange was advanced to August 1, 1842, so that the treaties were prevented from lapsing.¹

(4) *Ratifications exchanged and Elliot sent to Texas as chargé d'affaires.*—In December, 1841, the term of the Lamar administration expired, and Sam Houston again became president with Anson Jones as secretary of state. The new administration proceeded to make a clean sweep of the diplomatic and consular service. Jones wrote a curt dispatch to Hamilton in which he directed him to return to Texas at his earliest convenience, and stated that it was not thought necessary to send him formal letters of recall, as diplomatic relations had not been established with any of the courts to which he was accredited. This statement was true enough; but it did very scant justice to Hamilton, who in negotiating treaties with England and the Netherlands had done all that could have been expected of him and more than his predecessor had done, and who was in no way responsible for the delay of the Texas government in ratifying the treaties. He seems to have been already on his way home when his recall was sent out, for on February 8, 1842, he wrote to Jones from Austin. At the same time Ikin was removed from the Texas consulate at London and replaced by William Kennedy with the rank of consul-general. Kennedy's tenure of the office was short, for after Texas had finally been recognized he accepted the position of British consul at Galveston and was succeeded in London by Lachlan M. Rate. Ashbel Smith was appointed Texas *chargé d'affaires* to England and France as successor of Hamilton, and on his arrival in London in May, 1842, he took up with Lord Aberdeen the matter of exchanging the ratifications of the treaties. Aberdeen at first thought that this action should be delayed until August 1, according to the terms of the protocol he had signed with Hamilton; but Smith succeeded in persuading him so to hasten matters that the ratifications were finally exchanged on June 28. It was claimed that the delay was due, in part at least, to the remonstrances against recognition made by the Mexican *chargé d'affaires*. Some influence had been brought to bear on Sir Robert Peel by O'Connell and others to

¹Hamilton to Lipscomb, Dec. 3, 1840, and Jan. 4, 1841; Ikin to Mayfield, May 18, and June 3, 1841; Burnley to Burnet, Feb. 21, 1841; Miller to Jones, Jan. 22, 1842; Hamilton to Jones, Feb. 18, and Mar. 4, 1842; Kennedy to Jones, May 6, 1842; Smith to Jones, June 3, 1842.

refuse to ratify the treaties and decline to recognize Texas, but Peel had replied that the Melbourne ministry had pledged the national faith by entering into the treaties, and that he could not decline ratification. On May 31, 1842, Lord Aberdeen signed a letter accrediting Captain Charles Elliot of the British navy to the Texas government as British consul-general. Elliot's commission in this position was dated August 20, 1841, but his appointment was not completed at the time owing to the delay in regard to the treaties. On the day that the ratifications were exchanged Aberdeen signed a letter accrediting Elliot as *chargé d'affaires* to Texas, and Elliot proceeded at once to his post, announcing his arrival in Texas in a letter of August 23, 1842, to Secretary Jones from Galveston. He continued to hold the post of *chargé d'affaires* until Texas was annexed to the United States, and his relations with the Texas government were most cordial. He became the friend of Anson Jones in particular. Texas had for a long time wished that England would maintain an agent of some sort in Texas, but the English government had been unwilling to take the desired action. Now that the appointment had been made, the convenience of the arrangement from the standpoint of the Texas government was apparent. Negotiations in regard to the various English claims against Texas and, in large part, those in regard to the British mediation in Mexico were thereafter carried on in Texas, which made it possible to proceed with much greater expedition.¹

III. ENGLAND'S ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT ANNEXATION, 1842-1845.

1 *The motives.*

The key-note of England's dealing with Texas during this period was opposition to the annexation of that country to the United States. That she should have exerted herself to this end appears strange to one looking back from the present time, for it now

¹Jones to Hamilton, Jan. 26, 1842; Hamilton to Jones, Feb. 8, 1842; Kennedy to Smith, June 30, 1842; Smith to Jones, June 3, June 18, July 3, and July 4, 1842; Jones to Aberdeen, Mar. 4, 1842; Aberdeen to Jones, May 31 and June 28, 1842; Elliot to Jones, Aug. 23, 1842; Irion to Henderson, May 20, 1838; Jones to Kennedy, Feb. 28, 1842.

seems to us that annexation was from the beginning a certainty. And this view was certainly taken in England by some at least. In January, 1837, Wharton wrote from Washington that the English and French governments seemed to consider annexation inevitable and would not resist it. The *Liverpool Mercury* is reported as saying in 1844 that England in opposing annexation was opposing the natural course of human events, and that she should after all look upon it as favorable to her interests, since it would remove a cause of jealousy between England and the United States and would strengthen the American free-trade party. The English government, however, seems never to have taken this view. Perhaps it felt that the case of Texas might turn out to bear some resemblance to the case of Canada, which, from its geographical and economic position and because of ties of race and language, might also have been expected eventually to become a part of the United States, but which had never done so. Granting the possibility of keeping Texas out of the Union, England's motives for doing so were strong. In the first place, at that time English relations with the United States were by no means cordial,¹ and England had good cause to feel jealous of the encroachment of her American rival upon her political and commercial position in the Southwest. England was not only a heavy creditor of Mexico and the principal country trading with her, but English influence was dominant there politically. In fact, England's position was such that she felt justified in speaking of her "ascendency" in the Gulf of Mexico. Annexation of Texas to the United States, would threaten very seriously this ascendency. A second reason for England's policy was her fear for Mexico's safety in the event of the annexation of Texas. It seemed certain that annexation would cause a war between Mexico and the United States which would result in disaster to Mexico. This would still more seriously impair English ascendency in the Southwest. By maintaining the independence of Texas, a buffer would be secured between the two countries, and war between them would be averted. The expansionist tendencies of the American people seem to have created a distinctly unfavorable impression in England. Some suspicion was

¹The dispute over the northeastern and northwestern boundaries of the United States was causing much ill-feeling between the two countries while English recognition of Texas was yet in question.

probably entertained of a conspiracy such as was afterwards charged against the leaders of the Southern States, to detach Texas from Mexico and add it to the slave territory of the United States by sending American settlers into it, wresting it from Mexico, converting it into a republic, and finally annexing the republic to the United States. At any rate the English feeling on the subject seems to have been voiced by the Earl of Clarendon, who in a speech in the House of Lords in April, 1845, said that the restless and encroaching people of the United States would not in case of annexation be long without indulging their national taste for a boundary quarrel or establishing a cause of war with Mexico, and spoke of "a recent declaration made by the highest authority" according to which it had "for the last twenty years been the settled policy of the American Government to gain possession of Texas." It was natural that with such an opinion of the United States England should wish to see that country separated from Mexico by an independent State if possible. A third reason for England's desire for the continued independence of Texas was the fact that so long as Texas remained independent England would be able to secure favorable terms for commerce with her, with a possibility of the ultimate conversion of Texas to free-trade; but, if she entered the American Union, England's products would be shut out by the high tariff maintained by the United States. A specific motive mentioned in some of the letters of the time was England's desire to set up Texas as a rival of the Southern States of the Union in the production of cotton, with the expectation of obtaining cotton more cheaply from Texas on account of special commercial favors which England hoped to be able to persuade Texas to grant her. It was more than hinted at times that England hoped to be able to break down the American tariff by importing goods into Texas and smuggling them across the border into the United States, but it is of course unlikely that there was any basis for the charge. A fourth reason for England's conduct, and the one that attracted most attention, was her attitude toward slavery, of which she was the avowed enemy. By her treaties with the principal commercial nations she had almost broken up the slave-trade, and she now hoped to see the institution of slavery itself everywhere abolished. She regretted that it existed in Texas, but hoped through her moral influence and by giving financial aid

if necessary to stamp it out there. By so doing she would surround the slave States of the Union with a belt of free territory, thereby preventing the expansion of slavery which seemed essential to the continued existence of the institution itself. But, if Texas should become annexed to the United States, all this would be changed; for the Texas influence would be thus given permanently to the support of slavery, and it would become almost useless to hope for abolition, either in Texas or in the other Southern States. From this point of view it was desirable for England to keep Texas independent as long as possible, even supposing that she must ultimately become a part of the United States; for it might be possible in no very long time to stamp out slavery in Texas if isolated, and so to ensure ultimate abolition in the South. The American statesmen sometimes claimed that England hoped that by securing abolition in Texas she could make Texas a refuge for fugitive slaves from the Southern States, but it is unlikely that the English ever allowed themselves seriously to entertain such an idea, especially because of the fact that the United States would never have tolerated any such condition very long, even if the people of Texas could have been imagined willing on their part.¹

2. *English mediation with Mexico.*

(1) *Mediation offered under the treaty.*—While Texas and the United States desired annexation on general principles, this desire was much intensified by the fact that it was thought that only by annexation could Texas secure relief from the predatory warfare waged against her by Mexico. Hence it was England's part to endeavor to restore peace between Texas and Mexico, and England had recognized the fact long before this time. In December, 1839, before Hamilton's appointment as diplomatic agent of Texas, Richard Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, wrote to him that he had been instructed by Lord Palmerston to offer England's good offices on behalf of Texas with the Mexican government, but that the state of public opinion in Mexico was such

¹Wharton to Austin, Jan. 6, 1837; *Niles' Register*, LI 38-40, LVI 161, 166 (Upshur to Murphy, Sep. 22, 1843), 167-171 (Upshur to Everett, Sep. 28, 1843, and Upshur to Murphy, Jan. 16, 1844), 273-274; Terrell to Clarendon, May 5, 1845; Clarendon to Terrell, May 10, 1845; Smith to Van Zandt, Jan. 25, 1843; Smith to Jones, July 2, 1843.

that he was able to secure nothing more than an assurance from Cañedo, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, that commissioners from Texas would be listened to, with the distinct understanding, however, that no proposition for the surrender of the Mexican right of sovereignty over Texas would be entertained. In spite of this reservation, James Treat was sent to Mexico in the spring of 1840 as the confidential agent of Texas; but, as might have been expected, he was able to accomplish nothing. When Smith went to England to Exchange the ratifications of the treaties he found the British government not over-enthusiastic on the subject. Annexation was not at that time looked upon as an immediate probability, and consequently the British ardor for securing peace between Texas and Mexico had cooled somewhat. Lord Aberdeen told Smith that there was little chance for the success of British mediation with Mexico, saying that Pakenham had carried on a voluminous correspondence with the Mexican government on the subject and had been unsuccessful. As Smith pointed out to the Texas government, it was to the interest of England to act in the matter no more energetically than necessary, since any action on the subject jeopardized the friendship of Mexico and England. When the treaties were ratified, however, it became England's duty to renew the offer of her mediation, and Pakenham was accordingly directed again to lay the matter before the Mexican government. On August 30, 1842, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen that Mexico had declined to accept the offer. The fact seemed to be that Santa Anna's tenure of the presidency of Mexico was dependent on his large army, and he needed the Texas question as an excuse for keeping up its numbers.¹

(2) *Friction between England and Texas.*—During the same period in which England was offering her mediation under the treaty, Lord Aberdeen exerted himself in another way to secure peace between Texas and Mexico. In the spring of 1842 President Houston proclaimed a blockade of the Mexican ports as a measure of war between the two countries, and one of Ashbel Smith's first duties in England was to notify Lord Aberdeen of the existence of this blockade. Aberdeen spoke at the time of the unfortunate results likely to arise from the blockade. It would, of course, be

¹Pakenham to Hamilton, Dec. 12, 1839; Smith to Jones, May 17, and Oct. 17, 1843.

highly injurious to England and would be of comparatively little value to Texas. Moreover, as Aberdeen pointed out, it would be very apt to result in friction between Texas and the powers trading with Mexico. The move was certainly an unfortunate one unless it was designed to bring home to England the fact that war was still being waged against Texas and thus stimulate her mediation. Even in this case it would have had the disadvantage of making it less easy for England to mediate successfully. In a few days the subject came up in the House of Commons, where Disraeli by a question elicited from Sir Robert Peel the fact that the blockade would be recognized by England although Texas herself at that time had not obtained final recognition. Aberdeen at once asked, however, that the Royal West India Mail Steamers be excepted from the blockade, saying that they carried only passengers and mail and no freight and that they had been excepted from the blockade that France had recently maintained against Mexico. The request was granted, but before news of this action reached England the blockade was revoked by a proclamation of President Houston on September 12. Houston acted at the suggestion of Captain Elliot and of Joseph Eve, the United States *chargé d'affaires* to Texas. It is likely that by so doing he averted a disagreement with England; for on September 21, 1842, after the blockade had been raised but before the news had reached England, Aberdeen notified Smith that, since the dispatches from Pakenham showed that the blockade was not being efficiently enforced, the British government would no longer recognize it. The fact was that the Texas navy was not strong enough to maintain such a blockade, and that during the summer the Texas vessels had been withdrawn for repairs and refitting, with the intention of resuming the blockade in the fall. Of course no such blockade as this would be respected when it inconvenienced the commercial powers of the world. There was even fear that Spain, which inclined to favor Mexico against Texas, would send out a warship to force the blockade. President Houston thus acted discreetly in allowing Elliot and Eve to persuade him to raise the blockade.¹

¹Smith to Jones, June 3, June 18, and Sep. 8, 1842; Smith to Aberdeen, Dec. 10, 1842; memorandum, Sep. 10, 1842; Aberdeen to Smith, Sep. 21, 1842; Terrell to Smith, Aug. 20, 1842.

During the first six months of Smith's stay in Europe the greatest share of his attention was occupied by an incident which in its ultimate outcome was unimportant, but which from the light it casts on the attitude of the English government is very instructive. On May 6, 1842, four days before Smith's arrival in London, William Kennedy, the Texas consul-general at that place, wrote to John H. Brower, the Texas consul at New York, in regard to a vessel, the *Guadalupe*, that was being built at Liverpool for the Mexican government. She was an iron war-ship of about seven hundred tons, and was to be ready for sea in June. The matter is mentioned in the first letter written from London by Smith, who also speaks of another war-ship, the *Montezuma*, being built at London for Mexico, and says that he will protest to the British government in order, if possible, to prevent their departure from England. He had an interview with Lord Aberdeen on May 31, when the subject was brought up. Aberdeen did not think that the government would be willing to detain the vessels, and thought that its policy would be to permit both Mexico and Texas to obtain in England such supplies as they wished. The *Montezuma* turned out to be even larger than the *Guadalupe*. Smith received reliable information that they were being built for use against Texas and Yucatán, and that they were contracted for by Lizardi and Co., the Mexican house with which Texas was already unpleasantly acquainted. Their crews were recruited in England, and their commanders were officers in the English navy. Smith exerted himself energetically to prevent the vessels from sailing. On June 14 he sent a formal protest to Lord Aberdeen, declaring that the incident was inconsistent with the friendly relations existing between England and Texas. Aberdeen, however, declined to act, merely stating that the government had refused to grant permission to arm the vessels in English ports. On July 1, Smith wrote Aberdeen again, calling attention to reports that the vessels were built under the auspices of Lord Melbourne's ministry, and that the admiralty had furnished the plans and models for them and had assigned officers to command them, although they were built expressly to act against Texas. Aberdeen replied that the vessels were not armed, and that no officers of the British service would be permitted to serve in the Mexican navy against Texas. In the meantime the *Guadalupe* sailed. Smith felt that

the resolution of the government was such that nothing could be gained by pressing his views upon it, and accordingly went to France. The incident, however, had gained some notoriety, and on August 2 was the subject of comment in the House of Commons. Here the matter would probably have ended, and the *Montezuma* would doubtless have been allowed to depart in peace, but for the interference of General James Hamilton, who was again in England in a personal capacity. He and a certain nobleman who brought the matter to his attention sought to obtain a letter of marque from the Texas government enabling them to take the *Montezuma* as a prize on the high seas, but when they found this impossible they proceeded against her under the Foreign Enlistment Act, by which the treasury board was empowered to seize and confiscate vessels equipped, furnished, fitted out, or armed to make war against a country at peace with England. The vessel was seized under this act by the commissioners of customs; but when the treasury board was appealed to it was decided that, while the law had been violated, the violation was unintentional. This decision was based on the argument that the *Montezuma* was technically a British vessel, as she was not formally to be turned over to the Mexican government until she reached Vera Cruz, and she was technically only a merchant vessel, since she carried her guns in the hold instead of on the swivels that had been prepared for them. Accordingly, after a detention of almost a month, she was released, but only after her crew had been reduced to the number properly required to man a merchant vessel of her size, and after her guns, carriages, and military stores had been sent ashore. Even then the subject was not dropped, for Hamilton sought to have her seized by the British naval officer in command at Havana, where she was to touch on her way to Mexico. Hamilton's conduct in the matter was, of course, by no means altruistic, since he and his associates would have profited by the condemnation of the *Montezuma*; and it was considered particularly indelicate in that he, although his relations with the Texas administration were by no means cordial, undertook to act almost as if he had been an official representative of Texas and consistently therewith submitted to the Texas government an "official" report of the action he had taken. Smith afterwards conducted an extended correspondence on the subject with Aberdeen in which the points of in-

ternational law involved were discussed at some length, and in which considerable tartness was developed on both sides. Smith of course accomplished nothing in regard to the vessel itself, since it had sailed long before the correspondence was more than well under way; but he hoped that by reiterating his protests on the subject until the British government was, as he said, thoroughly tired of the matter, he might at least impress his objections very strongly on the government's memory and make it very cautious in regard to repeating the offense of which he complained. Through James Reily, the Texas *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, the matter was brought to the attention of President Tyler, who undertook to send the United States frigate *Mississippi* into the Gulf for the protection of Texas. Throughout this whole affair, the attitude of the English government was that of defending English commerce above everything else. It would not, to the detriment of this commerce, forbid the fitting out of Mexican vessels in England or the purchasing of supplies by Mexico for use against Texas so long as any color of legality could be found to justify its doing otherwise. Apparently it had no desire to befriend Mexico against Texas nor any to continue the war between the two countries. As Lord Ashburton and Fox, the English minister to the United States, told Henry Clay in the spring of 1842, England would be as likely to aid Spain in reconquering the Low Countries as to aid Mexico in reducing Texas, and in the relations between Texas and Mexico her first desire was for peace. And yet the building of the vessels in England was likely to encourage the early renewal of active hostilities on the part of Mexico. England's desire for peace at this time was by no means so acute as it afterwards became, and just now it was easily overpowered by considerations of commercial gain.¹

(3) *Suspension of hostilities with Mexico.*—On January 31, 1843, Jones directed Smith to protest to the English and French governments against the uncivilized warfare waged against Texas by Mexico. On June 10 Jones

¹Kennedy to Brower, May 6, 1842; Smith to Jones, May 17, June 3, June 18, July 12, Aug. 13, Oct. 19, and Dec. 30, 1842; Russell to Smith, June 4, 1842; Aberdeen to Smith, Sep. 27, and Nov. 8, 1842; Smith to Aberdeen, June 14, July 1, Sep. 14, Sep. 19, Oct. 10, and Dec. 12, 1842; Reily to Jones, Apr. 14, and July 11, 1842.

sent to Smith a formal declaration to be laid before England and France informing them that, unless before the meeting of Congress in the following December peace or a satisfactory armistice had been concluded between Texas and Mexico, Texas would commence offensive war. Before this declaration, however, was presented, other instructions were received by Smith, and it was only shown informally to the English and French governments; for on June 9 Captain Elliot received a letter from Percy W. Doyle, the British *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, who said that Santa Anna had agreed to order a cessation of hostilities if President Houston would do likewise, and to receive commissioners from Texas. Houston accordingly proclaimed a cessation of hostilities on June 15. By July 24 Elliot was able to state the Mexican position more clearly. Mexico still insisted, he said, on a recognition of her sovereignty over Texas in any agreement that might be reached, and he thought there was little likelihood of her receding from the demand. He was very anxious, however, to have Texas enter upon the negotiation for what it might be worth, and thought that Texas by making the nominal concession of Mexican sovereignty could obtain peace, security, and virtual independence. The English government was not so enthusiastic on the subject, for Smith said that Aberdeen and Addington had told him that they had heard Santa Anna was going to make propositions to Texas concerning it, but they thought that, since Santa Anna had said that he could not maintain his position for two days if he should entertain the question of recognizing the independence of Texas, these propositions did not promise a permanent peace. Aberdeen said that he did not think the propositions had anything to do with English mediation. But the Texas government took the matter up and sent commissioners to negotiate with General Woll. After some delay the commissioners drew up and signed an armistice, which the Texas government refused to ratify because in form it was not sufficiently respectful to Texas, and also because the Mexican government failed to give notice that it had ratified the proposed agreement. Accordingly by July, 1844, the Texas government in-

formed Smith that General Woll had announced the renewal of hostilities between Texas and Mexico.¹

(4) *Proposal for joint mediation.*—From the first Texas felt unwilling to rely on the efforts of England alone for the restoration of peace with Mexico. Some weeks before the treaty between England and Texas on the subject of mediation went into effect Anson Jones directed Smith to urge joint interposition by England, France, and the United States. Smith was in France when he received Jones's instructions on the subject, and he at once took up the question with Guizot, the French premier. In the latter part of August, 1842, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen on the subject, saying he understood that the French ambassador in London was instructed to lay the matter before the English government. The proposal was, indeed, at once accepted by France, but it was very distasteful to England, which wished no coadjutors in its position as closest European friend of Texas. Before the end of August Smith had returned to London, where he saw Lord Aberdeen and Addington, his under-secretary. They were of the opinion that Texas should rely on mediation by England alone, since England's relations with Mexico were much more cordial than those of France or the United States. For France had not long before maintained a blockade of the coast of Mexico, while the United States was very nearly at war with Mexico owing to correspondence between Daniel Webster, the American secretary of state, and Bocanegra, the Mexican minister at Washington, in regard to the relations of Texas and their respective nations. England's unwillingness to enter into the joint mediation proposed was no doubt intensified by the fact that her own relations with France were then very cool. In this state of affairs Texas appealed to the governments of England, France, and the United States separately to put an end to the war being waged against her by Mexico, but assured England that Texas was relying on the powers which had offered their friendly mediation and would use no other means to effect an adjustment. It

¹Jones to Smith, Jan. 31, June 10, June 15, and July 14, 1843; Elliot to Jones, June 10, and July 24, 1843; Jones to Elliot, June 15, 1843; Smith to Jones, June 16, 1843; Van Zandt and Henderson to Calhoun, May 15, 1844.

is difficult to reconcile these two acts, but some light is thrown on the subject by the fact that the assurance to England was given for the immediate purpose of conveying the news that Texas did not intend in the matter to make use of the services of General Hamilton, who had proposed to end the war by a secret negotiation at Washington between himself, the American government, and Almonte, the Mexican minister. The English and French governments, however, decided to exercise their mediation, but to act independently. By the end of the year Smith had expressed it as his opinion that English mediation under the treaty negotiated by Hamilton and Palmerston was utterly hopeless, and the Texas government felt that war must be actively renewed unless friendly powers succeeded in prevailing upon Mexico to make peace.¹

3. Annexation Promoted by English Efforts to Secure the Abolition of Slavery in Texas.

(1) *Reported utterances of Aberdeen.*—Aberdeen's policy during this period was such as indicates that he felt that he had the Texas situation still in hand. He seems to have considered that there was no reason to fear that annexation would soon again become an active issue. Thus, at a time when the situation was really delicate and when the success of his policy demanded the greatest caution on his part, he undertook an aggressive measure by which he played directly into the hands of his opponents. The annexation party in the United States under the leadership of such men as John C. Calhoun and President Tyler was preparing to make annexation the foremost issue in American politics, and it was bad policy on England's part to take any steps that would give color to the assertion that she was interfering in Texas in such a way as to disturb the interests of the United States. Such a step was taken by Aberdeen in his stand on the question of slavery in Texas. It was perfectly well known that England desired to see the universal

¹Jones to Smith, June 7, 1842; Smith to Guizot, Aug. 15, 1842; Smith to Aberdeen, Aug. (no day given, but evidently in latter part of month), 1842; Smith to Jones, Aug. 31, Oct. 17, and Nov. 30, 1842; Terrell to Smith, Oct. 15, and Dec. 7, 1842; Hamilton to Jones, Nov. 24, 1842; Jones to Van Zandt, Dec. 25, and Dec. 26, 1842.

abolition of slavery. This desire as to Texas had been avowed by Lord Palmerston when he first came into relations with General Henderson. The subject had not been pressed, however, and it was in the background until 1842. In July of that year, as Ashbel Smith reported, he was approached by a person in the confidence of the British government, who suggested that slavery should be abolished in Texas, England reimbursing Texas for financial losses resulting from the abolition; or, as an alternative, that Texas should be divided on the line of the Colorado River into two states, of which the eastern should be slave-holding and the western free-soil. Smith was told at the time that Aberdeen was cognizant of the plans and had said that by the division of Texas into two parts as suggested the whole of that country would ultimately become non-slaveholding. Smith, however, did not take the matter seriously, and the subject seems to have been forgotten until a year later. In the summer of 1843 a general anti-slavery convention met in London, and as was natural the subject of slavery in Texas came up for consideration. J. P. Andrews, a lawyer from Houston, Texas, was present in the interests of abolition. A committee of which Andrews was a member waited on Lord Aberdeen, who informed it that England "would employ every legitimate means to attain so great and desirable an object as the abolition of slavery in Texas." The convention made many suggestions as to the means of obtaining abolition, one of which, the guaranty by England of a loan to Texas to be used in paying for slave property held in the Republic, was said to have been endorsed by Aberdeen. Smith felt it necessary to tell Aberdeen that Andrews in no sense represented the government or the people of Texas, and to state that it would be impossible for Texas to accept anything in the nature of a British subsidy for the abolition of slavery, without a greater sacrifice of national dignity than she was willing to make.¹

(2) *England's stand for abolition brings annexation.*—This would probably have ended the matter if it had not now come to the attention of the government of the United States. But on August 8 Abel P. Upshur, the American secretary of state, wrote to William S. Murphy, the American *charge*

¹Henderson to Irion, Oct. 24, 1837; Smith to Van Zandt, Jan. 25, 1843; Smith to Jones, July 2, and July 31, 1843.

d'affaires in Texas, that he had just learned of the Andrews movement in England through a private letter from a citizen of Maryland. This letter afterwards became the subject of some notoriety and is thought to have been written by Duff Green, who was a friend of John C. Calhoun, and who was then in London. Green in his letter said without qualification that Aberdeen had agreed to guarantee the interest on a loan to be made to Texas for the purpose of extinguishing slavery. Upshur, who was somewhat exercised on the subject, instructed Murphy that the United States could not permit any such interference. On August 18 Lord Brougham, who was one of the most conspicuous of the English abolitionists, brought up the subject of slavery in Texas in the British House of Lords. In reply to his questions on the subject Lord Aberdeen spoke at some length, saying among other things that the government would make every effort to affect abolition in Texas, and that Brougham could not entertain a more ardent desire to put an end to slavery than was entertained by Aberdeen himself. He intimated very strongly that he was negotiating with Texas on the subject, but declined to communicate any definite information at the time. On hearing of this Upshur wrote to Edward Everett, American minister at London, directing him to obtain further information in regard to Aberdeen's negotiation with Texas. Everett communicated with Ashbel Smith, who was entirely in the dark on the subject and supposed that the negotiation was being carried on in Texas by Captain Elliot. Aberdeen, however, in an interview gave Everett the truth of the matter. With Texas directly no negotiations had taken place; but this statement could not have been meant to cover Aberdeen's tentative suggestion during the summer of 1842 of the plan for England's assisting Texas with money in the policy of abolition which Smith had reported. As to the proposal made by the abolition convention, which he was said to have endorsed, he declared that it had been promptly rejected. He said that the negotiation to which he referred in his speech in the House of Lords was the negotiation that he was carrying on with Mexico for the restoration of peace with Texas; for he entertained some hope that Mexico could be induced to recognize Texas on the condition, more or less clearly expressed, of the abolition of slavery by Texas. He told Everett that England would not interfere improperly in the

domestic concerns of Texas or the United States and had nothing in view toward Texas that need cause any anxiety in the United States. Aberdeen by this time saw that, through the agitation in the United States to which he had given rise, he had materially injured his own cause; for it was clear that the Southern party, which was particularly interested in the annexation of Texas, proposed to use English interference in Texas as a strong argument to hasten annexation by appealing to the suspicion with which England was in general regarded by the American people. Accordingly on December 26 he wrote to Richard Pakenham, who was now British minister to the United States, making a definite statement of the policy of the English government with reference to Texas. He said that so far as England's desire to see Texas recognized by Mexico was based on selfish motives at all, it was based on England's interests as a commercial power having dealings with Texas. She had no desire to acquire any undue influence in Texas with regard to slavery or any other matter, and while her desire to see slavery everywhere abolished was perfectly well known she had no notion of acquiring a dominant influence in Texas or of influencing the United States through Texas. This dispatch Pakenham was directed to lay before Upshur, and a copy was sent to Elliot and by him delivered to the Texas government. Pakenham did not deliver the letter to the American government, however, until February 26, 1844. As this was only a few days before the accident on board the *Princeton* by which Upshur was killed and the business of the state department disarranged, Pakenham was not answered until April 18. Calhoun, who had by this time succeeded Upshur as secretary of state, then wrote Pakenham a diplomatic note expressing his concern at the statement in Aberdeen's letter that Great Britain desired and was constantly exerting herself to procure the general abolition of slavery throughout the world, and stating that as abolition in Texas would be injurious to the interests of the United States it would be necessary for that nation to adopt the most effectual measures to prevent the bringing about of abolition through undue influence exerted on the part of England. Several notes accordingly passed between Calhoun and Pakenham on the subject. On May 17, 1844, the matter came up again in the House of Lords, where Lord Brougham took occasion to say that nothing that he or Aberdeen

had said justified the inference that England, although deplored the existence of slavery, ever contemplated any interference with the institution in America. These incidents served to bring out the attitude of England on the question of slavery, and slavery in Texas in particular; but they were not able to counteract the effects produced by the events of the summer of 1843. For in October, 1843, less than two months after Lord Aberdeen used in the House of Lords the language that caused the excitement, Upshur informed Isaac Van Zandt, the Texas *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, that recent happenings in Europe had given a new interest to the subject of annexation, and that he was prepared to make propositions on the subject to Van Zandt as soon as the latter should be authorized to receive them. The result of this was that when Calhoun wrote Pakenham his note of April 18, 1844, he was able to inform him at the same time that he had negotiated a treaty of annexation with Texas.¹

(3) *England aroused by prospect of annexation.*—The representatives of the English government had learned before this that Texas was again actively engaged with the annexation question. In March, 1844, Elliot in a note to Anson Jones asked whether Texas was considering the American propositions for annexation, saying that Mexico could not be expected to enter into any arrangement with Texas as long as annexation was immediately in view. Jones said in reply that, since Texas had given up hope of peace with Mexico, and since the door to annexation had been unexpectedly opened, the Texas Congress had instructed President Houston to negotiate on the subject, in accordance with which instruction General Henderson had been sent to Washington. Ashbel Smith wrote on June 2 that the annexation treaty was receiving much attention in England, and that

¹*Niles' Register*, LXV 49 ("Debate in Parliament relative to Texas"), LXVI 164-165 (Upshur to Murphy, Aug. 8, 1843), 166-167 (Upshur to Everett, Sep. 28, 1843), 169 (Everett to Upshur, Nov. 3, 1843), 170 (Upshur to Thompson, Nov. 18, 1843), 171 (Pakenham to Upshur, Feb. 26, 1844), 172 (Calhoun to Pakenham, Apr. 18, 1844), 202-203 (Pakenham to Calhoun, Apr. 19, 1844, Calhoun to Pakenham, Apr. 27, 1844; Pakenham to Calhoun, Apr. 30, 1844), 225 ("Annexation of Texas"); Everett to Smith, Oct. 24, 1843; Smith to Everett, Oct. 31, 1843; Aberdeen to Pakenham, Dec. 26, 1843; Upshur to Van Zandt, Oct. 16, 1843.

England and France had instructed their ministers at Washington to protest against it. This action was not to be taken, however, until the annexation treaty should be ratified, and hence the protest was apparently never made. The new agitation of annexation seems to have taken England by surprise, for it had been thought that the known anti-annexationist views of President Houston were a sufficient guaranty that no proposals for annexation would be considered. England and France were acting in concert on the Texas question, as Aberdeen told Smith at the time. Aberdeen, when he first heard of the annexation treaty, seems to have felt that he had been tricked, but Smith was able to set the matter before him an a light more favorable to Texas. Smith expressed to Aberdeen his personal opinion that if England and France would compel Mexico to make peace with Texas Texas would be willing to reject annexation. Mexico was now on less cordial terms with England than formerly on account of commercial restrictions laid on foreign commerce by the former. There was talk of Mexico's being compelled by England and France to remove the restrictions, and for a time diplomatic relations between England and Mexico were broken off. On June 24 Aberdeen informed Smith that if the annexation treaty failed of ratification by the United States Senate (which had actually happened on June 8) England and France would be willing to enter into a "diplomatic act" with Texas, the United States, and Mexico, settling the boundaries of Texas and guaranteeing its independence, and he added that if Mexico refused to accede to the act they would force her to acquiesce in it. The result of such an act would have been to guarantee Texas against molestation from Mexico on condition of her giving England and France a negative on the annexation of Texas to the United States. Smith advised against the arrangement, thinking that Texas would lose more than she would gain by it. The Texas government was willing to negotiate with England on the subject, but insisted on negotiating in Texas. This last point was still unsettled when Smith was granted leave of absence and George W. Terrell appointed to occupy temporarily his position. Terrell in January, 1845, brought the matter fairly before Lord Aberdeen, who expressed his willingness to carry on

the negotiation in Texas, intimating that instructions on the subject had already been sent to Elliot.¹

(4) *Defection of France and change in the attitude of Mexico.*—England was by this time thoroughly aroused to the danger of annexation unless determined measures were at once taken to prevent it, for she saw that the Texas people were strongly in favor of it, and that the American government had come to take the same position. In this state of affairs Lord Aberdeen was no doubt annoyed by indications that France, which was acting in concert with England, was not disposed blindly to follow the English policy, which was now to interfere authoritatively to prevent annexation. In January, 1845, Lord Aberdeen brought to Terrell's attention published letters of John C. Calhoun and William R. King, the American minister at Paris, which developed the fact that Guizot had told King that France would not consider annexation of sufficient importance to interrupt friendly relations with the United States. Aberdeen investigated the matter through Lord Cowley, the British ambassador at Paris, who reported that Guizot had told him that France was ready to unite with Great Britain and to go the whole length proposed by her, this being the guaranty of the recognition of the independence of Texas without further molestation, and that the two powers were prepared at any moment to sign with Texas a diplomatic act making the guaranty. The conflict between Guizot's statements to King and to Lord Cowley was not irreconcilable, but it seems to have given Aberdeen a feeling of uncertainty. Before the end of the month Terrell learned from Aberdeen that the French government, in view of a new development, no longer considered a diplomatic act necessary, though Guizot still spoke of a certain "*moral guaranty* which the two governments will have given to Texas, if at their instance she shall withhold her assent to annexation to the United States." This Aberdeen understood to mean the moral obligation under which England and France would rest to maintain the independence of Texas if at their solicitation she should decline annexation. The new development in question was a

¹Elliott to Jones, Mar. 22, 1844; Jones to Elliott, Mar. 25, 1844; Smith to Jones, Jan. 29, June 2, June 14, and June 24, 1844; Jones to Smith, July 14, and Aug. 1, 1844; Terrell to Smith, Jan. 21, 1845.

change of attitude on the part of the Mexican government. Aberdeen received from the British minister to Mexico a written avowal from Santa Anna of his willingness to recognize Texas with the Colorado River as boundary. The proposed boundary was of course preposterous, but Aberdeen considered Santa Anna's avowal distinctly encouraging, since it admitted the principle of recognition, which had theretofore been persistently denied, while there would be a probability of his agreeing to more favorable terms at a later date. In December, 1844, a revolution took place in Mexico, by which Santa Anna was deposed and Herrera made president. The new government was disposed to continue the efforts to make peace. By May 9, 1845, Terrell was able to report that Aberdeen had received information that the Mexican government was willing to recognize Texas if that republic would declare against annexation. England and France accordingly agreed to mediate between the two countries. On March 29 Ashbel Smith, whom Anson Jones, the new president of Texas, had made secretary of state, signed preliminary proposals for a treaty, which were put before the Mexican government through the English and French representatives in Texas and Mexico. Mexico was to recognize Texas, in return for which Texas was to bind herself not to become annexed to any other country. Boundaries were to be decided on in the final treaty, and if the parties could not agree the subject was to be submitted to ~~umpires~~. To give the mediating powers time to submit these proposals to Mexico, Smith signed a protocol with Elliot and Count Dubois de Saligny, the French *chargé d'affaires* in Texas, agreeing on the part of Texas not to accept any proposals for annexation to any other country for ninety days. This provision was practically nullified by a reservation made by Smith that if the people of Texas should decide to pursue the policy of annexation the Texas government might notify England and France to that effect and without any breach of faith be at liberty to consummate the same. The proposals were laid before the Mexican government, which on May 19, through Luis G. Cuevas, minister of foreign relations, accepted them. Lord Aberdeen in the meantime was exerting himself in other ways to prevent annexation. As early as July, 1844, Smith had written home from London

suggesting that England and France might be willing to make commercial concessions to Texas to induce her to remain independent. Accordingly the subject was mentioned in instructions furnished to George W. Terrell when he was sent out to take Smith's place. In February, 1845, Terrell brought the matter before Lord Aberdeen, who at first was unwilling to take it up. Terrell, however, by pointing out to him the fact that England by admitting Texas goods on specially favorable terms would give the opponents of annexation a strong argument with which to advance their cause, was able to persuade Aberdeen to change his opinion; for he finally promised to lay the matter before the cabinet and board of trade and said that important modifications in the tariff were likely to be made at the present session of parliament, when Texas would receive the most liberal treatment consistent with England's treaty obligations. The English government also sought to recover as much as possible of the ground that had been lost by the movement for the abolition of slavery in Texas. Aberdeen was very anxious to have it understood that he did not seek to have abolition made a condition of the recognition of Texas by Mexico. In June, 1844, he told Ashbel Smith that he regretted the agitation that had been caused by the discussion of abolition in Texas, and said that thereafter he would have nothing to say on the subject. In a conversation in February, 1845, Terrell obtained a very explicit statement concerning abolition from Lord Aberdeen, who said that England might have made her recognition of Texas contingent on abolition; but that, now that she had recognized Texas, she had no right to interfere in the matter and did not intend to do so. He was disposed indeed to subordinate everything in his dealings with Texas to his desire to prevent annexation, for it was still quite clear that this would mean war between Mexico and the United States and disaster to Mexico.¹

(5) *Annexation in spite of English opposition.*—The annexation movement, however, had now proceeded entirely too far to be stopped. It had been the leading issue in the American presidential campaign of 1844, and had received a triumphant

¹Terrell to Smith, Jan. 21, Jan. 27, Feb. 13, and May 9, 1845; Smith to Jones, June 24, and July 31, 1844; Jones to Terrell, Oct. 29, 1844; "Conditions preliminary to a Treaty of Peace between Mexico and Texas," Mar. 29, 1845; Jones, *Republic of Texas*, 473-474; Cuevas's "Declaration," May 9, 1845.

sanction from the people. Consequently at the session beginning in December, 1844, resolutions for the annexation of Texas were presented to Congress and finally passed just before the close of the session. The matter was then at the disposal of the Texas government. The opponents of annexation in Texas, of whom Terrell was one of the most prominent, entertained hopes that the matter would be allowed to rest until the next regular session of the Texas Congress, which would meet in December, 1845, and that in the meantime Mexico might be brought through England's mediation to offer such terms as would cause the people of Texas at least to hesitate before accepting the American proposals for annexation. But feeling in Texas was so strong that it became apparent that this course would not be adopted. The Texas Senate refused to confirm the nomination of Terrell to the mission to England and France, and Ashbel Smith was sent out again, reaching London on May 14. His mission had scarcely any other purpose than to explain to the English and French governments that Texas was fully resolved by this time to accept annexation on the terms of the joint resolution passed by the American Congress. He suggested to Aberdeen at his first interview that it might be desirable to have definite proposals from Mexico for submission to the Texas people at the same time that the annexation question should be submitted to them. Aberdeen had small hope that Mexico would be willing to recognize Texas, saying that while the policy of recognition might commend itself to the government it would be so unpopular with the Mexican people that there could be no hope of its adoption. He intended to press the subject upon Mexico, but on account of the jealousy of the people of Texas and the United States and the unwillingness of France to unite with England in the use of compulsion he would use only moral suasion. Aberdeen decided also not to enter into new commercial arrangements with Texas just then, probably thinking it undesirable at a time when the continued independent existence of the republic was a matter of much doubt. Smith intimated in his correspondence that England was disposed to leave Mexico to the consideration of the arguments already presented to her in the interest of Texas. He said that if the next mails from Mexico brought no news of a change in that country's attitude toward Texas he would then, pursuant to his instructions, notify the English and French

governments that Texas would no longer look for a settlement of its affairs from the mediation of friendly powers, but would rely solely on its own resources, pursuing its welfare and honor as seemed best, and that if it chose to maintain its independence it would force the acknowledgment thereof from Mexico. His second and last dispatch from London, written on June 3 on the eve of his return to Texas, while making no mention of this notification, left the inference that it had been made, for he said he considered his longer stay in London unnecessary. By his departure he in fact broke off relations between England and Texas by admitting that annexation was a practical certainty. Smith's action was, of course, taken in ignorance of the course pursued by General Herrera's government. By the proposals signed by the minister of foreign relations, Cuevas, on May 19, 1845, and transmitted to President Anson Jones on June 2 by Captain Elliot the very alternative which Smith had spoken of as so desirable was put before the people of Texas. By accepting the proposals of Cuevas Texas would be assured of peace with Mexico while she would retain her independence and the friendship of France and England. If she preferred, however, to become annexed to the United States she could do so by accepting the proposition offered by the American Congress. Jones on June 4 issued a proclamation informing the people of Texas that the alternative existed. On June 6 an extraordinary session of the Texas Congress met on Jones's call at Washington, Texas, to consider the question of annexation, and such other matters as might be laid before it. The proposals of the Mexican government, were submitted to the Senate, but they were rejected, and soon afterwards Congress adopted the resolutions accepting the offer from the United States. Jones also called a convention to meet at Austin on July 4, and to this convention he submitted both the resolutions for annexation and the Mexican proposals. But the convention, like the Congress, approved the terms of annexation and disregarded the proposals of Mexico, proceeding to the adoption of a constitution for Texas as a State of the American Union. Thus the hopes of England were finally disappointed, and the English policy was definitely defeated.¹

¹Terrell to Smith, May 9, 1845; Smith to Terrell, Feb. 10, 1845; Smith to Allen, May 17, and June 3, 1845; Jones to Alleye de Cyprey, June 6, 1845; Brown, *History of Texas*, II 305-307.

(6) *Effect of annexation on treaties.*—Elliot, who had gone to Mexico in the spring of 1845 to assist Charles Bankhead, the British minister to Mexico in persuading the Mexican government to accept the preliminary proposals of Texas, on his return to Texas went at once to the United States on personal business and returned to Texas only for a brief stay. His last interchange of notes with Allen, the Texas secretary of state, was of an interesting nature. In the debate in the House of Lords on May 17, 1844, to which reference has already been made, Lord Aberdeen, speaking of the treaty of annexation that was then under consideration, had said that the annexation of Texas raised a question new and unexampled in the history of public law, which would receive serious attention from the government. This Everett interpreted as referring to the effect of annexation on the previously existing obligations of the two countries involved. In December, 1845, Lord Aberdeen directed Elliot to notify the Texas government that the obligation of the treaties between Texas and Great Britain would not be impaired by the voluntary surrender by Texas of her independence but would continue in precisely the same condition as if Texas had remained an independent power, and that so long as they should remain in force Great Britain would be entitled to require that the engagements contracted by them be fulfilled on the part of Texas as they would be fulfilled on the part of Great Britain. Ebenezer Allen, the secretary of state of Texas, replied with propriety that during the independence of Texas her treaty obligations had been faithfully maintained, and that they would continue to be so maintained; but that after the organization of the State government should succeed to that of the Republic (which happened, in fact, on February 19, 1846) the settlement of all questions growing out of her treaty relations with foreign powers must, so far as Texas was concerned, be referred to the government of the United States. Allen's stand here was quite in accord with international law, and it seems to have satisfied the English government, for no further correspondence took place on the subject between Elliot and Allen. Probably Lord Aberdeen in making the protest desired merely to get his position on record for

use in case any unforeseen complication should arise as a result of annexation.¹

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENGLAND'S POLICY.

While the English policy had been an unqualified failure, so far as the attainment of its ultimate objects was concerned, it was by no means without significance in the history of the world. England had been unable to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States and had been unable materially to influence the question of the abolition of slavery either in Texas or in the Southern States, but she had started out with some reasonable hope of success and had made her influence decidedly felt. It was, of course, impossible for an English statesman to judge accurately the state of public feeling in Texas and the United States on such matters. If Lord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen had been able to understand the real feeling for annexation in Texas and the United States they would probably have been sufficiently convinced of the impossibility of persuading Texas to remain independent, or if they had embarked on an anti-annexation policy they would have pursued it more vigorously. They would certainly not have acted as Aberdeen did in the matter of the anti-slavery agitation, and they would certainly have presented their arguments to Texas in a more attractive form than they in fact adopted. They would have used their mediation with Mexico in a more authoritative manner, and would have shown less hesitation in the matter of granting commercial concessions to Texas. They seem, in fact, to have looked upon annexation as a possibility much more remote than it really was. They were evidently justified in coming to this conclusion, in view of their imperfect information. And depending upon this conclusion as they did, their plans were eminently reasonable. Distrustful of the United States as they were at the time, to establish in the Southwest an independent English-speaking republic, depending mainly on English protection and submissive to English influence, by means of which republic they might

¹Jones, *Republic of Texas*, 441, 443, 452-453, 468-471, 508; *Niles' Register*, LXVI 252 (Everett to Calhoun, May 18, 1844); Aberdeen to Elliot, Dec. 3, 1845; Elliot to Allen, Jan. 4, 1846; Allen to Elliott, Feb. 4, 1846; Hall, *International Law* (5th ed.), 103.

hope to defend Mexico against encroachments from the United States, to protect their own ascendancy in the Southwest, and to deal an effective blow at the American tariff and the Southern institution of slavery, was a dream that English statesmen were, from their own standpoint, fully justified in cherishing and one that they are scarcely to be blamed for seeking to realize, even if they had known from the beginning that the chances were against their success. As the matter worked itself out, however, England's conduct contributed to an effect directly contrary to that which she sought to produce. Her interference was never energetic enough to give a rallying-point to the anti-annexationist movement that really existed in Texas while it was strong enough to furnish a powerful argument to the party in Texas and the United States that favored immediate annexation. The annexation party in Texas, indeed, sought by coqueting with England to stimulate the annexationists of the United States. England by her efforts thus really assisted annexation and retarded abolition. The outcome showed England's fears for Mexico to have been fully justified, for the Mexican war resulted quite as mischievously to Mexico as England could have expected, and the advance of the United States to the Rio Grande did in fact give that country the ascendancy in the Southwest that had been possessed by England.

JOHN H. REAGAN.¹

WALTER FLAVIUS MCCALEB.

When John H. Reagan passed away peacefully in his home at Fort Houston, near Palestine, Texas lost her most distinguished citizen, the South one of her most loyal champions, and the Union an ardent patriot. The last survivor of the Confederate Cabinet, he belonged to a period of our history, which, in this strenuous age is already remote, mediæval.

He was born so long ago as October 8, 1818, in Sevier County, Tennessee. The Reagans were of mixed ancestry—English, Irish, German, Welsh—and it would be difficult to say which strain predominated in the character of their most distinguished scion. In a sense he combined them all, being English in his love of order, Irish in his prediction for polities, German in his desire for knowledge, Welsh in his persistence of purpose.

The date of his birth was not an inauspicious one, so far as the West was concerned; for the riflemen of his own State, who, under Jackson at New Orleans, had aided in destroying Packenham's army, were but returned from the war. In every village resounded the songs of triumph; in every household the frontiersmen taught their children reverence for the Stars and Stripes, and pointed prophesies of the coming power and glory of the United States. It is no wonder that young Reagan came to love the Union with an "almost extravagant devotion." It is a fact, which has been all too slow of recognition, that the Westerners—the early settlers of the Mississippi Valley—were the first devotees of the Constitution, most of whom indeed had borne arms in the revolution, making possible a Constitution by their victories, rendering it inviolable by their successes in the second war against the King. Love of country is a virtue bearing its finest fruit in the hearts of those

¹Thanks are due to the *Review of Reviews* for permission to make use of certain portions of my article entitled "John H. Reagan—A Character Sketch," appearing in the May issue of that magazine.—W. F. M.

who live nearest to mother-earth, and no nearer can civilized man than lived the pioneers who first broke through the Alleghanies. Among them axe and rifle were inseparably associated; and he that laid the wilderness with the one, was ready with the other to conquer the enemies of his country.

A pioneer was Judge Reagan's father, fresh from the ranks of the Revolutionary army. He settled in the mountains of East Tennessee, acquiring a small landed estate; and here his son was born into the world—a world that was all too hard and poverty-stricken. There was no refuge from the unrelenting environment, while over all brooded the spirit of the wilderness as yet unconquered, as if inviting conquest. It was truly a time when familiarity with the axe and rifle was of infinitely more consequence than knowledge of books. And into this *régime* young Reagan was thrust. In early life he busied himself on the farm and in the tanyard of his father, and while still a youth took part in some minor skirmishes with the Indians. But thirst for knowledge soon made him a captive, and the log schoolhouse with its puncheon benches proved a prison of the most delightful character, and to the close of his life he remained a student. During his residence in Washington he worked hard at whatever subject he had in hand. Senator R. Q. Mills has said of him that often returning late at night from some social function he could see the lights gleaming in the judge's rooms. He almost eschewed society in that quest which never ended.

Endowed with this longing after knowledge, nothing short of its gratification could satisfy the eager youth; so at a tender age he set out in pursuit of an education. This pursuit led him far from home, and over a very harsh and jagged way. Yet he went bravely, conquering as he went. For he managed to accumulate money and, perhaps better, to make friends. With the money he returned to school, and what with outside labors, mornings, evenings and Saturdays, he managed to secure several sessions at an academy and a so-called college. Then he entered the school of schools—life—hewing wood and drawing water in order to be able to continue his exploration of the realms of wisdom. But, in all charity, the byways of the Tennessee of that day were not lined with educational in-

stitutions, nor were those that here and there managed to exist celebrated for their teachers. Indeed the modern over-vaunted cultural influences were wanting in large measure—the time was not yet. But, perhaps better than all, because rarer in this day of graft and pompous formality, he imbibed those principles which have always distinguished gentlemen of the South—knightly respect for woman, watchful care of his own honor, whole-hearted hospitality, simplicity of every day life (a lost art), and an ardent love of country. Frontier-born and bred, he entered life endowed with an intuitive faculty of meeting emergencies on the spot, with a tact useful later in placating antagonists of various types. He had other qualities of the frontier, too—force, directness, frankness, patience, courage,—scarcely ever found in the same degree in the settled centers of society. The temptation to contrast him with Senator Hoar is very strong, for they were in many respects at antipodes,—in many, shoulder to shoulder. It is sufficient to know that one was born in Concord—the Concord of Emerson and Hawthorne—and the other in Tennessee—the State of Sevier and Jackson.

Politically, Judge Reagan was a Democrat of the Andrew Jackson type. As a boy, he grew up under this influence, for “Old Hickory” had assumed his sway in Tennessee. Besides, Democracy of this sort could exist only on the frontier or in the communities but newly sprung from the loins of society. The application of the dogmas of such a Democracy as was held by the West from 1800 to 1850 was impossible in a society which had begun to build cities and establish factories. And all his life Judge Reagan stood for the simplest governmental forms, looking with alarm upon the innovations of latter-day administrations. Chieftest of his cares, the core of his code of statecraft, was the individual. Like Jefferson, he desired to throw about the weak all the legal protections possible, realizing, as the father of ultra Democracy did, that without the erection of barriers the individual was but a pygmy in the power of harpies. Thus it was the tremendous growth and influence of trusts filled him with forebodings of disaster. In his opinion it was all wrong, and to be reprobated. Principles were everything to him. As a candidate for governor, he refused to per-

mit his name to go before the nominating convention because some of the planks in the platform ill-accorded with his views. Nor can it be charged that it was fear of defeat that prompted the act, for no man ever faced issues more fearlessly.

Judge Reagan was twenty-one years of age when he crossed the Sabine into the Republic of Texas. There still rang the echoes of the Texas Revolution, which in itself had been but a protest against governmental machinery—a conflict between Anglo-Saxon and Spanish institutions. The wars with the Indians which followed were also in the nature of simplifying the problems of government, and here, as a young man, he launched forth boldly, taking part in the Cherokee War. In the decisive battle he tried to save the life of Chief Bowels, the last great figure of this famous tribe, whom he had seen under unforgettable circumstances—in a conference with Sam Houston. The young man's gallantry on this occasion brought him an invitation to join the regular army, then under the command of Albert Sidney Johnston. But this was declined because it did not seem to open up a career. All his life, however, he had a strong desire for the military.

Not long after the close of the war he became deputy public surveyor, and striking out westward from Nacogdoches, he first marked out the lands in what is now Kaufman, Van Zandt, and other counties. Then, in regular course, he was elected justice of the peace; read law and was sent to the legislature; was chosen district judge, obtaining the title which clung to him to the end. In 1856 he was nominated for Congress by the Democrats, the representative of the district then being an American or Know-nothing—Judge Evans, a man of force and ability. While it was wholly against his wish, he was practically forced to accept the nomination. Taking the field, in one of the most sensational contests in the annals of the State, he triumphed completely. Two years later he was again nominated and again elected, although he opposed some of the slogans of his party, namely, filibustering, and the opening of the African slave trade. In the halls of Congress he was one of those who stood most stoutly for the preservation of the Union, his great speech on that subject being one of impelling force. It breathes an air of heroism, when,—the Crittenden Com-

promise having failed and the secession acts of several States having passed,—on the floor of the House he declared:

“I have loved the Union with an almost extravagant devotion. I have fought its battles . . . in times when the result for the Union seemed hopeless. If I believed we could have security of our rights within the Union, I would go home and fight the battles of the Union in the future with the same earnestness and energy that I have done in the past.”

On the other hand he incisively pointed out that the framers of the Constitution had recognized slavery, and that the laws formulated since the foundation of the Union had done likewise. “What right, therefore,” he asked, “had the North to force the South to abandon the institution?” To him it was a question of abstract right, and he hesitated not to follow the fortunes of his State, although it grieved him to sever the old allegiance. But the die was cast, and, toward the end of January, 1861, he, along with many Southern members, withdrew from the Capitol.

This was the beginning of the crucial period, for while *en route* home he learned of his election to the so-called Secession Convention of his State, which met at Austin. Here it was in a prophetic interview which he had with Governor Sam Houston, who stood aloof from the convention, that the latter pronounced his dismal forecast: “The people are going to war on the question of slavery, and the firing of the first gun will sound the knell of slavery.” Houston’s own attitude, too, was discovered, for, while he strongly opposed the secession movement, he gave out that he would never take arms against his own people.

But, spite of the tremendous influence of the governor, the convention passed the ordinance which parted it from the Union, and Judge Reagan was chosen one of the six delegates to the Provisional Congress of the Confederacy. The other members were General Waul, Judges Gregg and Ochiltree, and former United States Senators Hemphill and Wigfall. The latter was a man of marked ability, and, throughout the life of the Confederacy exerted unusual influence in directing the affairs of State. Indeed, toward the close his attacks on the government were so bitter that Judge Reagan visited him in a vain effort to stay his tongue. In Mont-

gomery, however, there was unanimity of action, Texas members taking no mean part in the discussions which led up to a constitution. Judge Reagan bore himself creditably, but to his surprise, there came one day notice of his appointment by President-elect Davis to the portfolio of postmaster-general. He accepted the rôle with misgivings, for he was aware that the attendant difficulties had deterred at least two other distinguished men from assuming the post. And the task might well have deterred him, for in all soberness, it was no simple matter to organize and set into operation a postal system of the magnitude demanded by the seceding States,—a system which was to be subjected to the severest tests. Here was his great triumph. The year prior to the outbreak of the war the expenditures of the government in connection with the postal service in the South reached the sum of \$2,879,530; the receipts, but \$938,105, leaving a deficit of nearly two millions. The situation was not encouraging; however, he not only gave the Confederacy better mail service for vastly less than the cost under the Union, but actually year after year, while the financial condition of the Confederacy steadily grew worse, he increased the net returns of his department. Even the last year of the war the surplus in the treasury credited to his department was no mean sum. This was a splendid achievement—an achievement proclaiming extraordinary executive ability.

Apart from Mr. Reagan's duties as postmaster-general of the Confederacy, he was one of the most faithful and trusted of President Davis's advisers. On many points of policy he took issue, not only with the other cabinet members, but with the president as well. At the very first meeting of the Cabinet in Montgomery, when the question as to the proper distribution of the troops came up, he urged the despatch of the most of them to Kentucky, alleging that here was a weak spot in the defences. And so it proved, and the point had been decided against him by the *doctrinaire* policy of interfering in no State without leave! Possibly, however, the most conspicuous instance of his opposition concerned the plan of the campaign of 1863. He objected in no minced words to sending General Lee into Pennsylvania, urging on the other hand the relief of General Pemberton and the capture of General Grant's

army, which, it is now strongly believed, was feasible. The next step was the re-conquest of Tennessee and Kentucky—the third and final, the return to Virginia to relieve the army of Lee in case it had been beset by the Army of the Potomac. But the Cabinet and the president and General Lee himself were all opposed to this programme, and the course was elected which eventuated in Vicksburg and Gettysburg. But even after the decision had been made, Judge Reagan wrote a final note to the president appealing in vain for a reconsideration of the question; and this document now lies in the national archives, its own commentary.

It was a marked characteristic of the man that when once a conclusion was reached he held it with a pertinacity recalling the elder Pitt. He had definite ideas on whatever matter came before him, and was conspicuous in the Cabinet for his clear-cut conceptions of what was best to be done under the circumstances. On the field his coolness and bravery were admirable, and in the fighting around Richmond several times he was under fire, while on one occasion his wit and that of Colonel Lyon probably saved the capital from Sheridan's cavalry. When the flying detachment of hostile horsemen appeared, Colonel Lyon and Judge Reagan, riding out along the lines, happened at the moment to be at a section quite destitute of defenders. Thereupon they rode back and forth behind the breastworks as though giving orders—and the blue-coats fled.

After the fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee's unvanquished though beaten army, he displayed his genius for dealing with pressing problems of state. General Johnston's fragment of an army, facing the hosts of General Sherman, could but choose to lay down its arms, and the terms of surrender were certain to constitute a precedent which might involve the whole of the Confederacy. This Judge Reagan realized, and, first of all the Cabinet, drew up and submitted for its consideration a tentative agreement, which, indeed, was finally accepted almost *in toto* by the victorious general. After that it would have been indeed difficult for the United States government to have turned upon its path and to have prosecuted the Confederates for treason—it was a weighty point won.

However, even though Lee and Johnston were no longer in the field, hope was not abandoned by the executive as to ultimate triumph; and as the bedraggled companies of Confederates, under General Breckinridge, beat on southward, Judge Reagan's was one of the stoutest hearts. This was shown by his appointment to the portfolio of secretary of the treasury, Mr. Trenholm having resigned on account of illness. Thus, acting in the double capacity of postmaster-general and secretary of the treasury, he went bravely on with President Davis when others fell away from him and his sinking cause to fly, as Benjamin did, in disguise to friendly shores, or to caress, as some did, the conqueror.

On May 10, 1865, the Davis party was captured and hurried northward. At Hampton Roads, where the prisoners were separated, Judge Reagan besought General Wilson, who was in command, to be allowed to accompany Mr. Davis, who, as many thought, was certain to be executed. Long afterward Judge Reagan again met General Wilson, who smilingly remarked that he remembered well the day the judge had begged to be shot. That was typical of the man. He knew that he was as guilty, morally or otherwise, as his chief, and that whatever fate befell that chief was meet for his adviser. And it was no pose on the judge's part. He had moral and physical courage of a superior order; no peril, no menace ever moved him a hair's-breadth from his purpose.

Imprisoned in Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, a few cells removed from Alexander H. Stephens, far from losing heart, he straightway set about ways and means to secure the readjustment of the States on lines acceptable to both sections. His Fort Warren letter, all things considered, was nothing short of prophetic. It urged the people of Texas to recognize the loss of their cause and to accept the legitimate fruits of the war, if they would escape heavier calamities. He foresaw, as scarcely any other southern man did, the horrors of reconstruction, and strove manfully to avoid them. Even after his release and return on parole to Texas, he never ceased his vigilance, urging in a letter to Governor Throckmorton, and in one to the people of the State, that the amendments to the Constitution needs must be accepted. Alas! his advice fell on deaf ears, and he was held up to censure by those he

sought to save, many of whom came, with bitterness, to see that he was right.

It was while in prison, too, and ignorant of what fate awaited him, that he wrote his justly memorable letter to President Johnson. It discussed the case of Jefferson Davis, whom the government was preparing to arraign on the charge of treason. For legal acumen and argument, possibly this letter remains Judge Reagan's masterpiece. Certainly it was, and is, unanswerable.

At length came his release from Fort Warren. Defeated and disfranchised, the man rose superior to all obstacles. He retired to his farm at Fort Houston and laid his hand to the plow, looking not backward. When his disabilities had been removed by Congress he resumed the practice of law, and in 1875 was returned to Congress, his service being continuous up to his election to the Senate in 1887. During this period his most distinguished labor was on the Committee on Commerce. For eight years he served as chairman, securing the passage of the present interstate commerce law in the face of bitter opposition.

Not less important, if less conspicuous, was the rôle he played on many occasions—the rôle of impugner. If ever there was in Congress a man who could scent corrupt legislation from afar, it was John H. Reagan. One instance will suffice. In its original form he opposed with all his might the famous Union Pacific Railway "enterprise," fearlessly pointing out the hiding places of corruption. And there were hiding places we have since discovered; and there were money-changers in the lobbies of the Capitol. He was himself, on one occasion, approached by the tempter; but in his public life of over fifty years there has yet to appear the charge that his fingers were soiled by a dishonest dollar. So honorable was his career that the State chose to honor him by elevating him to the post of Senator; and here again, we find that his every thought was how best to serve his people.

If he had not on other occasions shown that no sacrifice was too great for him to make, his resignation from the Senate to accept the appointment of railroad commissioner of his State would abundantly prove it. Not alone was the post of chairman of the commission less remunerative than that of senator, but to withdraw

from Washington to Austin to undertake the arduous labor of organizing a system which should curb the rapacity of the roads of the State might well have deterred the hardiest. And yet the Senator, despite his seventy-two years, took up the burden and carried it to a most successful ending. After ten years of this exacting routine he retired to his home and began—a labor which had been alas! all too long neglected—his Memoirs. Year after year he had planned to take up this work, so much demanded by the public, but his sense of duty and service were to him inexorable. Happily, when the final summons came, the written record was complete.

Up to the very last Judge Reagan never lost interest in politics, and it can be said without fear of contradiction that his influence did more than all else to secure for Judge Parker the support of Texas and the South. He was deeply concerned in the so-called reorganization of the Democratic party, eager to see the two parts again united; and the result of the election cast him down in spirit, for he realized that the organization he had seen control the government for decades was no longer intact, and that a period of political chaos was already entered upon—a period in which the trusts and protected industries promised to riot and the people to suffer.

For a number of years the judge served as president of the Texas State Historical Association, manifesting a warm interest in all that pertained to the annals of so splendid a Commonwealth. He himself had seen her as independent Republic, as State, as member of the Confederacy, and again of the Union. It was a long period and a brilliant one—and Judge Reagan's life had been woven into the fabric of the history of the State; woven in the warp and woof—woven imperishably.

A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF YOUNG TERRITORY.¹

FANNIE MCALPINE CLARKE.

The settlement of the portion of Texas designated on the maps for so long as "Young Territory" was retarded by the incursions of hostile Indians until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. After the annexation of Texas to the United States the Texas tribes were placed under the control of the Federal government which assumed the duty of protecting the Texan frontier from depredations by the savage tribes. As fully two-thirds of the state was unsettled at that time, one of the first acts of the national authorities to accomplish this purpose was the establishment of a cordon of forts from the Red river to the Rio Grande. Of these forts, Richardson, Belknap, Camp Cooper, and Phantom Hill were located in Young Territory. It was impossible for these garrisons, though well disciplined troops under efficient officers were stationed in them, to prevent frequent raids into the region whose unexcelled grazing facilities sustained countless herds of buffalo, antelope, deer, and mustangs, forming an ideal hunting ground for the red man and which, moreover, he claimed as his birthright. It is not strange that the fierce aboriginal tribes looked with jealous ire upon the gradual encroachments of the dominant race upon the Paradise of their savage tastes, or that they should wage a cruel and merciless warfare on the weak settlements of the daring intruder.

It was thought the native tribes of Texas—about 20 in number—were entitled to a domicile in the state on some of its vast unoccupied domain in order to reclaim them from the savage condition by instruction in the arts of civilization. The legislature of Texas set apart 55,728 acres of land to be reserved to the United States for this purpose. Under the supervision of Maj. R. S. Neighbors, two agencies were located, one on the main Brazos

¹Called in the statutes "Young Land District." See Gammel, *Laws of Texas*, IV 791.—EDITOR QUARTERLY.

river, below the junction of the Clear Fork, called the Brazos Agency, and the other sixty miles west on the Clear Fork, called the Comanche Reserve.¹

The native tribes of Texas consisted of two classes, the agricultural and the nomadic. Twelve of the agricultural class belonged to the Caddo family, and inhabited that part of the state lying east of the Brazos river, while the range of the class that depended on the chase for a subsistence was found in the western portion. Though at the time the Caddo tribes were first encountered by the white man they existed in separate tribes, they had a tradition that they had in time past been confederated and formed one nation, which similarity of language, tribal government, and laws of inheritance and marriage substantiate. They were more advanced towards civilization than any tribes north of Mexico, living in villages of good tents, wearing dress and ornaments, and cultivating the ground, producing crops of corn, melons, pumpkins, etc., which they providently stored for winter use. Though making incursions into other regions for the purpose of hunting, they always returned to their permanent home. Coronado encountered the Tejas Indians in the plains region and made use of them as guides to his expedition in 1540, and commends them for their faithfulness. Their village was on the east side of the Neches river, where Father Manzanet, who accompanied DeLeon's expedition into Texas for the purpose of dislodging the French in 1690, finding them so amenable and kindly, established the first Texas Mission, San Francisco de los Tejas, for their benefit. The good father expresses surprise at their crude civilization, and their system of tribal government, and above all at their ideas of religion, which recognized a chief spirit whom they called "Ayimat Caddo," and included a dim, undefined conception of a future state, as evidenced by the custom of burying provisions and weapons with the dead. He notes the deference paid by the tribe to its head chief or governor, who lived in a larger and better furnished house than the others and exacted a degree of reverence from his people that was suggestive of the ceremonies of royal courts among

¹*The Texas Almanac*, for 1859, p. 130.

civilized peoples.¹ It was from this tribe that the state took its name, Tejas or Texas.

All the Caddo tribes—Caddoes, Adaes, Bedaes, Keechies, Nacogdoches, Ionies, Anadaquas, Wacoës, Tawakanos, Towash, Enquisacoës, and Tejas—although at the time of the establishment of the reserve many of them were only feeble remnants, were placed upon the Brazos Agency and called for convenience “Caddoes.” The Tonkawas, though a nomadic tribe, as they were pacific and always friendly to the whites, were also placed upon this reservation.

The nomadic tribes of Texas were the Karankawas, Lipans, Tonkawas, Kiowas, Apaches, and Comanches. The Franciscan missionaries who had labored in Texas during the preceding century to civilize the more interesting and kindly disposed agricultural tribes had not been neglectful of these more ferocious denizens of the province, and had established missions for some of them. The Karankawas were a fierce tribe of gigantic size, who inhabited the coast region, and for whose benefit Mission Refugio was established; but at this period they had entirely disappeared. The Lipans ranged from the Brazos to the Mexican frontier along the foot of the mountains. They had acquired the Spanish language, and at an earlier date than the establishment of the reserves they emigrated to Mexico, but often made incursions on the southwestern frontier. In the war for Mexican independence, they fought on the side of the Republicans against the Spanish. The Tonkawas ranged between the Brazos and the Nueces from the coast as far inward as the upper Colorado. La Salle encountered them on the lower Guadalupe and was kindly treated by them. The Mission of Our Lady of Guadalupe was established for their benefit, the ruins of which may still be seen in Mission Valley. As this tribe was a bitter foe of the Comanches, who had almost destroyed them, they were placed among the friendly tribes on the Brazos Agency. The Apaches, whose village was at Bandera Pass, were a ferocious tribe that devastated the southwestern frontier from the earliest settlement of it by the Spanish. There are ruins in the upper Nueces which no doubt were missions established for them by the zealous fathers, who displayed not only

¹THE QUARTERLY, II 302-309.

fervid zeal, but courage of a high order in their attempt to civilize the fierce Texan tribes. After annexation, the Apaches, on account of the protection given their habitual range by the United States forts, had fallen back into New Mexico. The Kiowas claimed the Pan Handle of Texas for their range, and had made a treaty in 1853, agreeing to keep the peace and refrain from all hostilities for an annual payment of \$18,000 for ten years. How well it was kept will hereafter be seen. Finally must be named the numerous and powerful Comanches, a tribe of ferocious savages. All of the nomadic class were fearless horsemen, though awkward and ungainly on foot, supplying themselves in early times with horses from the herds of wild mustangs that roamed the western plains, and in later days by appropriating the numerous *caballadas* of the ranches of the settlements. Colonel Marcy, in his *Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border*, published in 1866, estimates their number at twelve to eighteen thousand. They were in three grand divisions, called by themselves, respectively, the Tennawas, Yamparacks, and Comanches, of which only the two latter ranged as far south as Texas. The band which was the dreaded foe of the Texan frontier was the last of these, or the Southern Comanches, for whom the Comanche Reserve on the Clear Fork of the Brazos was established.

Like all the other tribes, no matter how savage or migratory, the Comanches had their tribal laws, to which they clung with pertinacity. Their chiefs were elective and exercised a patriarchal rather than despotic control. They had a head chief and each clan or band had a chief besides, and all questions pertaining to the tribe were settled by a council. They called themselves "Naini," live people, as opposed to the peaceful tribes upon whom they had always preyed, and who held these ferocious foes in as great dread as did the white settlers. Though enemies of the Tonkawas, the Comanches were in alliance with the Apaches and Kiowas. There is a tradition that the Comanches were at first friendly to the Americans, though always the foes of the Spaniards. The San Saba Mission was successfully maintained for a long period for the benefit of these *Indios bravos* until mines were opened; and it may readily be conjectured that, in forcing these untutored savages to labor in them, a repetition of the cruel treat-

ment which history records was practiced in New Mexico and elsewhere under rigid Spanish taskmasters, had its share of the destruction of the mission. Stephen F. Austin narrates that on one of his trips to Mexico he was captured by a party of this tribe and released when they discovered he was an American. There are not wanting other instances of this tribe's fidelity to the white settlers in Texas. They made a treaty with the German Colony of Bettina, agreeing to vacate Fisher's Grant, lying between the Llano and San Saba rivers in the heart of their range, which they faithfully kept, never molesting the colonists in any way.¹ But whatever the cause, the Comanche finally became the *Hun* of the Texan frontier—a dread scourge. Their path was marked with gory victims, while others were torn from their homes by ruthless hands to endure a captivity worse than death.

The *Texas Almanac* for 1859 describes the two Indian reserves as follows:

"This reservation . . . called the Brazos Agency, . . . contains about eleven hundred souls. . . . On this reserve there are six hundred acres of land in successful cultivation in wheat and corn. The mode of culture is the same, or similar to that of the Americans. The Brazos Reserve Indians have made extraordinary progress in civilization since their settlement in 1853; and are very honest, trustworthy and industrious. They have a school, under the charge of Mr. Ellis Combes. Mr. C. reports fifty scholars in regular attendance; and, judging from the interest taken in this educational enterprise by the Old Indians, he is inclined to the opinion that good results will come of it. On this Reservation there are several good houses built expressly for the transaction of all and any business connected with the Indians. These buildings are situated near the center of the Reserve, in a very pretty mesquite valley, the approach to which affords a most lovely and sightly landscape. Capt. S. P. Ross, an old Texan, and a worthy man, is the Special Agent of the United States Government, in charge of the Brazos Agency. . . . His salary is \$1500 per annum.

"The Comanche Reserve is about sixty miles distant from the Brazos Agency, and is located on the Clear Fork of the Brazos River, forty-five miles above its confluence with the Main Brazos. Their Reserve extends over four leagues of land and contains four hundred souls—all Comanches, known as the Southern band of

¹THE QUARTERLY, III 36-39.

that tribe. Their head chief is a good man, and has been a valuable auxiliary in the reclamation of these Indians from savage life. He is known by the name of Kotemesie. The Comanches have not made the same progress as the Brazos Reserve Indians—not that they are any more indolent or lazy, but because of their total estrangement heretofore from the manners and customs of the white man. The Indians on the Brazos Reserve have always lived near, and frequently among the white settlers, while the Comanches have been outside of all intercourse of a friendly nature. This agency is furnished with all necessary buildings and, like the Brazos Agency, is supplied with competent and trustworthy farmers and artisans. The Comanches have a good crop this year, and will most probably make sufficient to bread themselves. Col. M. Leeper is their Agent, with a salary of \$1500 per annum.

“The United States Government has been very liberal in its appropriations for the benefit of the reclaimed savage, and has spared neither trouble nor expense in the furtherance of the peace policy.

“Maj. Neighbors disburses annually about \$80,000 for the use of the Texas Indians.”

In spite of these favorable reports of the attempt to civilize these tribes and domicile them in their native land, to which they clung with all the devoted patriotism of people of a higher order of civilization, Indian depredations with harrowing details of murder and capture of women and children were reported constantly. The troops at the posts were frequently compelled to follow the trail of the marauders in order to recapture prisoners and other property, which, if successfully accomplished, was generally at the cost of a bloody encounter.

In 1858 L. S. Ross, familiarly known as “Sul Ross,” a youth of eighteen years, while at home on a vacation from college, organized a company of one hundred and thirty-five warriors of the friendly tribes on the Brazos Agency and joined an expedition under Maj. Earl Van Dorn commanding the U. S. forces in this section of the frontier against the Comanches. October 1, 1858 the party came upon a large Comanche village on the False Washita River, in the Indian Territory. A sharp conflict followed, in the course of which ninety Indians were killed and a considerable number captured, either wounded or unhurt. The whites lost five killed and several wounded, including Ross and Van Dorn. In this battle was captured from the Comanches a little white girl

who seemed to be about eight years of age. Nothing could be learned of her relatives, and she was adopted by the young captain, taking the name of Lizzie Ross. She afterwards married a merchant who lived near Los Angeles, California. She died there two years ago.

Gen. Winfield Scott, commander-in-chief of the U. S. army, on hearing of this expedition, wrote to Ross, then an unknown Texas youth, commanding his bravery, and offering to help him to a place in the regular army, but he declined the unusual offer and returned to college.

The severe punishment thus inflicted on the hostile tribe was easily forgotten and they were soon on the war path again. The reserves on the Clear Fork and Brazos were located in a region possessing unexcelled grazing facilities, and the Texan stock raisers, in constantly increasing numbers, braved the dangers of Indian attacks and brought their herds hither to fatten upon the rich pasturage. The reserve Indians were accused of committing depredations as well as the hostiles, and conflicts ensued in which a number were killed. The average citizen would not discriminate between the two classes of Indians. There was in his eyes "no good Indian save a dead one," and he looked on the "Reserves" as pampered wards of the government, drawing rations, arms, and ammunition free of expense to prey upon the helpless settlements. This was no doubt literally true of the Comanches, for many of the raiders the troops were so often compelled to follow were drawing supplies at the Reserve.

The result was the experiment of domiciling the Texas tribes within the state, which proved a failure, and in August, 1859, Maj. Geo. H. Thomas, of the United States army, transferred the tribes to the Indian Territory. The Indians went away reluctantly and were so incensed at their removal that they began at once a series of depredations on the frontier of Texas. The annuity paid by the government to the Kiowas was also withdrawn in this year on account of their failure to keep their treaty obligation. They attacked the settlements of Texas and enacted some fearful tragedies. The Comanche tribes formed a confederation with the avowed object of driving the Texans from their usurped possession of the Indian ranges.

An account of the shocking crimes committed by these lawless tribes on the upper Brazos alone would fill a volume. One of the most noted is subjoined. In June, 1860, Josephus Browning was killed and his son Frank severely wounded by a party of Comanches on their ranch on the Clear Fork near the mouth of Hubbard creek. A party was immediately organized by John R. Baylor, Walt. Reynolds, and other well known citizens to go in pursuit of the Indians. On the 28th of June, they overtook them on Paint Creek, and a severe fight ensued, in which 13 Indians were killed. The victors returned to Weatherford with the scalps of the slain savages, and also the scalp of a white woman, whom the Indians had killed in their raid, and which they had in their possession. Besides these ghastly trophies, the victors had bows and arrows, darts, quivers, shields, lances, and tomahawks. The news of the success of the party in avenging the Browning murder was received with great rejoicing by all classes throughout the settlement; for, besides the attack on the Brownings, the horrible killing of Mrs. Sherman, and many other outrages were still fresh in the peoples' memory. The occasion was celebrated by a public barbecue on the square in Weatherford, at which stirring speeches were listened to by a vast assemblage from every portion of the surrounding country. In the evening a dance was given at the court house, and on a rope stretched diagonally across the large room were hung the arms and equipments captured by the party and also the scalp of the white woman, as well as those of the slain warriors—grewsome decorations for a scene of festivity. General Baker exhibited these trophies of the Paint Creek fight in many other places, and everywhere among the settlers arose the cry, "Exterminate the Indians."¹ Governor Houston, though a life-long advocate of the peace policy in dealing with the native tribes, was forced, by the terror of the people on the frontier because of the imminent danger that threatened them from incursions of these powerful and merciless tribes, the Comanches and Kiowas, to order the enlistment of state troops to assist in protecting the exposed region. Among those who applied to him for a commission to raise a company of Rangers was young Sul Ross,

¹Smythe, *Historical Sketch of Parker County*, 138-140.

who had just completed his college course and returned to the state. Receiving the commission from the governor, he enrolled sixty men as rangers and established his camp at Fort Belknap, in the old Brazos Agency.

About this time some outrages were committed in Palo Pinto and Jack counties, contiguous to the country in which Ross's camp was located, and he determined to chastise the daring savages. Leaving twenty men to guard his post, he supplied their places in his command with twenty picked cavalrymen of the 2nd Regiment of the United States army, then stationed at Camp Cooper, in the old Comanche Reserve, under Capt. N. G. Evans.

He led his company into the "Indian country," as the district north of the Clear Fork was then called, and on December 9, 1860, he came on a large Comanche village at the head of Pease River. In the course of the fight that followed the attack on the village, Captain Ross, who was accompanied by Lieut. Thomas Kelleheir, saw a party of three Indians, two of them upon one horse, and the other mounted alone. He followed the two that were mounted double, and Lieutenant Kelleheir followed the third. Captain Ross shot and killed the Indian that was riding behind, and this one, in falling, dragged the other from the horse. The survivor let fly a number of arrows at his pursuer, but by and by a shot from Captain Ross's revolver struck his elbow and disabled him. Ross demanded his surrender, but he refused; and, shortly afterwards, as he was singing his death song, a young Mexican killed him. He proved to be a noted chief, Peta Nocona, whom Ross had known well in former days.

When Captain Ross returned to Lieutenant Kelleheir, he found him cursing his luck because the Indian whom he had followed and captured was a squaw; but Ross called his attention to her blue eyes and told him she was at least no Indian squaw.

And she did indeed turn out to be a white woman. When the gallant young ranger, Capt. Ross, returned to Camp Cooper from his expedition against the Comanches with a female captive who showed her white blood, even though bronzed with exposure and having the habits of an Indian, the news was published extensively among the settlements. Among those who journeyed to this frontier post to examine the captive in hopes of finding a lost

child or relative, was the venerable Isaac Parker, for whom Parker county was named. He hoped to hear of a long-lost niece who was stolen from Parker's Fort, in Limestone county, May 19, 1836, by the Comanches. They were emboldened by the confused state of affairs in the province of Texas during the struggle for independence to make an invasion of the unprotected settlements. Attacking Parker's Fort, containing thirty-five persons, they killed all who were able to bear arms and carried several of the women and children off into captivity, but all the captives had been recovered except two, a girl and a boy. Many attempts had been made to recover these children by the Parker family, and the state had offered a ransom for them; but all efforts to recover them had failed, and a quarter of a century had now elapsed since their capture!

The age of the captive woman suited that of the object of Mr. Parker's search, but such a lapse of time would have transformed a child of nine beyond recognition in a life of ease; and how much more in the life of hardship among a roving tribe like the Comanches who, like all other savages, make drudges and slaves of their women! The captive had lost all knowledge of her native tongue, and maintained a stolid silence when addressed by her aged uncle. At length he said very distinctly to the interpreter, "The girl's name was Cynthia Ann." The familiar name aroused dim recollections of her past life, which time and suffering had wellnigh obliterated. The moment she heard her name she sprang to her feet and patting herself on the breast with joy beaming in her eyes, said excitedly, "Cynthia Ann! Cynthia Ann!" "I was convinced, says Mr. Parker, "of her identity and that in this poor creature I saw my long-lost niece."

She returned with her uncle to his home in the county that now bears his name. She had an infant with her at the date of her capture, and had left two other children with the Indians. She gradually adapted herself to a civilized life, learning to spin, weave, and sew, and made herself generally useful in domestic life. It has been said that she was not contented, and more than once attempted to escape and return to the Indians, but if this is true, it was because of her desire to recover her other children —a hope she was often heard to express. But death ended her

checkered career before this hope was realized. Her little child died shortly before its mother.¹ Her son Quanah is now chief of the tribe, living in peace and quiet on the princely reservation of over three million acres set apart by the general government for the three roving tribes, Apaches, Kiowas, and Comanches, in the southwestern part of the Indian Territory, in which Fort Sill is located.

When the Civil war began in 1861 the federal forts on the frontier were abandoned and some of them destroyed by the Union troops. Some of the officers resigned their commissions in the United States army and joined the Confederates, among them R. E. Lee, in command of Ft. Mason, and Maj. Earl Van Dorn. The gallant young Texan, Sul Ross, disbanded his company and enlisted in the Southern army as a private, but was soon promoted from one office to another still higher until he became a brigadier general of cavalry, the youngest of that rank in the service. His experience as a ranger fitted him well for the arduous campaigns of the fierce struggle. He was in one hundred and thirty-five engagements of greater or less importance and had seven horses shot from under him, but was never wounded during the whole war. The same kind Providence that protected him from the rude Comanche's battle-axe preserved him from the shot and shell of his more civilized foe.

The hostile tribes, still chafing under their forcible removal from Texas and seeing the frontier denuded of troops, renewed their attacks on the settlements, and many of the latter were abandoned. Some of the reservation Indians enlisted in the Union army, being within the Federal lines, but Placido, chief of the Tonkawas, refused to enlist, saying "he could never fight against Texas." In a mêlée which ensued he and a number of his men were killed. So great was the devotion of this simple tribe to their native land, they gradually came back, or a part of them, to the Clear Fork, where they were for a time allowed to stay on a reservation set apart for them near Fort Griffin. This was a post that was established after the civil war, when the Federal troops re-occupied the Texan frontier, and named for Maj. Gen. C. Griffin, commanding the military district of Texas. For many years suc-

¹For a more detailed narrative of this episode, see De Shields, *Cynthia Ann Parker*.

ceeding the war, Indian incursions continued, in spite of the vigilance of the troops, under the determined and gallant Gen. R. S. Mackenzie, and the desperate efforts of the long-suffering and revengeful frontiersmen. Fort Griffin was in the great buffalo range, and became the base of supplies for the buffalo hunters. These hunters soon denuded the adjacent region of the vast herds of this noble American species that had been from time immemorial the chief support of the wild tribes inhabiting the plains of the Northwest. Adventurous stockmen soon overspread the splendid pastoral section with their herds of cattle from the more settled portion of the state, and ranches of the crudest description, consisting of rude huts or "dug-outs" and picket *corrals* in the midst of open, unfenced ranges were established. Soon some of the counties were organized, and the district known as Young Territory disappeared from the maps of the state.

With the removal of the Tonkawas the last vestige of the native Texan tribes disappeared from the state. The wide variation in the two classes of our native tribes was mostly the result, no doubt, of the difference between the fertile, well-watered region of eastern Texas, where a subsistence was easily obtained, and the arid plains of the west, with their vast herds of herbivorous animals. But who can tell how great an influence the devoted Franciscan missionaries, who first chanted the *Te Deum* in these wilds two centuries ago and labored faithfully among these poor children of nature for a whole century, may have had on them? The partial knowledge of Spanish existing among them and the common occurrence of Spanish names such as Placido, José Maria, Santa Anna (names of noted chieftains), are conclusive evidence of it to the reflecting mind. We can but believe, had patience had "her perfect work" with these aborigines of our state, and the seed sowed by the pious fathers been carefully nurtured, many dark pages in our history might have been avoided. Instead of having only rude monuments, a few painted rocks with quaint picture inscriptions, many blood-stained battlefields and desecrated village sites, a collection of rude arms, shields, and savage ornaments, and the names of a few cities, mountains, and streams, to remind us of these tribes, we might have had happy and peaceful races lifted from barbarism to civilization to bless the coming of the Anglo-Saxon to his Paradise!

NOTES AND FRAGMENTS.

TEXAS, FOUR MILES FROM HEADQUARTERS.

April 10, 1836.

DEAR PARENTS:—Since I last wrote you I have been engaged in arranging an expedition against the Indians, who have committed many depredations against the frontier. On my return to the settlements, I learned that our country was again invaded by a merciless horde of Mexicans, who were waging a war of extermination against the inhabitants. A call was made for all friends of humanity to rise in arms and resist the foe. Men were panic stricken and fled, leaving their all behind them. I could not reconcile it to my feelings to leave Texas without an effort to save it. Accordingly, I bent my course for the army and arrived last evening at this place. I shall enter camp this morning as a volunteer. The army, commanded by General Houston, is lying on the west side of the Brazos, 20 miles from San Fillippe. The enemy is at that place waiting an attack. It is reported Houston will attack them in the morning. What will be the result, or the fate of Texas is hid in the bowels of futurity. Yet, I think we are engaged in the cause of justice, and hope the God of battles will protect us. The enemy's course has been the most bloody that has ever been recorded on the page of history. Our garrison at San Antonio was taken and massacred; so another detachment of seven hundred, commanded by Col. Fanning, and posted at La Bahia, after surrendering prisoners of war, were led out and shot down like bears. Only one escaped to tell their melancholy fate. In their course they show no quarter to age, sex, or condition, all are massacred without mercy. If such conduct is not sufficient to arouse the patriotic feelings of the sons of liberty, I know not what will. I was born in a land of freedom, and taught to lisp the name of liberty with my infant tongue, and rather than be driven out of the country or submit to be a slave, I will leave my bones to bleach on the plains of Texas. If we succeed in subduing the enemy and establishing a free and independent government, we will have the finest country the sun ever

shone upon, and if we fail we shall have the satisfaction of dying fighting for the rights of man. I know not that I shall have an opportunity of writing to you for some time, but shall do so as often as is convenient. Be not alarmed about my safety. I am no better, and my life no dearer than those who gained the liberty you enjoy. If I fail you will have the satisfaction that your son died fighting for the rights of man. Our strength in the field is about 1500. The enemy is reported 4000 strong; a fearful odds you will say; but what can mercenary hirelings do against the sons of liberty?

Before this reaches you the fate of Texas will be known. I will endeavor to acquaint you as soon as possible. I am well and in good spirits and as unconcerned as if going to a raising. The same Being who has hitherto protected my life can with equal ease ward off the balls of the enemy. My company is waiting, and I must draw to a close, and bid you farewell, perhaps forever. More than a year has elapsed since I saw you, yet, the thought of friends and home are fresh in my memory, and their remembrance yet lives in my affections and will light a secret joy to my heart till it shall cease to beat. Long has it been since I have heard from you. How often do I think of home and wish to be there. The thought of that sacred spot haunts my night-watches. How, often when sleep has taken possession of my faculties, am I transported there, and for a short time enjoy all the pleasures of home; but the delusion is soon over, and the morning returns and I find my situation the same. Dear friends, if I see you no more, remember Giles still loves you. Give my love to my sisters, brothers, friends and neighbors. I would write more if time would permit, but its fleeing steps wait for none. You need not write to me as I do not know where I shall be. With sentiments of sincere respect I bid you farewell. Your Affectionate son,

G. A. GIDDINGS.

AFFAIRS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

The memorial page in this issue serves as a reminder not only that another Texas veteran is gone, but also that the Republic of Texas will soon have passed beyond the memory of any living man. Ex-Governor Lubbock, who was in his ninetieth year when he died, was barely thirty when Texas became a State of the Union. It was, of course, but natural that he should take a special interest in the history of whose making he had seen so much. For seven years he was one of the vice presidents of the Association, and he was rarely absent from its meetings.

Ex-Governor Lubbock was a man of most exalted character, which was evident in all his conduct, both public and private. It is hoped that a suitable appreciation of him will be prepared ere long for publication in *THE QUARTERLY*.

Frances Richard Lubbock.

Clerk of House of Representatives of the Second
Congress of Texas, 1837-1838.

Comptroller of the Republic of Texas, 1838-1841.
Presidential Elector, 1856.

Lieutenant-Governor of Texas, 1857-1859.

Governor of Texas, 1861-1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel in the Confederate Army, 1863.

Aid-de-Camp to President Davis
and Colonel of Cavalry, 1864.

State Treasurer, 1878-1891.

Treasurer of the Texas Veteran Association, 1892-1905.

Fourth Vice-President of the Texas State Historical
Association, 1898-1905.

Born, October 16, 1815.

Died, June 23, 1905.

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THE SPANISH ABANDONMENT AND RE-OCCUPATION OF EAST TEXAS, 1773-1779.¹

HERBERT E. BOLTON.

In 1772 the Spanish government decided to give back to nature and the Indians, temporarily at least, all that part of Texas northeast of San Antonio de Béxar and Bahía del Espíritu Santo, some parts of which Spain had occupied, continuously even if weakly, for more than half a century. That this plan failed was due primarily to the attachment of some of the settlers of the district to their homes; to the desire of the provincial authorities to main-

¹BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.—This paper, with the exception of the first two subdivisions of section I, which are based mainly on secondary authorities, has been prepared almost entirely from manuscript materials hitherto unused, found in the Archivo General y Público of Mexico and in the Béxar Archives in the possession of the University of Texas. The principal documents used are the following:

1. Expediente sobre proposiciones del Gobernador de Texas Baron de Ripperdá, para erección de un Nuevo Precidio, y Emprender una cruda Guerra contra los Apaches Lipanes, hacienda Alianza con las Naciones del Norte. MS. Folios 107. The papers included cover the years 1771-1773.

2. Autos que se han introducido por los Vecinos del Presidio de los Adaes, Sobre que les deje ávecindar en el de la Mision de los Ais, y establecimto. del Pueblo de Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli. MS. Folios 22. The papers fall within the years 1773-1774.

3. Quaderno que Corresponde para el completto del Expediente señalado con el Nume. 1 [number 2 above] remetido con fecha 31 del

tain an influence over the Indian tribes of East Texas, as a make-weight against the hostile Apache and Comanche Indians and against Spain's new neighbors, the English; and to the temporizing and double policy of the viceroy. The story of the removal of the Spanish settlers from the eastern frontier in pursuance of this plan and of their early return and its sanction by the local government, regardless of the royal policy, is not without human interest nor without importance in the history of the Spanish occupation of the Southwest.

I. CONDITIONS LEADING TO A NEW FRONTIER POLICY.

In order to understand why Spain thus voluntarily resolved to relinquish her hold upon so vast and so rich a stretch of country, it is necessary to examine briefly conditions existing at the time

proximo pasado Marzo del corriente año. MS. Folios 53. The papers fall within the years 1773-1774.

4. Expediente Sobre que el Vecindario del Pueblo de Ntra. Señora del Pilar de Bucareli se le destine Parroco, por cuenta de la Real Hacienda. MS. Folios 21. The papers are dated 1775-1779.

5. Los Vecinos del extinguido Presidio, y Poblacion de los Adais, hasta el Numero de Sesenta y tres, que sin establecimiento alguno se hayan agregados al de San Antonio de Bexar, y Villa de San Fernando; Sobre que atendiendo al infeliz estado, en que han quedado, por haber abandonado sus Casas y Tierras; y á fidelidad, con que han servido, y estan, prontas, á continuar sirviendo a S. M. en aquella Fronttera, se les conceda por el Señor Governador en Gefe, Comandante General alguno establecimiento para que puedan Subsistir con sus Familias. MS. Folios 32. The papers fall within the period 1778-1779.

6. Representacion del Justicia de la Poblacion de Nuestra Senora del Pilar de Bucareli; Sobre libertad de Diezmos para aquellos Moradores. MS. Folios 10. The correspondence falls within the period 1777-1778.

7. Expediente sobre el abandono del Pueblo de Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli: Quaderno 5°. MS. Folios 53. Period covered, 1778-1780.

8. Expediente sobre el abandono del Pueblo de Bucareli, y establecer Comercio con los Yndios Gentiles del Nortte. Quaderno 6°. MS. Folios 46. Period covered, 1780-1782. Number 7 is cited in this article as "Expediente sobre el abandono," and number 8 as "Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio."

All of the above documents are collected in volume LI of Sección de Historia of the Archivo General. The original papers of which No. 1 is a copy are in volume XX of the Sección de Provincias Internas. Num-

along the north Mexican border as a whole, and more particularly those on the Texas-Louisiana frontier.

1. *Indian troubles in the frontier provinces.*—At the middle of the eighteenth century it seemed as if most of what had been accomplished for civilization in northern Mexico through the bravery and religious zeal of the Spaniards was about to be destroyed by Indian revolts within and Indian attacks from without. Nearly all along the northern frontier from Sonora to Texas the interior tribes were becoming less docile and those outside more aggressive.

In Sonora the chief trouble was from within. In 1751 the Pimas living near the head of the Gulf of California revolted under their native leader, Don Luis, destroyed most of the Spanish missions, pueblos, and ranches in and near the valley of the Altar River, and drove out many of the settlers. After several

bers 2 and 3, as contained in volume LI, were copied from copies contained in volume XCIII of Sección de Historia.

9. Consulta del Sor. Comandante Gral. de las Provas. de Oriente sobre solicitud que han hecho los Yndios Horcoquisac, Atacapaces, Vidais, y Cocos, pidiendole se estableasca la Mision del Orcoquisac: sobre que se separe del empleo de Tente. de Gobernador á Don Antonio Gil Ybarbo, etc. MS., 1788. In Volume XCIII, Sección de Historia, Archivo General.

10. Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz de las Naciones del Norte; y comercio ilícito de los Franceses de la Nueva Orleans. MS. Folios 48. A copy is contained in Volume XCIII of Sección de Historia, Archivo General.

11. Correspondence of Governors Ripperdá and Cabello concerning Texas, in volumes XCIX and C of Sección de Provincias Internas. Original MS.

12. Derrotero, Diario, y Calculacion de leguas, que en descubrimiento por derecho desde esta Provincia del Nueva Mexico hasta el Fuerte de Natchitoches y la de los Texas, de orden superior voy a practicar en compañía de Dn. Pedro Vial, comisionado a esta proposito, yo el abajo y lo ultimo firmado, Francisco Xavier Fragoso. Villa de Santa Fé, veinte y cuatro de Junio de mil setecientos ochenta y ocho. Signed also by Pedro Vial. Document No. 17, volume XLIII, Sección de Historia, Archivo General. MS.

13. Reglamento é instrucción para los presidios que se han de formar en la línnea de frontera de la Nueva España. Resuelto por el rey en cédula de 10 de setiembre de 1772, in Arrillaga, *Recopilacion de leyes, Decretos, Bandos, Reglamentos, Circulares y Providencias de los Supremos Poderes de los Estados- Unidos Mexicanos*, etc. (Mexico, 1835) Vol. IX, 139-189. Printed first in Madrid, 1772.

months of fighting and diplomacy quiet was restored, but the Indians continued threatening, and a blight rested upon the once flourishing Spanish establishments. Further south, in the same province, the Seri Indians soon afterwards destroyed the new mission at Guaymas, and for several years held the place against the Spaniards. Peace made with the tribe only by extravagant promises was soon broken, and war continued, greatly to the discouragement of colonization and missionary work in the region south of the Altar. Northeastern Sonora suffered from raids by Apaches from the Gila country. These attacks, if not so continuous as the disturbances caused by the near-by Pimas and Seris, were even more disastrous because of the great numbers of the invaders.

In what is now Chihuahua—then northern Nueva Viscaya—the devastation was perhaps somewhat less than in Sonora, but, nevertheless, there was general complaint there that the Spanish establishments were constantly exposed to destruction by the Apaches and renegade mission Indians, while the unconquered savages of Bolson de Mapimí infested the line of travel northward to Parral.

In New Mexico the Yutes, Apaches, and Comanches, all or severally, gave trouble nearly every year. In 1746 the last-named tribe had made an unusually violent attack upon Pecos, Galisteo, and other places, causing considerable loss of life along with the destruction of property. This outrage was followed in succeeding years by wars of vengeance that greatly disturbed the peace and the prosperity of the community.

In spite of the exceptional prosperity of Nuevo Santander at this time,¹ it and Coahuila, like Chihuahua and Texas, suffered from both apostate mission Indians and invading Apaches. The danger from the Apaches seems everywhere to have been less to human life than to property. The chief resources of the northern Span-

¹It was between 1748 and 1751 that the province of Nuevo Santander, which lay south of Coahuila and Texas, was so successfully conquered and colonized by José de Escandón. Notwithstanding the general prosperity of the province, however, which was quite out of keeping with conditions in the northern provinces as a whole, it was necessary to organize in 1757 a general campaign against troublesome Indians. By means of this campaign some of the natives were reduced to mission life, and some were driven into Coahuila or across the Rio Grande (Prieto, *Historia, Geografía Estadística del Estado de Tamaulipas*; Bancroft, *Mexico*, III, 342-346).

ish settlers were their droves and herds of horses, mules, cattle, and small stock, and to steal these was the main object of the Apache raids. Treacherous to the last degree, these Indians would enter a village or *presidio* in the guise of friendship, and upon leaving run off all the stock of the place. As the Apaches were pushed south by their inveterate enemies, the Comanches, such thievery, not always unattended by murder, occurred with increasing frequency, to the utter despair of many of the frontier establishments.

The Texas settlements, particularly San Antonio de Béxar and Bahía del Espíritu Santo, had long been infested by the thieving Apaches and Karankawas, and now one section of the province was beset by a more blood-thirsty enemy, the Comanches. This tribe was first heard of in Texas in 1743. They did no serious damage until 1758, but in March of that year they, in conjunction with a number of northeastern tribes, who had hitherto given no trouble, attacked and burned the newly founded mission at San Saba, on the San Saba River, murdered some of the missionaries and soldiers, set fire to the stockade of the *presidio* and drove off part of the stock. The occasion assigned for this attack was that the San Saba mission was designed to minister to the Apaches, mortal enemies of the Comanches. The presidials were terrified, they clamored for a removal to another site, and were only with difficulty kept from deserting. In the following year Colonel Parilla went out with five hundred men to punish the Indians, but instead he suffered an ignominious defeat. In the country of the Taovayases his troops were attacked by a large body of the allies, before whom they fled, leaving behind them baggage and artillery.¹ This victory over the Spaniards, which for more than a decade went unpunished, served to lessen the prosperity of the none too flourishing Texas settlements. The Comanches and other northern tribes continued to trouble the *presidio* of Sán Saba and even sought the Apaches in the neighborhood of Béxar.²

This condition of affairs called forth numerous reports from

¹See on page 108 a reference to the cannon left by Parilla.

²This section is based upon Bancroft's *Mexico* (Vol. III), his *North Mexican States and Texas* (Vol. I), and his *Arizona and New Mexico*; Prieto, *Historia, Geografía y Estadística del Estado de Tamaulipas*; Bonilla, *Breve Compendio*; the royal *Reglamento é instrucion* of 1772 (see bibli-

officials concerning the Indian depredations, and numerous appeals from the settlers for protection. These reports and appeals came to the notice of the king and he, in 1753, enjoined the viceroy to take the matter in hand. Nothing being done, in 1756 the king commissioned the Marqués de Rubí, a Spanish field-marshal, to inspect and make a report upon all the defences of the interior provinces. The usual delay ensued, and it was ten years before Rubí actually began his tour of inspection. But finally, in March, 1766, he left Mexico City, accompanied by his engineer, Nicolás de la Fora, and passed through one province after another, arriving in Texas in August, 1767.¹ The results of this visit are told further on.

2. *The cession of Louisiana to Spain, 1762.*—At the same time that a demand was growing for stronger defences along the frontier as a whole, there came a change that temporarily lessened the strain on the northeastern Texas border. This change was the cession of Louisiana by France to Spain in 1762, at the close of the long struggle in America known as the French and Indian War.

The proximity of the French had from the first been the characteristic motive for maintaining Spanish settlements in East Texas. News of La Salle's fortification on Matagorda Bay was what led Spain, after more than a century and a half's inactivity, to found in 1690 the first mission in Texas. Mission San Francisco de los Téxas, as the establishment was called, was placed far to the east, near the Neches River. This mission and another that was founded soon after, being abandoned, it required new French encroachments, in the form of San Denis's trading expedition across Texas (1714-1715) to bring the Spanish back to the frontier. Whatever may have been the designs of San Denis or of the government behind him, the Spanish authorities feared danger, and proceeded again to secure a foot-hold in the country threatened. An expedition sent out in 1715 re-established the

graphical notes, page 69); and a report made in 1784 by Domingo Cabello, governor of Texas, on the Indian affairs of Coahuila and Texas.

¹Bonilla, *Breve Compendio* (Translation by Elizabeth Howard West in THE QUARTERLY, VIII, 59. All of my citations of the *Breve Compendio* are to this translation); Cavo, *Los Tres Siglos de Mexico* (Mexico, 1835-1838), II, 184.

Téxas mission, founded five new ones in the vicinity, and placed a garrison at Presidio de los Téxas, or Dolores. All of these new missions were nearer the French frontier than San Francisco, the first one, while one of them, San Miguel de Linares, was beyond the Sabine River, squarely in front of the French post at Natchitoches.

The frontier military policy thus begun by establishing Presidio de los Téxas, was developed by war between France and Spain. A French attack on Pensacola in 1719 was followed by the flight of the frightened Spanish garrison and missionaries from the frontier to Béxar. As soon as possible the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo was sent (1721) to recover the province and to strengthen its defences. He re-established the abandoned missions and Presidio de los Téxas, built a new *presidio* called Pilar de los Adaes near Mission San Miguel, and garrisoned it with a hundred soldiers.

While the defences of the northeast had thus been first provided and later strengthened to guard against the danger of French encroachment, one of the principal reasons for weakening them again was an official opinion that this fear was unfounded. In 1727-28 General Pedro de Rivera inspected all of the Texas *presidios*; and, at the request of the viceroy, reported the changes that he thought should be made in them. Among these recommendations one was that, since the Indians of the northeast were peaceful, Presidio de los Téxas was unnecessary and should be abandoned; and another was that, since the danger from the French garrison at Natchitoches was very slight, the Spanish guard at Adaes was unnecessarily large, and should be reduced from one hundred to sixty soldiers. These recommendations were carried out a year later. One result of this change was that the Querétaran friars, whose missions depended on Presidio de los Téxas, moved their missions to San Antonio de Béxar (1731). This left on the frontier the *presidio* of Pilar de los Adaes and the missions at Adaes, Los Ais, and Nacogdoches.

For a score or more of years no important change was made in East Texas, but the chief matters of interest there were a dispute over the boundary between Spanish and French territory and complaints about French smuggling on the border. The increase of this species of trade along the Trinity led to the establishment

about 1755 of a new *presidio* on that river, which, after two removals was located at Orcoquisac, the site of the mission of Nuestra Señora de la Luz, near the present town of Liberty.¹

It is thus seen that fear of the French, in one form or another, had from the very beginning been a decisive factor in the Spanish policy on the Texas-Louisiana frontier. But in 1762 came the cession of Louisiana to Spain, and it was felt that danger from the French was largely removed. This transfer gave Spain England instead of France for a neighbor, and, as the English settlements were as yet far distant, they were less feared for the present than had been the French settlements of Louisiana while subject to a foreign power. This alteration of French relations just at the time of especial stress all along the rest of the frontier of New Spain helps to explain the radical change that was now made in the Spanish policy in East Texas.

3. *Rubí's inspection and recommendations.*—What the Marqués de Rubí saw when at last he made his inspection was recorded in the diary kept and the map made by Nicolás de la Fora and in the *dictamen*, or opinion, which Rubí himself sent later to the government.² With respect to the frontier in general, Rubí reported in detail the bad condition of affairs which has been briefly

¹See Garrison, *Texas*, chs. III, IV, V, VIII; Bonilla, *Breve Compendio*, in THE QUARTERLY, VIII, 12-59; R. C. Clark, "The Beginnings of Texas," *Ibid.*, V, and his "Luis Juchereau de San Denis and the Re-establishment of the Téjas Missions," *Ibid.*, VI, 1-26; Mattie Alice Austin, "The Municipal Government of San Fernando de Béjar," *Ibid.*, VIII. My opinion as to the location of Orocquisac is based on the La Fora map (see next note) and a map drawn by Gil Ybarbo in 1777 (see page 118).

²The diary kept by la Flora was entitled *Viage del ingeniero a Sta Fé* (1766, MS., in what Bancroft calls the Pinart Collection. See Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 258, note.) I have not had access to this diary. A copy of the map, if not the original, was once in volume V of *Sección de Historia, Archivo General*. I find a statement to this effect in some notes made by Father Talamantes, and the evidence of its having been torn out is still visible in the volume. Bancroft knew of the existence of this map, but was unable to find it (see his *Arizona and New Mexico*, 258, note). I fortunately found a photograph of it in the possession of the noted scholar, Mrs. Zelia Nuttall, of Coyuacán, Mexico, who generously allowed me to copy it. The tradition is, I believe, that the map was taken from its place by some one connected with Maximilian's government. A copy of the part of the *Dictamen* bearing on Texas is contained

indicated hereinbefore.¹ What he found in Texas, which is our chief concern here, was, when viewed as the results of three-quarters of a century's occupation, discouraging enough. Beyond San Antonio de Béxar toward the northeast the nearest Spanish establishment was the mission at Nacogdoches, across the Neches² River, administered by one missionary, but without a resident Indian, either converted or under instruction. A few leagues further on was the mission at Los Ais, with a few ranches round about. Here lived two missionaries in the same inactivity as those at Nacogdoches, without a single Indian upon whom to "exercise their calling."³

On the Louisiana frontier, seven leagues from Natchitoches, were the mission and *presidio* of Adaes. At this mission, like the others without neophytes, were two missionaries. The *presidio* was garrisoned by sixty soldiers, who, with the Indians in the neighborhood peaceful and Louisiana a Spanish province, had nothing to do. Round about the *presidio* in a village and on ranches was a declining population of some thirty families. Toward the south, on the eastern bank of the Trinity, "amid a thousand misfortunes and inconveniences," was the *presidio* of Orcoquisac, with a company of thirty-one soldiers and an imaginary mission with two *padres*. Though an attempt had been made to establish a colony there, the place had no citizen population. Finally, north of Béxar, at San Saba, now outside the limits of Texas, was a small garrison of soldiers, at the mercy of the Comanches and their allies, as had recently been proved.

Here, then, said Rubí, was a stretch of country beyond Béxar several hundred miles wide over which Spain claimed dominion,

in "Quaderno que Corresponde," Vol. 51, Sección de Historia, Archivo General (see bibliographical note, page 67). This is the only part of it that I have seen or have been able to locate.

¹Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 585, 629-630.

²It may be a matter of interest to know that the favorite and almost invariable form of spelling the name of this river in the documents on which this study is based is Nechas.

³Reference to page — will show that a few baptisms were made at these missions as late as the time when Rubí made his inspection.

but which was crossed by only two rude paths, and occupied by only three small garrisons, a handful of impoverished settlers, and four useless missions.¹

As a general result of his inspection, which revealed to him some establishments stagnant and useless and others without defence, Rubí concluded—what ought to have been seen long before—that Spain was trying to spread over too much ground, and that a wise policy for her to pursue would be to distinguish between her true and her “imaginary” dominions, and to sacrifice the latter to the former.²

Consistently with this conclusion, he made some far-reaching recommendations. The central one was to rearrange the frontier *presidios* in such a way as to form a cordon of fifteen strongholds placed at regular intervals between Bahía del Espíritu Santo, in Texas, and the head of the Gulf of California, with San Antonio de Béxar and Santa Fé as outposts. This line he considered the true frontier of New Spain, upon the defence of which all efforts should be concentrated.³

This central recommendation involved radical changes in Texas. Those parts of the province that lay beyond San Antonio de Béxar he regarded as only “imaginary possessions,” and he believed that, considering the pressing need elsewhere, they should be abandoned. San Saba, he said was at the mercy of the Comanches and their allies, Orcoquisac was at best of little use, and Adaes was bringing to a close a career that had been unfortunate from the outset. His first recommendation immediately affecting Texas was, therefore, that San Saba be deserted; that the *presidio* and mission of Orcoquisac be either extinguished or removed to a place somewhere in the neighborhood of Béxar and Bahía del Espíritu Santo; and that Adaes either be annexed to the government of Louisiana, or that it be extinguished and the settlers there brought near Béxar, or if they preferred, allowed to settle somewhere in Louisiana.⁴

¹Rubí, *Dictamen*, section 25.

²*Ibid.*

³Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 585; Rubí, *Dictamen*, section 17.

⁴*Dictamen*, sections 17, 20, 25. The proposals are not given in the order of the document, but rather in that determined by the view-point of this paper.

Rubí's next proposal was to strengthen the defences of San Antonio de Béxar and increase the population in its neighborhood. By abandoning the northeastern settlements, Béxar would be left, he said, the frontier establishment of all the internal provinces—distant, indeed, more than fifty leagues from the nearest of the *presidios* in the proposed cordon. Being thus isolated, it would still be in its present danger from the Apache-Comanche wars. The thieving Lipan Apaches¹ living between Béxar and the Rio Grande would not only continue to be unpleasant neighbors themselves, but they would still attract to the settlements their enemies, the Comanches and their allies. Moreover, if the Comanches, now dangerous only to San Saba, as the friend of the Apaches, should ever invade the interior, a circumstance not to be expected,² Béxar would become the chief object of their attacks. These considerations led him even to suggest withdrawing the villa of San Fernando and the costly and imposing but decadent missions at Béxar to the Rio Grande, in the shelter of the projected line of *presidios*. Refraining, however, from so radical a proposal, he advised that a fortification should be built to protect the citizens of the villa of San Fernando, adjacent to the *presidio* of Béxar, and that the garrison of the *presidio* should be increased from twenty-three to eighty men by bringing to Béxar the soldiers from San Saba, Adaes, and Orcoquisac, unless the last should be needed at Bahía del Espíritu Santo. The governor, residing at Béxar, should, he thought, be made commander of the *presidio* of San Juan Bautista, on the Rio Grande, which might be moved nearer Béxar if circumstances demanded it. Since fear of Indians had been the chief obstacle to the growth of population, he predicted that such a strengthening of the defence of Béxar would make it possible to colonize in its vicinity on a considerable scale.³

With regard to the Apaches, who were, as we have seen, troubling

¹The branch of the Apaches who were infesting Texas were the Lipans, commonly called the Lipan Apaches.

²Rubí reflected the fears of some when he said that he could not subscribe to the opinion that the Indians might be incited by the European neighbors of Spain toward the northeast to invade the interior Spanish provinces (Dictamen, section 17).

³Dictamen, section 17.

the frontier from Chihuahua to Texas, and the settlements of Coahuila and Texas in particular, Rubí declared mercy to be ill-timed, and maintained that since the Comanches came to the settlements only in pursuit of the Apaches, danger from the Comanches and their allies would cease as soon as the Apaches should be exterminated. He recommended, therefore, that Apaches should no longer be admitted to the shelter of the missions and *presidios*, where they would only prove their treachery, but that a vigorous war should be waged against them, and that, when conquered, the tribe should be dissolved and the captives taken to the interior of Mexico.¹

Turning his attention to the Gulf coast policy, he said, contrary to the opinions of some, that it was impossible, even if necessary, to occupy the Texas part of that coast by land because of its inaccessibility from the Gulf and of its bad climatic conditions. He advised, therefore, that the *presidio* of Bahía del Espíritu Santo should remain where it was, on the San Antonio River, for these reasons as well as to protect the well-stocked ranches already established there and the people whom it was proposed to remove thither from the eastern frontier.²

Rubí realized that there would be no lack of persons to call him unpatriotic in suggesting so enormous a diminution of the king's dominion; but he reminded such that the Spanish hold upon East Texas was so slight as to be only nominal; that relinquishing this shadowy grasp would be off-set by a saving of forty-four thousand *pesos* a year; and that the spiritual and the political losses would be slight. On these points he said: "With respect to the conversion of the unfaithful, not a Christian or a neophyte, . . . will be lost on the day when the four missions are suppressed; and with respect to the protection of our real dominions, by retiring this figurative frontier of two hundred leagues and more, we shall substitute for this weak barrier one that is being more respectably constituted on the Colorado [Red] and Missouri Rivers, since the present governor of that colony [Louisiana] . . .

¹Dictamen, section 26; Bonilla, *Breve Compendio*, 61; Garrison, *Texas*, 91. A few years after this time, Governor Ripperdá recommended using the northern nations as allies in the war against the Apaches (Bonilla, *Breve Compendio*, 66). See also, *post*, p. 92.

²Dictamen, section 19.

much more according to the intentions of the king, impedes communication and traffic between it and the dominions of this realm."¹

We should not, of course, regard these proposals of the Marqués de Rubí as a recommendation that Spain should relinquish her title to the territory in question, or that she should never undertake to occupy it, for they were conditioned by the fact that beyond Texas lay another possession nominally Spanish, which, in a sense, made Texas an interior province. But they did mean that Rubí considered that for a long time to come, at least, it would be useless for Spain to try to colonize or to exercise any real control in the country between Louisiana and San Antonio de Béxar; and the adoption of these recommendations by the king was, on the part of the central government, a confession of the same sort.

II. THE NEW FRONTIER POLICY, 1772.

1. *The royal order of 1772.*—Rubí's report passed to the hands of the king, and, after the usual deliberate course of Spanish legislation, the monarch issued, on September 10, 1772, an order popularly known as the "New Regulation of *Presidios*."² This was practically an adoption of Rubí's proposals, with the supplementary legislation requisite to carry them into effect.³

We have seen that the central point of Rubí's plan was to con-

¹Dictamen, section 25.

²Reglamento é instrucción para los presidios que han de formar en la línea de frontera de la Nueva España. Resuelto por el Rey en cédula de 10 de Setiembre de 1772. First printed in Madrid, 1772. The copy of the document which I have used is in Arriillaga, *Recopilación de Leyes, decretos, Banderas, Reglamentos, Circulares y Providencias de los Supremos Poderes de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, etc. (Mexico, 1835), IX, 139-189. I have unfortunately been unable thus far to find any records revealing the inner process by which this legislation was brought about.

³On the changes made on the northern frontier in consequence of this royal order, see, besides, the authorities already cited, Revillagigedo's *Informe de Abril*, 1793 (in Cavo, *Tres Siglos*, III, 112), and his *Carta de 27 de Diciembre*, in *Diccionario Universal de Historia y de Geografía*, V, 426 (Mexico, 1853-1856, 4to 10 Vols., and Madrid, 1846-1850, 4to 8 Vols.); Velasco, *Sonora, Its Extent, etc.* (San Francisco, 1861); Escudero, *Noticias Estadísticas de Sonora y Sinaloa* (Mexico, 1849).

centrate effort upon the defence of what he considered the real possessions of New Spain. To do this it was necessary to place the fortifications in such relations that one could support another, and near enough together to prevent hostile Indians breaking through the intervening spaces. Accordingly, the royal order provided that the fifteen frontier *presidios* should be placed forty leagues apart in an irregular line extending from Altar, near the head of the Gulf of California, as the westernmost, to Bahía del Espíritu Santo, on the San Antonio River in Texas, as the easternmost. The intermediate *presidios* of the line, named in order from west to east, were to be Tubac, Terrenate, Fronteras, Janos, San Buenaventura, Paso del Norte, Guajiquilla, Julimes, Cerrogordo, San Saba, Monclova, and San Juan Bautista. Of these only three, Janos, San Juan Bautista, and Bahía del Espíritu Santo, were to remain unmoved.¹

From the outposts, Santa Fé and San Antonio de Béxar, respectively, Robledo, twenty leagues above El Paso, and Arroyo del Cíbolo, between San Antonio de Béxar and Bahía del Espíritu Santo, were to be garrisoned.²

The force at San Antonio de Béxar was to be increased to the size recommended by Rubí, by bringing the requisite number of soldiers from Adaes and Orcoquisac; Santa Fé was likewise to have eighty soldiers, Bahía del Espíritu Santo fifty-one, and the rest of the *presidios* of the line forty-six each.³ The *presidio* of San Saba, instead of being extinguished, as Rubí had suggested, was to be removed to the banks of the Rio Grande, while those of Adaes and Orcoquisac, with their missions, were to be suppressed. The families at Adaes and Los Ais were to be brought to the vicinity of Béxar and given lands.

¹The map made by de la Fora (see page 74) was the one by which the king's advisers were guided in drawing up the "New Regulation" (Arrillaga, *Recopilacion*, IX, 172). For the location of most of these *presidios* before they were changed, see maps in Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 251, 310, 377, 381.

²Reglamento é instruccion, title "Instruccion para la nueva colocacion de presidios," Sec. 1.

³At each of the other *presidios* there were to be kept ten Indian explorers, but as it was thought that there were no Indians near Bahía suitable for this purpose, that place was to have five additional soldiers (Reglamento é instruccion, Titulo Segundo, in Arrillaga, *Recopilacion*, IX, 142).

To secure a more uniform and efficient military service on the frontier, the order provided for a new general officer, the *inspector comandante* of the interior provinces of New Spain. He must be a person of at least the rank of colonel, and might not, while inspector, be a provincial governor or a presidial captain. He was put directly under orders from the viceroy, but in case a *comandante general* of the interior provinces should ever be appointed, he was to be directly subject to that officer. To aid him in the discharge of his duties two assistant inspectors were provided. These duties were primarily to keep the viceroy informed of presidial and military affairs, direct frontier campaigns, and supervise the *presidios* and presidial officers. Either he or his assistants must make an annual inspection of each of the *presidios* and report to the viceroy.

The office of *inspector comandante* was filled by the appointment of Dn. Hugo Oconor, who had recently served as governor of Texas *ad interim*. Of his career there Bonilla, author of the *Breve Compendio*, wrote, "Oconor attained the glorious distinction of leaving an immortal name in the province. He attested his valor, disinterested conduct, and military policy, he preserved peace in the land, and he made himself an object of fear to the savages, who know him by the name of el Capitan Colorado [the Red Captain]."¹ Oconor chose for his assistants Antonio Bonilla, just quoted, and Dn. Roque Medina.²

2. *Oconor's instructions to Ripperdá*.—The viceroy's instructions to Oconor for carrying the new policy into effect were issued March 10, 1773, and on May 6, Oconor, from camp at Nuestra Señora del Carmen, despatched to Baron de Ripperdá, then governor of Texas, orders for putting in force so much of the new plan as concerned his province.³ Immediately upon receiving the

¹*Breve Compendio*, 62.

²The *Breve Compendio* was written before Bonilla Became Oconor's assistant.

³Ynstruccion Reservada que han de tener presente el Colonel de Caballeria Baron de Riperda Gobernador de la Prova. de Texas para la practica en los dos Presidios de alla del nuevo Reglamto. qe. su Magd. se ha servido expedir en Diez de Septre. del Año proximo pasado, y demas puntos que contiene, para el Govno. Politica de dha. Provincia dispuesta por mi Dn. Hugo Oconor, Coronel de Infanteria Comandte. Ynspector de las Pro-

orders the governor was to go to the frontier and extinguish the two *presidios* and the four missions¹ condemned by Rubí, taking in charge the ornaments that had been given to the mission churches by the crown,² and removing to Béxar the garrisons, artillery, and munitions from the *presidios*, and whatever settlers might be found at any of the four places. The settlers were to be brought to the villa of San Fernando, given lands within the villa for building spots, and outside the villa for pasture and arable lands, and the privilege of making at their own expense an irrigating ditch from the San Antonio River.³ On returning to Béxar, he was to reorganize the garrison, choosing for the prescribed eighty men the best in all three of the companies at Adaes, Orcoquisac, and Béxar. Ripperdá was to remain captain, Cordova and Oranday, lieutenants of the garrisons of Orcoquisac and Béxar, were to be lieutenants of the reformed company, while the aged lieutenant of Adaes, José Gonzalez, a veteran of some forty years' service at the same place, was to be retired with other superannuated and useless soldiers. The company at Béxar having been reorganized, a detachment of twenty men was to be sent at once to Arroyo del Cíbolo.⁴ The purpose of garrisoning this place was to protect a number of ranches in the neighborhood, and to cover the long distance between Béxar and Bahía del Espíritu Santo.⁵

¶ III. REMOVAL OF THE SETTLERS FROM THE EASTERN FRONTIER,
1773.

1. *Ripperdá on the frontier.*—These instructions reached the hands of Ripperdá on May 18. He apparently did not favor the *vincias de este Reyno de Nueva España de Orden del Exmo. Sor. Fr. Dn. Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua, Virrey Governor, y Capitan General de ella* (in *Expediente sobre proposiciones*, 79-90).

¹The official names of these missions were Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Nacogdoches, Nuestra Señora del Pilar de los Adaes, Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Ais, and Nuestra Señora de la Luz.

²The rest of the movables of the missions were to go to the College of Zacatecas, upon which the missions depended (*Ynstruccion Reservada*, Sec. 2).

³Ynstruccion Reservada, Secs. 5-9.

⁴Ibid, Secs. 10-15.

⁵See note on Arroyo del Cíbolo, page 87.

step about to be taken, as will be seen later on, but within a week, nevertheless, he set out for the frontier, going first to Adaes and returning by way of Nacogdoches.¹ It seems that the garrison of Orecoquisac was already at Béxar, and that, therefore, Ripperdá did not go to Orecoquisac.² As affairs at Béxar demanded his attention, he remained only eight days in the settlements, leaving the execution of his mission to Lieutenant Gonzalez, of the Adaes garrison.

At mission Nacogdoches, where a large concourse of Indians was assembled, the governor was visited by the head chief of the Téxas, Santo, or Vigotes, who had suspended hostilities with the Osages in order to entreat the Spaniards not to leave the frontier. Vigotes seem to have been moved to this solicitude in part by the fact that the Lipans were just then threatening hostilities.³ He undoubtedly knew, too, that the withdrawal of the Spaniards meant a decrease in the number of presents and in the available supply of firearms and other articles of trade.

Contrary to Rubí's prediction that Adaes was bringing to a close its unfortunate career, since his visit six years before the place seems to have prospered, at least in so far as numbers are a sign of prosperity; for whereas in 1767 Rubí was able to report only about thirty families — perhaps two hundred persons — Ripperdá estimated a population of more than five hundred, living near the *presidio* and on ranches round about Adaes and Los Ais.⁴ These

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, May 28, 1773, and July 11, 1773, in Vol. 100, *Provincias Internas*, Archivo General.

²On his return from the frontier the governor mentioned finding Captain Pacheco, of the Orecoquisac garrison, at Béxar. A report made on Dec. 15, 1771, shows that at that time all of the garrison belonging to Orecoquisac, as well as fifty of the soldiers from Adaes, were in Béxar. Whether the Orecoquisac garrison had remained there all this time I can not say. Ripperdá may have gone to Adaes by way of Orecoquisac, which would account for the garrison reaching Béxar in advance of the governor (Ripperdá to the viceroy, Dec. 15, 1771, and July 11, 1773, in Vol. 100, *Provincias Internas*, Archivo General).

³Ripperdá to the viceroy, July 11, 1773 (Letter No. 30, Vol. 100, *Provincias Internas*, Archivo General).

⁴*Ibid.*

figures are fairly substantiated by other evidence.¹ The population was a mixture of Spanish, French, and Indians, and, perhaps, Negroes. Much of the recent growth seems to have been due to an influx, after Louisiana became a Spanish province, of French and half-breeds from Natchitoches, some of them Indian traders.

2. *Antonio Gil Ybarbo*.—The most prominent citizen of the vicinity was Antonio Gil Ybarbo, who becomes the central character of the remainder of this sketch. The few facts that we can gather of his previous career shed light upon conditions on the eastern frontier, and, viewed in connection with Ybarbo's subsequent influence, upon the attitude of the government towards these conditions. Ybarbo was a native of Adaes, and at the time when this story opens he was about forty-four years old.² By his enemies he was reputed to be a mulatto.³ Though his headquarters seem to have been at Adaes, he was the owner of and lived part of the time upon a large ranch, called El Lobanillo (the Mole or Wart), situated near the mission of Los Ais. The documents represent this ranch as "already a pueblo," and tell us that Ybarbo possessed there a large amount of stock. In addition to his ranching interests he was also a trader, having for several years maintained commercial relations, both at Adaes and El Lobanillo, with a wealthy French merchant, Nicolas de la Mathe, from Point Coupée,⁴ Louisiana.⁵

¹See page 89.

²According to a statement made by Ybarbo in 1792 he was then sixty-three years old. This would have made him about forty-four years old in 1773. See a census of Nacogdoches, dated at Béxar, Dec. 31, 1792, and signed by Ybarbo (Béxar Archives).

³This statement is based on the assertion of Juan Ugalde, *comandante general* of the Eastern Internal Provinces, who was hostile to Ybarbo, and who, at the time he made the assertion, was trying to secure Ybarbo's removal from office (Ugalde to the viceroy, Oct. 30, 1788, in *Consulta del Sr. Comandante Gral.*, etc., 9-11).

⁴The Spanish documents render this name Punta Cortada or Puente Cortada.

⁵Quaderno que Corresponde, 9; testimony of Fr. Josef Francisco Mariano de la Garza, Nov. 14, 1787 (Béxar Archives). Garza was for several years in charge of spiritual affairs at Bucareli and Nacogdoches, and he knew Ybarbo well. His testimony was that of a warm supporter of Ybarbo, and was, therefore, not intended to be damaging in any way. For more about Father Garza, see pages 113-115; and about La Mathe, page 108.

In view of the hostility of the Spanish government toward French trade among the Indians and of the chronic complaint about French smuggling on the border, Ybarbo's position might be regarded as a questionable one did we not have good reason to suspect that, in spite of a multitude of laws, such things were customarily winked at by the local officials and lightly regarded as a question of private morals. Once at least, however, Ybarbo's trading activities had got him into trouble. It was during the administration of Hugo Oconor, who, in some circles, had the unusual reputation of having entirely put an end to contraband trade in Texas.¹ This official tells us that at one time Ybarbo had been imprisoned several months, in handcuffs, for complicity in the sale at Natchitoches and New Orleans of various droves of mules and horses stolen by the Indians from San Saba, Béxar, and Bahía.² Just what form the complicity took is not stated.

Notwithstanding his questionable pursuits, he was prominent in the affairs of the locality, and was held in favor by Oconor's successor, the Baron de Ripperdá. Because of his prominence, he was intrusted by Governor Ripperdá, who had never seen him, with the administration of the funds for purchasing the presidial supplies, a responsibility which he is said to have discharged wisely and honestly.³ Other indications of his good standing with the governor and of his influence in the affairs of Texas will appear as the story proceeds.

3. *Consternation among the settlers.*—As soon as he had arrived at Adaes, Ripperdá had issued an order that within five days every one must be ready for the march to Béxar.⁴ To the inhabitants this meant no less than expatriation. The love of home is deeply rooted in the human breast—the more deeply the simpler the people. Many of these had been born and had spent all their lives in the place; some had personal ties across Arroyo Hondo in the French settlement or in the Indian villages; and some had smaller or larger material interests in ranches and in Indian trade. It can not, therefore, cause surprise that the governor's order

¹See Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz.

²Oconor to the viceroy, Dec. 31, 1775. Quaderno que Corresponde, 41.

³Testimony of Father Garza, Nov. 14, 1787 (Béxar Archives).

⁴Ybarbo to Oconor, Jan. 8, 1774, in Quaderno que Corresponde, 6.

created a commotion. An extension of the time was asked and a few days were granted.¹ A number of persons, thirty-five according to the reports, refusing to be thus evicted, fled to the woods. Most of the inhabitants, however, prepared to obey the command, though apparently with bad grace in some cases, for complaint was made against Gonzalez that "when the day for leaving arrived he mounted a horse and went from house to house, driving the people from them."² This, no doubt, reflects the unwillingness of the people to leave rather than any harshness on the part of the old officer.

The sudden removal involved, of course, the abandonment of whatever permanent improvements the settlers had made, small in general though these doubtless were. The urgency of the order did not allow time for suitable preparation for the march. The people were without supplies sufficient for so long a journey. Their stock, of which they seem to have had considerable, was scattered, and much of it could not be collected. Corn was nearly ready for harvesting, but it had to be abandoned. Some things which could not be carried, including the gun carriages, some of the cannons, and the greater part of the ammunition, were buried within the *presidio*.³

4. *The journey to San Antonio de Béxar.*—On June 25, the day appointed, the weary three months' journey from Adaes to San Antonio de Béxar was begun. When the company reached Ybarbo's ranch at El Lobanillo, twenty-four persons dropped behind, some being too ill to travel, others staying to care for the sick. Several of these were of Ybarbo's family. His mother, sister, and

¹Ybarbo does not mention the request for or the granting of the extension of time in his complaints about the hardships of the Adaesans. But Ripperdá (letter to the viceroy, July 11, 1773) says that such a request was made and conceded, a statement that is borne out by other evidence. Ripperdá left Béxar for Adaes on May 25th. He says he was twelve days going, eight days there, and twelve days returning. He must have arrived in Adaes, therefore, on June 6th, and left on the 14th. His final order required that Adaes be abandoned on June 26th (Letter No. 30, Vol. 100, Provincias Internas, Archivo General).

²Ybarbo to Oconor, Jan. 8, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 6.

³Ripperdá to the viceroy, Sept. 28, 1773, in *Autos*, 21-22; Ybarbo to Oconor, Jan. 8, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 6.

sister-in-law were, it was represented, all unable to make the trip, and Ybarbo had secured from the governor a written permission to leave them, and with them his son and another family.¹ These facts, considered in connection with subsequent events, lead one to suspect that Ybarbo was not at this time intending to abandon his home for good and all. At mission Nacogdoches nine persons, comprising two families, dropped out, at the request, so the story goes, of the Téxas chief, Vigotes, who declared his intention of going to Béxar with his people to beg the governor to allow the Spaniards to return with a *padre*. At this place the aged Gonzalez and two women died. In Gonzalez's stead, the sergeant took charge of the march.

According to the reports, after leaving Nacogdoches the suffering of the emigrants was severe.² They were poorly supplied with beasts of burden, and many of them, women as well as men, had to go on foot till they reached the Brazos. In order to obtain food some were forced to sell not only their clothing, but even their rosaries and other sacred treasures. Owing to this scarcity of food, the drought experienced during the first half of the way, and the heavy floods encountered on the latter portion, there was much sickness among both people and animals, as a result of which ten children died, and some of the cattle were lost. At the Brazos, however, the party was met by supplies and mules sent out by the governor, and the suffering was relieved. At Arroyo del Cíbolo, where, in pursuance of the royal order, a garrison of twenty men had just been stationed by the governor,³ a few more persons

¹Ybarbo to Oeonor, Jan. 8, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 7.

²Gonzales died on July 30th, hence more than a month was consumed in getting past Nacogdoches. This does not indicate any great haste (Autos, 22).

³Arroyo del Cíbolo was doubtless identical with modern Cíbolo Creek, which joins the San Antonio River about half way between San Antonio and Goliad, or old Bahía del Espíritu Santo. According to Governor Ripperdá, the settlement on this *arroyo* was located "at the crossing of the Texas and the Tuacanes" (Ripperdá to the viceroy, Nov. 25, 1773. Letter No. 52, Vol. 100, Provincias Internas, Archivo General). According to a representation made by the government of the villa of San Fernando to Croix, Jan. 12, 1778 (Los Vecinos, etc., 10) it was about eighteen leagues eastward from San Antonio de Béxar. In 1782 the *ranchos* here were six in number, with a population of 85. Some twenty-five *ranchos*

dropped out of the company. Finally, on Sept. 26, the residue straggled into Béxar, foot-sore, and so broken in health that within some three months more than thirty others died. With the party had come the four missionaries¹ from Adaes, Los Ais, and Nacogdoches. The soldiers brought with them, drawn by the oxen of the settlers, twelve four-pound cannons, fifteen boxes of ammunition and eight *tercios* of gun-carriage iron.²

5. *The aftermath.*—No sooner had the Spaniards left Adaes than the neighboring Indians raided the place, scattered things about, and unearthed and carried away part of the ammunition and other effects buried within the *presidio*.³ But the Indians did not get all the spoils, for the families left at El Lobanillo appeared upon the scene and saved what they could.⁴ The runaways from Adaes shortly transferred their headquarter to El Lobanillo. On September 13, Pellier, in command at Natchitoches, wrote to Ripperdá that "many fugitives who escaped from the convoy from los Adaes have taken refuge at Lobanillo. They come surreptitiously to my post in search of liquor (*aguardiente*) with the purpose of introducing it into the tribes."⁵ With the Spanish garrison removed, the French apparently flocked in to trade and live among the Indians in greater numbers than before.⁶

had been abandoned (see Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 632). For additional information concerning this settlement, see *Los Vecinos*, etc., *passim*.

¹According to Rubí (see ante, p. 75) there had been five in 1767.

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, Sept. 28, 1773; petition of Ybarbo and others to the governor, Oct. 4, 1773—both in Autos, 21-22,4. Ybarbo to Oeonor, Jan. 8, 1774, in Quaderno que Corresponde, 7.

Four of the cannons brought to Béxar were ordered sent to Monclova (the viceroy to Ripperdá, Feb. 9, 1774, in Vol. 99, *Provincias Internas*).

³Testimony of a Spaniard who returned to Adaes for a sick man who had been left behind (Ripperdá to the viceroy, Sept. 28, 1773, in Autos, 21-22).

⁴Oeonor to Ripperdá, Feb. 17, 1774, reviewing a letter which he had received from Ripperdá.

⁵Volume 100, *Provincias Internas*. The original letter is in French. It is accompanied by a translation into Spanish.

⁶Ybarbo, in writing to Oeonor, Jan. 8, 1774, said: "Scarcely had we left when Frenchmen settled in all the nations. This report we got

So far as I have been able to ascertain, some of these people never left El Lobanillo, although orders were given to remove them, and Ybarbo did remove some of them. Thus it is possible, and even probable, that in spite of government commands the frontier was never wholly abandoned.

IV. THE ATTEMPT TO SETTLE AT LOS AIS.

1. *The petition of the Adaesans.*—As soon as the Adaesans arrived at Béxar, Ripperdá, in accordance with his instructions, promulgated among them an order to choose anywhere within the villa of San Fernando such lands as they desired for their building spots, fields, and pastures, providing that by the choice they should not interfere with the rights of settlers or of the Indians at the missions. Thinking that the families who had stopped at Arroyo del Cíbolo could do no better than to settle there, he sent a lieutenant to that place to lay out lands for them in case they chose to remain there.¹

But the Adaesans, both those at Arroyo del Cíbolo and those at Béxar, promptly refused to choose lands or to accept them, for they wished to return to the eastern frontier;² and eight days after arriving, they presented to the governor a petition to that effect, signed by seventy-five men.³ It stated that the lo-

from a Spaniard who remained behind sick, as well as from one of the French traders who came with some Indians and reported the fact" (Quaderno que Corresponde, 8).

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, Sept. 28, and Dec. 10, 1773, in Autos, 8, 21; Ybarbo to Oconor, Jan. 8, 1774, in Quaderno que Corresponde, 8.

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, Sept. 28, 1773, in Autos, 21.

³Only seventy-five names appear on the copy of the petition in my possession, but Ripperdá says there were seventy-six (Reply to the petitioners, in Autos, 5). It may be that the original petition contained seventy-six. Ripperdá stated that the families of these petitioners included 126 persons, which would make 202 individuals represented by the petition. In a letter of Dec. 11, 1773, the governor says the petition represented the majority of the Adaesans. If this be true, his estimate of the number of persons on the frontier (see page 83) was too large, even if he meant to include the soldiers who were there. According to Lieutenant Pacheco there were in Béxar in April, 1774, 140 men from Adaes capable of bearing arms (Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz, 13).

cality at San Fernando offered little or no opportunity to form a settlement without encroaching upon the rights of others;¹ that, because of the loss of all their property through the removal from the frontier, the petitioners were bankrupt and could not make the proposed aqueduct; that they wished permission to form a new pueblo at the old mission of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Ais, where, because of its nearness to Adaes, they might be able to recover some of the goods they had left scattered at their former homes; and that they hoped that, because of their known loyalty, their sufferings on the way from Adaes, and their present need, their prayer would be granted. In this event they agreed to bear, themselves, all the expense of the return, except for the support of a chaplain, whom they wished provided at government expense for ten years.²

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these petitioners so far as their request to be allowed to return to the frontier is concerned. But the claim that there was no room for them at Béxar was absurd, while the choice of the particular location asked for is suggestive of the part played by Gil Ybarbo in the matter. Mission Los Ais was close by his ranch, El Lobanillo. He was the person who had the most to lose by being driven from the frontier. He was the most influential man among them, acting as spokesman for the rest, and, naturally enough, his interests were not forgotten in the choice of a site for a new settlement. At El Lobanillo he had left his family; here he hoped to recover his lost stock and other property; here he had a ranch well established; and it may be supposed that, as was afterwards charged, he was loath to abandon the interests he had developed in contraband trade. Other persons who signed the petition were, no doubt, for similar reasons genuinely anxious to return, but the impression remains, nevertheless, that, although he represented the sincere wishes of his neighbors, Ybarbo was the moving spirit in the attempt to undo the policy of the government.

2. *Ripperdá favors the petition.*—The petitioners probably ex-

¹In a letter to Oeonor, Ybarbo said that the country from the Béxar to the Guadalupe was "overrun (*infestado*) with stock, missions, and men" (*Quaderno que Corresponde*, 7).

²Petition of Gil Ybarbo and others, Oct. 4, 1773, in *Autos*, 1-5.

pected support from Ripperdá,—indeed he may have encouraged them to present their request,—for it was known that withdrawal from the frontier was not in accord with his desires. Ever since he had become governor he had taken, under the influence of Captain Atanacio de Mezières y Clugnes, of Natchitoches, a definite position regarding relations with the northeastern tribes. Of first importance was to keep them under Spanish influence so that they not only would remain friendly themselves, but also might be used against the enemies of the Spaniards, particularly the Apaches and the Comanches. This was the key-note of his dealings with the northeastern Indians, and it seems to have been a foremost consideration in his relations with Ybarbo.

Through the aid of Mezières and Father Ramirez, president of the Texas missions, Ripperdá had in 1771 and 1772 ratified treaties of friendship with several of the northernmost tribes,¹ who had formerly been considered as enemies, and, at Mezières's suggestion, he had advocated enlisting these new friends in a campaign against the Apaches.² He maintained, moreover, that they could not be kept friendly unless, like the French, the Spaniards would supply them with fire-arms and ammunition. Otherwise, he said, they would prefer war to peace, for the sake of an excuse for engaging in their favorite pastime of stealing horses from the Spaniards and selling them to the French. As an additional means of cementing their friendship he recommended establishing among them a new *presidio*, with a colony of citizens and a mission near it.

With foreign enemies as well as the Indians in view, he advocated extending a line of *presidios* clear from New Mexico to the

¹The principal ones of these were the Quitseis (Keechis), west or a little northwest of Nacogdoches; the Yscanis, a short distance west of the Quitseis; the Tawakanas on the Trinity and the Brazos rivers west of the Yscanis; the Tonkawas, who lived a wandering life between the middle courses of the Brazos and the Trinity; the Xaranames, apostates from the mission at Bahía, now living among or near the Tawakanas; the Ovedsitas (Wichitas?), living on the Salt Fork of the Brazos; and the Taovayases (Towash?), living northeast of the Ovedsitas on the Red River west of one of the Cross Timbers (Mezières, *Informe, passim*).

²Mezières to Ripperdá, July 4, 1772, in *Expediente sobre proposiciones, 24-61. Bonilla, Breve Compendio*, 66.

Mississippi.¹ A new argument for more strongly defending the eastern frontier was now available and was made use of by Ripperdá to support this proposal. It was not long after the cession of the country east of the Mississippi to the English before there began to be talk of danger from that quarter, much as formerly there has been talk of danger from the French. Rubí had said he did not entertain any such fears² although others did. Later on, rumors floated in from the north that gave some ground for such apprehensions. Mezières claimed that when he was on his extended tour among the northern Indians in 1772, carrying to them the sword and the olive branch, he found among the Taovayases a certain Indian, named José, who was engaged in bringing from the Panis-Mahas (Pawnees?) firearms of foreign—that is, neither French nor Spanish—make. He found there also two Panis-Mahas advertising the advantages of trading with the English. These he brought to Béxar to be questioned on the subject.³ In addition to these things, Mezières declared the Osage Indians to be hostile to the Spaniards and friendly toward the English.⁴

Mezières's report convinced Ripperdá that, to keep them from contamination, the Taovayases and Ovedsitas should be brought from their remote homes on the upper Brazos and the upper Red rivers to the interior, and the new *presidio* established among them; and he saw in the situation of the Osages and the threatened English trade an additional argument for keeping an influence over all the northern Indians, namely, that they might be used eventually in driving the Osages and their allies across the Missouri River, or even in repelling an invasion by the English themselves.

The eastern tribes, living between Adaes and the middle Trinity were generally friendly toward the Spaniards, but recently suspicion had arisen that the Vidais and the Téxas were becoming

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, April 28, 1772, and July 5, 1772, in Expediente sobre proposiciones, 2-3, 19-20; Bonilla, *Breve Compendio*, 65-66. Ripperdá had earlier than this expressed similar opinions. See the *informe* of Barrios to the viceroy, Nov. 6, 1771, in Vol. 99, Provincias Internas, Archivo General.

²Dictamen, paragraph 17.

³Informe del Capn. infanta. Dn. Athanacio de Mezières al Sr. Coronel Baron de Ripperdá, July 4, 1772, in Expediente sobre proposiciones, 37-39.

⁴*Ibid.*

too friendly toward the Apaches, the worst enemy of the Spaniards. Ripperdá, therefore, favored establishing a closer surveillance over these tribes.¹

It is not surprising, therefore, that the governor, entertaining for the frontier such plans as these, should use his influence in behalf of the Adaesans, whose wish accorded so well with his. He replied to the petitioners that he could not grant their request without the infraction of a royal command,—that is, the king's order of 1772,—but that he sympathized with their cause, and that if they could not find suitable lands at San Fernando, at Arroyo del Cibolo, or in any of the old ranches in the neighborhood, they might carry their petition to the viceroy.²

3. *Ybarbo and Flores sent to Mexico.*—After some delay, during which an attempt may have been made to find lands to their liking, although this is doubtful, the Adaesans acted upon the governor's suggestion. On December 10, Ybarbo and Gil Flores, the two most prominent of their number,³ were formally made the authorized agents of the citizens to carry the petition to the viceroy.⁴ When they left Béxar they carried with them letters from the governor to the viceroy and Hugo Oconor. To prove the need of a minister on the frontier they carried a certificate taken from the records just brought to Béxar of the number of baptisms performed at the missions at Adaes and at Nacogdoches during their existence. This statement could hardly be considered the most convincing evidence, for it showed that in over half a century the aggregate number of baptisms at the two missions had been only three hundred and forty.⁵

In these letters to the viceroy and the inspector general, Rip-

¹Expediente sobre proposiciones, 1-3, 11-17; Ripperdá to the viceroy, July 5, 1775, in Expediente sobre proposiciones, 19-21.

²Autos, 5.

³“We who have most to lose” (Petition of Ybarbo and Flores, May 10, 1774, in Quaderno que Corresponde, 30.

⁴The certificate of authority is signed by fifty-two persons (Autos, 6). The agents were elected by majority vote (Los Vecinos, etc., 7.)

⁵The report for the mission at Nacogdoches extended from June 24, 1717, to April 17, 1768, and for that at Los Adaes from August 6, 1716, to Feb. 12, 1773 (Autos, 17, 18).

perdá made it clear that an adverse royal order had not served to change his mind with respect to the frontier. On the contrary, he restated his views with emphasis.

He said that he was not fully informed of the reason for having abandoned East Texas, but that he believed it would be advantageous to Béxar and the other interior settlements to establish Spaniards among the northern Indians, particularly the Tawakanas and Taovayases,¹ the northernmost and at the same time the most numerous and powerful of all the nations in the province. Since these tribes were new friends, such settlements would, he thought, be valuable as serving to cement and retain their alliance. By forming a militia of the settlers, a line of defence would be established from Béxar to Natchitoches. The only objection to such a plan that he could see would be the encouragement that might be given by the presence of the settlers to trade with the French at Natchitoches. But that, he said, was going on briskly even now, not only with the Taovayases and Tawakanas and other tribes hitherto supplied from Louisiana, but also with those supposedly supplied from the interior of Texas, as was proved by the fact that these Indians were so well provided with goods that when they came to Béxar they even had guns to sell to the Spaniards. He thought, moreover, that an attempt to close the trade with Natchitoches might have even worse results, in driving the Indians to trade with the English, which they could easily do. These considerations induced him, he said, to recommend the petition carried by Ybarbo and Flores as one worthy of careful consideration. In his letter to Oconor Ripperdá referred to a private request which Ybarbo had to make, and bespoke for him Oconor's assistance, so that in case the main petition should not be granted, "ultimately his ranch, El Lobanillo, might come to form a pueblo of more than sixty persons." From this it seems probable that at this time Ybarbo intended to ask permission to return to his ranch without the remainder of the petitioners, to collect and form a settlement of the persons left on the frontier, who numbered some sixty or more.²

¹After bringing the latter to the interior, he probably meant.

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, Dec. 10, 1773 (Autos, 8) and to Oconor, Dec. 11, 1773 (Quaderno que Corresponde, 10-11).

It will be seen further on that the private request actually made of the viceroy was slightly different in form from what Ripperdá apparently understood it to be, although it was not essentially different in effect.

The commissioners left for Mexico some time in December or early in January. On the 8th of January they were at Santa Rosa María. From this place Ybarbo dispatched a letter to Oconor, who was at Chihuahua.¹ In it he set forth in great detail the hardship incident to the eviction from Adaes and the sad plight of the exiles at Béxar. He said that more than thirty of his compatriots had died at Béxar previous to his leaving, and only God knew how many since; that subsequent to arriving there some of the families had been forced to go about the *presidio* and missions begging and some had even been forced to steal, in consequence of which trouble had arisen with the citizens; and that within two days after reaching Béxar the Indians had carried off the few animals they had brought. In conclusion, he said that he thought a settlement ought to be established on the frontier to keep out the French who were flocking in, and asked Oconor to support his demands.

4. *The petition granted.*—Having arrived in Mexico, the agents presented their petition, together with an address, on the 28th of February. The readiness with which the government now proceeded to reverse a definite policy of the king is, to say the least, surprising. In his action in the matter the viceroy was guided almost entirely by the advice of Areche, the fiscal, who, in his turn, was dependent upon conflicting reports from Béxar, Bahía, and Chihuahua. This official, to whom the petition and Ripperdá's letter were referred,² reported³ that in his opinion the proposal to establish a settlement at Los Ais was commendable, as a means of checking Indian assaults; that the king's reason for extinguishing the mission at Los Ais had been that it was without Indians and useless; and that the viceroy would do well to grant the request and

¹The letter was sent by Roque Medina, assistant inspector (*Quaderno que Corresponde*, 16).

²On Feb. 28th.

³On March 7th.

to order the governor to put the measure into effect.¹ He does not seem to have been impressed with the argument predicated upon danger from the English, for he did not refer to it in his report. He advised proceeding through the governor on the ground that Oconor's many duties and his distance from Texas would entail delay.²

The matter next went before a *junta de guerra y hacienda* called by the viceroy for the purpose. This body resolved that, in view of the situation of the Adaesans, and, more particularly, of the advantage that would, according to the governor, result from a settlement on the eastern frontier, the petition should be granted; that the Adaesans should be settled in Los Ais in conformity with the laws for the settlement of new pueblos and *lugares*,³ that the viceroy should instruct the president of the Texas missions to appoint a minister for the proposed settlement, provide through the *sinodo* for his equipment and maintenance, and make plans for bringing near the new pueblo as many of the surrounding tribes as possible, as a means of keeping them quiet and of preventing their communication with the English and other foreigners. This decision of the *junta* the viceroy ordered carried out.⁴

5. *Oconor interferes.*—Thus far Ybarbo's mission had prospered without a hitch. But a communication received by the viceroy suddenly changed the situation. In reply to Ripperdá's lett of Dec. 11 Oconor had written saying that he could not support Ybarbo's petition, and ordering the governor to bring to Béxar the people and the ammunition left on the frontier.⁵ To the viceroy he wrote in terms of strongest disapproval of the whole plan. He said that he was convinced that private interest, ignorance, mistaken piety, and malice had combined to defeat royal plans favorable to peace. Citing Rubí's report as authority, he maintained that Adaes had long been the seat of contraband trade in

¹Autos, 13.

²*Ibid.*, 13-14.

³See *Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias*, Lib. IV, Titulo VII.

⁴The *junta* was held March 17th, and on March 23d the viceroy gave the order to put its resolution into effect (Quaderno que Corresponde, 12-13).

⁵Oconor to Ripperdá, Feb. 17, 1774, in Autos, 19-20.

fire-arms and ammunition carried on among the northern Indians in spite of numerous royal orders, and that the reason why Gil Ybarbo and his co-petitioners wished to return to Los Ais was to engage in this illicit trade. Referring to an Indian who had accompanied Ybarbo and Flores to Mexico, he said that it was sad indeed that in addition to supporting so preposterous a petition, diametrically opposed to a royal order, Ripperdá should give to northern Indians a passport clear to the capital, thus enabling them to learn the routes into Coahuila and the state of its defences. Finally, he requested that Ripperdá should be required to carry out his previous orders with respect to the Adaesans, and to put a stop to contraband trade in Texas carried on from Natchitoches.¹

Just when this letter reached the viceroy does not appear, but four days after the *junta* had granted Ybarbo's petition it was referred to Areche.² A week later he advised that the recent action be rescinded, and that a new *junta* be called to reconsider the matter in the light of Oconor's letter and the reports of Rubí and Rivera, to which Oconor had referred. This plan was adopted, and on May 5 the new *junta* decided to refer the matter, with full testimony, to Oconor, with authority to grant or refuse the request, as he thought best.³ What his decision would be could hardly have been doubtful in the light of his previous expressions relative to the subject.

6. *The matter temporarily referred to Ripperdá.*—Upon learning of the decision of the *junta*, Ybarbo and Flores decided to present the private petition to which Ripperdá had referred,⁴ and to return to Texas without waiting for the settlement of their main business. Accordingly, on May 10, they asked permission to remove their families temporarily to Natchitoches, as a base of operations from which to recover their abandoned property.⁵ This

¹Oconor to the viceroy, Feb. 21, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 14-17.

²March 21.

³Areche to the viceroy, March 28, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 17-18; decision of the *junta*, *Ibid.*, 28-29.

⁴See page 94.

⁵To enable them to make the journey home, they asked for financial aid from the government, which was granted them in the form of a loan. During their stay in Mexico the government had supplied them each with a stipend of two *reals* a day (*Quaderno que Corresponde*, 30-32).

request was refused, and on the same day that he referred the decision to Oconor the viceroy instructed Ripperdá that he must not permit Ybarbo and Flores to go to Natchitoches under any consideration. But the force of this prohibition was greatly weakened by adding to it the very elastic instruction that he should give Ybarbo and Flores aid in locating the Adaesans "in a suitable place."¹ It seems that the viceroy verbally told Ybarbo that the new settlement must be one hundred leagues from Natchitoches, meaning, doubtless, that it should be no nearer than this.²

Thus on one and the same day the viceroy had left the matter in the hands of two different persons whose policies were at variance. While Bucareli doubtless intended Ripperdá to make only a temporary arrangement pending Oconor's decision, this vacillating and double policy left open the way for misunderstanding and for the eventual defeat of the royal plans, a result which was fostered also by Oconor's preoccupation and his procrastination. After a lapse of six weeks Oconor asked to be relieved from the responsibility imposed upon him, on the ground that it was an affair of Ripperdá's, and that he was too far away and too busy to perform the duty. The viceroy insisted, however, but long before Oconor was ready to turn his attention to the affair, Ripperdá had made arrangements difficult to set aside.³ When Oconor took the matter up with Ripperdá, the latter replied that he had already established the Adaesans in a settlement. Apparently in ignorance of the viceroy's order of May 17 to Ripperdá, Oconor now reprimanded the governor for exceeding his authority, since the decision had been left to himself. To this the governor naturally replied that he had acted according to the viceroy's orders, and this information Oconor chose to consider an excuse for another year's inaction.

¹"Donde corresponde, segun lo que está prevenido" (The viceroy to Ripperdá, May 17, 1774, in the Béxar Archives). See also Oconor to the viceroy, Dec. 31, 1775, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 42.

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, Sept. 10, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 34.

³Oconor to the viceroy, July 5, 1775, and Dec. 31, 1775; the viceroy to Oconor, August 30, 1775; Oconor to Ripperdá, Nov. 20, 1775; and Ripperdá to Oconor, Feb. 5, 1775—all in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 40-54.

V. THE SETTLEMENT AT PILAR DE BUCARELI, 1774-1779.¹

1. *The selection of a site for the Adaesans.*—The location of the Adaesans was thus left temporarily, until Oconor should interfere, to Ripperdá, with only the restriction that the place chosen must be at least one hundred leagues from Natchitoches. In the performance of this commission he again showed his sympathy with the desires of Ybarbo and his opposition to the royal policy by sending the Adaesans to a place as far from Béxar and as near to the northeastern frontier as the terms of his authority would allow.

The site designated by him was on the right bank of the Trinity River, at Paso Tomás, which was apparently at the crossing of the Old San Antonio Road and the La Bahía Road over that stream. This opinion as to the location of Paso Tomás is based upon the following data: Ripperdá said that it was the place where "the lower Adaes road," or, as he otherwise described it, "the road leading [from Béxar] to . . . Adaes and Orcoquisac" crossed the Trinity.² We are told, too, that it was above Orcoquisac,³ and considerably nearer to Nacogdoches than to the coast, the distances to these places being roughly in the proportion of two to three.⁴ It must, therefore, if this be true, have been at least as far up the river as the upper portion of Walker County. It was, moreover, at a point in a pretty direct line be-

¹The fullest printed account of this settlement, so far as I know, is the one by Bancroft (*North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 630), which occupies only a page, and that marred by errors and half truths.

²Ripperdá (writing from Béxar) to the viceroy, September 1, 1774, and November 15, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 34-36.

³Ybarbo, in describing a trip made by him to the coast in 1777, said that he went through Orcoquisac. See a summary of his report in a letter from Ripperdá to Croix, August 30, 1777, in *Expediente sobre. . . Parroco*, 13-19.

⁴Ripperdá said that Paso Tomás was "three regular days [march] from the coast" (Letter to the viceroy, November 15, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 36). Ybarbo reported that it was only a two days' march from the Texas village at Nacogdoches (Letter to Croix, May 13, 1779).

tween Nacogdoches and Béxar,¹ and could not, therefore, have been very far from the Old San Antonio Road which, it has usually been supposed, passed very directly between these places. It was, finally, in the Vidais country, their main village being within two leagues.² The location of this tribe in the later Spanish period of Texas history is marked in modern geography by Bidais Creek, which flows into the Trinity River between Walker and Madison counties.

These data, taken all together, make it seem probable, as has been said, that Paso Tomás was at the crossing of the Old San Antonio Road and the La Bahía Road over the Trinity. The La Bahía Road could with propriety have been referred to as the lower Adaes road, and at the same time as the road leading from Béxar to Adaes and Orcoquisac. Moreover, according to most of the old maps, the Old San Antonio Road and the La Bahía Road crossed the Trinity together at a point above the mouth of Bidais Creek.³ This place has in modern times been identified with the crossing known as Robbins's Ferry, at the old village of Randolph, in Madison County.

2. *The reasons assigned for the selection.*—The reasons given

¹Francisco Xavier Fragoso, in company with Pedro Vial, made, in 1788, a careful survey of the distances from Santa Fé to Natchitoches, from Natchitoches to Béxar, and from Béxar to Santa Fé. As he had been sent out expressly to survey these routes, we should be able to place dependence upon what he says about directions and distances. According to his diary practically no change was made from a southwesterly direction in passing from Nacogdoches to Béxar. He was on one of the well known routes across Texas, which was in all likelihood the Old San Antonio Road. On the way between these two places he passed through the abandoned site of Bucareli, as the settlement made at Paso Tomás was called (Fragosa, "Derrotero, Diario, y Calculacion de Leguas," etc. See bibliographical note, page 69.)

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, November 15, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 36, and to Croix, April 27, 1777, in *Documentos para la Historia . . . de Texas*, XXVIII, 224.

³See Austin's map, made in 1835, in Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 75; another map made in 1835, given in Wooten, *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 784; E. E. Lee's map of Texas, made in 1836, in McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, V, 12; John Arrowsmith's map, made in 1840, in Kennedy, *Texas*, I (2d ed., 1841).

by Ripperdá in his correspondence, either directly or by implication, for the selection of this site, were, briefly stated, (1) that Paso Tomás was on the highway from Béxar to Natchitoches, somewhere near midway, and that a settlement there would facilitate communication between the two places; (2) that it was sheltered from the Comanches through having between it and this dread foe the friendly Tawakanas and Tonkawas; (3) that it was in an agricultural region of extreme richness, which might be expected later on to provide the *presidios* of Béxar and Bahía with horses and certain other products that then came from outside; (4) that it would be a good place from which to watch and cut off French contraband trade; (5) that it lay in the midst of a number of friendly Indian tribes, some to the north and some to the south, which fact gave it special advantages as a base of operations for keeping them amicable and for doing missionary work among them; (6) and finally, that it was a vantage point from which to guard the Gulf coast from the inroads of the English,¹ who were now beginning to be feared in that direction as well as toward the northeast.

The last two reasons were the ones most emphasized by the governor. His desire to establish and maintain an influence over the northeastern tribes has already been set forth. His emphasis of danger from the English may be accounted for by the fact that rumors of English traders on the Gulf coast were becoming numerous. An example of these rumors may be of interest. In the fall of 1772 it was reported that Englishmen were in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Trinity cutting wood for houses and giving presents to the Indians. Captain Cazorla, commander of the garrison at Bahía, was sent out to investigate the ground for such a tale. He spent about a month on the expedition, and heard in

¹See letters of Ripperdá to the viceroy, September 1, and November 15, 1774, and January 15, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 34-36, 68-70; Ripperdá to Criox, October 28, 1777, in *Representacion del Justicia*, 3. When Mezières visited Bucareli in 1778 he gave essentially the above reasons why the place should be fostered, adding the argument that the Trinity would offer a good outlet to New Orleans for the abundant products sure to be raised in the new settlement. This argument was based on the assumption that trade between Texas and Louisiana would be allowed. Mezières to Croix, March 18, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio con los Yndios Gentiles*, 2.

the neighborhood of the Trinity reports of English traders, and found what he thought to be English guns. The Indians at a *ranchería* above Orcoquisac, reputed to be a center for French trade, told him that some Frenchmen living across the Neches in Louisiana were procuring these guns from Englishmen and bringing them to the Trinity, but that the French would not allow the English traders to come to the Indian villages in person.¹ Other reports of this kind were not lacking, and taken all together they may have caused the governor genuine uneasiness. He hoped, perhaps, in a settlement of the Adaesans on the Trinity, for a partial restoration of the coast protection that had recently been withdrawn by the removal of the garrison from Orcoquisac.² That this was a genuine consideration with Ripperdá is borne out by Ybarbo's activities on the coast, under the governor's direction, after settling on the Trinity. But the fact that Paso Tomás, in the midst of a large number of northeastern tribes, was chosen instead of a point near the coast, is a good indication that Ripperdá's desire to maintain an influence among these northeastern tribes and Ybarbo's desire to return to the neighborhood which he had left, together outweighed Ripperdá's fear of the English from the south.

The above reasons given by Ripperdá for the choice of Paso Tomás as the site for the new settlement all sound unselfish and patriotic enough. Other persons thought, however, that the selection was determined by the governor's and Ybarbo's personal interest in the forbidden Indian trade. Ripperdá had for some time been suspected of encouraging, if not of direct complicity with,

¹Diary of Luis Cazorla, in *Expediente sobre proposiciones*, 71-72. At this *ranchería* Cazorla was told that when an Englishman had come there to trade, "giving four balls for a deer skin," French soldiers from Natchitoches had arrested him and taken him to their post (*Ibid.*). For a report of the finding, in 1778, of remains of foreign vessels on the coast, see *Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 3. For another report of English on the coast, see below, page 118, and *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 165-7.

²The place which I have designated as the probable site of Paso Tomás corresponds very closely with the one indicated by Bancroft (*North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 612) as the site of San Augustin de Ahumada before the removals which finally placed it at Orecoquisac.

French smuggling.¹ He was well known to favor its continuance rather than leave the Indians unsupplied with what they desired or to run the risk of having it furnished by the English, for he had distinctly said so.² In spite of numerous orders from the viceroy and repeated promises from Ripperdá that the French traders should be driven from the province,³ it was patent that they still frequented or lived among most of the tribes of East Texas. Their presence there is proved by evidence from all sources—the testimony of the *padres*, of Cazorla, Oconor, Medina, Ybarbo, Mezières, and of the governor himself. Though the viceroy's orders that they should be expelled were answered with promises of compliance, local protests Ripperdá met, if not with threats, with the opinion that it was not time to stop the trade.⁴ Suspicion of Ripperdá was increased, by the fact that his principal representative among the Indians, Mezières, had the reputation of being a veteran Indian trader,¹ while the most prominent of the French

¹Father Josef Abad, missionary at Bahía, who went with Mezières in 1771 to make the treaties with the northern Indians, in reporting the "scandalous trade" that he witnessed on the frontier, said, "I thought (I do not know for certain) that the governor was implicated in the trade, through his communication with de Mecieres" (Report to the viceroy, July 15, 1774, in *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 149-150).

²See pp. 91-92.

³In communications dated December 9 and December 19, 1772, and January 6, March 5, May 25, and June 30, 1773, the viceroy issued orders to the governor to cut off this trade. Ripperdá as frequently promised that the commands should be complied with (See a letter from the viceroy to Ripperdá, April 23, 1774, in *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 138. Some of these orders are in Doe. 1, Vol. LI, Sección de Historia, Archivo General).

⁴When Father Abad, in 1771, asked permission to go to the governor of Louisiana to report the contraband trade that he had seen, Ripperdá replied, according to Abad, that "an immediate prevention of the trade would be undesirable" (Abad to the viceroy, July 15, 1774, in *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 149-150). Cazorla complained that any one who remonstrated with Ripperdá about the contraband trade was threatened with arrest. See also the charge made by Medina, below, p. 104.

⁵Father Abad said that it was "notorious" that Mezières was one of the principal promoters of the French trade with the Indians (Letter to the viceroy, July 15, 1774, in *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 150). Raphael Pacheco, lieutenant at Béxar, wrote on April 20, 1774,

merchants, Nicolas de la Mathe, stood in high favor with the governor.

Ripperdá was charged even with sheltering contraband traders in Béxar. Don Roque Medina, one of Oconor's assistant inspectors, who was in that place early in 1774 inquiring into Ripperdá's administration, reported that some Frenchmen were there under various pretexts, but apparently engaged in trade. "These," he added, "are not the only ones who have come to the interior of this province with the Indians. There have been various others, who have stopped at the house of the governor and then returned to the northern nations, serving as couriers to fetch and carry letters [to and] from Natchitoches.

"The French continue to trade in guns, powder, and balls, which they exchange for . . . beasts of burden. They do not raise horses and mules, hence, in order to supply the need, it is necessary to obtain them from the Indians in trade. To supply these it is the custom for the Indians to come and rob our lands, as in fact they are now doing. Indeed they have no other occupation. They never enter this *presidio* as friends, without carrying off horses and mules when they depart, and there is no human being who can control this governor, or make him believe that they [the thieves] are the northern tribes. Any one who says so is imprisoned. Only a serious measure can remedy this situation."¹ Medina no doubt got his information in part from the citizens of Béxar, who as a rule were just then hostile to Ripperdá, but his statement is a good sample of the general feeling in regard to the governor's relations with the French and the northern Indians.² Ripperdá maintained, of course, that all these charges were gross calumnies; but

that Mezières was a person "who had always lived among the said nations, since the time of Dn. Jacinto de Barrios, trading in guns and ammunition" (*Ibid.*, 133).

¹Oconor to the viceroy, May 13, 1774, in *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 141; Medina to Oconor, March 8, 1774, *Ibid.*, 129.

²Upon receiving Medina's report through Oconor, the viceroy severely reprimanded Ripperdá for not having put a stop to the French trade and for being deceived by the Indians of the north, and forbade him henceforth to allow a single Frenchman in Texas or even to communicate with Mezières (The viceroy to Ripperdá, May 8, 1774).

the case against him, taking into consideration the great accumulation of testimony, seems to be a strong one.¹

Added to these grounds for distrust were Ybarbo's previous record on the frontier and the fact that the Vidais Indians, who lived near Paso Tomás, were the chief intermediaries between the French and the Apaches in the trade in fire-arms.² It is not surprising, therefore, that evil motives were attributed to Ripperdá and Ybarbo in the selection of a site for the Adaesans.

As soon as Oconor gave the governor's choice any attention, he reported what he knew of Ybarbo's previous career and of smuggling at Adaes before its abandonment, and proceeded to say that the Adaesans had been located by Ripperdá in "the place which better than any other enables them to engage in illicit trade and to encourage the northern Indians in stealing droves of horses from the *presidios* of San Antonio de Béjar, Bahía del Espíritu Santo, and even as far as Laredo, as lately has been done. Moreover, the Trinity River facilitates navigation to the Opelusas and the neighborhood of New Orleans itself. Hence, it is concluded that the citizens established on the Trinity have better facilities than formerly for their contraband trade."³ That Cazorla and others made similar charges will appear later.

In concluding this subject one comment may be made. For Ripperdá to have been tolerant with French traders would have been quite consistent with his desire to keep on good terms with the Indians, to say nothing of any desire for private gain, considering, on the one hand, the great influence of the French over the Indians, and, on the other, the insistent demand of the Indians that French traders be allowed to go to them. Moreover, the com-

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, June 24, 1774, in *Expediente sobre la dolosa y fingida paz*, 163.

²See the *Informe* of Mezières, July 4, 1772, in *Expediente sobre proposiciones*, 40-41. Mezières therein says, "I have not included the Bidais tribe among our friends, because the peace which they have made with the Apaches seems to be sufficient reason to consider them as quasi-enemies, and because it is notorious that they continue supplying these Apaches with fire-arms and munitions in exchange for mules and horses, well known to be stolen."

³Oconor to the viceroy, December 31, 1775. *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 41-42.

plaint that Ripperdá's administration was marked by French influence was well founded. Hence, if all these charges made against him were true, the only matters for surprise would be that he so persistently denied them, and that Ybarbo, while on the Trinity, seems to have made some show of cutting off illicit trade.

3. *The removal to Bucareli.*—Preparations for removal of the Adaesans to the Trinity were made in August, 1774. Before leaving Béxar the emigrants chose¹ for their prospective settlement the name of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli, thus perpetuating the memory of their former home,² and at the same time invoking the patronage of the viceroy, Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursua. The governor, in view of the distance of Paso Tomás from any settlement and of the fact that the new pueblo was to have no regular garrison, organized from their number a company of fifty militia, and named officers "for greater stimulation among them." Gil Ybarbo was made captain of the company and *justicia mayor*³ of the prospective pueblo, since he was, as Ripperdá said, "the best fitted and the most acceptable to his compatriots." Gil Flores was appointed lieutenant and Juan de la Mora alférez. These appointments were made subject to the viceroy's approval.⁴ Of guns and ammunition most of these "militia" had none, but the governor interceded with the viceroy to have this lack supplied, asking at the same time that a parish priest might be provided for ten years at government expense.⁵

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, September 1, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 35. Ybarbo said that he was made captain on August 7 (Letter to the viceroy, March 22, 1791, Béxar Archives).

²Pilar de los Adaes.

³Bancroft is apparently wrong in calling Ybarbo *alcalde* of Bucareli (see his *North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 656).

⁴There is some evidence that the appointment of Ybarbo was approved on January 1, 1775, although it is not certain. An official statement dated at Béxar, January 17, 1784, says that Ybarbo began exercising the office of lieutenant governor of the pueblo of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli on the date named. Since, however, this is not the title which he was given by Ripperdá, and by which he was known—namely, captain of militia and *justicia mayor* of the pueblo—it seems probable that the statement referred to is unreliable.

⁵Ripperdá to the viceroy, September 1, 1774, and November 15, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 34-36.

Because of the poverty of the Adaesans, only a part of the families, including at the most not more than seventy full-grown men,¹ could get together an outfit for the exodus, and even these had to be aided by the missions with a supply of corn. Nearly all the rest, however, declared their intention to follow as soon as they could manage to get horses and a site should be selected.

Before September 1 the start for Paso Tomás was made,² the party being conducted by lieutenant Simon de Arocha and four soldiers, who were charged with the duty of founding the new pueblo.¹

Thus the little band of ignorant, poverty-stricken colonists had been able, through the aid of the governor, the vacillation of the viceroy, the delays of Oconor, and the personal force of their leader, Ybarbo, to circumvent the royal policy. They were now starting upon the first stage of a journey that was, when finished, to signalize a complete victory over the home government, and to take them back to the neighborhood of the place which they had been so reluctant to leave a year before.

4. *The growth of the settlement.*—As soon as the emigrants reached Paso Tomás, Ybarbo took the lead in forming the material beginnings of a settlement. Of his energy and efficiency as head of the community, Ripperdá always gave good report, which was sustained by his successor, Domingo Cabello, and by the religious who were put in charge of the spiritual affairs at Bucareli. Ripperdá reported that Ybarbo set the citizens a worthy example of thrift, aided them with his own tools, oxen, and mules, gave them good advice, and kept them in due subjection.

¹On September 1 Ripperdá wrote that only a few families had been able to go, yet there were enough, it seems, to form a company of fifty militia. On November 15 he wrote that Pilar de Bucareli had seventy men capable of bearing arms. There is some indication that others besides the first emigrants had gone by that time, hence I conclude that the first party included less than seventy adult men (*Quaderno que Corresponde*, 34-36). Ybarbo stated that a "large portion" of the Adaesans remained at Béxar (*Expediente Sobre . . . Parroco*, 2).

²This was the date upon which the governor reported the departure. Ripperdá said, several years after, that the settlement was begun in August (Letter to Croix, April 27, 1777, in *Documentos para la Historia . . . de Texas*, XXVIII, 223).

³*Expediente sobre el abandono*, 16.

Soon after arriving at the Trinity Ybarbo brought from Adaes the nails and other iron work of the houses that had been left there, powder, shot, six cracked cannons, and some gun carriage iron, to be utilized in the buildings and for the defense of the new pueblo. There were also brought to Bucareli two cannons from the deserted *presidio* at Orcoquisac and two that had been left at the Taovayas village by Colonel Parilla in his flight before the Indians in 1759.¹

In the buildings erected at Bucareli apparently neither stone nor adobe was used. The town was laid out with a plaza, with the houses surrounding it, as required by law. The cannons Ybarbo had mended and mounted, and round the place he built a wooden stockade.² The first church structure was a "decent chapel," built by the settlers shortly after their arrival, although at that time they had no minister. This chapel was soon replaced by a mere pretentious church supplied by Nicolas de la Mathe, the French trader with whom Ybarbo had so long sustained relations,³ and who was not tardy in visiting the new settlement and establishing himself in its good will. The motive assigned to La Mathe by the governor for this benevolence was extreme piety and special fondness for the patron saint of the pueblo, the Lady of Pilar. Be the truth as it may, early in 1776 he sent to Bucareli two carpenters, who built a wooden church twenty-five *varas* long, the

¹See a statement in the Béxar Archives concerning the whereabouts in 1792 of the soldiers and the cannon that had been at Los Adaes.

One of the terms of the treaty made in 1771 between the Taovayases and the Spaniards was that the latter should be allowed to remove the cannons (*Expediente sobre proposiciones*, 4). In 1772, when Mezières was at the Ovedsitas village on the upper Brazos, he organized a party to send for them, but later gave up the plan (*Ibid.*, 34). The cannons were very probably brought to Bucareli by Mezières about May 1, 1778. In April of that year he made a visit to the Taovayases village, while there he expressed his intention to remove them, and on his return he went direct to Bucareli (Mezières to Croix, May 2, 1778, in *Documentos para la Historia . . . de Texas*, XXVIII, 280, 283-284).

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 69-70; Botello to Cabello, December 23, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2-3.

³See page 84.

timber used being brought from the forest by the inhabitants.¹ When the removal had been made from Adaes the ornaments of the mission had been placed in charge of the governor. Some of them were taken to Bucareli early in 1775, and Ybarbo later on asked for the rest, but part of them, at least, remained in the governor's hands until after Bucareli had passed out of existence.²

Something more than a year after its beginning, Ripperdá was able to report that Bucareli contained, besides numerous *jacales*, twenty houses of hewn wood, grouped round the plaza, a wooden church, and a guard-house and stocks, the last two items having been provided at the personal expense of Ybarbo. And in June, 1777, Ybarbo reported that there were at the place more than fifty houses of hewn wood, corrals, fields, roads cut open, and an improved river crossing.³

The little settlement grew slowly in numbers by the addition of various odds and ends of humanity. Ybarbo brought some, but I suspect not all, of the people who had been left at El Lobanillo and Nacogdoches; some of the Adaesans who had remained at Béxar followed, as they had intended; an occasional slave, escaped from Louisiana, drifted into the place; though Ripperdá professed to allow no citizens other than Adaesans to go to Bucareli, he made exceptions in case of "useless vagabonds" who might be at Béxar; and finally, French traders flocked into Bucareli from Louisiana. During the winter of 1776-7 the pueblo was visited by an epidemic that made an inroad into its population by causing the death of seventeen persons. Among these, apparently, was lieutenant Gil Flores. At the same time the near-by Vidais Indian tribe was

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, November 15, 1775, in Expediente sobre . . . Parroco, 3; Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in Quaderno que Corresponde, 69; Ripperdá to Croix, October 28, 1777, and Ybarbo to Ripperdá, June 30, 1777, both in Representacion del Justicia, 2-3.

²Ybarbo to Ripperdá, November 23, 1775, and to the viceroy, January 15, 1776, in Expediente sobre . . . Parroco, 3-4; Croix to Cabello, January 5, 1780, in the Béxar Archives.

³Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in Quaderno que Corresponde, 69-70; Ybarbo to Ripperdá, June 30, 1777, in Representacion del Justicia, 2.

reduced by nearly one-half of its entire number.¹ What the nature of the malady was I do not know, but it was attributed to the excessive amount of water in the river valley. Before this epidemic there were in Bucareli, according to report, 99 "vecinos" or, as I understand the term, adult male residents.² A census taken some time in 1777 showed the population of the place to consist of three hundred forty-seven persons—one hundred twenty-five men, eighty-nine women, one hundred twenty-eight children, and five slaves.³ Round about lived the Vidais and other Indian bands. Small though it was, this was a growth that compared very favorably with that of the Spanish settlements that had grown up in Texas less irregularly and more under the paternal care of the government.

5. *Economic conditions.*—Bucareli was granted the usual favor accorded to new pueblos of exemption for ten years from all forms of royal taxation.⁴ As we have seen, one of the special advantages at first claimed for the place was its agricultural possibilities. True to the traditions of Mexican farming, Ripperdá had instructed Arocha to choose for the pueblo a site affording irrigation facilities. The location selected failing in these, which were little needed, as the event proved,⁵ the settlers sowed their first grain east of the Trinity, where there were some permanent lagoons. This crop was spoiled by a flood. The second summer they succeeded in raising a crop of corn west of the river, in a place pointed out by the Vidais Indians. Thereafter a number of families settled on *ranchos*, or farms, in this direction some distance from the

¹Mezières to Croix, March 18, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2; Ripperdá to Croix, October 30, 1777, in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 12.

²Ripperdá to Croix, January 11, 1778, in *los Vecinos, etc.*, 7.

³Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 67-70; Ybarbo to the viceroy, November 25, 1775, in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 2; Cabello to Croix, May 31, 1779, *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 16.

⁴Representacion del Justicia, 6.

⁵Ybarbo told Mezières that good irrigation could be had at a distance of twelve leagues (Mezières to Croix, in *Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 2).

pueblo. Here they raised at least one good crop of wheat before the settlement was abandoned.

Hoping to enable the place to supply its own blankets and coarse cloth, Ybarbo took from Béxar cotton seed, sheep, and a negro weaver, who was expected to teach his craft to the settlers. With a Béxar merchant, one Dn. Juan Ysurrieta, Ybarbo made a contract to have Bucareli furnished with merchandise in exchange for the prospective agricultural products of the place. Ripperdá professed to hope that Bucareli would in time prove especially productive of horses, cattle, small stock, tallow, soap, corn, wheat, and rice, and that it would not only furnish the *presidios* of Béxar and Bahía with horses, but also put an end to the frontier smuggling by furnishing the Indians with a substitute for French goods. Mezières, who visited Bucareli in March, 1778, reported that the place was well capable of becoming the basis of a rich trade with New Orleans, by way of the Trinity River and Opelousas, if such a boon should be allowed by the government.¹

Such dreams as these could have come true only on condition that the settlement had enjoyed a longer existence, that its population had been intelligent and enterprising, and that the government had changed its blind policy of discouraging the trade best calculated to induce the colonists to effort. As it was, the settlers were poor and shiftless, and during their short stay there they eked out an existence not far above that of their Indian neighbors, supplementing the scanty products of their fields and herds by hunting the buffalo and wild cattle that abounded between the Trinity and the Brazos.² From the testimony in the documents we are led to think that they spent a large part of their time in this pursuit. As the French who traded among the Indians in the vicinity were interested in fur dealing as well as in

¹Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 69-71; Botello to Cabello, December 23, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2; Mezières to Croix, March 18, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 2.

²*Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2, 8; *Representacion del Justicia*, 7, 9; *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 67-70.

They depended for supplies in part on the Tawakana Indians who lived on the Brazos near Waco (Mezières to Croix, April 5, 1778, in *Documentos para la Historia . . . de Texas*, XXVIII, 274).

procuring horses, it is reasonable to suppose that the Spanish colonists who engaged in hunting took advantage of the market for their peltries, exchanging them for the goods in which the French dealt. Of course, all trade between them and the French was contraband, for the Spanish government strictly forbade trade with Louisiana in any form.

6. *Spiritual affairs.*—Notwithstanding due efforts on the part of Ybarbo and the governor to secure a priest for Bucareli, there seemed to be some danger of the realization of the prophecy made by the *padres* of the mission at Bahía that the place would become a resort famed for "liberty of conscience" and "an asylum for apostates."¹ The little flock went to their new pasture unaccompanied by a shepherd, and for more than two years remained without one. During that time they enjoyed no other spiritual aid than that afforded by two short visits made by some religious from Béxar.

It has been seen that when the Adaesans first requested permission to return to Los Ais they asked also that a minister might be provided for them ten years at government expense.² As soon as they left Béxar Ripperdá repeated the request, and asked of the bishop of Guadalaxara, to whose jurisdiction Béxar now belonged, that the settlers be allowed to build a church. The latter petition was promptly granted.³ In February, 1775, temporary spiritual aid was furnished by the chaplain of the *presidio* at Béxar, who went to Bucareli, placed in the chapel which the settlers had built the image of the patron saint, the Lady of Pilar, and performed religious offices. A year later two missionaries from San Antonio spent a few days at Bucareli.⁴ Who they were I have not learned,

¹Cazorla wrote to the viceroy that the *padres* at the Bahía mission anticipated "the loss of many souls" at Bucareli. "Many wish to go to that settlement," he said, "because it is notorious that in it the Indians keep peace for the sake of the barter or trade which is carried on with them, as well as because they live there, as it is understood, with liberty of conscience" (Letter of May 15, 1775, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 38).

²See page 90.

³Ripperdá to the viceroy, September 1, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 34; the bishop of Guadalaxara to Ripperdá, December 19, 1775, in the Béxar Archives.

⁴Ybarbo to the viceroy, November 25, 1775, and Arrellano to Croix, April 27, 1777, both in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 2, 8. The

but there is some indication that one of them was Fr. Josef Francisco Mariano de la Garza, a Franciscian friar from mission San Antonio de Valero, who eventually became regularly installed at Bucareli.¹

Before this time Ybarbo had again addressed the viceroy on the subject of a regular pastor supported by the government, and again Ripperdá had seconded the request. In response, the viceroy, on the advice of Oconor, wrote Ripperdá, in August, 1776, that, since there were already ten religious on royal pay at the five missions near by, as a temporary measure the governor should require the president of the missions to send one of them to Bucareli until the disposal of that place should be decided. Ripperdá served the

bishop of Guadalaxara to Ripperdá, December 13, 1775, in the Béxar Archives; Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 69.

¹Ybarbo to the viceroy, November 25, 1775; Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 15, 1776; Oconor to the viceroy, June 15, 1776; opinion of the fiscal, August 8, 1776—all in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 3-5; the viceroy to Ripperdá, August 21, 1776, in the Béxar Archives. The viceroy carelessly took Oconor's statement that there were five missions near the *presidio* of San Antonio to mean that they were near Bucareli. Arrellano caught him up on this point, as the text below shows. Arrellano said that he promptly sent to Bucareli a *padre*, whose name he did not mention, and asked him to have him relieved. Croix (June 24, 1777) recommended relieving him, without mentioning his name; and Ripperdá (August 30, 1777) mentioned Garza as the *padre* at Bucareli whom he had seen fit to relieve. As no other religious is mentioned in this connection, and as Garza's presence at Bucareli from this time on can be established, I conclude that he was the one sent in consequence of Ripperdá's order of September 27, 1776 (see *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 12; *Representacion del Justicia*, 4; and *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 14, 38). Garza stated in his deposition made at Zacatecas in November, 1787 (see note 5, page 84), that he had known and dealt with Gil Ybarbo "almost without intermission, except for a few days," from February, 1776, to September, 1783. This would indicate that he was, perhaps, one of the two missionaries sent to Bucareli in the spring of 1776. But it seems that these missionaries returned in a short time, and that during the summer of 1776 the place was without a spiritual adviser. Hence his statement is puzzling. It appears that Ybarbo was in Béxar in February, 1776. This might account for the beginning of their acquaintance at this time, without supposing Garza to have been in Bucareli. In either case, I can not explain Garza's almost continuous dealings with Ybarbo after February, 1776.

order on September 27, and the president, Fr. Pedro Ramírez de Arrellano, "promptly" complied by sending Father Garza, mentioned above.

It now became a question whether Garza should remain at Bucareli or be relieved by one of the presidial chaplains of Bahía or Béxar. Though the president had obeyed, he resented the loss of his missionary, and ere long he appealed to Caballero de Croix, who was now *comandante general* of the Internal Provinces. To him he wrote that the viceroy's order was obviously based on an error, namely, the supposition that Bucareli was near the missions, when in fact it was one hundred forty leagues away; that, since one missionary must always be present at each mission to minister to the neophytes, if one were sent to Bucareli there would be no one to go into the forests to bring back absconded apostates or to seek new converts; and that, since the stipend of the *padres* was often the sole support of these Indians, they might suffer if one of the missionaries were removed. He concluded by suggesting that, since the bishop of Gaudalaxara had entertained such a plan, one of the presidial chaplains should be sent occasionally to Bucareli—as had been done in the spring of 1775—and the missionary fathers required to take his place while absent.¹

Croix now yielded conditionally, and ordered the governor to relieve Garza by sending one of the presidial chaplains, unless he had good reasons for not doing so. But Ripperdá, instead of relieving Garza, wrote to Croix that the objections to doing so were strong; that the *presidios* would suffer more than the missions by the absence of their ministers; and finally, that he was hoping to establish a mission at Bucareli, in which case the services of a trained missionary would be indispensable. In this tilt with the president of the missions, the governor apparently won, for Garza remained the minister in charge at Bucareli to the end of its history.²

If we may judge of Garza's personality from his subsequent preferment, we would conclude that Bucareli was fortunate in secur-

¹Arrellano to Croix, April 27, 1777, in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 6-9.

²Croix to Ripperdá, June 24, 1777; Croix to Arrellano, June 25, 1777, and Ripperdá to Croix, August 30, 1777—all in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 9-11.

ing for its pastor a man of more than ordinary ability. After leaving Nacogdoches (in 1783), whither he went from Bucareli, he became president of the missions of the province of Texas, and later was reader in sacred theology, then assistant in the council (*discreto*) of the Franciscan College at Zacatecas.¹

A short time before Bucareli was abandoned another missionary, Fr. Juan Garcia Botello, was there. When or under what circumstances he went I have not been able to determine.²

Having secured a minister at government expense, Bucareli next applied for exemption from church tithes. In the summer of 1777 it was announced in the church that tithes would be collected, and two years' dues were gathered; but Ybarbo made this the occasion of appealing, in the name of the citizens, to Ripperdá, asking relief from this burden, on the ground of the poverty and misfortunes of the community, and of the public services which it had rendered. The petition was passed by the governor, with his approval, to Croix, who referred it to Pedro Galindo Navarro, the assessor of the commandancy general. Navarro recommended granting the request on two grounds, first, because Bucareli was exempt from all civil dues,¹ and second, because, since tithes were intended for the support of ministers of the altar, and since no religious of this class was serving there, the tithes could not legally be collected. Acting on this advice, Croix requested the church authorities at Guadalaxara to exempt Bucareli for ten years, which request was soon granted.³

It has been seen that Ripperdá informed Croix in August, 1777, that he had hoped to establish a mission at Bucareli.⁴ This was

¹Testimony of Garza, November 14, 1787; Schmidt (Rev. Edmond, J. P.), *A Catalogue of Franciscan Missionaries in Texas, 1528-1859* (Austin, 1901), 10-11.

²In his letter of August 30, 1777, Ripperdá seems to say that Arrellano had been forced to send a second *padre* to Bucareli, although his meaning is not clear. This may have referred to Botello's going (*Expediente Sobre . . . Parroco*, 10. See also *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 72).

³Croix presented the request to the bishop, the dean, and the *cabildo* of the church of Guadalaxara, by way of command and entreaty (*ruego y encargo*). For the facts involved in this paragraph, see *Representacion del Justicia, passim*.

⁴See page 114.

not the first indication that he entertained such a plan. It was clearly his desire from the first to gather around Bucareli as many Indian tribes as possible. His mission projects, however, seem to have looked primarily to collecting there the apostate Indians who had in times past deserted the various missions of the province—a prospect which he knew could not lack attractiveness to persons who had had experience with mission Indians. In January, 1776, he informed the viceroy that one purpose of sending the two missionaries just then about to depart for Bucareli was to minister to the neighboring Gentiles and to found a mission to attract apostates, and his subsequent requests for a minister for Bucareli were based in part upon this ground.

Often Ripperdá wrote hopefully about prospects for the fulfillment of his desires in this particular. Now he reported that many of the Indians living near Bucareli were being baptized and that the Kanrankawas were beginning to come to the pueblo to live; now that there were good indications that many apostates from the old mission of San Xavier would gather there; and again, that the Téxas, Quitseis, and Tonkawas were in the habit of coming for presents; that the Mayeses had failed to settle near the place only through groundlessly having taken offence with the Spanish; that he hoped, by gentle means, to retain the friendship of the Tawakanas with whom lived the desired apostate Xaranames; and that the Orcocuisacs, who had years before deserted their mission, were likely to come to settle near Bucareli, since they were imploring Ybarbo for a mission and were sending presents to Father Garza. In spite of these hopeful expressions, however,—which, doubtless, were as strong as the facts would justify,—nothing came of the plan for a mission at Bucareli except the baptism of numerous Vidais and a few other Indians, and the restoration of some of the Xaranames to Bahía, unless, perhaps, it is this plan that explains the presence of Botello at Bucareli in the fall of 1778.¹

7. *Ybarbo among the Indians and his search for the English.*—Ybarbo's activities were by no means confined to establishing the pueblo of Bucareli and administering its internal affairs. He

¹Ripperda to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 69, 71; to Croix, August 30, 1777, in *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 11-12; and to Croix, October 28, 1777, in *Representacion del Justicia*, 4.

was equally active, as Ripperdá had predicted that he would be, in promoting good relations with the Indians and in watching the coast. Indeed, it was at Bucareli that Ybarbo received his best training for a more conspicuous career later on. His life at Adaes and El Lobanillo had given him some knowledge of Indian character, and now, by his four years in a position of responsibility, and at the same time of semi-independence, at Bucareli, he so extended his acquaintance with the natives and his knowledge of Indian affairs that he became very influential among the tribes of East Texas.

During these four years, he made—according to his own statement—in addition to hostile campaigns against the Comanches, no less than three friendly tours among the northern Indians and as many to the coast for the double purpose of conducting Indian relations and looking for Englishmen.¹ The governor ordered Lieutenant Arocha, when he founded Bucareli, to go with Ybarbo to invite the Vidais, Téxas, Quitseis, Yscanes, and, if possible, the more distant tribes, to come and live near the new establishment. Before Arocha returned to Béxar he and Ybarbo were able, through lack of horses, to visit only the Téxas and the Vidais.² But later, through friendly visits, presents, and other inducements, Ybarbo gradually attracted various bands to the vicinity of Bucareli to live or to trade and receive presents. In March, 1778, he went with Mezières and made a treaty with the Tonkawas, one of the conditions of which was that this tribe should regularly be visited by a trader.³ On the same expedition he, Garza, and Mezières persuaded part of the Xaranames living among the Tawakanas to return to their mission at Bahía.⁴

The most noteworthy of these expeditions was that made in 1777 to the mouth of the Sabine River. In the summer of that year a trader stationed among the Orcoquisac Indians reported to Ybarbo

¹Ybarbo to Ripperdá, June 30, 1777, in *Representacion del Justicia*, 2.

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, November 15, 1774, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 36.

³Ybarbo to Cabello, December 7, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 5.

⁴Mezières to Croix, April 5, 7, and 8, 1778, in *Documentos para la Historia . . . de Texas*, XXVIII, 273-278.

that in the mouth of the Neches River there was a stranded English vessel laden with bricks; that the bricks had been given to the Opelousas and the Atakapas Indians near by; and that there was another vessel in the mouth of the Trinity. Ybarbo at once got together thirty men and started for the coast, going first to the Orcoquisac town. The Indians here told him that the English had entered the Neches with small vessels to trade with the natives; that in the summer of 1774 they had remained long enough to sow a crop; and that the vessel now lying in the Neches had arrived in the previous May (1777), had missed the channel, and stranded, the occupants withdrawing, but promising to return. Ybarbo scolded the Indians for not reporting the matter promptly, and then, with ten men and two paid Indian guides, he reconnoitered the coast. He passed eastward along the shore and came upon the vessel, apparently in Sabine Lake. It still contained some bricks, but nothing else. Such other things as had been on board were seen in the possession of the near-by Atakapas. These Indians told Ybarbo that the English had left three men to guard the vessel until the main party should return, but nothing was seen of them by the Spaniards.

Ybarbo next returned to reconnoiter the mouth of the Trinity, but he did not find the vessel reported to have been there. Near the shore some distance farther west, however, he found an Englishman, lost and nearly naked. Ybarbo understood him to say that his name was Bautista Miler, that he had come from Jamaica bound for the Mississippi with a Captain named José David, who in order to rob him of some coffee, whiskey, and five negroes, had cast him adrift in a canoe, and that he had been lost for seven months.

This story told by Miler gives no further hint as to who the English were that the Spaniards had been hearing of and dreading in the direction of the coast.

Before returning to Bucareli, Ybarbo made a map of the coast from Sabine Pass to a point some distance west of the Trinity River. The sketch has historical value, particularly as it helps us to locate with some accuracy the old Spanish *presidio* of Orcoquisac.¹ After an absence of twenty-two days, Ybarbo returned with Miler in custody, and reported his exploit to Croix.

¹It is in volume LI, Sección de Historia, Archivo General.

Wishing to ascertain the truth about the other English vessel, Ripperdá dispatched a second expedition, composed of fifty men, including Ybarbo and thirty of his militia, to reconnoiter the coast from where Ybarbo had left off to the Colorado. The party set out from Bucareli July 11, 1777, but what it accomplished does not appear.¹

8. *Contraband trade, and the question of suppressing Bucareli.* —To what extent the establishment of Bucareli actually increased or decreased smuggling in its vicinity it is hard to determine. It had previously existed among the Indians thereabout and it continued to flourish, but the exact part taken in it by Ybarbo and his colonists is a difficult matter to decide, for the evidence is conflicting. If we were to accept, unquestioned, the reports of Ybarbo and Ripperdá we would conclude that the latter made special efforts to prevent it. But, though there is some evidence that this was the case, there are also indications pointing the other way.

Ybarbo found French traders from Adaes and Natchitoches among the Vidais Indians when he first went to establish Bucareli. Some of them, whose Spanish wives went to live at Bucareli, applied for residence there, which, according to Ripperdá, was granted only upon condition of their giving up Indian trade.² Bucareli had scarcely been founded when La Mathe, apparently king of the Indian traders, arrived at the place, with a pass from the governor authorizing him to "collect some debts"—a subterfuge, more than likely, to enable him to continue his traffic.³ As we have seen, he put himself into the good graces of the community by building a church for it, but one is inclined to be skeptical when told that he did this through extreme piety alone, particularly when informed by one of Ybarbo's admirers that La Mathe and Ybarbo kept up

¹The story given here is based on Ripperdá's letter to Croix, dated August 30, 1777, accompanying which is the map referred to. I have not seen Ybarbo's original report to the governor. Navarro's report to Croix, dated June 8, 1779, has aided me in reading Ripperdá's letter (see *Expediente sobre . . . Parroco*, 13-19).

²Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 67.

³See page 84.

former relations during the whole existence of Bucareli, buying and selling of each other, just as before.¹

A few instances of actual smuggling at Bucareli came to light, and, we may assume that, in the nature of the case, for each one that was reported numerous others escaped notice. The reports of these cases suggest much more than they actually say in regard to what was going on. In the spring of 1775 some men from Bahía, who had been across the Guadalupe River, met a party of Béxar men coming from Bucareli with French tobacco in their possession, some of which the men from Bahía obtained. The Béxar men reported that the article was plentiful at Bucareli, whither it was being brought by Frenchmen, who also traded with the Indians. The matter reaching the ears of Captain Cazorla, he, by strategy, verified the report, identified one of the culprits at Béxar, and notified Ripperdá. The governor replied that he had ascertained that the amount of tobacco smuggled had been small. Cazorla afterwards intimated, however, that the governor may not have taken "due pains" to find out. Cazorla reported the affair to the viceroy, with the comment that "it appears that the sole motive of the subjects who go to Bucareli to live is to smuggle and to be free from the yoke of justice." He added that, since so many were desirous of going to that place where license reigned, and where the Indians were more friendly than elsewhere, there was danger of depopulating and weakening the defenses of the other settlements.²

Not long after this Ybarbo seized contraband goods from one Marcos Vidal, of Béxar, who was on the way from Natchitoches. Vidal was sent in custody to Béxar, was convicted of smuggling and imprisoned, but escaped. These two cases show that the Spaniards as well as the French and Indians engaged in the forbidden trade.³

On another occasion Ybarbo confiscated a large quantity of merchandise from Augustin de Grevenverge,⁴ captain of militia

¹See Garza's deposition of November 14, 1787, in the Béxar Archives.

²Cazorla to the viceroy, May 14, 1775, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 37.

³Ripperdá to the viceroy, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 68. A report of the case is in Béxar Archives.

⁴Variously spelled in the documents.

at Atakapas, in Louisiana, who was on his way to Béxar to trade for horses and mules, ignorant, he claimed, of the law forbidding trade between the provinces. How this could be when these prohibitions were so oft repeated is a matter to cause wonder, but when the trifling affair finally reached clear to the royal throne this excuse was accepted by His Majesty.¹

Cazorla's report to the viceroy established at once in Mexico a bad reputation for Bucareli, and set on foot an attempt to remove it from the frontier. On the advice of Areche,² Ripperdá was instructed, in July, 1775, to report upon the reputed disorders at Bucareli, and, if necessary, without further notice to remove its inhabitants nearer to the center of the province.³ Cazorla was complimented for his vigilance and enjoined to continue it, while Oconor, to whom was sent a copy of Cazorla's letter, was requested to hurry up and decide the final disposition to be made of the Adaesans. He was even to send them to Los Ais if he saw fit, the royal order to the contrary notwithstanding.⁴ Oconor did not reply until December 31, but on that date he expressed to the viceroy the strongest condemnation of Bucareli; repeated the objections that he had made to allowing Adaesans to go to Los Ais; indulged in more or less "I told you so"; gave Ybarbo a bad name; and declared his disappointment that the governor should establish the settlers in the very place best calculated to cause trouble. To permit them to remain, he said, was certain to have evil consequences. He recommended, therefore, that the matter be taken out of Ripperdá's hands and put into Cazorla's, giving him authority to distribute the Bucareli settlers at Béxar, Bahía, and Arroyo del

¹In *Expediente sobre comercio reciproco entre las Provincias de la Luisiana y Texas*, 4-6 (Vol. 43, Sección de Historia, Archivo General), is a copy of the memorandum of the goods confiscated by Ybarbo.

²Areche to the viceroy, July 13, 1775, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 38-39. Areche said in his note, "It appears that this settlement presents some dangers that, lest they increase, ought to be remedied, and at the opportune moment cut off at the roots."

³The viceroy to Ripperdá, July 26, 1775, in the Béxar Archives.

⁴Areche to the viceroy, July 13, 1775, and Cazorla to the viceroy, February 27, 1776, both in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 39, 65; Oconor to the viceroy, December 31, 1775, *Ibid.*, 40-54. The date of the order to Oconor was July 26, 1775.

Cíbolo as the royal order had required.¹ On hearing from Oconor, the government again, in February, 1776, referred the matter to him, and decided that no further step should be taken in Mexico until Ripperdá should be heard from. His report, when it came,² containing only contradictory testimony, the government concluded to try to get at the truth of the situation by having the president of the Texas missions make a report based on the testimony of the religious at Bucareli. Oconor, not to be outdone in the matter of procrastination, decided, in April, to suspend action until he could go in person to Béxar, and, in conference with the *cabildo*, consider the whole matter. This, he said, was the only way to avoid the endless importunities which "some persons might make, with the sole purpose of succeeding in their caprice of not obeying the viceroy's and his [Oconor's] repeated orders."³ Thus, so far as any immediate action on the part of Oconor or the viceroy was concerned, the French, Spaniards, and Indians on the frontier were left free to carry on illicit trade at will. But Ripperdá consistently denied that it was openly allowed by the Texas authorities. Although he admitted that it existed, he claimed that Ybarbo was active in trying to prevent it, that the citizens of Bucareli were law-abiding, and that positive public advantages would be realized by fostering the settlement which was under such general suspicion.⁴ He defended the place to the last. Shortly before he retired from the office of governor he urged that it be reinforced by sending to it the Adaesans still remaining in Béxar, instead of trying to form of them a new pueblo at Béxar, Arroyo del Cíbolo, or on the Guadalupe or the San Marcos River, as was then being talked of.⁵

Had Oconor remained in power, it is not at all improbable that

¹Oconor to the viceroy, December 31, 1775, in *Quaderino que Corresponde*, 40-45.

²It was dated January 25, 1776.

³Areche to the viceroy, February 21, 1776, and May 2, 1776; Oconor to the viceroy, April 5, 1776—all in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 54, 72, 66.

⁴Ripperdá to the viceroy, January 25, 1775, in *Quaderno que Corresponde*, 67-71.

⁵Ripperdá to Croix, January 11, 1778, in *Los Vecinos, etc.*, 7. Croix was at this time in Béxar.

as soon as his hands had become really free he would have carried out the royal order to the letter and suppressed the place. But Bucareli now profited by another year's delay due to Oconor's pre-occupation, and then by a change in the government. Early in 1777 the affairs of the Internal Provinces were put into the hands of a *comandante general*, independent of the viceroy. The person appointed to this office was Caballero de Croix. The mere change of administration gave Bucareli an additional term of grace, and, of more importance, it transferred the supervision of the interests of Texas from Oconor, the main opponent of Bucareli, to Croix, who was not only opposed to the royal policy of withdrawing from East Texas,¹ but who also enjoyed a high degree of independence in his office.

It was more than a year after Croix took charge of affairs before he reopened the question of Bucareli's continuance or suppression. Then, in July, 1778, he ordered that Domingo Cabello should be requested to report, as soon as he should take charge of the office of governor of Texas, upon the advantages and disadvantages of Bucareli.² But before Cabello replied the fate of Bucareli had been decided independently of governmental authority.

VI. THE COMANCHE RAID ON BUCARELI AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN NACOGDOCHES.

1. *The Comanche troubles at Bucareli, May and October, 1778.*—One of the advantages that had been claimed for Bucareli was that it was protected by the powerful Tonkawas³ and Tawa-

¹On May 18, 1779, he wrote to Mezières stating that Texas was, of all the Spanish provinces, one of those most worthy of attention, because of its size, fertility, good climate, and location (Mezières to Croix, October 7, 1779, reviewing the letter to Croix referred to, in *Expdeiente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 7-8). In 1778 he tried hard to secure permission to open up trade between the provinces of Texas and Louisiana (*Expediente sobre Comercio Reciproco*).

²Croix to Navarro, July 24, 1778, in *Representacion del Justicia*, 7. Croix to Cabello, July 30, 1778, cited in Cabello to Croix, May 31, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 13.

³The Tonkawa tribe was at this time one of the most numerous of those in Texas. It was estimated in 1778 that it comprised 300 warriors (*Informe del Gobernador de Texas*, in Vol. 64, *Provincias Internas*, Archivo General).

kanas from the dreaded Comanches. And this claim seems to have been well founded, for it was more than three years before the peace of the settlement was disturbed by the Comanches' unwelcome presence. But at last it became the object of their depredations.

One day in May, 1778, the inhabitants of Bucareli were frightened half out of their wits by the arrival in the neighborhood of about thirty warriors of this tribe led by the son of the head chief, Evea. Ybarbo sallied out with his men, however, and pursued the Indians, overtook them at the Brazos, killed three, and put the rest to flight. The story of this occurrence rests upon the testimony of Ybarbo, Garza, Botello, and Mezières, who agree upon the points thus far stated. But as to the object of the Comanches' visit to the pueblo there is conflicting testimony. Ybarbo, Garza, and Botello represented the occurrence as an attack, and Garza even claimed that the Indians stole some of the horses of the settlers. Mezières, however, who happened to be in the neighborhood at the time, and who doubtless got his information from the Comanches, told and professed to believe a different story. According to his version, the Indians were on the way to make a friendly visit to himself, had camped near the ranches at Bucareli, had turned their horses loose, and were resting—anything but hostile actions—when they were frightened off by the boisterous commotion raised by the terrified Spaniards in their haste to corral their stock and raise an attacking party. When he heard this story from Croix, Governor Cabello flatly rejected it, justly I suspect, on the ground that in the first place it was absurd to assume, as did Mezières, that a Comanche would approach a Spaniard settlement with friendly intent, and secondly, that he had full confidence in the testimony of the three eye-witnesses of the event—particularly that of Botello, whom he had closely questioned on the matter—and that all of them had represented the Comanche visit as an attack.¹

¹See Botello to Cabello, December 23, 1778; Garza to Cabello, January 8, 1779; Ybarbo to Cabello, January 12 and October 19, 1779; Cabello to Croix, August 31, 1779—all in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2, 5, 7, 8, 17, 38; Mezières to Croix, November 15, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 4.

Ybarbo (letter of January 12) reported the date of the Comanche visit

Whatever may have been the purpose of this first visit of the Comanches, the object of the second was not doubtful. In October of the same year, Bucareli was raided by a much larger party than the one that had approached before. Driving off two hundred seventy-six horses, mainly the property of Nicolas de la Mathe, the Comanches crossed the Brazos. Here, at the point where they had on the former occasion been overtaken, they left an ambush to cover their retreat. The Spaniards apparently followed, but hearing of the ambush, gave up the pursuit, and the Indians escaped with their rich booty.¹ Near a Taguayas village they left the stock in charge of seven braves. Soon this guard was attacked by a party of Quitseis and Texas, both of which tribes were friendly toward the Spanish. In the fight three Comanches were killed and the horses were taken. But the triumph was short, for the escaping Comanches returned with friends, overtook their enemies, killed three Téxas warriors, and recovered the horses.²

This raid on the Bucareli ranches was followed by rumors in the settlement that something worse was to be expected at the hands of the Comanches. Traces were found indicating that Indian spies had effected a night entrance into the stockade and learned the weakness of its defence. Rumors were brought in by French traders and friendly Indians now to the effect that the Indians were planning the total destruction of the place by burning the town, killing the men, and carrying off the women and children; now that traces of Comanches had been seen in the neighborhood of Nabasat; and again that their attack was delayed only to secure the alliance, or at least the neutrality, of the Vidais and other Indians friendly to the Spaniards.³

Such rumors as these were usually very disturbing to Spanish as May 3 (*tres*). According to Mezières (letter cited above) it was after May 6. This leads me to suspect that *tres* in my copy of Ybarbo's letter should be *trese* (13).

¹See references cited above, note 1, page 124. The different accounts vary somewhat as to the number of horses stolen on this occasion.

²Ybarbo to Cabello, December 7, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 4.

³Ybarbo to Cabello, December 7, 1778, and January 12, 1779; Botello to Cabello, December 23, 1778; and Garza to Cabello, January 8, 1779—all in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2-6.

settlements stronger and less isolated than Bucareli, and we need not be surprised that they terrorized this weak village. Ybarbo could muster only a handful of men, and these poorly equipped. The cannons were useless to resist a surprise attack. The houses were of wood and easily combustible, and the stockade was in a bad state of repair. Ybarbo feared, moreover, the disaffection of the Tonkawas, one of the tribes on which Bucareli relied for protection. In the March preceding, he and Mezières had promised to send them a trader, for whom they had asked. But the promise had not been kept, and the Indians were complaining. To pacify them Ybarbo was compelled to make them presents at his own expense.¹

To strengthen the means of defense, Ybarbo appealed to the governor for arms and ammunition, but without practical avail. Once more he collected a handful of men and went out to reconnoiter, but, after one day's march, upon being overtaken by a messenger and informed that a large party of Comanches and Taguayas were between the San Xavier and the Brazos, on the way to attack the Spaniards and the Vidais, he turned back.²

Of the situation in Bucareli, Father Garza, who was there, now wrote: "These miserable inhabitants are left in such a deplorable state that they have no way even to hunt for food . . . for they can not go out to hunt except in large numbers and well armed, nor yet can they go out together and with their weapons, lest they should leave the settlement helpless. . . . Hence they can follow no other occupation than to be continually on guard of the horses and the settlement, relieving each other morning and night. The time left free from this fatiguing work they spend in witnessing the need and the miseries of their families, without being able to furnish them daily food by the ordinary work of hunting, fishing, or other similar means, and, moreover, without hope of remedy in the future, since the best time for sow-

¹Ybarbo to Cabello, December 7, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 5.

²This event happened some time before December 7, 1778, when Ybarbo reported it to Cabello (*Expediente sobre el abandono*, 4-5. See also his letter of January 12, 1779. *Ibid.*, 9.)

ing wheat has passed without a grain being sown up to the present.”¹

2. *The flight from Bucareli, January-February, 1779.*—The settlers now began to appeal either for protection or for permission to remove to the neighborhood of the Téxas villages to the eastward.² It is a matter for comment that they did not request permission to go to Béxar, where the defences of the province were strongest and where the king had ordered that they should establish themselves, but that, instead, they asked to be allowed to return a step nearer to the place whence they had been removed in 1773. Whether the suggestion of a removal came from Ybarbo or from some one else I can not say. The first mention of such a plan in the correspondence is found in a letter written in December,³ 1778, by Father Botello, who had recently returned from Bucareli. In response to an inquiry made by Governor Cabello about the condition of affairs at Bucareli, Botello said that, in his opinion, the place should be abandoned; that, besides being threatened with destruction by the Comanches, it was incapable of irrigation and had proved unhealthful because of heavy rains; that these shortcomings could be remedied and all of the advantages of Bucareli with respect to fertility and location⁴ secured at little additional cost by establishing the settlers “on the Neches River among the pueblos of Téxas, on the Angelina River among the pueblos of the same tribe, with even greater security in the place where the mission of Nacogdoches formerly was, with much more on the Atoyaque River, and with advantages and security beyond comparison at the site of the mission of Los Ais, on the road from Natchitoches, thirty-nine leagues from that post.”⁵ It is not at all

¹Garza to Cabello, January 8, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 6.

²Ybarbo to Cabello, January 12, and January 27, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 8.

³December 23.

⁴The advantages of Bucareli’s location he conceived to be its position midway between Natchitoches and Béxar, and its importance as a place from which to watch the coast and to keep up friendly relations with the Indians. —

⁵Botello to Cabello, December 23, 1778, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 2-6.

unlikely that this preference of Botello's for Los Ais was simply his reflection of the desires of the Adaesans, learned by him during his residence at Bucareli.

About two weeks after the date of this letter¹ Ybarbo wrote the governor that the people had twice come to him in a body begging that they might either be supplied with a suitable military guard or be allowed to go with their families to the neighborhood of the Téxas villages. In the name of the settlers, Ybarbo forwarded the petition to the governor.² Cabello replied that he could not send men and arms to aid the place, but that he could furnish ammunition if Ybarbo would come after it, though he dared not send it for fear that it would fall into the hands of the Indians.³

But before help was received, Ybarbo, compelled, as he claimed, by the straits and the supplications of his people, granted their request to be allowed to remove to the Téxas country. On January 25 the larger part of the families, including Ybarbo's own, began to leave. Two days later Father Garza set off on foot with the sick and the church treasures in his care, Ybarbo remaining behind with twenty men to protect the families and to guard the stock and goods left in the flight until the owners might return for them.⁴ Incident to the departure of these families, either by accident or design, half of the houses of the place were destroyed by fire.⁵

Now an additional reason for deserting Bucareli presented itself in the form of a flood. On the night of February 14, according to the story, the Trinity River overflowed its banks, rose to half the height of the houses of the pueblo, and drowned part of the re-

¹On January 8, 1779.

²Expediente sobre el abandono, 9-10.

³Cabello to Croix, February 11, 1779, in Expediente sobre el abandono, 11.

⁴Ybarbo to Cabello, January 27, 1779, in Expediente sobre el abandono, 10.

⁵This fact was not reported by Ybarbo, but Cabello said that he learned it "extrajudicially" (Letter to Croix, February 11, 1779, in Expediente sobre el abandono, 11).

maining stock. The women and children and some of the stock were saved on improvised boats and rafts and removed to higher land quite a distance from the river. Here the people remained a few days, when they were again molested by Comanches, who, after what was reported to be an all night siege, ran off thirty-eight head of horses that had been saved from the deluge, and then killed, near-by, half a dozen Indians friendly to the Spanish. After this raid, haste was made to remove the people in boats to the east bank of the river, but here they were again disturbed by the Indians.¹ Being now thoroughly frightened by the Indians and evicted by fire and flood, Ybarbo at once set out for the Téxas country with the remainder of the settlers.²

3. *The beginnings of modern Nacogdoches.*—On the way he apparently picked up the people who had gone on before and who were living scattered among the Indians. The journey was continued toward the northeast "until," to use the words of Ybarbo in his report to Croix, "there were seen the site of the Téxas Indians and, three leagues beyond, the old mission of Nacogdoches, where there was a small chapel in which the reverend father may perform the holy sacraments and a house where he may live,³ as well as plenty of water, lands, and materials for houses." He does not mention the Old Stone Fort,¹ which it has been supposed had

¹Ybarbo to Croix, May 13, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 22; Cabello to Croix August 31, 1779; *Ibid.*, 37; Garza to Croix, April 30, 1779, *Ibid.*, 23.

²When the settlers left Bucareli they left six cannons, four of which were sooner or later taken to Nacogdoches. Those remaining at Bucareli were ordered sent to Béxar, and in 1793 steps were taken to remove them thither, but that they ever reached there I can not say (see a document entitled "Provincia de Texas, Año de 1792," and a letter from Revilla Gigedo to Governor Muñoz, April 10, 1793, both in Béxar Archives).

³Mezières, in his letter of August 23, 1779, testifies to the fact that the mission buildings were still standing when the Spaniards returned. He says "It [the mission] is situated at the foot of a knoll, where its buildings still remain" (*Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 6).

⁴It is just possible that one of the buildings mentioned by Ybarbo, the chapel or the house, was identical with what has been known as the Old Stone Fort, which has recently been torn down, but this is improbable. I can not assert with confidence that Ybarbo did not build the Old Stone

been built there before this time.¹ "I approached," he continues, "in order that we might sow grain to support ourselves and to await the decision of your Grace, whom I humbly beg to approve this my action, since it is impossible to return to the same place or to the banks [of the river] below or above, because the lands are low, or farther away [from the river], because of even greater risk. There is not to be found in this vicinity another place better than this one or the one which was granted to us by his Excellency, the viceroy,² and this one facilitates watching the movements and operations of the friendly Indian nations and keeping in touch with the doings of the traders, as well as getting news from the coast, a matter with which I am charged by my governor."³

Unless some of the Bucareli families who had set out in January reached Nacogdoches in advance of Ybarbo—and it would appear that they did not—this entry of Ybarbo's into the abandoned mission was the beginning of the modern city of Nacogdoches, for the continuous existence of a settlement there from this time forward can be traced.

There would be some satisfaction in being able to give the exact date when this event took place, but from the available records I am unable to do so. The best that I can do is to say it was certainly as early as April 30, the date of the first communication from Nacogdoches known to me. On that day Father Garza wrote from there to Croix recounting the story of the Bucareli flood, stating that Ybarbo had already given a report of the situation at Nacogdoches, and using terms that imply that all or nearly all of

Fort for defense against the Indians soon after going to Nacogdoches, as has been supposed was the case. Indeed, in one communication he refers indefinitely to "fortifying" the place, but this probably meant the building of a wooden stockade. A strong indication that the Fort had not been built before September 4, 1788, is the testimony of Francisco Xavier Fragoso in his *Derrotero* (see page 69). He notes that at Nacogdoches, where he arrived on that date, the houses were of wood and eighty or ninety in number. If so substantial a building as the Old Stone Fort had been there, he in all probability would have mentioned it as a noteworthy object.

¹See *The American Magazine* for April, 1888, pp. 721-728.

²That is, Los Ais (see page 96).

³Ybarbo to Croix, May 13, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 23.

the settlers from Bucareli had already arrived.¹ Ybarbo's first report of his arrival at Nacogdoches I have not been able to find. The earliest communication of his from there that I have seen is dated May 9. It is a letter to Governor Cabello, and contains language implying that he had been at Nacogdoches some time and that Cabello already knew about the removal from Bucareli.² In reporting to Croix on May 13 the story of the desertion of Bucareli he says that more than a hundred days were spent in getting to Nacogdoches. To have been true this could not have referred to the party he conducted, for he did not leave Bucareli till some days after February 14. Neither could it have referred to the whole party led by Garza, because one hundred days from January 25, when he set out, was May 5; but, as we have seen, some, if not most, of the settlers had arrived at Nacogdoches as early as April 30. If Ybarbo's statement was true, therefore, he probably meant that it was one hundred days from the time when Garza started before all the stragglers who had stopped by the way arrived at the new settlement.

It is necessary here to correct an error that crept into the story of the abandonment of Bucareli as it was told in the Spanish correspondence, namely, the assertion that the cause of leaving the place was the flood. It is clear from the above account that the Comanche raid was the external cause of the removal of the people to the east, and that the flood did not occur till nearly three weeks after most of them had left. Yet, through an increasing emphasis of what was in reality a secondary matter, it soon became current in the government accounts that the change of location had been primarily due to the overflow of the Trinity.³

¹Expediente sobre el abandono, 23-24.

²*Ibid.*, 32-33.

³It is true, however, that a previous flood had destroyed the crops at the place, and that the recurrence of the disaster may have been a strong reason for not returning to Bucareli (Botello to Cabello, December 23, 1778, in Expediente sobre el abandono, 2-3). Interesting examples of the way the story became distorted are the following: "In reviewing Cabello's first report Croix wrote, "The governor of the province of Texas says . . . that because an inundation occurred at that pueblo and the Comanches stole the greater part of their horses, they were so frightened that they have deserted the settlement" (Croix to Cabello, May 21, 1779,

4. *Nacogdoches recognized by the government.*—Since it is not my aim to pursue the history of East Texas beyond the foundation of Nacogdoches, it only remains to show how this place, settled without authority, secured recognition from the government, and to indicate briefly the importance it soon attained.

The main purpose of Ybarbo and Garza in their first reports to Croix of the desertion of Bucareli was to show their unwillingness to return thither, and to secure permission to remain at Nacogdoches. By this time Ybarbo had changed his mind as to the relative desirability of Los Ais, for he concluded the letter of May 13 to Croix with the opinion that of the two available places for a settlement, Los Ais and Nacogdoches, the advantages were with the latter.¹ At the same time that he was asking Croix for permis-

in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 12). Croix's assessor general, Navarro, in reviewing the history of Bucareli in 1780, wrote that "the flood which the river caused, and the fire which followed it, reduced to ashes the buildings that had been made, and obliged the settlers to disperse and seek shelter and asylum among the friendly nations near by" (*Expediente sobre el abandono y establecer Comercio*, 45-46).

¹With respect to returning to Bucareli Garza had written two weeks before (Letter to Croix, April 30, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 23-24): "It is now wholly impossible to restore this population to the same unprotected place whence they fled, without exposing them to greater and more evident perils than those which they have already experienced, because—not to mention this hostility [of the Comanches], which was the cause of their flight and which may be greater in the future,—that district has been proved uninhabitable by the inundation which it suffered on the 14th of February." To possible locations elsewhere on the Trinity or nearer to San Antonio he was even less favorable. "Since this is the place formerly considered the best," he wrote, "I judge that such other as there may be on that river to the north or to the south are as bad if not worse. And not less unsuitable are the places which might offer some advantages toward the west between the Brazos, San Marcos, and Guadalupe rivers, since these places, because of their large *encenadas*, are the paths of ingress and egress for the Comanches, and are much more dangerous [than the others] in proportion as they are more frequented by these Indians, nearer their lands, and distant from the friendly tribes, circumstances which, having been weighed by these settlers, led them to flee to this vicinity." His opinion of Nacogdoches, on the contrary though based mainly on hearsay, as he frankly admitted, was highly favorable, and he intimated—what Ybarbo expressed—a preference for it over Los Ais. "Under these circumstances," he continued, "there is no doubt that your Grace's generous piety will deign to approve this temporary withdrawal,

sion to remain at Nacogdoches, he was making recommendations to Cabello that implied an expectation that his request would not be refused. These recommendations were of a kind that he knew would appeal to the government, since they concerned the control of the Indian tribes about him. In May he reported¹ that the Tonkawa Indians who had been promised traders and had been disappointed were becoming insolent; and as a remedy he suggested that a trading post should be established at Nacogdoches and that a commissary should be stationed there. A month later he reported new difficulties with the Indians, and said that Nacogdoches should be supplied with a good garrison.²

Croix and Cabello discussed the new situation without any reference to the royal order in response to which the Adaesans had been removed from the frontier further than to indicate that they were aware that it was not being complied with. They both showed plainly that they desired that Ybarbo be allowed to remain wherever he would be most useful as an Indian agent, the only question being what was the most desirable location. When Croix learned

and, if it be your superior wish, concede them permission to attempt to establish their settlement in another place—even if it be in (*hasta la*) the old mission of Los Ais, which the excellent viceroy, Dn. Fr. Antonio Bucareli granted them—where, free from hostile invasions, they may in some measure retrieve what they have lost in all these removals. . . . And I believe that the advantages which, they assure me, this depopulated mission of Nacogdoches possesses, will contribute to this end. Although the site for the settlement is not the best nor the most beautiful, it is yet the most suitable, judging from what I have heard and the little which I have seen, for it is on firm land, commanding, entirely free from inundation, and between two *arroyos* abundantly supplied with good water. Besides having a healthful climate, it enjoys the advantage of having near by many spacious plains of proved fertility, some more and others less watered, for the grain, and open commons (*exidos*), good pastures, and numerous springs of water, for raising horses and cattle, and affords all other conveniences that these people could wish for their relief. The advantage to the province resulting from their settlement in this place would not be slight, through their being able to visit the friendly Indians frequently—having them near by—and to promptly report everything that they may attempt anew contrary to the peace promised to your excellency."

¹In his letter of May 9, cited before.

²Letter to Cabello, June 13, 1779, in Expediente sobre el abandono.

of the break-up of Bucareli he left the temporary disposition of the inhabitants to Cabello, giving him permission to bring them back to the Trinity River, or, better, as he thought, to establish them in any one of the places to the northeast that had been suggested by Botello. Far from recommending that they be brought back to Béxar, to do which now was the opportune time if it was to be done at all, he distinctly said that such a procedure "would be prejudicial to the plans which are being meditated, by interfering with the cultivation of the friendship of the Téxas and other allied tribes."¹ Cabello, who had already given his opinion that Bucareli could not be held against the Comanches without a garrison,² soon expressed a preference for Nacogdoches over any other place, approved Ybarbo's request for a garrison on regular pay, and recommended that it be formed of the settlers already there.³

While Croix and Cabello thus favored Nacogdoches, Mezières advocated re-occupying Bucareli. We have already seen the good opinion entertained by him of the site of Bucareli, and his charge that the Comanche attack which caused its desertion had been brought on by the foolish fears of the Spaniards. Now, in August, 1779, he visited Nacogdoches to assist the settlers during the absence of Ybarbo in pursuit of Comanches, and while there he wrote to Croix a gloomy account of the situation of the inhabitants. He criticised their location, said that plenty of places safe from flood could be found near Bucareli, insisted, as before, on the importance of a settlement there to maintain Indian relations and with a view to opening up trade with New Orleans, and suggested that the people be sent back there and reinforced by a regular garrison and by the Adaesans who had remained at Béxar.¹ But Mezières died

¹Croix to Cabello, May 21, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 12-13.

²Cabello to Croix, February 11, 1779, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 12.

³Cabello to Croix, May 31, 1779, April 30, 1779, and August 31, 1779—all in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 13, 19, 31. In his letter of May 31, In his letter of May 31, Cabello said that he was hardly decided as to the respective merits of the two places, but by the time of his next letter he had no doubts.

⁴He said that the first crop sown at Nacogdoches had failed and that the people were "scattered among the Gentile Indians, carrying what they

soon after the expression of this opinion,¹ and the only effective opposition to the occupation of Nacogdoches was removed.

Only to Navarro, in Chihuahua, did it occur that perhaps, in order to fulfill the king's command made seven years before, Ybarbo and his people should be brought to the neighborhood of Béxar. But even to him this was but a passing thought, and he recommended, instead, that choice be made between Bucareli and Nacogdoches, and that the decision be left to an impartial observer after a careful examination of the two sites.² Croix appointed as this impartial observer, governor Cabello, whose preference was already known. But Cabello found excuses for not performing the commission himself or delegating it to any one else, while Croix claimed that he knew of no one outside of Texas available to fill the place.³ And thus the matter appears to have dropped by a tacit understanding, and the pueblo of Nacogdoches remained undisturbed.

Not only did Croix and Cabello refrain from breaking up the settlement, but, in effect, they legalized its existence by assigning Ybarbo a salary and conferring on him a new and more dignified title. At Bucareli Ybarbo and his men had served without pay and had furnished their own arms and ammunition. Ybarbo claimed, besides, that making presents to the Indians and aiding the settlers had cost him a goodly sum from his own private means. He asked, therefore, shortly before leaving the place, that arms and ammunition be furnished him and his men, and that they be paid for time spent in actual service. Ripperdá, and after him his successor, Governor Cabello, supported his request before Croix. Failing to secure his demands, Ybarbo now threatened that he would leave his post. The effect of this threat discloses the real attitude of Cabello and Croix toward Ybarbo's presence on the frontier.

possess, offering clothing for food, bartering hunger for nakedness" (*Expediente sobre el abandono . . . y establecer Comercio*, 6-8).

¹Some time before January 18, 1780 (*Expediente sobre el abandono*, 46).

²Navarro to Croix, January 17, 1780, in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 46-48.

³Croix to Cabello, January 29, 1780; Cabello to Croix, April 1, 1780; Croix to Cabello, January 19, 1780—all in *Expediente sobre el abandono*, 50-53.

Cabello wrote to the *comandante general* that it would be unwise to let Ybarbo retire, since there was no one else in the province who could wield such an influence among the Indians and do so much towards keeping them quiet. In consequence of this opinion, Croix in October, 1779, assigned Ybarbo a salary of five hundred *pesos* a year.¹ At the same time Cabello conferred on him the title of Lieutenant-Governor of the Pueblo of Nacogdoches.² That he was ever formally commissioned to this office I cannot say, but it was as such that he was thereafter dealt with by both the governor and the *comandante general*. It is plain, therefore, that Ybarbo was no longer remaining on the frontier by mere sufferance, but that, on the contrary, he was kept there through the positive desire of Cabello and Croix to maintain an influence over the Indians of the northeast.

With the occupation of Nacogdoches begins a new and important epoch in the history of the Spanish régime on the Texas-Louisiana frontier, and of the developments there Nacogdoches instead of Adaes becomes the center. The trading house asked for by Ybarbo was established and the Indian trade was reorganized. Nacog-

¹Ybarbo to Croix, October 19, 1778; Ripperdá to Croix, October 31, 1778; Croix to Cabello, January 12, 1779; Cabello to Croix, April 3, 1779—all in Expediente sobre el abandono, 16-18. Croix to Cabello, January 16, 1779; Cabello to Croix, March 30, 1779; Croix to Cabello, October 15, 1779; and Cabello to Croix, December 17, 1779—all in the Béxar Archives.

²The first use of this title that I have found was by Cabello in a letter to Croix, dated December 17, 1779 (Béxar Archives). He then calls him captain of militia and lieutenant governor of the pueblo of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Nacogdoches. Cabello's letter notifying Ybarbo that he had been assigned a salary was dated March 11, 1780. It would seem that this letter was considered by Ybarbo as the source of his authority and the title to his pay, for in after years, when an attempt was being made to remove him, he furnished a copy of the letter as evidence of his official standing. That the government also considered this letter as his commission would appear from the fact that Governor Pacheco in 1788 furnished a copy of it as evidence of one of the offices (*empleos*) that had been created in Texas between 1775 and 1787 (Pacheco to Ugalde, May 29, 1788, in the Béxar Archives).

In 1797, Ybarbo, in a letter asking permission to resign his post, styled himself "Capitan de Milicias, Teniente de Govr. Militar y Politico, Jues Delegado de Contravandos y de Comisos, y Justicia Mayor del Pueblo de Nacogdoches y su jurisdiccion" (Letter to the viceroy, March 22, 1791, in the Béxar Archives).

doches, through being made the headquarters for the trade and the distribution of presents among the dozen or more tribes in whose midst it lay, became the most important Indian agency in the province, while Ybarbo, as head of the community, became among the Indians of the northeast the most influential Spaniard of his day. To Nacogdoches the government now looked for the maintenance of a counter influence among the Indians as a makeweight against the Anglo-Americans who made their way to the borders of the country; and when, in 1803, the American frontier was carried clear to Texas, Nacogdoches became equal if not superior in importance to Béxar through being at once the outpost for aggressive movements by the Americans and for resistance by the Spaniards.¹

¹It should be noted that before the Louisiana cession in 1803 the Tao-vayases country on the upper Red River, as well as the northeast, was looked upon as a point of special danger with respect to the Anglo-Americans.

ENGLAND AND MEXICO, 1824-1825.

FREDERIC L. PAXSON.

The activities of Great Britain in Mexico during the years 1824 and 1825 were inspired not only by a desire to ascertain the actual conditions prevailing in that Republic, with a view to ultimate recognition, but also by an anxiety lest the United States should profit by proximity and interest and thereby acquire undue advantages in Mexico. These facts are clearly developed by the Foreign Office correspondence of these years, and the following extracts from the correspondence tell the story with but little need for comment.

It was with difficulty that Canning preserved in his Mexican agents the neutral attitude which he desired to show to all the Latin-American colonies. The most imperative instructions often failed to direct the actions of the men on the ground. "You are sent," he instructed one of them,¹ "to ascertain the Fact of Mexican Independence, not actively to promote it; and to form and report an Opinion of the Stability of the Government, not to prescribe its form or attempt to influence its Councils." Yet there was a quality in the Mexican influence to which none of his agents was impervious. Whether it was a corrupt attack, or a sympathy with the spirit of independence, or a truer view based upon better information, is hard to say, but certain it is that the English agents can not be accused of failing to see certain dangers taking shape along the northern frontier, or of failing to try to inspire both Mexico and the Foreign Office to resist them.

As early as January, 1824, the agent, Lionel Hervey, had announced to Canning that Mexico was ready to enter into exclusive trade arrangements with Great Britain, and had advised strongly in favor of such an arrangement. Spain had been expelled, he said, and Mexico was too poor and too weak to stand alone. "Hence the Mexicans are looking anxiously around them in quest

¹Canning to Morier, July 30, 1824, Foreign Office MSS.

of an Alliance with one of the great Maritime Powers of Europe, and if they should be disappointed in their hopes, they will ultimately be forced to throw themselves into the arms of the United State, already opened wide to receive them."¹

In particular, the danger arising from the American colonization of Texas, then in progress, was realized by the English agents. Hervey in the dispatch already mentioned, called attention to the introduction of American capital, and to the building of American roads, as well as to the immigration of American citizens. And Ward, the chargé who succeeded him, repeated his cries of warning. On the 1st of June, 1825, the latter assisted² "at the reception of Mr. Poinsett, who has presented his credentials as Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary, from the United States," and was particularly impressed by "the length of Mr. Poinsett's speech, which occupied near a quarter of an hour. After paying the Highest compliments to General Victoria, to whose courage and constancy, Mr. Poinsett attributed the present prosperous state of Mexico, he congratulated the Mexicans in general, upon the choice which they had made of a republican form of Government, which, he said, was most particularly agreeable to the President and citizens of the United States. He spoke in the most flattering terms of the manner in which the struggle for Independence had been conducted, and added that it was to the great qualities which had been displayed in the course of this struggle, that they must attribute the justice which was now done them by the *first* nation of the Old World, and the nation, which had *first* sown the seeds of liberty in the New.

"Mr. Poinsett concluded by giving an analysis of the object of his mission, which, he said was to conclude a Treaty of Commerce, and Boundaries,—an intimation, which appeared, by no means so palatable as the preceding part of his speech, if one might judge by the looks of the Spectators, who are well aware of the difficulties with which the question of boundaries is likely to be attended.

"General Victoria's reply was very concise, but as I expect to be

¹Hervey to Canning, January 18, 1824, F. O. MSS., Mexico, VI.

²Ward to Canning, June 1, 1825, F. O. MSS., Mexico, XIII.

able to enclose a translation of it, I do not think it necessary to trouble you with any details upon the subject here."

The relations between Ward and Poinsett during the summer of 1825, and after, would make an interesting study, and one for which materials lie ready to the hand of the worker. In the manuscripts of the Foreign Office, are preserved the original letters of the British agent, while the fourteen folio volumes of the papers of Joel R. Poinsett which are in the Library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, have hardly been even touched. Yet in these papers is to be found the detailed story of the struggle between British and American influence in Mexico. Both of the competitors emerged from the contest with high opinions of the abilities of their respective opponents.

During the struggle of 1825 the British agent became further convinced of the inevitable conflict between Mexico and the United States along the Rio Grande and his despatches are truer than most historical prophecies.

"The treaty," he writes to Canning, on the 6th of September, 1825,¹ "between the United States and this country, advances but slowly, though I am at a loss to understand, in what the cause of the delay consists . . . while the Mexicans are . . . jealous in guarding against encroachments in the shape of a treaty, they are suffering, on the other hand, by an absurd mixture of negligence, & weakness, the whole disputed territory, and an immense tract of country beyond it, to be quietly taken possession of by the very men, whose claim to it, they are resisting here:—you will perceive Sir, by a reference to the Map, that the whole of the lands between the rivers Sabine and Brazos, have been granted away to American Settlers, and that the tide of emigration is settling very fast in the direction of the Rio Bravo. These grants have been made by the provincial Government of Texas, and retailed by the Original speculators to the hordes of their countrymen, which have already arrived there, at a moderate price of half a dollar an acre, by which however they have cleared 150 per cent profit. On the most moderate computation, six hundred North American families are already established in Texas; their numbers

¹Ward to Canning, September 6, 1825, Foreign Office MSS., Mexico, XIV.

are increasing daily, and though they nominally recognize the authority of the Mexican Government, a very little time will enable them, to set at defiance any attempt to enforce it. . . . General Wavell has, I believe, a considerable share, [of the land] but he is, I understand, almost the only Englishman, who has applied for land in Texas. The rest of the settlers are all American—Back-woodsmen, a bold and hardy race, but likely to prove bad subjects, and most inconvenient neighbors. In the event of a rupture between this country and the United States, their feelings and earlier connections will naturally lead them to side with the latter; and in time of peace their lawless habits, and dislike of all restraints, will, as naturally, induce them to take advantage of their position which is admirably adapted for a great smuggling trade, and to resist all attempts to repress it. In short, Mexico, though she may gain in point of numbers, will not, certainly, acquire any real strength, by such an addition to her population. . . . Not knowing in how far His Majesty's Government may conceive the possession of Texas by the Americans, to be likely to affect the interests of Great Britain, I have not thought it right to go beyond such general observations upon the subject, in my communications with this Government, as appeared to me calculated to make it perceive the danger, to which it is wilfully exposing itself. Were but one hundredth part of the attention paid to practical encroachment, which will be bestowed upon anything like a verbal cession, Mexico would have little to fear."

There is reason to believe, from this correspondence, that the tendencies of the western movement in Texas were recognized by England before even the settlers realized that which was coming to pass.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Napoleonic Exiles in America, by Jesse S. Reeves, Ph. D. (Johns Hopkins University Studies, Series, XXIII, Nos. 9-10, Baltimore, 1905), is a monograph which, according to the author's prefatory note, "centers about the unfortunate colonial enterprise called Champ d'Asile on the banks of the Trinity River in Texas." As a matter of fact, however, Champ d'Asile, while it furnishes the *dénouement* of the story, occupies only a little more than a third of the space devoted to the fortunes of the Napoleonic exiles in America.

Dr. Reeves shows that after Napoleon's overthrow, Joseph Bonaparte and many of Napoleon's followers, including several officers of the "Old Guard," sought asylum in the United States. Conspicuous among these officers were the brothers Charles and Henri Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, and Rigaud, who became leading spirits among the exiles in the formation of various insane schemes.

Part of the refugees were organized into a "Napoleonic Confederation," which conceived the quixotic plan of raising an army of nine hundred men in the Western States, capturing by force the northeastern frontiers of Mexico; and, aided by the revolutionists there, establishing Joseph Napoleon in Mexico as King of Spain and the Indies.

To enable them to gain a livelihood, a portion of the refugees were organized at Philadelphia into the "Society for the Cultivation of the Vine and the Olive." They secured from the United States government a tract of land on the Tombigbee River and attempted to found a colony there, but the project, very naturally under the circumstances, was an utter failure. The only connection established by Dr. Reeves between this colony and the scheme of revolutionizing Mexico is that they were promoted by the same persons, and that an attempt was made to raise money for the Mexican project by the sale of lands from the colony's grant.

More directly connected with the Mexican scheme, doubtless, although just what the connection was has not been shown, was

the attempt of the Lallemands and Rigaud to found on the Trinity River the settlement known as Champ d'Asile. In telling the story of this unfortunate affair, Dr. Reeves has relied almost entirely on Hartmann and Millard's *Le Texas*, and Just Girard's fictitious narrative contained in the *Adventures of a French Captain*. To this part of his story, therefore, he has added very little to what was already well known by specialists. He has, however, brought to light the correspondence relative to Champ d'Asile between the Spanish Minister, Onis, and the United States government, and has shown how Monroe's administration proceeded to interfere with the Lallemands' plan by sending George Graham to Galveston Island to see what was going on.

In spite of a partial failure to state his own conclusions in a sufficiently definite form, Dr. Reeves has done a good piece of work. But to complete the story of the Napoleonic exiles in America, and particularly of the Champ d'Asile episode, it would be necessary to examine the Mexican archives and the Béxar Archives at Austin, Texas. Onis was, during his ministry, in constant correspondence with the government at Mexico and Chihuahua, and the officials at these places, in turn, communicated their fears and directed their orders for precautionary measures regarding the United States frontier to the authorities in Texas. The reviewer has seen in the Mexican archives correspondence from the Mexican side of the Champ d'Asile question, and is confident of the existence of the same sort in the Béxar Archives. The Mexican side of Dr. Reeves' story, therefore, yet remains to be told.

H. E. B.

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VALENTINE BENNET.

MARIE BENNET URWITZ.

Some lives seem cast in a mould of self-abnegation, as it were; are so unmindful of self, and so full of helpfulness for others that they pass out into God's great eternity unnoticed and are all too soon forgotten. Such in an eminent degree is the case of Valentine Bennet, of whom it is a sacred privilege to write, to trace anew the records of a life giving its best years to Texas; a patient, devoted servant of the young Republic, who esteemed no sacrifice too great nor any hardship as such, for the beautiful land of his adoption.

The Bennet family held an ancient seat in the north of England, whence its knights issueing forth to do service for the King, bore upon their banners the royal quarterings. It is said laughingly that an old grandam of the family, when some misfortune had befallen her children, was wont to comfort them by saying, "Oh you have the lion's paw anyway; don't fret."

When the family came to America is not known, but it is certain that one of the sons, Valentine, a young man at the breaking out of the War of 1812, did valiant service in a Massachusetts regiment at the battles of Brandywine and Lundy's Lane. He married a Miss Kibbe, whose family, also of English origin, is mentioned in the charming story of Lorna Doone. The elder Mr. Kibbe, having secured large grants of land in what was known as the "At-

takapas country," induced his family of sons and daughters, married and single, to emigrate with him to this new Louisiana region; and, embarking with all their worldly possessions on flatboats, they came down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and through a bayou, to their future home. Here many vicissitudes of fortune befell them, and Mary, the wife of Valentine Bennet, died, leaving him, broken in heart and in home, with two children—a son of two years and an infant daughter. Realizing the utter impossibility of rearing his children in this wilderness, he took them to Cincinnati, and fortunately was able to place them in the care of an excellent Scotch Presbyterian lady whose careful training was shown in the high moral character of the boy and girl who afterwards became useful citizens of the Republic and of the State of Texas.

Mr. Bennet himself engaged in boating on the Mississippi, and became the owner of a steamboat plying on the river. This boat sank, and after many adverse experiences he bade adieu to his children and departed for Austin's Colony, in the Province of Texas. At Brazoria he was building a house when summoned to join the colonists in their attack on Fort Velasco, June 26, 1831. Here he was severely wounded in face and hip, and lay for months a helpless sufferer at the home of a patriot friend. Mr. Bennet thus took part in the first open and armed defiance of the colonists against Mexico, and was one of the first to shed his blood for this new cause of freedom.

We next hear of him at Gonzales as one of the "immortal eighteen" who, throwing the gauntlet in the face of Ugartechea, resisted his demand for the cannon. The news of the situation at Gonzales drew many hastily-armed citizens thither, and a volunteer army of Texas was immediately organized with General Stephen F. Austin in command. Valentine Bennet, from his early experience in the War of 1812, was a fine tactician, and, being commissioned lieutenant, drilled the troops as they moved to the vicinity of San Antonio. He was with the small force that fought the battle of Concepción, and an active participant in the siege of Bexar, where he was made quartermaster. His service in that campaign was especially commended in the dispatches of General Ed.

Burleson, then commanding the volunteer army, who says: "I have also to contribute my praise to Major Bennet, Quartermaster General, for the diligence and success with which he supplied both armies during the siege and storm." For this especial service Major Bennet afterwards received from the Republic of Texas a donation of 640 acres of land.

After the fall of the Alamo, the army, under command of General Houston, fell back from Gonzales, and the town was burned. The family of Captain Westover (a victim of Goliad) had care of the account books of Major Bennet, but was unable to save them from the burning house. On the retreat Major Bennet was extremely busy in procuring beef and commissary supplies, teams and wagons, and on the eve of the battle of San Jacinto, it was he who handed the axes to Deaf Smith when he sped on his momentous mission to Vince's Bridge. While the Texas army was encamped on the battleground of San Jacinto and after the engagement, occurred a funny little incident in the commissary department: Major Bennet having received, among other stores for the troops, a hogshead of sugar, and apprehending the difficulty of securing it from pilferers, inquired for a "good, honest soldier," and was directed to Mr. Em. H. Darst, whom he placed as an especial sentinel over the sugar until it could be regularly issued by the quartermaster's sergeant. Major Bennet, being much occupied by his other duties, did not return to the sugar for some time, and upon doing so, what was his astonishment at seeing Darst, who had made a sack of his drawers and filled the legs full of the coveted "sweetening," making off from the hogshead. The ludicrous appearance of Darst and the chagrin of the quartermaster were the occasion of much merriment among the boys who knew the circumstances, and there were many jokes at the expense of the Major and his "good soldier."

Remaining in the army, Mr. Bennet was in 1838 granted a three months' furlough, during which time he visited his children in Cincinnati, and brought back with him his son, Miles S. On arriving at Galveston, they were met by Colonel Moseley Baker who, greeting them affectionately, exclaimed, "Well, Major, so you have brought another rifle to Texas."

The writer feels that she can not better continue this life-story than by quoting here at some length from a diary kept by her father, Miles S., which will show how now began that comradeship so beautiful and touching in its devotion between father and son, hitherto strangers to each other. The diary says: "Reporting at headquarters at Houston for duty, June 5, 1838, father was by General Barnard E. Bee, quartermaster general, instructed to proceed to Fort Houston, San Bernard, Texana, Gonzales, and San Antonio, to collect and preserve the scattered military stores, have the beeves and army horses taken care of, and to report the condition of the frontier. Being entitled to a clerk and assistant, he took me with him to act in that capacity. On our route we went to Samuel Damon's, at the Mound, six miles northwest of Columbia; his house was the repository of some of father's quartermaster's account books and the Texas 'Star Brand' that he had made for the cavalry horses. Proceeding to the San Bernard, we examined the horses in the care of Mr. Anders and sent them to headquarters; visited Captain McFarland's command at the old station, and issued a requisition for stores for some of his sick men.¹ Went by Texana and the La Vaca settlements to Gonzales. A few of the families who had survived the 'Runaway Scrape' of April, 1836, were returning and rebuilding their old burned homes; they knew father well, and begged him to use his influence at headquarters to have some troops sent for the protection of this frontier. Reporting from San Antonio, where we found a few military stores and only about twenty Americans, we were ordered to remain there for the present. Returning to Houston, we were received with consideration by General Houston, and by special invitation we both attended his levee on December 7, 1838. We were authorized to procure wagons, teams, beef, corn and commissary stores for the marching of two companies of troops from headquarters at Houston for the protection of the Gonzales and San Antonio frontier."

¹The diary also mentions much privation and sickness among the troops in the summer of 1838—and the satisfaction felt by Major Bennet when he was able, at the request of Dr. Ewing, Surgeon General, to furnish a barrel of vinegar for the camps at "Old Station" on the San Bernard. The vinegar was a substitute for lemons in treating those suffering from fever.

In the meantime Major Bennet had completed a comfortable home in Gonzales to which he brought his daughter, Sarah, who had grown into a cultured and lovely woman, one whose strong Christian character impressed itself upon all who came within her influence. At this time occurred a serio-comic incident in the home life. By some rare good fortune the Major had procured for his daughter the gift of a barrel of handsome china, and, in lieu of a cabinet, shelves were constructed for its safe keeping, and here the cups and pretty things were tastefully displayed by the young chatelaine. But alas, the house cat, spying an intruding mouse, sprang to the uppermost shelf, where she overturned a large platter, which fell upon another large platter, which brought the shelf down upon the next below and so on, until the whole fell in utter ruin and with amazing crash. The tears of the young lady were unavailing for, although the indulgent father and brother would have done all in their power, to have replaced this fragile china would have been in those days almost as impossible, and quite as useless, as to have imported a peach blow vase.

Another incident occurred about this time which exemplifies the scrupulous ideas of integrity and the upright business character of Major Bennet. It seems that the day for the payment of a certain sum, \$500 in coin, in the city of Houston was fast drawing near. How to transport this sum safe from the eyes of marauding freebooters and bands of Indians was a question. It was finally decided by arranging that Miles S. should go on horseback accompanied by a faithful man, Larrabee,¹ and his ox wagon by means of which supplies might be brought back on the long and tedious way, for it was summer. Accordingly, arrangements were completed and dried beef and "pones" of hard-baked corn-bread and a small supply of ground coffee placed on the wagon. The tar bucket, which, for lubricating purposes, always hung from the rear of the wagon, was removed, its contents poured out, the silver dollars placed in the bottom, the melted tar and grease refilling it, nearly to the top, and the innocent looking bucket swung to its accustomed place, although a shrewd observer could have seen that it was rather securely fastened. On nearing Houston they were

¹This man Larrabee accompanied Major Bennet on the Santa Fe Expedition and died in the prison of San Cristoval.

warned not to enter, as yellow fever held the town. Here was a dilemma. Young Bennet was just from the North, a fine subject for the fever, of which he had a mortal dread. To send a hired man into danger, from which he himself shrank he scorned to do, and to return to that father with the mission for which he had gone so many miles unaccomplished, did not occur to him. So removing from its greasy receptacle the money and cleaning it as best he could, he tied it in a wallet to his saddle, mounted his horse and at high noon rode into the plague-stricken city, discharged the duty and the debt and galloped back to the camp. Here he found Larrabee with the frugal meal ready, the oxen yoked, and the heads of those oxen turned to Gonzales. But this happy home life at Gonzales lasted only a short time, as, early in 1841, Mr. Bennet was re-commissioned major in the quartermaster's department and sent on the Santa Fé expedition, the hardest campaign of all his life—that which shattered his strong constitution, tried his fortitude, and broke his spirit.

To discuss the wisdom, or the policy, of this undertaking would be foreign to the intent of this article. The following brief summary from the *Galveston News* of August 2, 1892, will suffice:

“During President Lamar’s term of office, the Congress of the Republic having failed to make provision for the support of the army, the troops were disbanded. The President in his message of 1839, had recommended measures for the assertion of the jurisdiction of Texas over the Territory of New Mexico, and bills had been introduced into both Houses of Congress for the purpose of authorizing an expedition to Santa Fé, and making small appropriations for that object, but both bills were rejected. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1841 preparations were made under the sanction of the President for such an enterprise, but the intention was declared to be simply to invite the people of that region to accept the jurisdiction of Texas, with an offer to assist them in resisting the Indians and the authority of the supreme government of Mexico.

“The command was instructed not to attempt the forcible subjugation of the country in case of resistance, and Colonel W. G. Cook, Dr. R. F. Bremham and Colonel José Antonio Navarro were

appointed commissioners to treat with the authorities and people of New Mexico. Colonel Hugh McLeod was military commander of the expedition, and notwithstanding the lack of appropriations the President gave orders to the commissary and headquarters general of militia to purchase the necessary provisions and munitions, indorsed the order himself and directed the proper officers to audit and pay them. Hon. James B. Shaw was comptroller and refused to obey the order, but was overruled by the President and secretary of the treasury and about \$90,000 drawn from the treasury for the purpose.

“Five companies of mounted infantry and one of artillery were raised, but the whole number of soldiers was but 270, which was increased by the commissioners, merchants, tourists and servants to about 320 in all. The project had become known all over the United States and in both Old and New Mexico, while the departure of the expedition was delayed more than a month after the time for its intended start. No breadstuffs were carried and the only dependence for food was an insufficient number of beeves on foot and such wild game as might be procured on the route. No known route was pursued, and after setting out from Brushy creek, above Austin, on the 20th of June, 1841, its movements were directed by guides evidently unacquainted with the country.

“After undergoing fearful hardships the expedition finally reached the borders of New Mexico, and an advance guard sent forward to San Miguel to confer with the authorities. There they were captured, through treachery, by the Mexicans, and a short time afterward the main body of Texans were surrendered by Colonel McLeod. The prisoners were treated with the utmost barbarity by Armijo, the governor of New Mexico, and Salezear, one of his officers, and a number of them were murdered in cold blood. The survivors were marched under a strong guard to the City of Mexico, where they were kept in prison until 1842, when they were released, and in August of that year reached Galveston from Vera Cruz by vessel, and from here were sent forward to their homes in the interior.”

Before the final march to Mexico the ill-fated prisoners were confined for some time in a prison of San Cristoval, from which

the following letter, given in fac-simile, was written by Major Ben-
net. This, being the only specimen of his handwriting which any
of the family now living have ever seen, is highly prized by them:

Dear Children.

I am here a prisoner
near Mexico, I expect to leave in
a few days, about 180 miles on the
road to Vera Cruz, the beam of this
will give you every information respect-
ing our capture, it is uncertain how long
I may be detained. Do not feel
any anxiety about me, as I am in good
health & doing as well as I could expect.
Go on in the path of virtue, & you will be
sure to be prosperous & happy.

Your affectionate Father

John Cristoval
Feb 3rd 1842

J. Bennett

Those who have read Mr. Kendall's account of this expedition will recall the forlorn picture of the captive Texans as they entered the City of Mexico—"some suffering from smallpox in all its stages borne on litters; the rest in clothing which would have disgraced a party of beggars, mounted on burros, their appearance excited no little sensation among the kind-hearted women. Although suffering from fever, I could not help laughing at a circumstance which occurred at this time. Among our party was Major Bennet, our quartermaster before the capture of the expedition. He was some 55 or 60 years of age, but hale and hearty, although suffering now the pains incident to the early stage of smallpox. He was a native of Massachusetts, Puritan by birth and education; knew the Bible by heart, and was always ready with a quotation from that book to 'point his moral and adorn his tale.' Though sick and a

captive, nothing could daunt his spirits or prevent him from quoting scripture in or out of season. The anecdote which follows shows the character of the man and would have provoked a smile from Niobe herself:

“Major Bennet was drumming with his heels the flanks of a lazy donkey upon which he was mounted, when three or four women came out of a house immediately before him. Struck by his wretched appearance, the kind-hearted creatures, clasping their hands, uttered their common expression of sympathy, as ‘Mira! Mira! los Tejanos pobrecitos,’ while their lustrous eyes were filled with tears. The major, seeing the effect his woe-begone appearance had created, instantly resolved upon a speech. Seizing his donkey by the ear, and pulling his head around, the common way of stopping the animal, he looked intently into the faces of the poor women who had commiserated him, and raising his other hand as if to impress more forcibly what he was about to say, ejaculated: ‘Weep not, daughters of Mexico! Your rulers are coming seated on asses!’ This slightly-altered quotation from the Scriptures he uttered with a mock gravity truly ludicrous, and then pulling his donkey’s head back to its former position, by dint of much kicking forced it into a mincing trot and soon overtook the party. Knowing from his character and the preparation he had made that his speech would be something uncommon, I paused to hear it, but I little thought anything could have forced from me, at that juncture, a laugh as hearty as that which followed the winding up of his address. What the women thought of us, I know not, for, of course, they did not understand a word of what was said.”

When Mr. Kendall was taken to the prison at Santiago, he found himself confronted with the necessity of choosing from among the prisoners a partner to assist him in carrying the heavy chain which was now to decorate one of his ankles. This choice fell upon Major Bennet, of Scripture-quoting memory, one end of his chain being vacant, owing to the sickness of his comrade at that time; but he was especially induced to make this choice because of a sly wink the major gave and a side-speech to the effect that he had a way of ridding himself of the fetters which all the Texans did not possess. So Mr. Kendall, with the major carrying his chain, were conducted into a room where the instruments of servitude

were to be fastened on. At the major's whispered suggestion, by slipping a dollar into the palm of the blacksmith, he was given a ring so large that it could be removed after taking off his boot. "This chain was some eight feet long and of the kind used to draw logs with oxen, a 'log chain.' Even here the major could not resist the temptation to be facetious at the expense of both, remarking that now we were 'bound together by the strongest ties,' and with a gravity which would have become a graven image, he pretended to comfort me by paraphrasing from Job, 'That we all have our trials and tribulations,' that 'Repining was of little avail,' and 'That the time would soon come when all our bonds would be rent asunder.'" In his further account of this dreary confinement in the dungeons of Santiago, Mr. Kendall says: "But of all modes employed to while away the evenings (they were made to work in the sewers during the day) the most common was reading. Conspicuous among this class was my yoke-fellow in chains, Major Bennet, who might have been seen pouring daily over a Bible which had been given him by Mr. Elliott, Chaplain of the United States Exploring Expedition, when in Santiago, on his way from the Pacific to Washington."

As was stated above, in the *Galveston News*, the prisoners were released in 1842, and in August of that year the remnant reached Galveston by vessel, from Vera Cruz, and were sent forward to their homes in the interior. Among these Major Bennet arrived at Galveston broken in health and his body in rags. But here he was soon in the arms of his children, Miles S. and his daughter, Sarah, now Mrs. Thomas J. Pilgrim, and who was living in Houston. After a short rest he, with his son, started on horseback for their old home in Gonzales. Here an incident may be mentioned showing how, through all the bitter things which had happened to him, he preserved that sweetness of disposition which characterized him all through life. On the way out from Houston the father and son, being well mounted for the long journey westward, overtook a soldier of the Republic, one whom Major Bennet had known in his department, trudging alone, on foot. He immediately dismounted and insisted that his comrade join their party, walking and riding by turns, and this plan was persisted in, although it greatly impeded their progress, until by some good fortune they

secured a mule for the third man, and thus, all three mounted, they arrived at Gonzales. Here the old major was received by his friends who had never expected to greet him again. With indomitable spirit he almost immediately re-entered the army, as, to quote again from the diary of Miles S., "The Mexican advance under General Adrian Woll made it necessary for the frontier men to again organize and retard movements until stronger forces could come to our help. We both engaged in this Woll campaign. Father established a commissariat, procured small supplies of corn for bread, and a few cattle, which he carefully barbecued and issued in small rations to the squads of hastily-equipped men gathering for the fight. I also assisted in driving beeves to the command and participated in the Battle of the Salado, and we both helped pursue the retreating Mexicans away from our settlements. Father immediately received instructions from Headquarters to procure corn, beeves and commissary stores for subsistence of the troops, as public sentiment favored the organization of a Texan force strong enough to carry the war into the Enemy's country. The Somervell campaign ensued, during which father was continued in his position until his death," which ended a service of nine years' duration.

Major Bennet was of slender build, tall, and in his younger days erect as an Indian; of extremely sensitive disposition, he could not bear the sight of suffering in man or beast, and was never known to willingly allude to the experiences of himself and comrades on the dreadful march to Mexico. Exceedingly amiable in disposition, his appearance among a group of children was greeted by a shout of merriment, and, like Peter Pindar of old, with a plea for "a good long story." In the fall of 1843 he laid down the cares of this life, and in the cemetery at Gonzales repose the ashes of this old hero, unmarked save by a simple stone erected by his devoted son. His life was one of self-sacrifice, and, so modest and retiring was he, and so loath to speak of his deeds, that, as some one has written of him, "He has not been given that prominence in the history of Texas that worthy patriotism and greatness entitle him to receive. In his administration of the affairs of the quartermaster's department of the Texan army, he exhibited the greatest skill and energy, and when unable to obtain supplies on the credit of

the Government, he did not hesitate to use his own means and credit. For many of these expenditures he was never reimbursed by the Republic, and after his death his son, Miles S. Bennet, sacrificed the valuable lands given by the Republic to Major Bennet for military services in order to pay some of the debts made by the latter to obtain food for the Texas soldiers. It is a pathetic picture."

Although he left but little of worldly goods to his children, theirs was the heritage of a noble and honorable name which they cherished and transmitted untarnished, to their children,

"The place
Where shining souls have passed imbibes a grace
Beyond mere earth; some sweetness of their fames
Leaves in the soil its unextinguished trace,
Pungent, pathetic, sad with nobler aims
That penetrate our lives, and, heightens them or shames."

CAPT. JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

GEN. JOHN E. ROLLER.

This distinguished but ill-fated young soldier was born in the town of Staunton, in the State of Virginia, on the 31st of January, 1814. He came of that old Scotch-Irish Covenanter stock which has furnished so many heroes for American history in the various struggles for liberty that have taken place upon the soil of this continent, from the wars of colonial times to the present day.

His mother, who gave to him his gentle yet chivalric spirit, was a woman much loved and admired in her day for her strength of character, associated—as it was—with a charming person and engaging manners. She was married in the first place to John Henry, a member of a family ever held in high repute in the Old Dominion, by whom she had two children. One, Dr. Richard Hendricks Henry, of Waynesboro, Va., died on the 13th of December, 1846, leaving a memory behind him as fragrant as that of the “Doctor of the Old School” of Ian MacLaren. John Henry died on the 9th of August, 1800, and some ten years later his widow was sought in marriage by Absalom H. Brooks. From their marriage in 1810, five children were born, towit: Norborne C. Brooks, who for many years was post master of the city of Staunton, and died beloved and lamented; Mary A. Brooks, who was married to Charles Wortham Reins, of Richmond, Va., in 1834, and whose son, John Malcolm Reins, now of Winnipeg, Canada, was one of “the bravest of the brave,” a gallant member of the 5th Virginia Regiment of the famous Stonewall Brigade. Another daughter died unmarried, while a fourth, Miss Henrietta Brooks still survives aged nearly eighty. Her adopted daughter, Josepha Brooks Richardson, a niece of Gen. John E. Roller, of Virginia (a Confederate Veteran), of Col. O. B. Roller (of the 2d Virginia Regular United States Volunteers in the war with Spain), and of the Rev. R. D. Roller, D. D. (rector of the Episcopal church, at Charleston, Kanawha, West Virginia), is the wife of Channing B. Cornell, the nephew of Gov. Alonzo B. Cornell, of New York, and

grandson of Ezra Cornell, the founder of Cornell University at Ithaca. The last survivor of the Brooks family makes her home with this adopted child.

The papers and letters printed with this sketch are original documents of historical value. They serve to illustrate an important chapter in the history of Texas, and to show to her sons and daughters for all time, the patriotism and heroism of the men who died that she might be free. The documents are the following:

(1) An official copy of the descriptive list of John Sowers Brooks upon his enlistment in the United States Corps of Marines, and showing, also, his promotion in that service.

(2) Letter to his brother dated August 12, 1835, and one to his father dated November 4, 1835, announcing his purpose to enlist in the "Rebel Army" of Texas.

(3) Letters to James Hagarty, dated July 10, 1835, August 13, 1835, and August 19, 1835, of the same purport.

(4) Letters of Captain Brooks to his family from the time of his arrival at Velasco, Texas, about the 23d of December, 1835, to the time he was disabled by a severe wound in the battle of Coleto, March 14, 1836.

(5) Letter of William Christy, dated June 4, 1836, confirming the news of the death of Captain Brooks.

(6) Letter of Gen. Sam Houston, dated June 26, 1836, to the same effect.

(7) Letter of Capt. Jack Shackleford, of the "Red Rovers," dated August 5, 1836, to the same effect.

(8) Two letters of Dr. Joseph L. Field, dated September 2, 1836, and October 7, 1836, respectively, also giving further particulars.

(9) Letter of John D. McLeod, dated January 30, 1837, giving further particulars in regard to his fate.

(10) Extracts from the "Staunton Spectator," upon which paper Captain Brooks was a compositor and to whose columns he frequently contributed. These show the great doubt and uncertainty that existed for some time, among his friends, as to the tragic termination of his life. It is said that his mother, as long as she lived, never did give up the hope that he would some day

return, and every year knit new stockings for him with her own hands.

The hope is indulged that the publication of these papers will serve to embalm for future ages, the memory and fame of as chivalric a spirit as ever graced the earth, and of whom, owing to the modesty of his relatives and friends, but little has been known in Texas.

1.

The descriptive list of John S. Brooks, as given by the Hon. John Boyle, Acting Secretary of the Navy, June 12, 1835, is as follows:

JOHN S. BROOKS, A CORPORAL, born in the United States, County of Augusta, State of Virginia, aged nineteen years, five feet, nine inches high, of a sandy complexion, red hair, blue eyes, and by trade or occupation, a farmer, was enlisted at Charlestown, Mass, by Bvt. Lt. Col. Freeman, on the 19th day of September, 1834, for four years.

REMARKS.

Promoted Corpl. 25th Feb. 1835. Now on board Frigate Constitution.

P. G. HOLLE,
Adjt. and Insp.

Head Quarters of the Marine Corps.
Adjutant and Inspector's Office.
Washington, 12th June, 1835.

2.

Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, Aug. 12th/35.

My Dear Brother:—I received your letter of the 5th inst. to-day and hasten to answer it immediately; and I do it with the greatest pleasure, as I have tidings to communicate which will, doubtless, be very acceptable to Father—for he will be spared some trouble and anxiety, which I understand he is about to take in procuring my discharge. Any further application for that purpose will be supererogatory. Soon after the date of my last letter, I wrote to Col. Henderson, Commandant of Marines, and in as neat and handsome a manner as was possible in the present disordered condition of my intellects, requested my discharge from the Corps, which he

has the honor to command. I referred to several reasons as the grounds of my application, among which was my ill-health, and general dissatisfaction with the service. A reply has been received, by which I am informed that I am to be discharged. As a necessary preparatory measure, my clothing returns, and other accounts, will be transmitted to Head Quarters, and as soon as they can be adjusted, my discharge will be forwarded to this station, and I will be released from the service. This will probably require ten or twelve days—and possibly longer. A soldier, specially discharged, as is the case with myself, is required to pay for all the clothing he has received from the Government; but the pay now due me will be sufficient for that purpose. However, if it should not, I will remain in the service until I am able to leave it in an honorable manner. My pay is nine dollars per month; and a little frugality will soon enable me to discharge my arrears, should there be any, which I very much doubt.

Although I have procured my discharge, and feel all that pleasure that naturally arises from the consciousness of being released from a galling bondage, yet I cannot avoid entertaining the melancholy conviction that my prospects are as gloomy and uncertain as ever. What shall I do? I have forgotten nearly all the little knowledge which I acquired at the Printing Business. I cannot labor,—I will not beg,—and have no idea of starving. I have now been near eleven months in the United States service, and profess to have some knowledge of company and battalion drill. Indeed they are the only things I ever acquired with anything like ordinary facility; and my habits, from actual service, and a predisposition for that mode of life, have acquired so much of a military cast, as to render me almost unfit for any other occupation. There is a strong probability of a rupture between the Mexican Government and the Province of Texas. The people of the latter have established a provisional government, which step, I presume, will be followed by a declaration of independence. The Mexicans have embodied troops, which are now marching upon the colonists. Col. Austin is a prisoner in the City of Mexico; and I can perceive nothing in the aspect of their affairs to prevent the contest, which this state of things predicts. There is then some hope, of my finding active employment in a military capacity there; and from

my knowledge of the American system of tactics, and the necessarily disorganized condition of any forces which the Province can embody, it will not be difficult, I think, to attain a more elevated station than that I now occupy. My services as a drill master would be valuable; and in the event of a war, I am sanguine enough to believe that I will soon entitle myself to a commission. I infer from your letter, that I cannot obtain appointment in the Navy and I can conceive of no other resource in my present condition. I will therefore probably go to Texas.

In reply to your inquiry, I will say that I received \$10 from Mr. Hagarty, which, he informs me, was from Father. I neglected, but not through ingratitude, to return my thanks for this opportune donation. Father will pardon my forgetfulness, when he recollects my confusion and distress of mind.

When Mr. Hagarty visited me, as I have before informed you, he told me to write to him, and apprise him of my situation and my wishes relative to it. I complied with his request promptly, writing to him the next day, as the earliest opportunity. I have not heard from him since. I will embrace the first chance of telling him that I have procured my discharge.

Give to the gentlemen, who have so generously interested themselves in my behalf, my sincerest thanks and best wishes for their prosperity and happiness. It is my duty, and it will be my highest gratification, to acknowledge their kindnesses individually, by letter, as soon as I possibly can. I have but a few moments of time each day to myself. There are but three Corporals on the station, and so many recruits to drill, that their time is entirely occupied by duty.

Tell Mother I will write to her in a day or two, when I will comply with her request in relation to Mr. Heiskell. His kindness has made a deep impression on my heart, and not the less so because his generous exertions in my favor, were not crowned with success. I can never forget it; and if my prayers will avail, he will live long and happily in this world, of which I am so weary. Tell R. Williamson and L. T. M. Fackler to write to me. I will expect letters to [*sic.*] them. I have been looking for a letter from Mary Ann, and also from Father. How is Richard and his family? Remember me to all who inquire for me. Give my love to all

the family. I will answer your enquiries as to where I have been et cetera, in my next letter. Excuse this, as I have no time to read it over.

It is almost Tattoo—I have been very much hurried in writing this letter, and have scarcely time to fold it. I have much to say, which I am compelled to defer to another opportunity.

Your brother,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

(Post Marked, Brooklyn, N. Y. Aug. 13. Addressed, Norborne C. Brooks, Staunton, Augusta County, Virginia).

New York, Nov. 4, 1835.

My Dear Father:—Ere this letter shall have reached you, I will be once more on the billows of the Atlantic. To-morrow morning, I embark on board the schooner America, bound for the port of Brazoria, for the purpose of volunteering in the “Rebel Army” of Texas. I have not taken this important step, my dear Father, without the most anxious and deliberate reflection upon the probable consequences. Experience has taught me the dangers of the sea, and particularly the Gulf of Mexico, in light vessels; and I am not blind to the possibility that exists of our being captured by a Mexican man-of-war, or Revenue Cutter,—and consequently of finding my military ardor circumscribed to the sphere of one of their prison-walls, instead of the wide field of a Texian Campaign. I know the hardships, privations, and dangers a soldier must incur; and I well know too, from personal observation, that the effect upon the character and disposition of a long habituation to the rules of military life and the customs of war, is more to be dreaded than even the peril of “life and limb.” I have given all these circumstances my calmest consideration, and the result is a determination to volunteer in defence of the holy rights for which Texas is now contending. If I have erred, it is surely an error for which the heart of every American will suggest an apology; and I trust, my dear Father, that you will not view my conduct with that displeasure which a superficial or hasty glance at the reasons which have impelled me to it, might perhaps excite.

I have neither talent nor inclination for business; and you know that my habit of thought and my education have strongly predis-

posed me for a military life. It has always been my desire to enter the Navy, Army or Marine Corps of the United States. That wish has hitherto been frustrated; and there seems now no probability, however remote, that it can be effected. Texas opens a wide and variegated field to the ambition and enterprise of the soldier of fortune. But I have no hope of distinction there—for I cannot believe that the evil fortune which has so long pursued me will not still assert its claim to control my wayward destiny. I trust I have a holier motive than mere ambition, for abandoning my native country and the pleasures of social life, to encounter the dangers and turmoils of war in a foreign land. There is something in the cause of the Texanians that comes home to the heart of every true American. Its near similarity to the glorious struggle of our own ancestors in "Seventy-six" must produce a sympathy for them in every part of the Union, which will result in something more than mere kind wishes, for their success. I hope and believe that there are many of the youths of our country who have inherited enough of the spirit of their fore-fathers to induce them to procure, like myself, a musket and a hundred rounds of ball cartridge, and join the holy crusade against priestly tyranny and military despotism.

I feel a deep and abiding interest in the success of Texas and her people. They are our own countrymen, who have been seduced from their native soil to settle in a distant land, under the most solemn assurances of protection and support. Those assurances are now to be violated and revoked, even at the expense of the plighted faith of a nation, and they are to be driven from the soil which they have made their own, by the "sweat of the brow." Their Republican form of Government, their local Legislature, their Municipal Law, and their sovereignty and distinction as a State, or integral and component part of a Federal Republic, is to be destroyed at one ruthless blow. Will America permit it?

Our vessel will lay-off the mouth of the Mississippi for intelligence. If we find the coast in the hands of the Mexicans, or strictly blockaded by their Cutters, we will proceed to New Orleans, and I will make my way by land to the interior of Texas. If, however, there should be a possibility of eluding their vigilance we will move at once into Brazoria, where we will be safe. If some of the family should write immediately upon the receipt of this,

it is possible that I will get the letter in New Orleans. If I go there, I will wait a day or two for that purpose.

The Schooner mounts a nine-pounder, on a pivot, and the crew are provided with small arms. I have a musket and a hundred ball cartridges.

Give my love to Mother and all the family.

Your affectionate son,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

P. S. And now, My dear Father, if you should never see me again, for the fate of battles is uncertain, and it may be my lot to fall in a foreign land, I hope you will forget all my errors and follies, and believe, as I assure you, that I have never for a moment forgotten your kindness or affection or that of my dear Mother. Often have I sighed to see you all before I go—but that cannot be—and when I reflect how possible it is, that I may never see you again in this world, I love you with an affection so intense that it almost breaks my heart. But—Farewell—I hope not forever.

BROOKS.

My health is very good—I take this step unknown to any one and without advice or permission. Mr. Hagarty has not seen me for some days, and does not know where I am. I will leave a note behind for him.—BROOKS.

Tell Norborne and Mary Ann to write to me, and Hannah and Henrietta might add postscripts. If A. St. C. Boys is in Staunton, tell N. to ask him to write to me. Direct, Brazoria, Austin's Colony, Texas.

BROOKS.

(Post-marked New York, Nov. 4. Addressed, Mr. A. H. Brooks, Staunton, Augusta Co., Virginia.)

3.

Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, July 30, 1835.

To James Hagarty, Esq.

Dear Sir:—Although I did not express the gratitude which your visit yesterday excited in my bosom, yet believe me, I appreciate most fully the kindly feelings that must have prompted it. That

you have taken an interest in the wayward destinies of an unhappy wanderer, as deep as that you have manifested towards me, is but another claim to my admiring esteem, and will serve to fix more indelibly on my heart the impression which your kindness has already made upon it. It may have occurred to you, that I have made but a poor return for your benevolence, and that my thanks were but coldly and slightly expressed. But, sir, there is an apology for me, to which I deem it due to myself to advert. While I am endowed with the faculty of writing with tolerable facility, I am denied even the ordinary colloquial powers, and find it extremely embarrassing to maintain a conversation on the most common topic. This defect I am conscious arises more from a kind of timidity, which I have in vain endeavored to overcome, than from absolute absence of words. But, although I do not evince that voluble gratitude we so often see, yet I feel as deeply, and perhaps more deeply, than those who resort to that method of requiting their obligations.

You desire to know my wishes with regard to my future course. I will tell you frankly—for your noble-hearted generosity to me demands, and shall receive, the most explicit answer I am capable of making. My situation in the Marine Corps is as disagreeable as it can possibly be. The men who compose it; and with whom I must necessarily associate in a certain degree, possess habits, passions, and feelings with which I can never sympathize. Indeed I was alone even on the crowded decks of a man-of-war and felt as desolate as I could have possibly done in the midst of the dreary Sahara of Africa or the boundless forests of Oregon. I have not one feeling in common with most of them, and consequently can receive no pleasure from their society. My life is perfectly miserable; and can it be wondered, if I desire, most anxiously desire, to be released from my bondage? It is now the main purpose of my life, the darling object of my pursuit, to obtain my discharge, and apply myself to some honest and honorable avocation. My attention was, for a short time, turned to the art of composing, and I had arrived to a tolerable proficiency, when I was compelled to abandon it from an apprehension of injury to my health. I am willing, however, to resume it, and to incur any risk, rather than remain in my present degraded situation. I submit myself entirely

to your guidance. Whatever pursuit you point me to, I will unhesitatingly adopt. It is true, I have my preferences; but my conduct has not been such as to entitle me to indulge them. If I can only be released, and find some honorable employment which will afford me an opportunity of rendering myself again worthy of the affection of my parents and other relatives, my ambition shall be satisfied. I am aware of the difficulties in my path; but I think I have energy and perseverance sufficient to surmount them. My hand writing is not as good as it has formerly been. It has been long since I have exercised it; and it is not always possible for a soldier to procure the best materials.

I received a letter from my father, on yesterday which I immediately answered. In it he referred to the expressions which Col. Peyton and Messrs Kinney and Michie are making in my behalf.

A warrant in the Navy, or a commission in the Marine Corps, would either of them be a desirable position for me. But I fear that neither can be procured now. My proclivity, if I have ever developed any, is decidedly military. I conceive it to be the only pursuit for which I am at all calculated. But, although I may not possess natural talent for business, I think that stern and untiring application will avail to [over] come the abstacles which are likely to obstruct my progress. At all events, I am willing to exert every power, both mental and physical; with which I am endowed to make myself useful and respectable, to regain my self-esteem, and to elicit the approbation of my friends. Permit me to thank you—for the interest which you have taken in my behalf. Your kindness has made an impression, deep and abiding on my heart, so that time can not efface it. But I will not weary you with my professions of gratitude—a feeling which is better evinced by deeds.

Any notice of this hasty scrawl will be gratefully received.

Most respectfully,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

(Post-marked New York, July 31.)

U. S. M. Brks. Brooklyn, August 13th, 1835.
To James Hagarty, Esq.

Dear Sir:—I received yesterday a letter from my brother, in which he informed me that application was about to be made for

my discharge; and that you had generously expressed a determination to interest yourself in procuring it. It gives me pleasure to tell you, that any further exertion with that view will be entirely supererogatory. Encouraged by the success of others in numerous instances, and the well-known kindness of the Commandant of Marines, I wrote to him soon after your visit to me; and in as handsome a manner as the disordered condition of my intellects would permit, requested my discharge from the Corps. I referred to several reasons as the grounds of my application,—among which, the most prominent were, the fact of my minority at the period of my enlistment, my ill-health and general dissatisfaction with the service. A reply was received, by which I was apprised that the Colonel had acceded to my request. As a necessary preparatory measure, my clothing, returns, and other accounts, will be transmitted to Head Quarters, and as soon as they can be adjusted, my discharge will be forwarded to this station, and I will thus be released from the most servile bondage. A soldier specially discharged, as will be the case with myself, is required to pay for all the clothing he has received from the Government. The pay due me, added to a small sum which I now possess, will be sufficient to accomplish this purpose. If, however, it should not, I will remain a short time longer, in order that I may be enabled to leave the service in an honorable manner.

I wrote to you, according to promise, stating my anxiety to be released, and to pursue any honorable avocation for which my habits and education might most adapt me. That letter was directed to No. 26, Broad Street, and sent to the Post Office in New York. I presume you have received it.

Pardon this hasty scrawl. I have had but a few moments to devote to it.

Your obliged Sev't.

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

(*Addressed* James Hagarty, Esq., 26 Broad St., New York.)

Brooklyn, August 19, 1835.

To James Hagarty, Esq.,

Dear Sir:—I was yesterday favored with my discharge from the United States Marine Corps, and am now free from the obligation which my oath of enlistment imposed. While I must acknowledge the extreme gratification I derive from the consciousness of being

once more free and unshackled, yet I cannot forbear entertaining the melancholy conviction that my prospects are as gloomy as ever. My ingenuity can suggest no scheme, likely to be successful in its results, to which I may resort for the purpose of procuring an honest subsistence. I acquired but an imperfect knowledge of the art of printing; and it has now been so long since I exercised even that little knowledge, that I fear it will be deemed presumption in me to enquire for employment as a compositor. But whatever may be the struggles to which I am doomed, I shall ever feel gratified for having escaped the miseries of four years' servitude in the Marine Corps; and I shall never forget the benevolent kindness which prompted you to interest yourself in the behalf of a poor, wayward boy. I cannot but think that honest exertion will be followed by its appropriate reward, and that persevering industry will finally conduct me to a reasonable position in society. It is this consideration that gives me courage, and induces me to hope even amidst the circumstances of gloom by which I am surrounded. It does not seem to me that my lot has been a hard one. While I have ever cherished the most glowing ambition to attain a situation of respectability, untoward accidents have always restrained my advance and prostrated me even lower than my gloomiest forebodings could anticipate. It is true, I must confess, that a candid and careful investigation of my misfortunes, has led me to the humiliating conviction, that my own faults and follies were their chief causes. And, while I make this admission, so derogatory to myself, it becomes me, in justice to my own feelings, to say, that there were circumstances which I could not control, that exercised no inconsiderable degree of influence over my unhappy career. It would be painful for me to advert to these circumstances, and, as they have long since ceased to possess the influence which they once exerted, I permit myself to hope that you will not require a more comprehensible allusion to them.

Since your visit to me I have written to you twice. My first letter was a compliance with your request for a full disclosure of my situation, and my wishes relating to it. The second was in relation to my discharge. I informed you that I had applied to the Commandant of Marines, enclosing him a Surgeon's Certificate of my ill-health, and that he had consented to discharge me on the

usual conditions of a special discharge. Since the date of that letter my discharge has arrived, and was handed to me yesterday, after a settlement of my accounts. Not having been a year in the service and having drawn a years' clothing, I consequently had much of to pay for. The pay due me from Government, with a small sum which I possessed, was sufficient for this, leaving me twelve dollars which is all I now possess in the world. I left the Barracks this morning, and have procured cheap boarding at a respectable house, as far as I can see, in Brooklyn. I will remain here until I see what will be best for me to do. A few days, however, must determine. What do you think of Texas? Is there not some prospect in that country, in its present unsettled state, for one who has some knowledge of the American system of tactics. I respectfully solicit your advice, and shall be guided entirely by it.

Yours respectfully,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

Mr. James Hagarty, No. 26 Broad Street.

4.

Letter to A. H. Brooks, Staunton, Va.

Velasco, Texas, 23rd December, 1835.

My dear father:—

The die is cast. I am over the Rubicon and my fate is now inseparably connected with that of Texas. I have resolved to stand by her to the last and in a word, to sink or swim with her. Permit me to entreat you to suffer no unnecessary uneasiness about my situation. From what I have learned since my arrival here, I do not consider the service extraordinarily dangerous. We have to contend with a mercenary foe who has no other inducement to fight than the hope of gain, and who is moreover, taught from his infancy, to dread the very name of a North American. San Antonio de Bexar has been carried by assault and Gen. Cos and six or seven hundred of his men are now prisoners to the gallant Texans, who so nobly sustained the honor of their country on that occasion. Several other engagements have occurred in all of which, the invincible Yankees triumphed and invariably with in-

considerable loss. There is now not a single Mexican soldier within the borders of Texas, exclusive of prisoners. The people have organized a provisional government and appointed a Governor, Lieut Governor and Legislative Council, with the other requisite functionaries. Their authority is to cease in March next when the General Consultation of all Texas is to meet and constitute some more permanent form of Government. All is confusion,—but many warm hearts and wise heads are energetically engaged in reducing this chaos to order and we hope ere long, to see Texas enjoying all the advantages and blessings of a firm and stable administration of such laws as the wisdom of her rulers may suggest. She is now a disjointed fragment of the Republic of Mexico, and the blood of thousands will be shed, ere the haughty tyrant of that worse than despotism, again rivets his chains upon free born Americans.

I have been appointed Adjutant of a Regiment with the assurance that the Commission of Lieutenant and Adjutant will be issued to me in a few days. In order to make this respectable situation secure to me, I hope my dear Father, you will make a little exertion and procure me the recommendations of Gen Baldwin, Col. Peyton, Wm. Kinney, Esq., Erasmus Stribling, Thos. J. Michie, Dr. Boys and Alex H. H. Stuart, Esqrs. and such other prominent gentlemen of Staunton as may be disposed to favor me with their testimonials of my character. Their letters may be directed to Gen. Houston or to Col. Fannin in Velasco, Texas, or to myself on an envelope containing their address. The letters must be postpaid in Staunton to New Orleans by you or they will never reach here and you had better write a request on the outside to the Post Master in the latter place, to forward them to Velasco without delay. It would be a great advancement of my interests if you would not lose a moment in complying with the above request.

I am at present stationed at Velasco, a small town at the mouth of the Rio Brazos de Dios. There are about 250 men assembled here and tomorrow I commence the tedious duty of drilling recruits. As soon as we are organized, and reach something like a state of discipline, it is contemplated to reinforce us and then detach us to attack the city of Metamoras in the State of Tamaulipas.

This will be the commencement of a regular and systematic invasion of Mexico and I trust I shall live to see it end beneath the walls of the Capitol of Santa Anna's iron ruled dominions, that we will ultimately succeed, I can not entertain a doubt. I know too well the materials of which our army is composed to think for a moment that they will flinch in the hour of peril. We are all animated by one spirit, defiance to tyrants—and our watch word is "Texas and Glory." Our war cry is Liberty or Death. We must triumph. I can not, I will not believe otherwise. Tell Mother to feel no alarm on my account. Tell her to reflect that I am in the hands of an all wise being and the God of Battles will dispense to me whatever fate he may deem my due, and be assured, my dear father, and my dear mother, that I will never disgrace either the name of a soldier or that of a Virginian. You shall never blush for your wayward boy's conduct on the field of battle.

I forgot to tell you that I arrived here the 20th of this month. The vessel in which I sailed from New York, the Schooner, America, was wrecked away on the Brazos Bar, and we escaped from the wreck in an open boat with the utmost difficulty to another vessel that lay securely outside the tremendous breakers which dash along the coast in a gale of wind from the North. As soon as the vessel struck and began to fill, the sailors seized upon the liquors and soon became intoxicated and by threats and violence, only, could we force them into the boat. I shall never forget that long weary night of terror and dismay, but I will give you the particulars in a future letter. We were a month and ten days on the passage out and saw 80 whales. I have kept a journal since the 10th of Nov. with the exception of the last three days. I was compelled to leave most of my baggage aboard the wreck and if you could spare me a few dollars, it would be of great service to me. I will soon be in a condition to return it. We get 1100 acres of land as citizens, 600 for our services during the war, besides the pay, clothing and rations of a soldier.

Give my love to Norborne, Mary Ann, Hannah, and Henrietta, and to Richard and his family and tell them all to write to me. Be sure and get the letters of recommendation without delay. Good night.

Ever your affectionate son,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

P. S. Perhaps some of the items of intelligence contained in

this letter, would be new to the readers of the Spectator, and you better give Mr. Harper a summary of them. Mr. Patterson's letter to Dr. Archer was received, and did me much service here. I feel greatly his debtor in gratitude for the favor so kindly conferred. I am in very good health and weigh much more than I did when I left home.

If Allan St. C. Boys, R. Williamson and Lt. M. Fackler are in Staunton, tell them to write to me. I write in the midst of the noise and confusion of a camp and have no time to read this over.

BROOKS.

(Mailed Velasco, 23d December, 1835. Post-marked New Orleans, Jan. 3.)

Letter to Miss Mary Ann Brooks, Staunton, Va.

Camp Independence, near Velasco, Texas, Jan. 8th, 1836.

My dear Sister,

I have just been informed that a vessel is about to sail from Velasco to New Orleans. I have but a moment to inform you that I am at present stationed at Camp Independence, three miles from the mouth of the Rio Brazos. I have the situation of Adjutant to about 200 volunteers, denominated the "Georgia Battalion of Permanent Volunteers." My duties here are arduous in the extreme. They are all perfectly raw. The laborious task of drilling all the officers from the major to the junior corporal in the elementary school of the soldier devolves upon Mr. Chadwick, Sergeant Major and myself. It is nothing but drill every day until I have become completely sick of it.

We expect to take up the line of march for Goliad towards the Mexican frontier on Monday, next, for the purpose of forming a junction with the main army under Gen. Houston and then going into the winter quarters. No expedition of importance is intended this winter. Our time will be chiefly employed in organizing and disciplining the army. It is however, proposed to attack the City of Metamoras with the Georgia Battalion, to which I am attached. If we succeed in taking it, my next letter will be dated from that place.

You have perhaps heard of the expedition to Tampico under

Gen. Mexia, who formerly distinguished himself in the Mexican service, but became dissatisfied and joined the Texans. They were compelled to retreat from the want of ammunition with the loss of 50 prisoners and we have just learned that they have all been shot by order of the Mexican authorities. This act of wanton barbarity will only bring so many more bayonets into the field against them. We have resolved to show them no quarter, should the chances of battle place them in our power.

It is said that Santa Ana is mustering 10,000 troops for the invasion of Texas, and that 1000 infantry and 500 cavalry are now on their way towards our frontier, breathing imprecations against all Americans, but particularly the Volunteers. They have hoisted a black flag as an indication that they will show no quarter. So much the better for us. We will not be burdened with prisoners.

It is apparent that there are two parties in this Country who indulge all the virulence of party spirit. One party is strongly in favor of an immediate Declaration of Independence and the other desires a non-politic course. They think that a declaration for the Constitution of 1824 will unite the Liberal party in Mexico with them and thus enable them to establish their independence ultimately with greater ease. There is undoubtedly policy in this course but it is such an one as I would not like to adopt. I am in favor of pursuing an open, bold and fearless course, such as a Virginian would feel it due to his character to pursue. An immediate Declaration of Independence would insure us the aid of every Liberal in the United States, either in men or money, and this temporizing policy, this fighting under the bush, I do not like. Our enemy is not invincible, our cause is good and at the worst, we can but die in defense of this little altar which we have erected to Liberty in the wilds of Texas. My heart is in this struggle. Every feeling and every sympathy, I possess, is enlisted in the cause and I feel that I can die, if necessary for its advancement, but I hope I shall live to see the termination of the war and to hear the terms of peace dictated by our victorious army from the Congress Hall of the City of Mexico.

In my letter to Father, dated Velasco, I gave some account of my disastrous voyage to Texas and ship wreck on the bar of the

Rio Brazos de Dios. I suppose you received that letter, and it is therefore unnecessary for me to recapitulate.

In conclusion, permit me to return through you to father and Mother, my sincerest thanks for their kindness to their erring child. If I die, remember me with kindness cherish every recollection that can atone for my errors, forgive my faults, forget my follies, breathe a sigh, and shed a tear to the memory of your unhappy brother, and believe that he will die as a soldier and a Virginian should, fearing nothing caring nothing.

Give my love to all the family.

Ever your brother,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

P. S. Direct your letters to me to the care of Messrs. McKinney and Williams, Quintana, Mouth of the Brazos and they will forward them. I enclose you a Texas paper of a late date. Send me some Staunton papers.

JNO. S. BROOKS.

Write immediately. I have not heard from home since I left New York.

(Mailed—Camp Independence, near Velasco, Jan. 8th, 1836
Post-marked—New Orleans Jan 29.)

Letter to A. H. Brooks, Staunton, Va.

Camp Fannin, at Velasco, Texas, January 20th, 1836.

My dear father:—

The "Georgia Battalion of Permanent Volunteers," to which I am attached in the capacity of Adjutant will embark tomorrow morning on some vessels lying in the mouth of the Brazos and proceed to Copeno lower down the coast for the purpose of forming a junction with 6 or 700 other troops and then taking up the line of march for the invasion of Mexico. The expedition will consist of 1000 men and will be commanded by Gen. Houston or Col. Fannin. The first point of attack will be the City of Metamoras. It contains a population of from 15 to 20,000, (about one twentieth of whom are Americans) and is said to be wealthy and stored with public property to a vast amount. Two thirds of the inhabitants have manifested a preference for the "Liberals," as we

are called, and consequently are opposed to the misrule of Santa Ana and will probably aid our enterprise. Various rumors have reached us with regard to the state of preparation in Metamoras. It is said the City is well fortified and garrisoned with 4000 regulars. Another rumor leaves it almost defenceless and a third fixes its garrison at 1100 men. We will take with us only a small part of artillery and will be altogether unprepared to operate as a besieging army and therefore, if we find the first rumor correct, we will endeavor to force an entrance by assault and retreat if we fail.

The objects of this expedition appear to me to be not a systematic invasion of Mexico, but primarily to give employment to the Volunteers and lastly to secure if practicable, a foot hold in Mexico, to carry the war out of Texas and to sustain ourselves upon the enemies means until a more formidable and better concerted plan of invasion can be arranged. We are all enthusiastic in the cause and if ceaseless perseverance and indomitable courage can prevail, my fond hope of our success must be realized. Yet it is sad to think that there are some among us with hearts now beating high with expectation who will then hear the merry sound of their last reveilé. I may be one of that hapless number. I hope not, but if such is my fate, I will submit, without a murmur.

You would perhaps like to know some thing of the policies and present positions of parties in this country, for the wild malignant demon of party spirit has appeared here in its most virulent form. There are two parties—one of which is warmly in favor of a secession from Mexico, and a Declaration of Independence by the Convention which is to assemble in March. One portion of this party entertained the project of entering your Confederacy as an integral member of the Union. Another part, are desirous of selling the Country to the United States and thus enjoy the privileges of a free government, as a Territory without the expense until an increase of population and wealth has given them consequence sufficient to justify the assumption of a more exalted and responsible attitude as a constituent of the Federal Government. And a third portion are clamorous for the establishment of a separate and independent sovereignty. They argue with great plausibility that this course will produce confidence abroad and secure us aid in

men and money which could not otherwise be obtained. They say that if we succeed in maintaining an attitude of independence, the country will be populated with a rapidity unprecedented in the annals of emigration and that then her prosperity will essentially depend upon a free, unshackled commercial intercourse with foreign nations and a full development of her own resources which would be impossible as a component part or territory of the United States. These three divisions of the first and I believe the most numerous party all concur however, in the opinion that a *Declaration of Independence* is a necessary preliminary to the furtherance of either of their particular designs. The second and smallest party which is composed of the grantees of land and extensive land speculators are opposed to a Declaration of Independence and to all the views of the other party. They desire a reestablishment of the Constitution of Mexico of 1824 and assert their intention to adhere to the Mexican Confederacy under that form of government which recognizes the sovereignty of Texas as a member of the Republic and gives her a local Legislature and they contend a code of municipal law suited to the education, habits and pursuits of the people. But this party seems to be actuated by a different motive than that which they profess. Their extensive speculations in lands have acquired them an influence in the Mexican councils which it is said, they have exerted to their own aggrandizement and to the detriment of the interests of the settlers. Their influence with the prominent Mexicans enables them to govern the Colony as they desire. It is also said that they have acquired fraudulent titles to land which can not withstand the investigation which the Government of Texas will institute when established and these are the reasons which induce them to advocate so warmly the restoration of the Constitution of 1824 and to oppose so violently a Declaration of Independence.

I may be mistaken in the above views of the state of parties here. My residence in the Country has been brief and I have seen but few of the leading men and therefore would not have you to look upon them as infallible.

We have just heard that the General Council have deposed the Governor and delegated to the Lieutenant Governor authority to act in that capacity. The particulars have not reached us. We

have been aware for several days, of the existence of dissention between the Executive and the Legislature but have yet received no accurate intelligence of the cause. The General Council I believe have assumed the control of affairs denying the Governor's authority to act while the Governor contends that the Council has become a nullity by his decree of dissolution and consequently incompetent to discharge the functions of a Legislature, and thus we are left at this critical juncture in uncertainty and doubt as to the existence as to any legal and responsible authority or acknowledged source of power.

I beg you will excuse this hasty and imperfect sketch of the condition of parties in Texas. I write amid the noise and confusion of a camp sitting on the ground and holding the paper on my knee.

Give my love to mother, to Norborne, to Mary Ann, to Hannah, and to Henrietta and to Richard and his family. Tell them to write to me and direct to Quintana, Mouth of the Brazos, Texas, to the care of Messrs. McKinney and Williams.

Affectionately,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

P. S. Tell mother I still possess the Bible she gave me when I left home and that I read it some times. My time is employed day and night in the organization and drilling of the troops. There is but one other professional soldier in the Battallion, besides myself, Sergeant Major Chadwick, from West Point. I have become habituated to sleeping on the ground with one blanket and feel no inconvenience from it.

BROOKS.

I have no room for all the intelligence I am desirous of communicating. If I have another opportunity of writing, I will tell you some thing of the agricultural conditions of the Country.

BROOKS.

My health is better than it has been of late. I weigh more now than I have at any former period of my life and I have frequently got up in the morning perfectly drenched in rain and leaving my full print in the mud where I had reposed.

BROOKS.

If we accomplish the capture of Metamoras, as I believe we shall, our next object will be the City of Tampico where there is said to be a considerable party in our favor. You have heard of the attack upon that place by Gen. Mexia and the result. All the Americans who were taken were shot. I have not had a letter from home since I landed in Texas. If you write and neglect to pay the postage to New Orleans, they will never go any further. If we succeed in taking Metamoras as I believe we shall, and I survive the attack, I will write immediately and give you the particulars. If I fall, of course, _____.

(Mailed Velasco, Texas, Jan. 20th, 1836. Post Marked New Orleans, Feb. 8th, 1836.)

Letter to Miss Mary Ann Brooks.

Fort Defiance, Goliad, Texas, Feb. 25th, 1836.

My dear Sister:—From the hurry of a preparation to march, I have stolen a moment to write to you. An express from San Antonio de Bexar received here a few moments since, with intelligence that the Mexican Army under Santa Ana, were in sight of that place and preparing to attack it. He heard the firing of cannon after he had gained some distance towards us. He estimated their strength at from three to five thousand men. Bexar has a garrison of 156. They have retired to the Alamo, determined to hold out to the last and have solicited reinforcements from us. We have 420 men here, and have been engaged in repairing the Fort, and mounting artillery. Commanding Officer, in the field, Gen. Fannin, has made Goliad his Head Quarters, from the conviction of its importance, as being advantageously located for a depot of reinforcements, clothing, provisions and military stores. It commands the sea coast particularly, Aransas and Matagorda Bays,—and consequently the only convenient landings for vessels of any tonnage. The only troops in the field at this time are volunteers from the United States, and they probably do not exceed 800, and perhaps but one third of them are near the scene of action. He was therefore compelled to remain in this place in order to prepare it as a depot, and to forward provisions, et cetera. From the want of cavalry, we have been unable to obtain any ac-

curate information of the enemy's movements. Thus Bexar has been left exposed and the Mexicans availing themselves of the advantages thus unavoidably offered them, have marched against it with all their force. With a forlorne hope of 320 men, we will start tonight or tomorrow morning at the dawn of day in order to relieve the gallant little garrison, who have so nobly resolved to sustain themselves until our arrival. Our force is small compared with that of the enemy. It is a desperate resort, but we hope the God of Battles will be with us—that victory will again perch on the bright little banner of Texian liberty and that the civic militia, now aroused to a sense of their danger and the proximity of their implacable and mercenary foe, will appear in their strength, that the young lion will arise in the majesty of his untried strength and our youthful Republic make herself worthy of the high destiny at which she aims. If by forced marches we can reach Bexar, a distance of more than a hundred miles, and cut our way through the enemy's lines to our friends in the Fort, our united force thus advantageously posted, may perhaps be sufficient to hold out until the militia can be collected to reinforce us. If the militia do not rendovous promptly, I apprehend much. But the sin be upon their own heads. We have resolved to do our duty and to perish under the walls of the Alamo, if stern necessity requires it. We are but poorly prepared to meet the formidable host of Mexicans, arrayed against us.

I am now acting aid-de-camp to the Commander in chief, having resigned my appointment of the Adjutancy to the 1st Regiment. I have also been acting as chief engineer to the post and but for this occurrence, would have had it in a tolerable state of defense in a short time. The ordnance and Magazine were also placed under my charge. From this circumstance, you will readily and rationally infer, that there are but few professional soldiers here, when one of my age with but few months experience has so many important trusts confided to him. My duties have been arduous in the extreme, having besides the above appointments, frequently to drill the Regiment and companies, and this must be my excuse for not having written home as often as I might have done otherwise. By the way, I have not heard from home either

by letter or otherwise since I left New York. Why have you not written?

And now my dear sister, I would ask you to look upon my situation in its proper light, and to indulge in no unnecessary fears. I am a soldier both morally and physically. Death is one of the chances of the game I play and if it falls to my lot, I shall not murmur, and you should not regret. I shall write to you as soon as some thing decisive occurs. We shall probably be attacked by the Mexicans on our way to Bexar, and if I should die, my services will entitle me to 1800 or more acres of land which will be valuable. It will revert to my representatives, and father should claim it. Tell him I owe Mr. Hagerty in N. Y. and a portion of it can be applied to the discharge of that debt.

We will take with us, four pieces of artillery, two sixes and two fours.—Now is the time for the people of the U. S. to do some thing for Texas. Can nothing be done in Staunton?

Give my love to all the family, tell mother to remember me, and tell them all to write to me. They are calling for me now. In the greatest haste, Ever your brother,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

(No post mark.)

Letter to A. H. Brooks.

Fort Defiance, Goliad, Texas, Feb. 25th, 1836, 10 P. M.

My dear Father:—

I wrote to Mary Ann today, and as the Express does not leave before reveille tomorrow, I thought that I might profitably employ the few moments I have obtained in writing to you, for it is possible I may never have another opportunity.

In my letter, I gave a hasty detail of our intended movements and the causes which produced them and I would refer you to it, if it has reached its destination.

From information received since the letter above referred to, was written, we are induced to believe that the Mexican force at and near San Antonio de Bexar does not exceed 3000. The Garrison which has been withdrawn from the town to the Alamo, a Fort in the suburbs, consists in 156 effective men. They are resolute

and have determined to die in the ditch rather than dishonor themselves, the cause they have espoused, or the Country they represent.

We will march at the dawn of day tomorrow with 320 men, and 4 pieces of artillery,—2 sixes and 2 fours. We have no provisions scarcely, and many of us are naked and entirely destitute of shoes. But something must be done to relieve our Country. We have suffered much and may reasonably anticipate much greater suffering. But if we succeed in reaching Bexar, before the Garrison is compelled to surrender and are successful in taking the place and its gallant defenders, we shall deem ourselves amply repaid for our trials and hardships. But if we fail, I fear that our misfortunes will have an unhappy influence in prolonging the struggle in which poor Texas is engaged. We will leave a Garrison of 100 men with the hope that a portion of the Civic Militia who are embodying will be ordered here, and the remainder sent to reinforce us. If we are successful, it will prove a check to the Mexican army from which it will not readily recover and which will ever after have a salutary influence upon our cause. But my dear Father, I frankly confess that without the interposition of Providence, we can not rationally anticipate any other result to our Quixotic expedition than total defeat. If the Militia assemble, and move promptly to our aid, we may be saved. We have less than 350 men; the force of the enemy is possibly 3000—a vast disparity. We are almost naked and without provisions and very little ammunition. We are undisciplined in a great measure; they are regulars, the elite of Santa Ana's army; well fed, well clothed, and well appointed and accompanied by a formidable battery of heavy field and battering pieces. We have a few pieces but no experienced artillerists and but a few rounds of fixed ammunition, and perhaps less of loose powder and balls. We can not therefore, calculate very sanguinely upon victory. However, we will do our best, and if we perish, Texas and our friends will remember that we have done our duty.

In my letter to sister, I alluded to the possibility of my death, not with a view to elicit hers or your sympathy, or to excite any unpleasant feelings in my behalf. I owe Mr. Hagarty a small sum he furnished me and am desirous of pointing out some mode by

which it may be repaid, if I should be unfortunate enough to fall. My services here will entitle me to 1800 or more acres of land. It will revert to my legal representatives, and I hope you will claim it and appropriate a sufficient portion of it to that purpose.

From our information, we are induced to apprehend an attack on our march to Bexar, by a detachment of the enemy's cavalry. We hope they will not be in sufficient force to retard our march, much less defeat us.

I am at present acting Aid de Camp to the Commander-in-Chief and Chief Engineer of the post and master of ordnance.

It is getting late, I slept but little last night and as we must march soon in the morning, I beg you will excuse this hasty scrawl.

Give my love to mother, Norborne, Mary Ann, Hannah, Henrietta and to Richard and his family. My health is good. Farewell!

Your affectionate son,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

P. S. I have not heard from home since I left. Direct your letters to the care of J. W. Fannin, Jr., Army of Texas, pay the postage to New Orleans. I have no money. I should like to have

BROOKS.

Do not fail to write me immediately, and send me some money if possible. I am very much in want of it, I assure you. The Government has obtained a loan and will soon pay us off—when I can pay you.

BROOKS.

Give my respects to all who remember me. Tell the youth of Staunton they may now do some thing in the cause of Liberty if they will come to Texas.

(No post mark.)

Fort Defiance in Goliad, Head Quarters,
Army of Texas, March 2, 1836.

My dear Mother:—

In my letters to Father and Sister a few days since, I apprized you of some of the events transpiring on the western frontier of Texas, and of our contemplated movements. Since the date of those letters, circumstances have occurred which have materially

changed our system of operations for the present. I informed you that the advance of the Mexican Army consisting of 2000 men had attacked Bexar or Baiar. the town which was surrendered by Gen. Cos, to the Americans, and that we were preparing to march to its relief—it being garrisoned by 156 men, among whom is “Davy Crockett.” We marched at the time appointed, with 420 men, nearly the whole force at Goliad, leaving only one Company of Regulars to guard the Fort. Our baggage wagons and artillery were all drawn by oxen (no broken horses could be obtained) and there were but a few yokes of them. In attempting to cross the San Antonio River, three of our wagons broke down and it was with the utmost labor and personal hazzard, that our four pieces of cannon were conveyed safely across. We remained there during the day, with our ammunition wagon on the opposite side of the River. During the night, some of the oxen strayed off and could not be found the next morning. Our situation became delicate and embarrassing in the extreme. If we proceeded we must incur the risk of starvation, and leave our luggage and artillery behind. The Country between us and Bexar is entirely unsettled, and there would be but little hope of obtaining provisions on the route and we would be able only to carry 12 rounds of cartridges each. Every one felt an anxiety to relieve our friends, who we had been informed, had retired to the Alamo, a fortress in Bexar, resolved to hold out, until our arrival. Yet every one saw the impropriety, if not the impossibility of our proceeding under existing circumstances and it was equally apparent to all that our evacuation of Goliad, would leave the whole frontier from Bexar to the coast open to the incursions of the enemy, who were then concentrating at Laredo and the provisions, clothing, military stores, et cetera, at Dimmitts Landing and Matagorda, perhaps all that were in Texas, would eventually be lost. Intelligence also reached us that the advance of Santa Anas lower division had surprised San Patricio about 50 miles in front of our position and put the whole garrison under the command of Col. Johnson to the sword. Five of them have reached this place. Col. Johnson is one of them, and they are probably all that have escaped. Capt. Pearson of the Volunteers, was killed with several others, after they had surrendered. The war is to be one of extermination. Each party seems

to understand that no quarters are to be given or asked. We held a Council of War in the bushes on the bank of the River; and after a calm review of all these circumstances, it was concluded to return to Goliad, and place the Fort in a defensible condition. We are hard at work, day and night, picketing, ditching, and mounting cannon, &c. We are hourly in expectation of an attack. On the morning of the 29th ult. our pickets were driven in by a number of men supposed to be a reconnoitering party of the enemy. The Garrison was called to arms and dispositions made for defense. A party of 50 men were sent out to make discoveries and the rest remained under arms till day light. Nothing satisfactory was ascertained. There are about 450 men here. The Mexican force approaching us is variously estimated at from 1500 to 3000 men. We will endeavor to make as good a stand as possible and if we are taken, it will be after a hard fight for we know that we can not expect quarters and therefore do not intend to give or ask any, result as it may.

If the division of the Mexican army advancing against this place has met any obstructions, and it is probable they have been attacked by the Comanche Indians, and their advance much retarded by the loss of their horses and baggage, 200 men will be detached for the relief of Bexar. I will go with them. Our object will be to cut our way through the Mexican army into the Alamo, and carry with us such provisions as it will be possible to take on a forced march. Our united force will probably be sufficient to hold out until we are relieved by a large force from the Colonies.

We have just received additional intelligence from Bexar. The Mexicans have made two successive attacks on the Alamo in both of which the gallant little garrison repulsed them with some loss. Probably Davy Crockett "grinned" them off.

We will probably march tomorrow or the next day, if we can procure fresh oxen enough to transport our baggage and two six pounders. The people in the settlements are all arming themselves. The sound of clashing steel is heard on their borders and it is time they should awake now if they wish to preserve their freedom and the fruits of so many years of toil and privation. Now is the time for volunteers from the United States. Let them

come with six months clothing and one hundred rounds of ammunition, and they may be of essential service to the cause of Liberty, and no doubt will be amply rewarded by the people of Texas. Now or never.

Write to me soon. I have not heard from home for four months. Direct your letters to John Sowers Brooks, Volunteer Army of Texas, to the care of J. W. Fannin, Jr., Col. and Comt. Artillery, or to Quintana, Mouth of the Brazos, to the care of Messrs Mc-Kinney and Williams and they will forward them to me. Tell Mary Ann, Father, and all of you to write, and perhaps some of the letters will reach me. Give my love to all the family. Tell Richard to write to me.

Your affectionate son,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

P. S. We are all nearly naked—and there are but few of us who have a pair of shoes. We have nothing but fresh beef without salt—no bread for several days.

BROOKS.

On my arrival here, I was appointed Adjutant of the Post. The Col. desired to have me in his family—I therefore resigned the Adjutancy and was appointed as Aid-de-Camp.

A spy was taken last night, who will probably be shot tomorrow. One of our men is under arrest for sleeping on post. He will be tried by a Court Martial—the penalty is death.

I have had no money for some time and I am now nearly naked and starved—Fresh beef, without salt, is all we get.

(Mailed Fort Defiance Goliad, March 2nd, 1836. Post-marked. New Orleans. Date blurred.)

Letter to Miss Mary Ann Brooks.

Fort Defiance Goliad, Texas.

March 4, 1836.

My dear Sister:—

Another opportunity of writing to you occurs, and I embrace it because they are infrequent, and becoming hourly more so. The precarious channel, through which all letters must arrive at, or go from this place, affords, indeed, the only satisfactory explication of your mysterious silence; and the belief that yours have been intercepted or miscarried, is consoling indeed, for it renders doubt-

ful what, in my moments of desperation, I have often—feared is certain—that you had forgotten your poor, wayward brother. Why is it so? Why have you not written? War, it is true, “opens a vein that bleeds Nations to death;” but why should it invade the sanctity of social connection? Why should it dissolve fraternal bonds or sunder domestic ties? Is it necessary that we should be morally, as well as physically separated? That the associations of infancy, the remembrances of child hood, the anticipations of youth, and the common pleasures, hopes, and fears of better and happier days, should be forgotten, and we pursue our weary and desolate track through life, as if neither had existed? Is it necessary because we are separated, because the billows of the Atlantic, or the Pillars of the Alleghany are between us, that all the ties which bound us, in other days should be severed? I trust not. Why then do you not avail yourself of that medium of communion, which language proffers? Have I rendered myself unworthy of your affection? I know my course, since I left home, has been erratic in the extreme. But can you conceive of no reason why it has been so? If you can recall the events of the last few years, you must; if you can not, you may then perhaps, with justice, censure me for that reckless indifference, to my hopes and prospects in life, with which, I have so often been charged. It is true that I have passed unimproved many opportunities of acquiring the good opinion of my fellow men, but why was it so? Because early misfortunes have broken and seared a heart, perhaps too sensitive, and blighted all the hopes which a disposition too sanguine, has prompted me to form and cherish. Can I change the fiat of fate? *Can I control the waves of mighty destiny?*

My life has indeed, been a wayward and useless one; and you can not be more sensible of it, or more sincerely deplore it, than myself. But, notwithstanding all my faults and follies, I have never failed in respect for the soil of birth, regard for my native village, love for my home, or affection for my relatives. I have never forgotten: and many an hour of my loneliness has been consumed by thoughts of them. Often has the recollection of the past and of you, arrested me on the brink of acts of deeper recklessness, and of more irremediable desperation so far as this world is concerned, than any I had hitherto committed, Still a latent hope

that I may see you all again, and be once more happy, swells my throbbing bosom. But there is some thing, *I know not what*, which whispers me, that the hope is destined to no realization on earth.

I am acting, my dear sister, in that sphere which nature designed me to fill. *I am a soldier of fortune*; and all the premonitions of my child hood early told me that I should be one. My profession, perhaps for life, be it short or long, will be that of arms. It is the only pursuit in which I could feel a throb of interest; and the cause in which I now exercise it, renders it still dearer, and more ennobling to me. It is the course of Liberty, of the oppressed against the Tyrant, of the free man against the bigoted slave, and, what recommends it more strongly to me, of the weak against the strong. If I fall, let me fall— It is one of the chances of the game I play—a casualty to which every soldier is liable. My prayer has been, since my earliest recollection, to die on the field of battle, with the shout of victory in my ears; and, if it is the will of high Heaven, that that fate should meet me now, I will not murmur and you should not. Remember that your religion teaches that death is but a change of scene.

But all this is of no avail. Perhaps a brief retrospect of the events of our campaign, up to this period, would be interesting to you. On the 24th day of January 1836, the Georgia Battalion of Volunteers, (of which I was Adjutant), consisting of four Companies, sailed from Velasco, at the Mouth of the Brazos, in two vessels. Our object was primarily, to attack and take Matamoras, and thus form a point of rendezvous, and concentration for volunteers from the U. States, for a more extensive invasion of Mexico. Our intention was to allow Liberal principles, and support for the time, the federation of 1824, and thus revolutionize Tamaulipas, the greater portion of whose citizens are opposed to Santa Ana, and to secure our foot hold in Mexico. The fourth day, we debarked at Copano, and after a days march, we pitched our tents at the Mission of Refugio, and waited for the promised munitions and reinforcements. They never arrived. In the mean time, our spy, who had preceded us, returned with the intelligence, that the people of Tamaulipas were opposed to any severance of the Republican bonds, and would not favor our project, if Texas declared itself independent. He also informed us, that Santa Ana was

concentrating his troops, to the number, of from 7 to 12,000 men, at Matamoras, Laredo, Saltillo, Monclova, and Monterey, for the purpose of invading Texas, and punishing his rebellious subjects, with a war of extermination. We retreated to Goliad, and commenced fortifying and preparing for the threatened storm. We have remained here ever since, busily employed, in getting in provisions, military stores, picketing, ditching, and mounting cannon, for our defence.

Santa Ana's army is now in motion, and our almost unprotected frontier, is the destined goal of its operations. One of his divisions has already attacked Bexar, the town which was surrendered to the Americans, on the 18th Dec. 1835, by the Mexican General, Cos,¹ which garrison consisted of only 156 Volunteers, who retreated to the Alamo, a strong fortress in the suburbs, and still held out, at our last intelligence. "Davy Crockett" is with them. The Mexicans amounted to 2000. We started with 300² men to their relief, but found it impossible to proceed, from the want of horses or oxen, to transport our baggage and artillery. While deliberating on what steps to take, intelligence reached us that 200 Mexicans, the advance guard of the division of their army, which was destined to operate against this portion of our frontier, had attacked and totally defeated, Col. Johnson and his force of 40 men at San Patricio, a town on the Rio de la Neuces, about 60 miles in front of our position. Only five escaped, among whom was Col. Johnson and Mr. Toler, a merchant. We are in hourly expectation of an attack; but, from the want of horses, we are unable to obtain any accurate information of the strength or movements of the enemy. We suppose their force to be from 1500 to 3000 men. We have but 500—all Volunteers. But we are resolved to die, to a man, under the walls we have thrown up, rather than surrender to a horde of merciless savages, who have declared their determination to adhere to none of the rules of civilized war fare; but to murder all Americans, indiscriminately. Capt. Pearson and several others were shot down, after they had surrendered at San Patricio. This on the part of the enemy, is to be a war of extermination, not directed solely against the armed sol-

¹Cos surrendered San Antonio on December 10.—E. C. B.

²See above, pages 179, 181, 183, and below, 191.

diers in the field, but against the peaceful citizen, the helpless female, and the defenceless infant. They show no quarter; we do not require it; and, indeed, both parties seem to have tacitly contracted, that it shall neither be asked nor given. Let them pursue their course of ruthless cruelty; they will encounter spirits as stern as their own; they will find, if retaliation requires it, that we can be as deaf to the calls of mercy as they can be. If victory favors us, ample shall be their retribution, for the murdered volunteers at San Patricio.

We have just learned that Col. Grant with 22 men, has been attacked by 200 Mexicans, on the road from San Patricio to Matamoras, 15 miles from the former place, and his whole party, with the exception of two who escaped, killed or taken. Col. Grant is a prisoner. Up to this time, they have uniformly killed all the Americans they take, and it is reasonable therefore, to infer that not one of that ill fated party survived.

We will probably be attacked before I can write you again. The advance of the enemy is within 25 miles of us. If we are defeated, it will be after a hard fight. Tell every one of the family to write to me, and mail their letters different days.

Events are thickening upon us. I will write to you again, the first opportunity that occurs. In the mean time write to me by several different mails; and if I die, reflect that it will be in a good cause.

Give my love to all the family.

Your affectionate brother,

JOHN SOWERS BROOKS.

Direct your letters to John Sowers Brooks, Volunteer Army of Texas, to the care of Col. J. W. Fannin, Jr., or to Quintana, Mouth of the Brazos, to the care of Messrs. McKinney & Williams. It has been four months since I have heard from home.

On my arrival at Goliad, I was appointed Adjutant of the Post. I have since been transferred to the General's Staff, as Aid-de-Camp.

I am nearly naked, almost barefooted, and without a cent of money. We have had nothing but beef for several days. We suffer much and labor hard in repairing the Fort.

(Endorsed on the back, "Will Mess. McKinney & Williams,

please forward this letter to U. S. by first opportunity and oblige,
J. S. B."

Post Marked, New Orleans, Mar. 23. Endorsed, Fort Defiance,
Mar. 4, 1836.)

Letter to Mr. James Hagarty, New York, U. S.

Fort Defiance, Goliad Texas, March 9, 1836.

My dear friend:—

I have written to you several times since my arrival in Texas; but, as I have received no answer from you, I presume my letters have miscarried. An opportunity now occurs of forwarding to Matagorda, whence it will more probably be shipped to New Orleans, than by the usual route, now infested by the enemy.

A brief retrospect of our heretofore bloodless campaign, will perhaps, be interesting to you. I write in great haste, and may possibly, omit events necessary to elucidate our conduct. Indeed, it is impossible within the compass of a single letter, to give you any idea of the manner in which our little army has been influenced by the policies of the Country; though most of them are strangers to it, and consequently unable to realize the motives, which actuate the different parties.— For Texas is not, as you would probably suppose, united, in the great struggle before her. Party spirit has taken a form even more malignant than she has assumed in the U. States; and to such an extent has domestic cavilling been carried, that the Council have deposed, impeached, and arrested the Governor, while he, by an official fiat, has dissolved the Council; and thus we see the striking anomaly of two Governors, created by different authorities, ruling in the same country.

But, to return— On the 24th day of January 1836, the Georgia Battallion of Volunteers, in which I held a responsible office, sailed from the Brazos, under the Command of J. W. Fannin, Jr. The object of this expedition was to take the City of Matamoras, to revolutionize the State of Tamaulipas, to form a nucleus, or point of rendezvous for volunteers from the U. States, to harrass the enemy at sea, to relieve ourselves from the burden of the war by carrying it out of the Country, and to give employment to the volunteers who had lately arrived. On the 4th day we arrived

Copano, at the head of the Aransasso Bay, where we debarked, and landed our stores, munitions, and artillery. After a days march, we pitched our tents at the Mission of Refugio, in Mr. Power's grant, and remained for a few days, in order to make cartridges and prepare our artillery, which was defective, for service. In the mean time, the scout who had been sent ahead, returned with information, that Santa Ana had already commenced the concentration of his army on our frontiers. They were rendezvousing at Matamoras, Monclova, Saltillo, Monterey, and Laredo, to the number of from 6 to 10000 men, and designed attacking Bexar and Goliad simultaneously, with two divisions of his army, and marching the third between those points to San Felipe, where he intended fortifying. We immediately apprised Government of these facts, and fell back to Goliad with our small force of 450 men, and commenced repairing the Fort. Bexar was garrisoned by 150 or 200 men; and with this handful of 6 or 700 Volunteers, we are left by the generous Texans, to roll back the tide of invasion from their soil.

On the 23rd ult. the Mexican advance, reached Bexar, and attacked the subsequent morning with 1800 men. The gallant little garrison retired to the Alamo, a fortress in the suburbs, resolved to hold out to the last. The Mexicans made several assaults, and were repulsed with loss at every instance. On the receipt of the intelligence at Goliad, we promptly marched with 320¹ men and four pieces of artillery, to their aid. In marching a few miles, our oxen became weary, and we were compelled to halt or leave our baggage and artillery. While consulting on what course to pursue, we received news of the successive defeats of the parties of Cols. Johnson and Grant, in Tamaulipas., and of the approach of the lower division of Santa Ana's army on our position at Goliad. A Council of War was held in the bushes, and it was determined to return to the post we had vacated in the morning, as its abandonment would leave the road open to the settlements, and completely uncover our depot of provisions, the only one now in Texas, and consequently the main stay of the Army.²

The Mexicans, to the number of 700, are now in San Patricio,

¹See above, pages 179, 181, 183.

²See above, page 183.

about 60 miles in front of our position; and another party of 200 have been discovered within 18 miles of us, between us and Gonzales. Every thing indicates that an attack will be speedily made upon us. Their scouts, well mounted, frequently push up to our walls, and, from the want of horses, we are unable to punish them.

We have again heard from Bexar, Santa Ana has arrived there himself, with 3000 men, making his whole force 4800. He has erected a battery within 400 yards of the Alamo, and every shot goes through it, as the walls are weak. It is feared that Bexar will be taken and that the devoted courage of the brave defenders will be of no avail.

We have had no bread, for several days. I am nearly naked, without shoes, and without money. We suffer much, and as soon as Bexar falls, we will be surrounded by 6000 infernal Mexicans. But we are resolved to die under the walls rather than surrender.

You shall hear from me again as soon as possible.

I am acting Aid-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, with the rank of Lieutenant. The Express is anxious to start, and I am compelled to close this letter, unfinished.

Independence has probably been declared. We are in a critical situation. I will die like a soldier.

Farewell,

JOHN S. BROOKS.

(Endorsed, "Mes. McKinney & Williams will please forward this to the U. S. by the first opportunity and oblige, J. S. B." Also "Goliad, Mar. 9, '36. Post Marked New Orleans, Mar. 28.)

Letter to A. H. Brooks.

Fort Defiance, Goliad, Texas,

March 10, 1836.

My dear Father:—

I wrote to Mother and to Mary Ann a few days since; but, as the route over which the Government's courier, who carried the letters, must have passed has been infested by advanced parties of the enemy, it is possible they have been intercepted; and, as an officer will be sent to Matagorda to morrow, I have concluded to write again.

In the letters referred to, and some others I have previously written, I gave a brief detail of the events of our campaign up to this period. As some of these epistles, must have reached their destination, I will not again trouble you with a narration of incidents, which I presume, are familiar to you.

A party of 70 men, under the joint command of Col's. Grant and Johnson, have been in Tamaulipas, for the purpose of acquiring information, as to the designs of the enemy, ever since the fall of Bexar in December last. They had taken from 2 to 300 horses, for the use of the army; and were gradually retiring on this post, when half the party, with Col. Johnson at its head, was attacked by about 200 of the enemy, and totally defeated. Six, among whom was their leader, escaped. Capt. Pearson, and two others were inhumanly butchered, after they had surrendered. They, of course, lost all their horses and arms. The party under Col. Grant, were attacked between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning. They were bringing on a large herd of horses, and in their attempt to save them, and, at the same time, fight the enemy, who amounted to 150, they were cut to pieces. Five only escaped. Col. Grant was either killed on the ground, or is now a prisoner. Scarcely had the intelligence of these disasters to our advance in Tamaulipas reached us, when we were informed by express, that the Mexicans had entered Bexar with an effective force of 1800 men. The garrison there consisted of 156 Americans, who retreated, on the approach of the enemy to the Alamo, a Spanish fortress in the neighborhood, which was immediately invested, and has been vigorously besieged up to the date of our latest intelligence.

Immediately on receipt of the news, we promptly took up the line of march, in order to relieve them. After proceeding three miles, several of our baggage wagons broke down; and it was found impossible, to get the ammunition carts or artillery over the river San Antonio. We accordingly halted. During the night our oxen strayed off. In the morning a Council of War was convened. While it was in session, a courier apprised us, that 650 of the enemy, the same, probably, who had defeated Grant and Johnson, had reached San Patricio on the Neuces and would attack our depot of provisions on the La Baca, and at Matagorda.

With these facts before us, it was concluded to return to Goliad, and maintain that place, which was done.

Thirty two men have cut their way into the Alamo, with some provisions. The enemy have erected a battery of nine pounders within 400 yards of the Fort, and every shot goes through the walls. A large party of the enemy are between this and Bexar, with a design of cutting off reinforcements. Another division of 3000 Mexicans have arrived at Bexar, making their whole force now there 4800 men. The little garrison still holds out against this formidable force. It is said that Santa Ana is himself with the army before the Alamo.

It is said that Santa Ana designs driving all the Americans beyond Sabine. We have just been advised that he intends detaching 1000 men from Bexar, to form a junction with the 650 at San Patrico, and then reduce this place. We have 450 men here, and twelve pieces of small artillery. We have strengthened the fort very much; and he will find it difficult with his 1650 men to drive us from our post.

We are hourly anticipating an attack, and preparing for it. We are short of provisions, and that is now our deadliest foe. Unless we are soon supplied, we can not hold out much longer. We have had no bread for some time. We suffer much from the want of shoes and clothing.

Excuse this hasty letter. I have just returned from a weary and unsuccessful march in pursuit of a party of Mexicans, who appeared a few miles from this place.

I have not heard from home since I have been in Texas, and I am at a loss to account for your silence.

The Convention, which met the first of this month, it is rumored, have declared Texas independent. No official or authentic information, however, has come to hand.

You shall hear from me again as soon as possible. I am Aid-de-Camp to the Commandant here. Farewell.

Your affectionate son,

JOHN S. BROOKS.

P. S. I have neither clothes nor money to buy them. The Gov-

ernment furnishes us with nothing,—not even ammunition. I have written nearly twenty letters home, all of them unanswered.

BROOKS.

Give my love to all the family and write.

(Endorsed "March 10th, 1836, Fort Defiance, Goliad." Post Marked, "New Orleans, April 19.)

5.

New Orleans, 4th June, 1836.

Mr. N. C. Brooks:—

Sir., Your letter of the 13th ult. came to hand this morning; I showed it to General Houston, who is now at my house, confined by a very severe wound, and I very much regret to be compelled in candor to inform you that he has no doubt of the fact of your brother's having fallen. The Brooks, who made an application before me, cannot be your brother, his name is different, and he is quite an illiterate man. With the hope that you will excuse the laconic style of a business man, who has to answer some half-dozen letters similar to yours every day.

I am respectfully

Your mo ob Sr

W.M. CHRISTY.

(Post Marked New Orleans, June 5, '36.)

6.

Natchitoches, 26th June, 1836.

To A. H. Brooks, Esq.,

Dear Sir:—I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your esteemed letter of the 30th ult. which did not reach me until last night.—In answer to your inquiries respecting the fate of your brave and gallant son, John S. Brooks, I can give you no certain information. Major Cook informs me that he saw your son in La Bahia on the 19th of February last. He was then adjutant of the Regiment under Col. Fannin, and continued in that station until the surrender of Col. F. I have no doubt but that he was amongst our unfortunate countrymen who perished at La

Bahia—If any information reaches me concerning him or if his papers should be received, they shall be forwarded to you without delay.—

Your obt. Servant,

SAM. HOUSTON.

(Post-Marked New Orleans, June 30.)

7.

Courtako, Ala., 5th Aug., 1836.

Mr. N. C. Brooks, Staunton, Va.

Dear Sir:—I have just received your letter, and hasten to give you the information you desire, in relation to the fate of your gallant though unfortunate brother. I knew him well, and as we were both natives of the same state, we soon became well acquainted, and our intercourse was of the most friendly character. Indeed, commanding "The Red Rovers" my-self, placed me in a situation to be with him almost daily.

He was in the battle of the Prairie on the 19th March, fought with a musket, in the most cool and chivalrous manner, and received a very severe wound in the centre of the left thigh which shattered the bone and caused great pain. He was taken back to Goliad and lodged in the same house with some wounded Mexican Officers,— This was done at Col. Fannin's instance who thought he would be better attended to, and who seemed to take a deep interest in his situation. He was daily attended by a young Surgeon (Dr. Field) and I visited him likewise. I saw him for the last time, late on Saturday evening previous to the massacre. Dr. Field was with him that night and has since informed me, that he was at his bed-side on the following morning, when he was taken out by a file of soldiers, who murdered him within a short distance of the house. I have thus been particular in my details, in order to remove everything like doubt or suspense on this painful subject. I sincerely condole with his friends in their bereavement and if anything can mitigate their grief, it can be found in the estimate which was placed upon the young man by all who knew him.

John Sowers Brooks, was alike conspicuous for his private virtues and noble daring in battle.

Respectfully yrs.

JACK SHACKLEFORD.

(Post-Marked Courto. A. Aug. 5.)

8.

Charlemont, September 2, 1836.

Dear Sir:—Yours of the 27th August, was received this morning and though a review of those horrid scenes is painful to me, yet it always gives me pleasure to be able, though in a small way, to administer the balm of consolation to the bereaved friends of those who have fallen by more than savage cruelty. And the interest which I had taken in your brother, renders this task peculiarly unpleasant. I was introduced to your brother John Sowers Brooks, at Goliad, about two weeks before the fatal battle of Colette in which his thigh bone was broken by a ball. Your brother's pleasant and affable manners soon brought about an intimate acquaintance between us. He bore himself at all times in a manner worthy of his rank and promise. He was a favorite with all who knew him, especially Col. F. and Mr. Chadwick. His suffering was much more severe than is common in such cases in consequence of spasms in the muscles of the wounded thigh, which made him often pray for death, which he asked at my hand, as his only remaining friend to whom he could appeal. He gave me many small mementoes, which I designed to send to his friend, but I was unable to keep them.

I rendered him every comfort in my power, but how little that was, you, I presume, can imagine. He had no warning of his death until the blow came that set his spirit free.

When he gave the last shriek, a Mexican officer who was also wounded turned to me and said, "Your friend is dead." He then ordered me to carry your brothers trunk to him, and opening it, he appeared to derive much satisfaction from the prospect of so many good clothes.¹ Among the papers given me to read and interpret was a letter from Gen. Austin, in reply to one from your

¹See above, pages 171, 185, 192.

brother proposing to assist the Texans, in their struggle for the defence of their homes, and constitutional liberty, and likewise a captain's commission from the Texian government. Your description is in exact agreement with the person whom I call your brother.

The names of the Mexican officers I do not remember.

A minute account of that engagement together with many others fought in Texas, with an account of the causes of the war &c., I have given the public in pamphlet form. I, a few days since, forwarded a paper containing the account of my suffering on that occasion, to Mrs. Mary Brooks of Staunton, the only one of his, your brother's relatives, whose name I remember.

With much esteem and commiseration,

I subscribe myself, &c.,

Jos. E. FIELD.

(Postmarked "Charlemont" Sept. 6th, 1836.
To Mr. Norborne C. Brooks.)

New York, October 7th, 1836.

Dear Sir:—Yours of Sept. 1st was duly received, but from a hope that I should be able so to arrange my affairs as to enable me to return through Staunton, I have delayed an answer until the last moment of hope.

Nothing could afford me greater satisfaction than an interview with the friends and relatives of one of whose acquaintance I have so much cause to be proud. It would also remove the embarrassment I now feel in anticipating the enquiries you would make concerning him.

My acquaintance with your son was short but interesting to me and the good feeling he always manifested, will make his memory ever dear to me.

Our conversation turned generally upon the incidents of the war in which we were engaged. The probability of its favorable issue. The beauties of the country, and promising prospects which it afforded to the young and enterprising.

I know that he kept a journal, but what became of it at his death, I cannot tell. I thought more of dying myself, at that time, than preserving mementoes of my friends, but I have since

regretted that I did not make an effort to save some papers which were shown me and which I think I could have preserved without danger. On my return to Texas I will make diligent inquiry for the journal, which you have reason to believe was left with Mc-Kinney and Williams.

In answer to a letter from Mr. Norborne C. Brooks, I gave a short account of some papers that were found in your son's trunk. Except those, I do not remember to have seen any after his death.

The first opportunity for a display of military prowess which was presented to Col. Fannin's army after my union with it, was the expedition sent to the relief of Capt. King to the Mission Refugio under Lieut. Ward in which your son volunteered as the representative of Col. Fannin.

But some of his companions being dilatory in making preparations for their departure caused a disaster to them on their way. Their guide, being bewildered in the prairie, lost his way, and after wandering all night, the light found them near their place of starting to which they returned. Mr. Chadwick was his companion in this, as on all other occasions of a similar nature, and as I have reason to believe shared a common fate. The next occasion on which he manifested a wish to be useful, was the morning previous to our retreat. Our company of horse had got into a skirmish with the enemies' cavalry upon the other side of the San Antonio river near a dilapidated fortress in which our troops had taken shelter. Capt. Brooks, voluntarily put himself at the head of a company of infantry, and waded the river for the purpose of bringing on an engagement, but the Mexican horse retreated too soon. In the retreat he was very active and useful. During the engagement I had no opportunity of seeing him nor did I know that he was wounded until I was informed by Col. Fannin, who requested me to go to him. He made no complaint, except from thirst. One of the many comforts denied us at this time was water, the best refreshment to a wounded soldier, but after an hour or two's search I found one solitary dram in a gourd, suspended from the horn of the saddle of a wild mule, used for packing. This was the only comfort within my reach. The next morning we were separated and I saw him no more until he was brought into the fort in a cart with the other wounded. At my request he was

placed in the same room with me and I was allowed to be with him the principal part of the day and to be by his side in the night. Col. Fannin was very kind in letting him have his blanket, of which we had most of us been robbed. The Mexicans at first neglected to give him food necessary for his comfort, but by my sharing with him the small pittance allowed me, we were enabled to prolong existence against the day of bloody and vindictive revenge. With an old axe I made a long extending splint, which with the assistance of Doctor Shackleford who was very kind, I was enabled to apply so as in some degree to mitigate his sufferings.

He often inquired of me if I thought his wound would terminate fatally, and spoke of death with perfect composure. As I can no longer serve your son in this world, permit me, as a token of respect I have for his virtues, to do a small service for his relatives by selecting the land to which you are entitled by his death and services.

Anything directed to me at Matagorda, Texas, will be attended to by your unworthy friend and humble servant,

JOSEPH E. FIELD.

N. B. I do not remember any of the other gentlemen of whom you made inquiry.

To Miss Marion [Marian] :

As language is inadequate to convey to you the sentiments of gratitude I feel for the kind expressions and honor done me in your supplement to your Father's letter I can only wish that instead of apologies you had filled the letter with inquiries. Perhaps it is not too late yet. Nothing can give me more happiness. Concerning the Bible. About one hour before your brother's death a young Mexican officer came into the room and made some inquiries concerning his religious belief and if he had a Bible. Upon which, he, Capt. B., requested me to take it out of his trunk and show it to the officer. He received it and after looking over it put it in his pocket and walked away. I have reason to believe that he valued it much.

Yours in sincerity,

J. E. F.

I have been waiting here for passage to Texas in the armed schooner Invincible. Capt. Brown.

To Mr. A. H. Brooks, Staunton, Va.

(Post Marked New York Oct. 8th 1836.)

9.

China Grove, Texas, 20th Jan., 1837.

To Mr. A. G. Brooks,

Staunton, Va.

Dear Sir.—At the request of Dr. Field I address you these few lines in relation to your deceased son. I was acquainted with him, and as you want some little information in relation to him, I can give you a little, although you must excuse this bad writing, as I am still laboring under a severe attack of bilious fever and salivation; He was made adjutant of the Post of Goliad and acted as such until a Mr. Bristow arrived in February, when he was superceded. He was then advanced to the Staff, and in fact was, as I have heard Col Fannin say, the most useful person about the fort. He built, or at least he drafted the plan of laying a half-moon battery, which gave great satisfaction, and was a masterpiece which did him great credit. It was called Brooks's Battery, and the soldiers performed the work. Also several other things, which if Fannin had remained, would have played havoc amongst the Mexicans. Amongst them all was a frame of wood containing 100 muskets, which they call in France an Infernal Machine. He and Chadwick used to drill the whole of the men every day, Your son was loved by all, as a good officer, as a gentleman, and for his amiable disposition. He was severe, but commanded respect from all. I lived with Fannin and knew his sentiments toward your son, which were the following;—that when I started to see the Govt in relation to some Mexicans and other business of Fannin's, he recommended your son and Chadwick strongly to the Govt. I hoped that they would both be forwarded to the Regular Service instead of the Volunteer Service, and to be commissioned not less than Major, as they were military men, Your son he also stated, was an excellent Engineer. I carried these letters on to the Governor myself. I saw a letter from Mr. Brook's sister in June last. A Mr. Atwell opened it and told me to read it, He stated to me

that he was going to administer to your son's estate. I told him he had better get a power of attorney from you before taking any such step, He said that he had written on to you for that, but since then Atwell was drowned in the Guadalupe river while in the act of crossing; so I suppose nothing has been done. I will here state what your son is entitled to or near about it. From \$60 to \$100 salary, at that time soldiers not officers were only allowed \$20 per month. Also he is entitled to about sixteen to seventeen hundred acres of land, which you ought to attend to quick as the land opens on the 1st of June and all the choice land will soon be taken up or send some friend a Power of Attorney so that he may administer on his Estate. You must excuse this part of the letter, it is not intended to hurt your feelings, but I do wish to see that the Martyrs to Liberty shall have their rights secured to their Parents or relatives. I expect that the journal you enquired about, fell also into the hands of the Mexicans, as I used to see him write in a large book. Before finishing, I will state, that he was wounded in the battle and afterwards led out with the balance of the officers and shot; There is another paper by a private who made his escape, of the names of the troops, which is very likely the way that you heard that your son was still alive, but I am sorry to say to the contrary. Any assistance I can render you in arranging your son's affairs, will be done with pleasure, by writing me, addressed to the care of Hon. Wm. S. Fisher, War Dept., Texas. I am out in the country trying to recover my health. I shall here conclude. Do sincerely sympathize with you in the loss of your son, who was an ornament to society. Answer to another question in his sister's letter: He had a Bible with him. In conclusion,

Your obt. servt.,

Jno. D. McLeod.

(Post Marked New Orleans Feb 6,)

10.

STAUNTON (VA.) SPECTATOR.

Thursday, May 19, 1836.

The Mexican official dispatches of the operations in Texas have reached this country, through the Vera Cruz and Metamoras

papers. Santa Anna states his column of attack, in the storming of the Alamo, at only 1400 men, and admits the loss of but 70 killed and 300 wounded. He states that he buried in the ditches, more than six hundred of the Texans. This is rather too much license for even Mexican grandiloquence. It is well known that Travis' forces did not exceed 180 men. He very probably buried as many as he reports, but, unquestionably, if he did, two-thirds of them, or more, were his own dead.

The Nat. Intelligencer, of Monday, infers, from the tenor of the despatches, that there is no truth in the report of the massacre of Fannin's battalion of three hundred men. We are sorry to say that an attentive perusal of the despatches of Gen. Urrea inspires no doubt of the kind, in our mind. This letter is dated on the 23d of March; one day after the surrender at discretion—terms having been refused, of Fannin. Now if the editors of the Intelligencer will turn to the account published in their own paper of the massacre, they will see that it is alleged to have taken place nine days after the surrender.—There is nothing, however, in the letters of the Mexican Generals, to weaken confidence in the truth of the horrible story.—It will be seen, by a paragraph in another column, that a subsequent fusilade has been perpetrated on a body of unarmed men, on their way, we presume, to join Houston.

ARENA.

STAUNTON SPECTATOR.

Thursday, June 2, 1836.

From the Louisville (Ky.) Jour. May 13.

Extracts of a letter from Chas. B. Shain, a youth of this city, who was taken with Col. Fanning, to his father, dated April 11, at Grover's [Groce's] Crossing, on the Brazos River:

“Dear Father.—I take this opportunity of writing you a few lines to let you know that I am in existence. I suppose you will have heard before this reaches you, that I was either taken prisoner or killed. I was taken prisoner on the 20th of last month, and kept a week, when all of us, who were taken with Col. Fanning, besides other prisoners, were ordered out to be shot, but I, with six others, out of five hundred and twenty-one, escaped. Before we were taken Col. Fanning's party had a battle with the Mexicans

in a large prairie, and killed and wounded, as the Mexicans themselves said, three hundred of them; but one of the Texans, who was a prisoner at the time, said that it took them all the night of the 19th to bury their dead, and that we must have killed and wounded something like eight hundred or a thousand.— Their force was nineteen hundred strong, ours, two hundred and fifty.

“The circumstances under which we were taken, are these: We were completely surrounded, without any provision or water, and in such a situation that we could not use our cannon; in consequence of which we thought it best to surrender on the terms offered to us—which were, to treat us as prisoners of war, and according to the rules of Christian war-fare. But how sadly we were deceived, the sequel will show:—after starving us a week, they ordered us out saying that we were going after beef, but when we had marched about a half a mile from the fort we were ordered to halt. The Mexicans marched all on one side of us, and took deliberate aim at us, but I, as you have seen, was fortunate enough to escape. I have however had monstrous hard times, having nothing to eat for five successive days and nights, but at length arrived safely here this morning, after a travel of two weeks through prairies and dangers, during which time I had some narrow escapes, especially the night before last on the line of the picket guards of the Mexican force, I was near being taken or killed.

“San Felipe is taken. The Mexicans are in Texas, but I think I shall live to see her free, notwithstanding. We have near 1500 men in camp, and expect to attack the enemy in a few days.

“I am well with the exception of very sore feet occasioned by walking through the prairies barefooted. Tomorrow I shall go over the river to a farm house to stay until I get entirely well, when I will try to avenge the death of some of my brave friends. All of my company were killed.

“Your affectionate son,

“Chas. B. Shain.”

The following named persons under the command of Cols. Fanning and Ward, made their escape: Joseph Andrews (our informant) David Holt, Lewis Washington, —— Dickson, Maurice Bullock, Samuel Hardaway, and Benjamin Mordecai, all Geor-

gians. Dr. Shackleford of Alabama, had his life spared, and is now in attendance upon the wounded Mexicans.—Georgia paper.

Extract of a letter from a Mexican General to his wife, dated Goliad, March 27, 1836.

There are now in this place 250 prisoners awaiting their deaths as pirates and incendiaries, there being only two who did not participate in the latter crime. The images and saints in the church served them for fuel. There are in Gaudaloupe 100 other prisoners who were taken at La Vaca. There is as yet no intelligence from the Divisions which marched for the towns of Austin and Nacogdoches: but I will send you the first news that may come from that quarter.

This day, Palm Sunday, March 27. has been to me a season of heartfelt sorrow. At six in the morning the execution of 412 American prisoners was commenced and continued until eight, when the last of the number was shot. At eleven began the operation of burning the bodies. Who can tell when they will be consumed!! I assure you that the number of foreigners who have fallen in Texas during this campaign must exceed 1,000. We have still 80 of them left.

STAUNTON, VA., SPECTATOR.

Thursday, Aug. 11, 1836.

JOHN S. BROOKS.

The following letter from Capt. Shackleford renders it but too certain that our young friend, JOHN SOWERS BROOKS, has been numbered among the victims of Mexican perfidy, in the massacre of Col. Fannin's division. Indeed it seems to us, that there can no longer be a doubt as to his fate. Mr. Brooks was one of Col. Fannin's staff, and although there is a slight mistake in the name, it may have been typographical, or it may have been inadvertent in the writer. It is hardly probable however that there were two of Col. Fannin's staff whose names were so nearly alike. As to the impression that he had received a military education, it must have been an inference merely, from the fact of his superior

qualification. But there is still another circumstance to fix this belief in our mind. He is spoken of as being a native of one of the upper counties of Virginia. Here, there is no room for doubt. We are forced therefore to yield to the sad conviction that the gentleman of whom Capt. S. thus speaks is our friend. How painful the thought!! Had he died on the battle-field, the death which the soldier covets, our feelings would be different. But to have been dragged from his bed, suffering and exhausted from a wound received in battle, and butchered in cold blood in the street, harrows up every feeling of the soul, and fires us with indignation against his murderers.

Mr. Brooks was an inmate of this office, for nearly two years—We knew him well. His mind was of a very high order, and his feelings and principles were all elevated and noble. He embarked in the cause of Texas Independence at the first onset, and although but about twenty-two years of age, no man had obtained a higher reputation for usefulness and efficiency in the Texas army, than he. He was in fact, the soul of the division to which he belonged; and if his life had been spared, he must have risen to high distinction in the country of his adoption.

But—he is gone! His gallant spirit has fled forever. His career, though brief has been brilliant—and the name of Brooks will be hallowed in the annals of Texas.

With his family, we are sure the whole community will sympathize in their affliction.—None knew the noble youth, who did not love him, and all must lament the bloody tragedy which has extinguished at once so many bright endowments and glowing anticipations. Mr. Spahn, of New Orleans, who was spared to attend the wounded Mexicans, states these as the particulars of Captain Brooks' death, who, we have no doubt, is the same.—Other accounts represent him as having been wounded in the battle which preceded the surrender.

Tuscumbia, July 16.

While here Dr. Shackleford furnished us with a very interesting sketch pertaining to the campaign, and has promised, as will be seen, a detail more complete hereafter.—NORTH ALABAMIAN.

THE RED ROVERS.

To the Editors of the North Alabamian:

Sirs: As everything in relation to the fall of this unfortunate but gallant little band, will be acceptable to their friends, I have made out a list below (from memory) of those who were absent during the engagement, those wounded in the action, those who escaped the massacre, and those who were massacred. I intend in a short time to give a full account of the battle, and will then speak of the whole corps engaged.

At the time of the attack, we were in an open prairie, drawn up in a hollow square, numbering about two hundred and seventy-five effective men. The force of the enemy must have been at least five hundred cavalry and fifteen hundred infantry,—that with this disparity of force, we fought for about three hours—repelling charge after charge, and mowing large numbers of the enemy in every attempt made upon our lines, until they were finally driven from the contest, and compelled to take refuge in the very timber which we had endeavored to reach ourselves. Our whole loss was seven killed, and between forty and fifty wounded, some mortally. I have frequently been asked why we did not retreat that night? In answer to this inquiry, I will remark that the night was dark and gloomy, that we had no way of taking off our wounded, except upon our backs, and that we were determined never to abandon them to the mercy of the enemy. In addition to this, we had repelled every charge made upon us, and compelled the enemy to seek safety in retreat, and we anxiously looked for a reinforcement in the morning, when we expected to consummate our victory. The fatal morning however arrived, and instead of being reinforced ourselves, the enemy received a large accession to their force, and opened upon us with a piece of artillery. We were suffering greatly from the want of water, and there was no alternative left us but to abandon our wounded, and cut our way through the enemy, or to make an honorable capitulation. A flag was sent out and promptly met by the enemy, who offered the following terms:

1st. That we should be received as prisoners of war, and be treated with every mark of kindness which is extended to prisoners by the most civilized nations of the world.

2nd. That private property should, in every instance, be respected, and that the arms of the officers should be given up to them upon their exchange or parole.

3rd. That the prisoners should be exchanged or sent to the United States upon their parole, so soon as a conveyance could be procured. This was signed in the most formal manner, and the most solemn assurances given, that it would be scrupulously observed. The bloody massacre which followed, will show how far confidence can be reposed in the honor of a Mexican officer.

My life was spared, not from any feeling of humanity towards me, but from a necessity, for my services in their hospital: the same may be said of Drs. Barnard and Field. I was detained at La Bahia (Goliad) for about four weeks, where my sufferings were almost insupportable, and then sent to St. Antonio in company with Dr. Barnard to visit their wounded at that place, who had been very badly attended to. We remained there, being required to attend their hospital, until all their force (but one company) had commenced their retreat. We then procured horses and other means through the assistance of some confidential friends, and made off, passing the Mexican Army in the night.

While at St. Antonio, I take much pleasure in stating that I was treated with great kindness by a majority of the Mexican officers, and by the citizens generally—that I frequently heard the massacre of Fannin's army spoken of. The officers declared that the bloody order emanated from Santa Anna; that it was in violation of a solemn capitulation, and in opposition to the advice of nearly all the field officers.

In addition to the fate of the Red Rovers, I will mention two gallant young men who were attached to the staff of Col. Fannin, John L. Brooks and _____ Chadwick. They were both highly gifted young men, and had received a military education. Brooks was a native of one of the upper counties of Virginia, and Chadwick of the State of New Hampshire, though for the last few years a resident of Illinois: The former received a wound during the engagement. They both shared the fate of many other gallant spirits.

In the subjoined list, those marked "w" were, some slightly and others severely wounded, though not in the hospital.

Those marked "w,h," were wounded and in the hospital, and all massacred in the fort. The residue, not accounted for, were marched out of the fort, under pretext of going to Copano to be exchanged, and all fired upon without the least intimation of their fate.

Yours ob't

Jack Shackleford,
Late Captain Red Rovers.

COL. WILLIAM G. COOKE.

HARRY WARREN.

William G. Cooke, celebrated in the annals of the Texan Revolution and of the Republic of Texas, was born in Fredericksburg, Virginia, March 26, 1808. He was the son of Adam and Martha (Riddell) Cooke, both of whom were natives of Ireland. His father, Adam Cooke (son of James Cooke), was born of English parents in Glasslough, Ireland. Adam Cooke had one brother, John, and three sisters, Rebecca, Isabella, and Jane. Rebecca married an Englishman, Hawley by name, and lived in Manchester, England. Isabella also married an Englishman, and lived in Bath. She and her daughter later came to Fredericksburg, Virginia, where they died. Her daughter married a Mr. Johnson from Maryland, and left a married daughter, Mrs. Susan Turner, who became a widow. Jane never married. John, Adam Cooke's brother, became the great grandfather of George Gordon, of San Antonio, Texas. One of the great grandfathers of Jane Oliver (who was the mother of Adam Cooke) was Robert Riddell, a Scottish earl. He was banished from Scotland, and all his property confiscated, for taking a prominent part in a rebellion in that country. He crossed over and settled in the north of Ireland. W. G. Cooke's mother, Martha Riddell, had two brothers, William and John, and a sister who married a Mr. Robertson. She had also three half-brothers, James, Robert, and Joseph, and one half-sister, Mary, who married an Englishman named Hamilton. William went to Fredericksburg, Virginia, during the War of 1812. With Dr. James Cooke, brother of W. G. Cooke, he joined a volunteer company from Fredericksburg, and after the war, enlisted in the United States Army, and died in the service, of fever, on Lake Erie. John Riddell became a surgeon in the English navy. He died of the fever at Rio Janeiro, on board the warship *Huron*. Both William and John Riddell died unmarried.

W. G. Cooke's grandfather, Riddell, became, after he went to Ireland, a linen manufacturer, and was the only one who had the

King's authority for stamping all the linen manufactured with the seal of England; and, all linen made in the north of Ireland had to be brought to him to be stamped.¹ Adam and Martha (Riddell) Cooke were the parents of nine children, as follows: Jane Oliver, the oldest, died at sea on the voyage to America; James, educated for a physician, chemist, pharmacist, and dentist, at the University of Pennsylvania, died August 10, 1873, in Fredericksburg, Virginia, in his 78th year; Eliza, married C. P. James, died in Peoria, Illinois, January 8, 1880; Annie, died in her 26th year; William G., the subject of this sketch, born March 26, 1808; Robert, died in infancy; Jane; Martha Rebecca, born January 10, 1813, died November 22, 1893, at San Diego, California; and Mary Hamilton, born January 4, 1818, taught 45 years, died November 22, 1884.

Miss Martha Rebecca Cooke, writing to her nephew, Wm. N. Cooke, the son of W. G. Cooke, said, "I think our parents [Adam and Martha (Riddell) Cooke] came to this country in 1792."

In 1835 W. G. Cooke, then a young man about twenty-seven years of age, came to Texas with a company from New Orleans, and took a very active part in the storming of San Antonio de Bexar, in December of the same year. For the particulars of his brilliant share in this movement the reader is referred to his letter to his brother, Dr. James Cooke, of Fredericksburg, Virginia, which is printed below.²

Houston, 7th Augt., 1839.

Dear Brother: By the boat from the Columbia today, I had the pleasure to receive yours of the 16th ulto. I know of nothing

¹This statement and the genealogy of Col. W. G. Cooke here given are from letters written by his sister, Miss Martha Rebecca Cooke, to her nephew, ex-Sheriff Wm. Navarro Cooke, of Eagle Pass, Texas, which I have been permitted to examine.

²The original letter, old, time-worn, and in places torn, is now in the possession of his son, ex-Sheriff Wm. N. Cooke, Eagle Pass, Texas. I have endeavored to supply the missing words and parts of words. I have been told by Mr. Cooke that some years ago, at the request of Col. H. P. Brewster of the Department of Statistics and History, Austin, Texas, he sent him his father's most valuable papers, and that he has later been informed that they are lost. These papers, if they could be found, would, very probably, cast further light on Texas history. Could they not yet be located?

in this world that can afford me more real pleasure than a letter from you. I acknowledge my fault. I have been very neglectful in answering your communications, but I have undertaken a very heavy duty which occupies all my time, and which, with the aid of providence, I am determined to accomplish. I have never given you a history of my campaign in Texas. I will now give you some few outlines, and, at some future day, will give you a full detail.

Early in Octo., 1835, the Texan Revolution commenced. Genl. Houston's proclamation calling for aid from the citizens of the United States reached N. Orleans about the 12th.¹ A meeting of those citizens friendly to the cause of Texas was called. Subscriptions to aid the cause were very freely made, & volunteers called on to give in their names. I saw that it was an opportunity for the enterprising to better their fortunes, and immediately stepped forward and enrolled my name. Saml. Pettus & Nathl. Brister from Virginia did the same. In four days we had the company completed. We sailed from New Orleans provided with four months provisions by the citizens of New Orleans. On our arrival at the Headquarters of the Army, which had been, for some time, encamped before the town of San Antonio and the Alamo. I was elected Captain of the Company. We found the Texian Army in a state of insubordination caused by frequent orders from the Commanding General to make a night attack on the town, which were often countermanded. On the day of the 3d of December, 1835, orders were issued Genl. Burleson (then commanding) for an attack on the town to take place at day-break. Our force was about 700 men, the enemy about 800. Immediate preparations were made; the men were all ready by twelve o'clock. About this time Maj. Morris reported to Genl. Burleson that one of the sentinels had observed a man pass from our camp to the Alamo and

¹As commander-in-chief of the Department of Nacogdoches Houston issued a proclamation on October 8 (see Brown, *History of Texas*, I 365), but it may be doubted whether this occasioned the meeting here referred to. The meeting which was held in New Orleans, October 13, 1835, seems to have been occasioned by general reports which had reached there on conditions in Texas. Later, on October 26, the permanent, or general, council issued a proclamation to the citizens of the United States, calling for aid. This is signed by R. R. Royall, president of the council. A copy may be found in THE QUARTERLY, VII, 271, note.—E. C. B.

after a short conference with a sentinel on the walls had gained admittance. On this information, Genl. B. thought proper to countermand the attack. This created great dissatisfaction among the men, in consequence of which a general parade was ordered, and Genl. B., after giving Maj. Morris's statement as his reason for withdrawing the order for attack, formally resigned his command. Nearly all the field officers present did the same. Burleson then proposed a retreat to Goliad, and offered to continue his command until the arrival of the troops at that place. Immediate preparations for the retreat were commenced. The men commenced deserting in squads from ten to twenty. I saw that the citizens of the country had despaired of success and had given up the contest. There were three companies from the U. S.: 1st company from New Orleans, commanded by myself, consisting of 70 men; 2d comy. from N. O. under Capt. Breese, 50 men; & 15 men under the command of Capt. Peacock from Missi. About four o'clock I took up the line of march, and on arriving opposite the Genls quarters was informed that a deserter (a Lieut.) from the enemy had come in & was then in conference with Burleson & others. I saw it was a favorable opportunity to prevent the retreat, & called on my men to know if they would follow where I would lead. *Their answers was unanimous: "Yes."* I immediately faced them and marched them up and down the lines, calling on the men to fall in & take the town rather than retreat. Breese's and Peacock's compys. immediately joined me, & I succeeded in raising 300 men who were willing to undertake the attack. Many voices called on me to [take command], but Col. B. R. Milam, an old citizen & a brave & good officer b[eing present], I refused and proposed him. He was unanimously received.¹ I f[ear to make] this too long. I must curtail my account until I can give you a f[uller description.] The attack was made in two divisions: one under Col. Milam, [and one] under Col. Johnson. We entered the town on the morning of the fifth [fighting] continually until the 8th, with but little success. On the evening of [———, I] rec'd orders to hold my compy. in readiness for an attack on the Pub-

¹Colonel F. W. Johnson in his official report of the storming of Bexar, dated December 11, 1835, gives a somewhat different account of this affair. See Brown, *A History of Texas*, I 417-21.—E. C. B.

lic [Plaza, which] was the most strongly [fortified] position of the enemy. About 11 o'c[lock I was] ordered to make the attack. My men were reduced by wounds to 37. [———] Capt. Patton's co. with himself was added. The moon was shining very [bright.] I led my men on. So soon as we got from under cover of the [illegible and torn] to the enemy occupied by our troops a heavy fire bearing from two direction[s was] opened by the enemy. Our guide led us to a place which we found impregnab[le.] The firing from port holes bearing directly on us was tremendous. We were completely cut off from retreat, & I saw the necessity of getting on the square from some point. I led my men within two feet of a line of port holes, (which we avoided, in a great measure, by stooping) to the priest's house, which was also strongly barricaded. We climbed up to a place which admitted one man at a time. As we got up we fired our rifles, and succeeded in driving off the men who occupied the house. On gaining admission, we rushed on the square, and found two six pounders planted within fifteen paces of the hole through which we entered. We attempted to spike them, but, by this time, the square was filled with troops, blowing the charge from twenty different quarters. I immediately called my men under cover, and commenced barricading. A very heavy fire was opened on us from artillery & infantry. We found in the priest's house about twenty women and children. These [were] placed in the safest part of the house. They, with two soldiers which we [made] prisoners, informed us that the enemy had been re-inforced about 4 hours before [the a]ttack with 700 men under Col. Ugartachea. I thought that our [case] was hopeless. We were completely cut off from re-inforcements, and I [determ]ined to sell our lives as dearly as possible. My men were all of the same [determination.] The firing continued during the whole night without intermission. I had [all] my men ready in case they should break thro' our barricades, to at least tell [sell?] [man] for man, when just at day-break, their trumpets sounded a parley, & we observed a [wh]ite flag approaching. I jumped over the barricade and received it & then [took i]t back to the commanding officer. If I were to continue this account, I would consume half a [do]zen sheets. I must therefore leave it for other opportunities.

In relation to the Surveyorship I was almost certain that Philips would get it. They have been long trying for it. . . . In regard to politics I have nothing to say. I am attached to the Military, and am obliged to obey my rulers without murmur. A visit this fall will be impossible. My duties are of such a nature as to prevent it, besides, there is a probability of an unfriendly visit from our Meixcan neighbors, and I would like to salute my old acquaintances once more. My health is exceedingly good. I never enjoyed better. . . .

Yours affectionately,

W.M. G. COOKE.

In the year following the siege of San Antonio the battle of San Jacinto was fought, (April 21, 1836). It will be remembered that Gen. Sam Houston was wounded in the ankle during that sanguinary struggle, and that he repaired soon afterwards to New Orleans for medical treatment. The following letter will show the respect and confidence reposed in young Cooke by his commander-in-chief:

Natchitoches, (La) 17th June, 1836.

Dear Father: I wrote you hastily from New Orleans, stating my intention of visiting you in a few weeks, but, at the request of Genl. Houston, I am induced to remain with him until he recovers from his wound, which, I hope, will be in the course of a few weeks. I left N. O. in company with the Gen'l. on the 6th ins. for Nacogdoches, (Texas), and arrived at this place last evening. I met with Robt. Mackay, Wm. Dunbar, & Doct. J. Herndon (formerly of Fred.g) at Alexandria, a very flourishing town on this river. They are all doing well. R. M. has an apothecary store combined with a book establishment. He states that his business is very good, and I have no doubt he will succeed. The papers have, ere this, given you a full account of our last victory over St. Anna. The last intelligence from Texas states that the enemy have all left the country. I think it will be their last effort to subdue it. I shall continue to write to you from Nacogdoches, as often as possible, and should like very much to hear from you frequently. When you write, address to Major Wm. G. Cooke,

Texas Army, care of Gen'l. Sam Houston, Nacogdoches. Give my love to all my relations and friends, and believe me to be truly

Yr. affectionate son,

Wm. G. COOKE.

Major Cooke soon resigned from the army, and received a civil appointment, but by September 27, 1837, he had engaged in the drug business with L. H. Bancroft, formerly of Richmond, Virginia. He had at that time just returned from New Orleans where he had suffered a severe attack of yellow fever, which, he claimed, had proven beneficial to his general health as it had completely rid him of a case of scurvy.¹

In the foregoing letter, to his brother, Cooke says that he is "attached to the Military." It would appear then that he had re-entered the service before August, 1839.

His commission as quarter master general, from the Republic of Texas, is dated January 13, 1840, but the appointee was to rank as such officer from the 25th of October, 1839. The commission is signed by President Mirabeau B. Lamar and A. Sidney Johnston, Secretary of War. His commission as Colonel of the First Regiment of Infantry in the Texas Army is signed by David G. Burnet, President of the Republic of Texas,² and by B. T. Archer, Secretary of War and Navy. It is dated March 2nd, 1841, but was to be effective from August 18, 1840.³

The following letter from Gen. Hugh McLeod is self-explanatory. Let the reader also note the unique post-script from Cooke's friend, "Luckett."

Special Order No. 346.

ADJUTANT & INSP. GENLS. OFFICE,

AUSTIN, Novr. 25th, 1840.

Col. Wm. G. Cooke, Comdg. 1st Infantry,
On the Military Road.

Sir: Information having reached the Dept. thro' the Tonkeway

¹W. G. Cooke to Dr. James Cooke, dated "Houston 27th Septem., 1837," now in the possession of W. N. Cooke, Esq., Eagle Pass, Texas.

²Burnet was vice-president, but this commission may have been signed by him while acting president during the absence of President Lamar.—E. C. B.

³The original commissions of Col. Cooke, referred to in this article are in the possession of his son, W. N. Cooke.

Indians, and believed by corresponding circumstance, that the hostile Indians are embodied on the Upper Brazos, and contemplate a descent upon the settlements, you will take such a portion of your command as you may think necessary and attack their camp, and, if possible, destroy them.

Lieut-Col. Clendennin is ordered to report to you with the effective force of his detachment and twelve Tonkaway warriors, who will aid you as spies and conduct you to the hostile encampment.

By order of
The Secty. of War.

H. McLeod,
Adjutant & Inspr Genl.

P. S. Congress has just refused an appropriation to march Howard's force from San Antonio to attack the village above. Felix wants to go & do it, but I don't think he can succeed. We have heard horrible accounts from Lt. Ratcliffe of your cannibalism, eating mules, &c, not so much eating a mule, but the poverty of the beast.

"Here's a health to thee, Tom Moore." All well & send love.

Yrs. truly,

H. Mc.

"And a double health to thee "Col. Coo—k I'me well sure having just returned from La Grange with Todd, *he was acquitted*. I send you some late papers.

Yr. friend,

Luckett.

We have enough from the States to say that Genl. Harrison has beat Little Van B. worse than Old Jackson ever beat anybody.

L.

In 1841 the ill-advised, ill-regulated, ill-conducted, and ill-fated Santa Fé Expedition set out on its dangerous journey across the plains and Indian-infested country to the west. For a minute and graphic account of this expedition and the mal-treatment of its members, the curious reader is referred to Kendall's lively little little volumes.¹ The expedition was authorized and set on its feet

¹*Narrative of an Expedition across the great Southwestern Prairies from Texas to Santa Fé, etc.* By George W. Kendall. In two volumes. London, 1845.

by President Mirabeau B. Lamar, who was then anxious to extend the laws of Texas to the utmost verge of the domain claimed by his country, namely on the west to the Rio Grande. The military part of the expedition went out under the command of Gen. Hugh McLeod who had six captains under him, viz.: "Old Paint" Caldwell, Sutton, Houghton, Hudson, Strain, and Lewis. There was also a civil branch of the expedition, and commissioners were sent along to confer with the New Mexican authorities as to the advisability of throwing off the Mexican yoke and coming under the laws of the Republic of Texas. Col. Cooke, Dr. R. F. Brenham, and José Antonio Navarro were the commissioners.

Miseries came thick and fast before, and especially after, reaching the confines of New Mexico. Unfortunates who had escaped death on the alkaline plains of West Texas by starvation and at the hands of blood-thirsty Indians, met death at the hands of the brutal governor and military tyrant of New Mexico, Armijo, or were marched overland to Mexico, where, loaded with chains, they were incarcerated in vilest dungeons. Cooke and Navarro did not escape the latter indignity. Navarro, though a Mexican himself, was an especial target for the poisoned shafts of malice thrown by the Mexicans. He was the only member of the expedition still a prisoner at the time Kendall wrote his *Narrative*.¹ (See Vol. 1, page 72, footnote.)

On June 16, 1842, all the Texan prisoners of the Santa Fé Expedition were released, except Mr. Navarro.² After Col. Cooke was released he remained a few days in the City of Mexico at Gen. Thompson's house, but he soon returned to Texas, and married

¹The prisoners were confined in various prisons, Santiago, Acordada, San Lazaro, Puebla, and Perote. Kendall was for a while confined in the loathsome lepers' prison (or hospital) of San Lazaro. For a description of San Lazaro and its inmates at this time see Kendall, *The Santa Fé Expedition*, etc., II 239.

²From a letter dated "Washington [Texas], 15th. Decem., 1844," from Cooke to his wife, the following is taken: "In regard to our dear uncle, Don J. Antonio Navarro, everything has been done to effect his release that can possibly be conceived of, and a large appropriation of money has been made to support him and render his situation more comfortable until that [his release] takes place."

Miss Angela Navarro, daughter of Don Lucio Navarro, a brother of Don José Antonio Navarro.

Col. Cooke's commission as Adjutant General of Militia, from the State of Texas, is signed by Gov. J. Pinckney Henderson, "Commander-in-chief of the Army, Navy, and the Militia thereof," and by David G. Burnet, Secretary of State. It bears date, April 27th, 1846.

But the gallant and battle-tried soldier did not wear his new honor long. He died on December 24, 1847; he was buried at Seguin. He left one child—a son—then about a year old, William Navarro Cooke, who now lives at Eagle Pass, Texas. A prosperous county of Texas bears the family name.

Col. Cooke's widow afterward married a Mr. Martin, and became the mother of the learned lawyer, Judge I. L. Martin, of Uvalde, Texas. She died at Brackett, September 22, 1880.

NOTES AND FRAGMENTS.

TEXAS STONE LAID IN SLOAT MONUMENT.—On Saturday last [December 9, 1905], occurred one of the most interesting events connected with the Sloat monument, in the presentation to Captain Lambert as custodian of the Sloat Monument Association to that association of a beautiful granite stone by Comrade William H. Hilton, as representative of the president, officers and comrades of the Texas Association of Veterans of the Mexican War. The stone now crowns the southwest corner of the base of this, the first national monument of the Pacific coast. The stone was laid with the solemn rites of the Masonic order, and in the cement was mixed the sacred blood-sprinkled soil of the battle-fields of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Fort Brown, sent by patriotic citizens of Texas at request of Comrade Hilton, who was in these battles. The soil from Palo Alto was sent by J. D. Scrivner, of Brownsville, and was taken from the spot where the famous charge was made by the Mexican cavalry on Duncan's battery, and was repulsed. The soil from Resaca de la Palma is from the location of Ringgold's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Ridgely, when he told Captain May, "Wait, Charley, until I draw their fire," and immediately upon the discharge of the Mexican battery May charged across the ditch, and the battle was practically gained by the Americans. . . . This soil was sent by J. B. Sharpe, postmaster of Brownsville. The soil from Fort Brown was sent by James K. Powers, of Brownsville, Texas, and was taken from the spot where Major Brown fell while directing the sighting of one of the guns on Matamoras. Mr. Powers is the son of James H. Powers of Company H, 16th Infantry, commanded by Captain Smith. He was at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, and under General Scott to the City of Mexico. He emigrated to California in 1850, and died at Sutter's Fort in 1853. James K. Brown sent his kindest greetings to the veterans in California, some of whom may have been his father's companions-in-arms.

Comrade Hilton was appointed a committee of one to try and get a stone presented by Texas to the monument, and after considerable correspondence with many parties finally succeeded, aided by Comrade J. W. Kennedy, of Cleburne, Texas, who had a resolution passed by the Texas Association of Veterans of the Mexican War, who agreed to send a stone and pay for it out of the funds of the association, passed at Dallas, Texas, May 24. Credit is due Mrs. Murdock, secretary, and to the patriotic efforts of the ladies of Texas.

All honor to all who aided in the patriotic work. The stone left Texas November 3 and arrived at Monterey December 1, and was taken care of by Captain Lambert, custodian of the executive committee of the Sloat Monument, representing Comrade Hilton until he could deliver it to the Sloat Monument Association. On December 9 the stone was laid with the solemn rites of the Masonic order, and as Comrade Hilton stated in his presentation speech, "May He who doeth all things well preserve this, the first national monument on this coast for all time for the patriotic purposes for which it was designed."

There was a strange connecting link with the past in the presence of two brass guns at Fort Mervine, immediately adjacent to the monument. These two guns belonged to the lamented Major Ringgold's Battery of Light Artillery at Palo Alto; also were at Resaca de la Palma, commanded by Lieutenant Ridgely in battles fought on Texas soil May 8 and 9, 1846. They were also at Monterey, Mexico, September 21-23, 1846, and at Buena Vista, in Captain Braxton Braggs' Battery February 22-23, 1847, and saved the day to the American army when General Taylor gave the command, "A little more grape, Captain Bragg!"

After the laying of the stones the Ladies of the Grand Army decorated the two guns with wreaths, and Comrade Hilton was called upon to make an address. He gave a concise history of the guns, as related above. At Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Fort Brown he was in Captain Sam Walker's Company of Texas Rangers, attached to gallant May's Dragoons, to aid in protecting the battery of guns, and saw the lamented Ringgold get his death wound; and at Resaca de la Palma heard Lieutenant Ridgely tell Captain May, "Wait, Charley, till I draw their fire," and then

Captain May's Dragoons and Captain Sam Walker's Texas Rangers charged across the lagoon and captured the Mexican battery. A Texas Ranger captured General Vega. He rode up to him, and saying: "Surrender! I don't want to shoot you!" pointing his revolver at him. The general gave up his sword. He was then taken and surrendered to General Taylor. General Vega would not give his parole, and was sent to New Orleans a prisoner of war. He presented his spurs and bridle to the Ranger who captured him. An incident is connected with this. The Ranger afterwards found his revolver did not have a load in it when he demanded General Vega to surrender. In the excitement of the battle he had fired every shot.

He stated that at Monterey Lieutenant Ridgely was thrown from an unruly horse and his neck was broken. The battery of the then four guns and two howitzers passed to the command of Captain Braxton Bragg, who did such splendid service at Buena Vista. He also stated that Captain Sam Walker's company was disbanded at Monterey, their six months' term of service ending. He then joined Captain Ben McCullough's company in the famous Jack Hays Regiment, and lost sight of the guns when that regiment was transferred to Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico route, where they did such effectual service in keeping the road free from guerrillas.

—*Monterey [California] Express*, December 11, 1905.

The acquisition by the University of California of the noted Bancroft Library is a matter of great importance to the study of American history. Formerly this collection was practically inaccessible, but now, as soon as the university can make proper arrangements, it will be put in charge of a competent librarian, and opened to the use of students. This library, which cost the present owners only \$150,000, is the richest storehouse in existence on the history of the Pacific coast of North America. It was collected by Mr. Bancroft at the sacrifice of a lifetime's tireless work and a magnificent fortune. Its possession by the University of California will enable that institution to take a leading place in the development of historical study. A highly interesting report of the contents and value of the library, made by Dr. Reuben Gold Thwaites, who ap-

praised it for the purchasers, is printed in the California *University Chronicle* for December, 1905. In disposing of this library Mr. Bancroft has set a praiseworthy example of public spiritedness. Dr. Thwaites valued the collection at \$300,000, and Mr. Bancroft has always held it at \$250,000, but he sold it to the University for \$150,000, with the distinct understanding that the difference, \$100,000, is to be considered as a gift.

Letters recently received by Professors Garrison and Bolton from Professor Jameson, director of the Department of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution, bring news to the effect that the Department is at last ready to undertake the examination and description of the Mexican archives, and that Professor Bolton has been appointed to take charge of the work. In the summer of 1900 Professor Garrison and Miss Casis went to the City of Mexico, where they spent several weeks in copying important documents in the Archivo General. Since that time the work has been continued by Misses Casis, Rather, and Austin (now Mrs. Hatcher), and Drs. Bolton and R. C. Clark. Dr. Bolton has spent three summers in the Archivo General, and has published in the QUARTERLY portions of the results of his research. Meanwhile Professor Garrison has been endeavoring to get the Carnegie Institution or the Congressional Library to assist in the enterprise, and the Institution has finally decided to take it up. Being now no longer dependent on private energy and means, and proceeding under competent management, the work will doubtless go forward rapidly and satisfactorily. Reports on other foreign archives similar to that which Dr. Bolton is to make on those of Mexico are being prepared for the Carnegie Institution. That on England has been assigned to Professor C. M. Andrews, of Bryn Mawr College; that on Spain to Professor W. R. Shepherd, of Columbia University, and that on Cuba to Mr. Luis M. Pérez.

AFFAIRS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

The tenth annual meeting of the Association will be held at the University of Texas, main building, room 44, at 3 p. m. on March 2, 1906. A paper will be read by Dr. Herbert E. Bolton on "The Texas Indian Tribes, 1770-1780," and one by Mr. E. W. Winkler on "Wm. Barrett Travis." At the business session reports from the Recording Secretary and the Treasurer will be heard, and officers will be elected for the ensuing year.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The QUARTERLY has received a copy of a splendid edition of the Floydada *Hersperian*, which is devoted largely to the history of Floyd County. This edition was specially prepared by Mr. Claude V. Hall, a former student of the University of Texas. It is full of interesting and important information that has been skillfully organized into a very readable and valuable sketch. Such an edition as this might appropriately have appeared in pamphlet form, which would have greatly facilitated its use and preservation.

H. E. B.

History of Eastland County, Texas, by Mrs. George Langston. A. D. Aldridge & Co., Dallas, 1904. As a sign of a growing interest and a proper pride in local history, this little book forms a welcome addition to the somewhat scanty store of North Texas memorabilia. Eastland County forms an integral part of a section of Texas that is as nearly without a history as almost any portion of the globe, and in treating the subject there was but small chance to create a history in the modern sense. Our authoress, however, has diligently collected quite a mass of material, and while anecdotes and somewhat apocryphal conversations abound, the sources and credibility of such are always pretty clearly indicated. The history is divided into three pretty well-marked periods. The part devoted to the first, 1858-1873, deals with the settlement of the county, first settlers, Indian fights, and nature of the country. There is an abundance of local color here, and throughout the book, perhaps more than the authoress realizes. A rather unexpected fact is brought out when she states that the population was 99 in 1860, and 88 in 1870. The second period, 1873-1880, is marked by the organization of the county and the coming of the Texas and Pacific and the Texas Central railroads. In 1880 the population of the county was 4855. The last Indian raid took place in 1874 or 1875. The third period, 1880-1904, is uninteresting historically, and is dealt with by our authoress by giving biographies of prominent citizens and lists of business houses in the various towns. This part of the book is in the nature of a directory.

H. Y. B.

Rise and Fall of the Mission San Saba, to which is appended a Brief History of the Bowie or Almagres Mine, also a Sketch of Summerland and its Builders, by John W. Hunter (Mason, Texas) is a commendable pamphlet devoted to local history. The brochure was prepared as a souvenir of the Confederate Veterans' reunion held in July, 1905, at Menardville, which is near the site of Mission San Saba.

Mr. Hunter, who until recently has been editor of a newspaper, has a much better style and a much better historical sense than is commonly the case with writers of local histories. His general knowledge of the history of Mission San Saba is quite extensive, and in this pamphlet he has brought together more information about the subject, it is believed, than can be found in any other single account in English. He seems to have had access to a number of rare works, some of them not commonly known even to special students of Texas history. While the major portion of his account of the mission's history is quoted verbatim from Bonilla and Bancroft, he has supplemented these authorities in some places with valuable and detailed information. The value of these contributions is impaired, however, by the writer's failure at a number of critical points, to cite his authorities. He claims to have "just grounds" for believing that the San Saba Mission was founded many years before the date given by Bonilla and Morfi (1756), but he gives no hint as to what these grounds are or where he gets his information. The essay contains some contradictory statements of fact that are puzzling and which mar its general effectiveness. The pamphlet contains a diagram of the mission.

Part two is a sketch of the mine known by the Spaniards as Los Almagres and in modern times as the Bowie Mine. Mr. Hunter submits testimony going to show "that the Almagres mine was discovered; that it was immensely rich; that its location is on the San Saba River, not distant from the present site of the old mission." In this, as in the former essay, he seems to have had access to considerable material not commonly known or easily accessible.

The third part of the pamphlet, "Summerland," is a much less serious piece of historical work than the foregoing, and although it contains important facts in modern local history, it bears evidence of having been written to please a popular audience rather than to instruct.

H. E. B.

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THE TEXAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.¹

EUGENE C. BARKER.

1. *The Consultation and the Military Plan.*

It will be remembered that when the war of the Texas Revolution began a call had been issued for the election of delegates to a convention or consultation at San Felipe on October 15. At the appointed time, however, a volunteer army was already on the march to Bexar, and many of the delegates were with it, so that the meeting was postponed by agreement until November 1. In the meantime there had been formed at San Felipe by the advice of Stephen F. Austin a sort of central executive committee, composed of representatives of the local committees of safety and correspondence. This committee, self-styled the "permanent council," assumed until October 31 general direction of the work of organizing the defense against the Indians and of reinforcing and supplying the volunteers. By November 3 a quorum of the delegates had arrived in San Felipe, and the consultation began its sessions. Its most important work was the adoption of a plan for a provisional government and for the formation of a regular army. The government was to consist of a governor, a lieutenant governor, and a general council, composed of one member from each municipality

¹In the preparation of this paper use has been made chiefly of the *Journals* of the Consultation; of the *Journal of the Proceedings of the General Council of the Republic of Texas*, etc., which will be referred to

of Texas. The military plan contemplated two things—the creation of a regular army and the organization of the militia.

The army was to consist of 1120 men, rank and file, part of them regulars, enlisted for two years, and part of them volunteers, enlisted for, and during the continuance of, the war—"permanent volunteers," they were called. To this was added a corps of 150 rangers, commanded by a major, and subject to the commander-in-chief when in the field. The soldiers were to be governed, so far as local conditions and circumstances would permit, by the regulations and discipline of the regular army of the United States. And the force might be decreased or augmented at the discretion of the governor and council. The commander-in-chief, appointed by the consultation and commissioned by the governor, and "subject to the orders of the governor and council," had the rank of major general and was to be "commander-in-chief of all the forces called into public service during the war." He was allowed to choose his own staff of one adjutant general, one inspector general, one quartermaster general, a surgeon general, and four aids-de-camp.

For militia duty all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and fifty were declared qualified, and they were ordered to embody themselves, on or immediately after the third Monday in December, in companies of fifty-six men, and elect officers—a captain and a first and second lieutenant. The municipality was to be the basis of organization, and in case there should be as many as three companies in a single municipality, the officers were to elect a major to command the entire force; if there were four companies, they were entitled to a lieutenant colonel; if five, to a colonel, and if more than five, to a brigadier general. Five companies formed a regiment of militia.¹

General Sam Houston had already been elected commander-in-chief, *Proceedings of the General Council; of the Ordinances and Decrees of the Consultation, Provisional Government of Texas, and the Convention, etc.*, which will be referred to as, *Ordinances and Decrees*; and of the Archives of Texas, section D. Since my notes were made these documents have been transferred to the State Library and catalogued, but the file numbers have been preserved, and are therefore retained in the references. Considerable use has also been made of the Austin Papers, at the University of Texas.

¹*Journals of the Consultation*, 48-49.

chief (November 12)¹ and on the 14th the consultation adjourned, to be succeeded by the provisional government that it had created.

2. *The Organization of the Army.*

The Militia.—In his first message to the council, on November 16, Governor Smith, among other recommendations, urged haste in the organization of the militia. The council thereupon instructed the military committee to consider the object of the consultation in ordering an election of militia officers in December. The ideas of the committee were embodied in an ordinance that was passed November 25. It provided that the council should appoint in each municipality three commissioners to divide the district into militia precincts, which were to conform as nearly as possible with those already existing, and to choose election judges for each precinct. Officers were to be elected and companies formed as required by the plan of the consultation. Muster days were fixed for company, battalion, regimental, and brigade drill on the first Saturday in April, May, September, and October, respectively. Commissioners for sixteen municipalities were elected November 26, those for Matagorda were appointed the next day, and others for San Patricio and Sabine later. The governor was commander-in-chief of the militia, and was allowed a staff of four aids with the rank of colonel.² To what extent the organization of the militia was effected is uncertain. Probably very little was done, for about the time that the elections were to take place news spread that the volunteers had begun the storming of Bexar and needed reinforcements. Many prepared to hasten to their assistance, some of the commissioners among them, and thus the organization was delayed.³

¹*Journals of the Consultation*, 36.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 14, 24, 43, 48-9, 56-8, 70, 148, 166; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 28-30.

³Thus Eli Mercer, writing to Governor Smith, December 16, said: "I received your appointment authorizing me to assist in organizing the militia of Austin. I have called a meeting of the board to attend to this, but feel it my duty to join the army, which I shall do next Tuesday. I recommend Mr. Menefee for my place in organizing the militia." Archives of Texas, D, file 13, No. 1261.

The Regular Army.—The military committee on November 21 presented a detailed report on the organization of the regular army. This force, which the consultation had limited to 1120 men, they proposed to divide into two regiments—one of artillery and one of infantry—of 560 men each. Each regiment was divided into two battalions and each battalion into five companies of fifty-six men. The field officers of the infantry were to be a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a major; those of the artillery, a colonel, two lieutenants colonel, and two majors. Artillery companies, likewise, were to have three lieutenants instead of two. These additional officers were considered necessary on account of the varied and important work that would be required of the artillery.¹ The council with some amendments adopted this report in the form of an ordinance on the 24th. Officers and privates were to be subject to the same discipline and to receive the same pay as in the regular army of the United States, and each private and non-commissioned officer was promised a bounty of 640 acres of land. Later, as an incentive to enlistment in the regular army, rather than with the volunteers, an additional bounty of 160 acres of land and \$24 in money was offered the regulars; one-half of the money was to be paid when the recruit reported at headquarters, and the balance on the first quarterly pay-day thereafter.²

On the same day that this ordinance was passed Governor Smith sent to the council a message, urging it to make “the necessary enactments calculated to authorize the commander-in-chief to issue his proclamation, in order that volunteers and other troops . . . may know to whom to report.” Whatever the act may have been which the governor considered necessary, the council was in no hurry about passing it. On the 28th company officers were elected for the regiment of infantry, and on December 1 it was agreed to elect the artillery officers the following Monday. Before this was done, however, the governor transmitted to the council a letter from General Houston, complaining of that body’s delay in helping him

¹Their appointment appears to have caused some dissatisfaction, and in his message of January 14 Lieutenant Governor Robinson, then acting governor, advised their abolition. Nothing was done with his recommendation.—*Proceedings of the General Council*, 323.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 41, 47, 50, 150; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 21-22, 87.

organize the regular forces. The military committee replied that, considering "the press of business and the distracted state of affairs," they had done as much as they could, and been as expeditious as possible, a good deal of their time being necessarily consumed in trying to provide for the volunteer army. They were of the opinion, moreover, that it would not be good policy, anyway, to appoint all of the officers of the regular army at that time. If the war should be prolonged, Texas would be compelled, they said, to depend largely upon aid from abroad, and they thought that men of superior qualifications would hardly be attracted from the United States if every door to promotion were closed.¹ In conclusion, they urged that the governor be requested to issue a proclamation fixing the headquarters of the army at Gonzales or some other point on the frontier.²

On December 7 and 8 the field officers for both infantry and artillery were elected,³ but in accordance with the above report,

¹This was in complete agreement with the policy of the consultation. In his inaugural address the chairman of that body had said, "Some of our brethren of the United States of the North . . . have generously come to our aid, many more ere long will be with us. . . . The path to promotion must be open, they must know that deeds of chivalry and heroism will meet their rewards" (*Journals of the consultation*, 8). But the greatest influence was probably exerted on the committee by a letter from J. W. Fannin, Jr., which they had considered on December 4. Fannin was sure that many West Point graduates would come to Texas, if commands were reserved for them.—Fannin to Smith, November 31 [sic], 1835, in archives of Texas, D, file 6, No. 555. Part of the letter is printed in the QUARTERLY, VII 324-25.)

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 52, 71, 107, 116-17. For Houston's letter see Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II 447. General Houston declared that the chairman of the military committee (Wyatt Hanks) through personal dislike for him was throwing obstacles in the way of the organization of the army. And the above report, he said, originally contained such indecorous remarks about him that the council had thought it necessary to expunge them.—*Houston to Smith*, December 17, 1835, in Yoakum, II 453. The indecorous matter seems to have been to the effect that the importance of supplying the volunteer army could not be neglected by proceeding immediately, simply "to gratify the wishes of General Sam Houston," to the election of officers for the regular army. See W. Roy Smith's "The Quarrel between Governor Smith and the General Council," etc., in the QUARTERLY, V 310.

³Of the artillery J. W. Fannin, Jr., was elected colonel, James C. Neill

company officers for only one battalion of artillery were chosen. Before hearing of this action General Houston wrote again to the governor, insisting that a complete corps of officers must be elected at once, if any success were to be expected in enlisting the regular army. Upon receipt of this letter the council proceeded to the election of company officers for the remaining battalion of artillery (December 11). The commander-in-chief was then provided with a list of all his officers and a copy of all proceedings of the council that related to the army. The council, however, was not yet through with the general. Another letter to Governor Smith on December 17 called attention to the fact that no appropriation had been made to cover the expenses of the recruiting service. A few officers had been ordered on this service, he said, but he had done it solely on his own responsibility. This obstacle was removed by the council on the 21st, when an ordinance was passed, appropriating \$40,000 for recruiting purposes. Another ordinance (December 26), empowering all commissioned officers to administer the oath of enlistment completed the enactments for the organization of the regular army.¹

In the meantime, the council had early taken up the organization of the corps of rangers, which was to form a sort of adjunct to the regular army. The consultation had authorized the enlistment of three companies, aggregating 150 men, but the ordinance proposed by the military committee, November 21, raised the number to 168, in order that the companies might conform in size to those of the regular army. The rangers' term of service was fixed at one year and their pay at \$1.25 a day. They were to furnish their own rations, horses and equipment, and were required to be "always ready armed and supplied with one hundred rounds of powder and

and David B. Macomb lieutenants colonel, and W. B. Travis and "T. F. L. Barrett" (this undoubtedly should be T. F. L. Parrott) majors. Of the infantry Philip A. Sublett was elected colonel, Henry Millard lieutenant colonel, and William Oldham major. Travis declined his appointment in the artillery, on the ground that he believed he could be more useful in some other branch of the army, and F. W. Johnson was elected in his place. Sublett did not accept the colonelcy of infantry, and Edward Burleson fell heir to that place.

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 121, 124, 141, 148, 151, 181, 185, 191, 210; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 96, 99. For Houston's letters see Yoakum, II 449, 453.

ball." R. M. Williamson was elected major and commandant of the rangers, subject to the orders of the commander-in-chief.¹

Auxiliary Forces.—On December 4 the council referred to the military committee a letter from J. W. Fannin on the subject of the regular army. He was emphatically of the opinion that its size ought to be doubled. "If an army be at all requisite," he said, "it sh'd be *large enough to answer the [purpose] of its creation.* . . . The case appears to me so plain that I can not doubt but you will see it in the same light. With this conviction, I will proceed to the main subject—By virtue of your delegated powers & exigency of the case increase the 'Regular Army' to another Brigade of like numbers with the one already ordered."² It was no doubt due to the influence of this letter that the military committee at the evening session of December 4 introduced an ordinance "to organize and establish an auxiliary volunteer corps to the army of Texas." By a suspension of the rules the act was passed the next day. Permanent volunteers, or those enlisted for the duration of the war, were to receive the same pay, rations, and clothing as were allowed by the United States in the war of 1812, and, in addition, at the expiration of service, or when honorably discharged, a bounty of 640 acres of land.³ Those who enlisted for only three months were entitled to 320 acres of land, but at the discretion of the governor and the commander-in-chief others could be accepted for even a shorter period, such as they thought consistent with the good of the service. These last, however, were to receive no bounty. The ordinance does not fix the number of this corps, but the day after its passage a resolution was adopted authorizing the commander-in-chief "to accept the services of at

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 39, 49, 72, 87-8; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 20.

²Fannin to Smith, November 31 [sic], 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 6, No. 555.

³It will be remembered that the regular army was composed of regulars and of volunteers enlisted for the duration of the war. A supplemental ordinance of December 14 increased the bounty of these to 800 acres of land and \$24 in money. So far as can be gathered from the records, the only differences between these "permanent volunteers" of the regular army and the volunteers of the auxiliary corps seem to have been that the former were entitled to this larger bounty and the latter were allowed to choose their own company officers.

least five thousand auxiliary volunteers, in addition to the local volunteers."¹

Just as the auxiliary corps was in a great measure due to the influence of Fannin, so the creation of a cavalry force seems to have received its first impulse from Travis. On December 3 he wrote to Governor Smith, saying that a member of the council had asked him for his views on the organization of the army. He unhesitatingly approved the recommendations of Fannin on the subject of the regular army, he said, and, therefore, confined himself to a consideration of the volunteers. Among these he thought that provision should by all means be made for a battalion of cavalry, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, "subject alone to the orders of the commander-in-chief for the time being." They ought to be armed with broadswords, pistols, and double-barrelled shotguns or yagers, and should be enlisted for twelve months—unless the war terminated sooner—"subject to *regular discipline* & the rules & articles of war," for, he concluded, "a mob can do wonders in a sudden burst of patriotism or passion, but can not be depended on as soldiers for a campaign."² This letter was passed to the military committee on the 4th, and on the 16th Mr. Hanks, the chairman, brought in a bill embodying Travis's recommendation. General Austin and General Houston both concurred, he said, in the belief that cavalry was necessary. The strength of the force was fixed at 384 men, rank and file, divided into six companies, and Travis's suggestion as to arms was so modified that, while all of them had broadswords and pistols, one-half of them had in addition double-barrelled shotguns and the other half yagers. They were to receive the same pay as cavalry in the service of the United States and a bounty of 640 acres of land. It is somewhat interesting to note that this was the only force for which the council prescribed, or, indeed, even mentioned a uniform. It was to be "a suit of cadet grey cloth coats, [with] yellow bullet buttons, and pantaloons for winter, and two suits of gray cottonade roundabouts and pantaloons for summer, and fur caps, black cloth stocks and cowhide boots." Travis, who had declined a previous appoint-

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 105, 106, 107, 118; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 47-50, 85.

²Travis to Smith, December 3, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 18, No. 1757.

ment in the artillery, was elected lieutenant colonel and commandant.¹

An "Army of Reserve for the protection of the Liberties of Texas" was the last of the auxiliary forces authorized by the council. It was to number 1145 men, officers included,—three battalions of infantry, one of riflemen, one of cavalry and one of field artillery—and was to receive the same pay and bounty as the other auxiliaries. Judge T. J. Chambers was responsible for this act. The first of January, he offered to recruit a force in the United States and have it ready for service, if possible, by May 15, 1836. He agreed to loan \$10,000 of the funds necessary for the purpose, and to raise the balance on the credit of the government without harassing the council. Naturally the council accepted the proposal, and pledged the public faith to repay his loan and any other obligation incurred by the undertaking. Chambers, with the rank of general, was to command the men enlisted. This ordinance was passed January 7 and sent to the governor for approval, but was never returned by him to the council. Chambers, therefore, was never commissioned, and, strictly speaking, had no authority to carry out his plan. Nevertheless, he was not deterred, as we shall see, from going to the United States and sending to Texas between May and December of 1836 nearly 2000 men and quantities of war materials, in which he spent some \$23,000 of personal funds and \$9,035 in Texas bonds.²

3. *Recruiting the Army.*

The Regular Army. — The effort to enlist the regular army was a heart-breaking failure. Accurate figures can not be obtained, but the assertion may be ventured that at no time before the battle of San Jacinto did the regulars much exceed one hundred men. Houston issued

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 169-70, 188; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 92. On January 7, 1836, the council passed "an ordinance and decree to amend an ordinance and decree for augmenting the regular army of Texas, and for raising a cavalry corps," but in the confusion of that time it escaped publication, and no clue to its contents can be obtained.—See *Ibid.*, 262, 275-76.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 275; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 123-25.

his first proclamation inviting recruits December 12.¹ It is a remarkably strong document, even for Houston's pen, but it was all but fruitless. By January 17 there were thirty-five regulars at Refugio, and some others, apparently, elsewhere, for Houston urges Governor Smith to "cause all the regulars now enlisted to be formed into companies, and marched to headquarters."² By January 28 Travis had enlisted twenty-six more and marched to the relief of Bexar. And on February 12 George W. Poe wrote that there were many at Columbia who would enlist if the officers were only prepared to "support them and clothe them." "Lieutenant Chaffin," he said, "has enlisted about 30 men who have no place to live at and he has no supply of arms, clothing &c for them."³ But the fact remains that on March 10, when the Alamo had been four days fallen, and Sesma was beginning his march on San Felipe, Harrisburg, and Anahuac, and when Urrea was drawing near Fannin at Goliad after the massacre of Johnson and Grant's division at San Patricio, a special committee, appointed by the convention then in session at Washington, had to report that "Of the regular army, there appears to be sixty privates," and, though they did not know it, thirty of these were dead with Travis in the ruins of the Alamo. The chairman, J. W. Bunton, acknowledged that his information was incomplete, and there may have been a few more, in fact, he had heard unofficially of a company of forty regulars under Captain Teal, but the number all told was pitifully small.⁴

The Auxiliary Corps.—Enlistments for the auxiliary corps were more numerous. Companies from Tennessee and New Orleans and Mobile had arrived early in the campaign of 1835, and, as time passed, volunteers came in constantly increasing numbers from the United States—chiefly from Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio (Cincinnati). Most of these later arrivals and some of the earlier ones joined the auxiliary corps,

¹Yoakum, II 450-52.

²Houston to Smith, January 17, 1836, in Yoakum, II 458-59.

³Travis to Smith, January 28, 1836, archives of Texas, D, file 18, No. 1759; Poe to Smith, February 12, 1836, archives of Texas, D, file 15, No. 1412.

⁴*Proceedings of the Convention at Washington*, 57-58, in Gammel's *Laws of Texas*, I 877-78.

though in general they hesitated to volunteer for a definite period, and were with difficulty enlisted for a term of only three months.¹ After the capture of San Antonio, an effort was made to bring the volunteers there under the orders of the commander-in-chief,² but most of the Texans dispersed to their homes, and the others, together with some companies from the United States at first refused to submit to the command of an officer of the regular army. Six captains—Llewellyn, Lawrence, Pearson, Baugh, Burk, and Cooke—declared themselves of this mind, December 25, and claimed that their men, having volunteered with the understanding that they would be independent of the laws of the regular army, could not be induced to serve under any other condition.³ They must have thought better of it very soon, however, for a month later three of these captains, Burke, Cooke, and Lawrence were refusing to follow F. W. Johnson in the Matamoras expedition without the consent of General Houston, and one of the others, John J. Baugh, was killed while serving under Colonel Travis in the Alamo.

Indifference of the Texans.—The citizens of Texas often manifested a surprising amount of indifference toward the war—and

¹Houston, writing to Governor Smith, December 30, 1835, enclosed muster rolls for the companies of Captains Wyatt and King, and said, "I have had much difficulty in getting them to volunteer for any definite period. But the ordinance left a discretion with me to accept their services for such time as I 'might think the good of the service required.' I did think it necessary to specify some certain time, and that time, I conceived, ought not to be less than three months; if so it would be burdensome to the country without corresponding benefit. I think they will eventually all volunteer for during the war."—Yoakum, II 456.

"Governor Smith, in a message to the council, dated December 23, said, 'The documents relating to the creation of officers in the camp [*i. e.*, at Bexar], requiring commissions, &c. &c, I have passed over to the commander-in-chief, with a request that he proceed to order the proper officers to that point to take command, and reduce the previous disorganization to system.'—*Proceedings of the General Council*, 196.

³Archives of Texas, D, file 10, No. 945. F. W. Johnson for personal motives probably brought about this declaration. He transmitted the protest of the captains to the council with this postscript: "It is utterly impossible to induce the army now here to become auxiliaries to the regular army, or to subject them to the comr-in-chief," though he adds, "they have willingly submitted to a system of due subordination and discipline as citizen soldiers."

this attitude was much more general than is ordinarily suspected. They did, as we shall see below, form the majority of the force that by good luck captured Bexar in December, but their lack of discipline—the simple expression of the frontiersman's individuality—was the despair of such officers as Austin, Travis, and Fannin. With the termination of the campaign they did not enlist either as regulars or auxiliaries, and did not again take the field in any numbers until immediately preceding the battle of San Jacinto. On December 17 Silas M. Parker wrote the president of the general council that he had with the greatest exertion been able to get together but thirty rangers, and could with difficulty get provisions for them. "I cannot," he said, "engage any beef or pork for them, tho there is plenty in the country. Such is the indifference of the people as to the cause of Texas." He had to go to the men who had beeves to spare and value the beeves and kill them himself. Travis, in a letter to Governor Smith, January 28, complained of the same indifference, and gives some pertinent reasons for it. He said: "I have done everything in my power to get ready to march to the relief of Bexar, but owing to the difficulty of getting horses & provisions, & owing to desertions &c, I shall march today with only about thirty men, all regulars except four. . . . Our affairs are gloomy indeed—The people are cold and indifferent—They are worn down & exhausted with the war, & in consequence of dissensions between contending & rival chieftains they have lost all confidence in their own gov't and officers. You have no idea of the exhausted state of the country—Volunteers can no longer be had or relied on—A speedy organization, classification, & draft of the militia is all that can save us now. A regular army is necessary—but money, & *money* only can raise & equip a regular army—. . . The patriotism of a few has done much; but that is becoming worn down—I have strained every nerve—I have used my personal credit & have neither slept day nor night since I received orders to march—and with all this exertion I have barely been able to get horses and equipments for the few men I have." Again he writes from Bexar, when the enemy were already advancing against it, that he hopes the people of Texas will at last open their eyes to the danger and unite in a common cause. But he bitterly adds, "I fear that it is useless to waste arguments upon them—*The thunder of the enemy's can-*

non and . . . The cries of their famished children and the smoke of their burning dwellings will only arouse them—I regret that the gov't has so long neglected a draft of the militia which is the only measure that will ever again bring the citizens of Texas to the Frontier." Almost at the same time Fannin was writing to Lieutenant Governor Robinson, "But when I tell you that among the rise of 400 men at and near this post, I doubt if twenty-five citizens of Texas can be mustered in the ranks—nay, I am informed that there is not half that number—Does not this fact bespeak an indifference and criminal apathy truly alarming? We count upon the service of our volunteer friends to aid in the defense and protection of our soil. Do the citizens of Texas reflect for a moment that these men, many of whom have not received the first *cent's wages*, and are nearly naked and many of them barefooted, or what is tantamount to it? Could they hear the just complaints and taunting remarks in regard to the *absence* of the old settlers and owners of the soil, and total neglect in the officers of the Government—not providing them with even the necessities of life—this, our mainstay would not be so confidently relied on!"¹ Finally, on April 8, when Santa Anna was at San Felipe, entering the heart of the most populous settlements, A. Roberts wrote to President Burnet, "I was astonished to find upon making a call upon the men who have stopped here [at Spring Creek] that in place of obeying promptly the general's call, some of them began to prepare for going further who had previously decided on remaining here for some time . . . while others manifest a total indifference on the subject. . . . It is thought that there is at this time on this side of the Brazos in a moving position at least a thousand men liable to do militia duty."²

The special committee appointed by the convention to consider the state of the army could only report, therefore, on March 10,

¹Parker to Robinson, December 17, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 14, No. 1408; Travis to Smith, January 28, 1836, D, file 18, No. 1759 (A part of this letter may be found in Brown's *A History of Texas*, I 532); same to same, February 12, 1836, D, file 18, No. 1761; Fannin to Robinson, February 10, 1836; Roberts to Burnet, April 8, 1836, D, file 15, No. 1470. Of the same tenor are the letters of John Sowers Brooks, in the QUARTERLY, IX 178, 181, 191, 194-95. On March 9 he wrote to a friend in New York, "And with this handful of 6 or 700 Volunteers we are left by the generous Texians to roll back the tide of invasion from their soil."²

that "Of the volunteer army, there are 390 at Goliad, commanded by Colonels Fannin and Ward and Major Mitchell; and 130 at Bexar under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Travis."¹ There was, besides, at this time a force concentrating at Gonzales, but most of it, no doubt, was composed of citizen soldiers, not regularly enlisted.²

The Army of Reserve.—General Chambers and his "Army of the Reserve" warrant a passing notice. He left Texas February 22 for Natchez, Mississippi. Shortly after his arrival there news of the fall of the Alamo and the Goliad massacre so lowered the credit of Texas that he could raise no funds, either on his personal pledge or on that of the State, and very few volunteers. He reached Tennessee coincidently with reports of the battle of San Jacinto, and found his credit improved. He sold some land, and in the next six months sent many companies to Texas from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio. By December (1836) he had thrown into Texas 1915 men, all well equipped, and had shipped a number of cannon and a considerable amount of ammunition and other supplies. In doing this he expended of his own money \$23,621.30, and in bonds which he issued on the government of Texas \$9,035. Besides these amounts a great deal had been contributed by sympathetic friends for the support of the men. He had been hampered a good deal in his operations, he said, by President Burnet's proclamation that Texas had no agents in the United States, except Thomas Toby & Brother. Some time in 1837 he returned to Texas, and made a detailed report to congress on June 3. He claimed that he had faithfully fulfilled his contract, and that by the terms of his commission from the council he was a major general, the second one created—Houston being the first—and now that Houston was president he was entitled to the command of the Texan army. Congress accepted his report, voted him a resolution of gratitude for his services, instructed the auditor to honor his

¹*Proceedings of the Convention at Washington*, 57, in Gammel's *Laws of Texas*, I 877.

²On March 8, the number at Gonzales was about 170; when General Houston took command on the 11th there were 374.—Moseley Baker to committee of San Felipe, March 8, 1836 (circular in the Austin Papers), and Houston to Collinsworth, March 15, 1836, in Yoakum, II 476.

accounts, and requested the president to make a satisfactory settlement with him in regard to his commission.¹

4. *Supplying the Army.*

Though the regular army, so far as its relation to the general council was concerned, remained a good deal of an abstraction, steps were not neglected to secure supplies for its use when needed. On November 27 an ordinance ordered the purchase of munitions, provisions, scientific and surgical instruments, books, and stationery. Among the small arms enumerated were 300 yagers, 600 muskets, 200 pairs of cavalry pistols, 1000 butcher knives, and 1000 tomahawks; among the provisions desired were 350 barrels of flour, 20,000 pounds of bacon, 15,000 pounds each of coffee and brown sugar, 5000 pounds of soap, and 3000 pounds of Kentucky chewing tobacco; the books included 100 copies of Scott's "Infantry Drill," 26 copies of Crop's "Discipline and Regulations," and 36 copies of McComb's "School of the Soldier."² A resolution of December 6 permitted the commander-in-chief to send two agents along with the commissioners to the United States to purchase these supplies, but whether he availed himself of the privilege does not appear. Doubtless many of the supplies were never bought, but the commissioners, Messrs. Austin, Archer, and William H. Wharton, appointed William Bryan, of New Orleans, general agent for Texas, and he from time to time shipped the stores that were most urgently needed.

The council decided, December 8, that the original order for

¹Chambers's report, without the documents and vouchers by which he fortified it, is printed in the *Telegraph and Texas Register*, July 15, 1837. Burnet strongly insinuated that Chambers left Texas to avoid participating in the war, and thought it a piece of sentimentality in Congress to recognize in any degree his claims upon the government. His argument, briefly, was that Chambers had gotten his appointment from the Council while Texas was still fighting for the Constitution of 1824. He was, therefore, a Mexican officer. The Convention declared Texas independent in March, and the Constitution provided that all civil appointments of the provisional government should remain temporarily in force, but made no such provision for the military. Hence Chambers had no appointment at all.—*Telegraph and Texas Register*, August 26, 1837.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 39, 40; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 34-36, 56.

350 barrels of flour was insufficient, and increased the number to 700, while at the same time it requested the governor to have the commissioners to the United States employ one or more bakers for the army. On December 18 it created the office of commissary general and appointed to the place Thos. F. McKinney, probably the largest merchant in Texas. Mr. McKinney declined the office, but never spared either trouble or expense in his private capacity to procure all necessary supplies for the soldiers. Finally, thinking, perhaps, that private enterprise might be able to supply some necessities which the government could not, the council elected a sutler. He was governed by the regulations for the same office in the United States army, and had authority to appoint sub-sutlers whenever the commander-in-chief requested them.¹

5. *Dependence Upon the United States.*

Of the Consultation.—From the very first day of its session the consultation looked toward the United States for aid, both in men and money. Indeed, the “permanent council” before it had already issued an address to “Citizens of the United States of the North,” begging for help and promising to volunteers ample rewards in land and money.² Mr. Edward Hall, on November 3, brought the news that a committee of Texas sympathizers in New Orleans had raised \$7500 and equipped and started to Texas two companies of volunteers. And Dr. Archer, in his inaugural address to the consultation, expressed the opinion that many others from the United States would soon arrive. By his advice the consultation among its first measures made provision for rewarding such as came with grants of land, and placing them “on an equal footing with the most favored citizens.” Mr. Hall was then appointed agent for Texas to solicit volunteers and purchase munitions of war in the United States, with instructions to draw on the New Orleans committee for the amount of his purchases. And on the 12th the consultation elected three commissioners—Austin, Archer, and W. H. Wharton—to go to the United States and, especially, negotiate a loan,

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 130, 189, 254, 286; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 74, 94, 132.

²The QUARTERLY, VII 271-73, note.

but incidentally to make arrangements for fitting out a navy, procure supplies for the army, and receive donations.¹

Of the General Council.—The general council continued to look in the same direction. In his first message Governor Smith suggested the formation of a corps of “civil and topographical engineers,” for what was considered the extremely important work of fortifying the seaports and frontier towns. The special committee that considered this recommendation reported their entire accord with His Excellency, but upon investigation were forced to confess, they said, “that our country at this moment, whatever it may possess of enterprise and skill, talent and industry in other branches of science adapted to the more immediate necessities of a pioneer population, is nevertheless almost entirely destitute of that species of knowledge essential to the construction of fortifications and works of defense. . . . Your committee, therefore, . . . recommend that we direct our search to the United States, and procure from thence as many gentlemen of acknowledged scientific attainments in this arm of defense as may be necessary, and that this important duty be confided to our three agents, Messrs. Austin, Archer, and Wharton, who are soon to proceed on their mission.” The organization of this force went no further, but the council took pains to have published in the United States the ordinances creating the auxiliary corps and fixing the bounty of volunteers, and, as we have seen, one reason why it delayed the election of officers for the regular army was the fear that men of high qualifications would be deterred from coming to Texas unless they could obtain commissions.² That this dependence upon the United States was well placed has been abundantly shown. Loans and donations of money and provisions were large, and volunteers came in ever increasing numbers, as the revolution progressed.

6. *Overtures to the Mexican Liberals.*

By the Consultation.—During the first day’s session of the consultation a committee of twelve was appointed to frame “a declaration, setting forth to the world the causes why we have taken up

¹*Journals of the Consultation*, 7, 9, 24, 29, 31, 37; Instructions to the Commissioners, Austin Papers, N 2.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 13, 29-30, 110-11, 117, 124.

arms, and the objects for which we fight." The subject evoked much and animated discussion, and at least four provisional declarations were submitted, but all were harmonized by the committee, whose report was adopted, November 7. A fair impression of this "declaration of November 7th" can best be conveyed by quoting those sections defining the attitude of Texas toward Mexico. "The good people of Texas," so runs the preamble, "availing themselves of their natural rights, solemnly declare,

1st. That they have taken up arms in defence of their rights and liberties, . . . and in defence of the republican principles of the federal constitution of Mexico of eighteen and twenty-four.

"2d. That Texas is no longer morally or civilly bound by the compact of union; yet, stimulated by the generosity and sympathy common to a free people, they offer their support and assistance to such of the members of the Mexican confederacy as will take up arms against military despotism.

"3d. That they do not acknowledge that the present authorities of the nominal Mexican republic have the right to govern within the limits of Texas.

"4th. That they will not cease to carry on war against the said authorities, whilst their troops are within the limits of Texas.

"5th. That they hold it to be their right during the disorganization of the federal system, and the reign of despotism, to withdraw from the union, to establish an independent government, or to adopt such measures as they deem best calculated to protect their rights and liberties, but that they will continue faithful to the Mexican government so long as that nation is governed by the constitution and laws that were formed for the government of the political association."¹

There were not wanting astute Mexicans in Texas who claimed that the declaration was insincere, and Austin thought it ambiguous.²

¹*Journals of the Consultation*, 12, 21-22. The four drafts of the declaration referred to may be found in the archives of Texas: A, file 2, No. 282; A, file 3, No. 441½; and in Volume 3 of Records, in Vault No. 1, pp. 16-17, and 24. The last two are copies. An interesting account of the discussion of the declaration in the consultation is given in a letter from Gail Borden, Jr., to Austin, November 5, 1835, in the Austin Papers.

²See Antonio Padillo to General Council (November 25, 1835), concerning the iconoclastic views of Father Alpuche, in archives of Texas,

But the consultation was much encouraged a few days later by the news that General Mexia had organized a small force in New Orleans and was preparing to make a descent upon Tampico in the interest of federalism, while a committee reported on the 12th that the rumors of unsettled conditions in Mexico "gives hopes of a co-operation of our Mexican brethren in the glorious cause of liberty and the constitution, in which Texas has set the noble example." This feeling can only have been increased by the arrival of Governor Viesca and Col. José María Gonzales, the latter bringing with him about twenty Mexican soldiers. He had formerly served in the Mexican army and had at one time commanded several companies of cavalry that were then defending Bexar. Austin and Fannin believed that he could induce these to desert in a body.¹

By the General Council.—Gonzales came before the general council, November 30, and, after having explained to him the declaration of the 7th, offered his services and was accepted (December 3) as "a volunteer to defend the republican principles of the constitution of 1824, and the rights of Texas." He was ordered to retain command of the Mexicans under his charge and report himself to General Burleson at Bexar. An advance of \$500 was made him to defray necessary expenses of himself and men. He cannot have arrived at Bexar in time to have caused much disaffection among its defenders, but the day after its fall we do find him issuing a proclamation to his old comrades in arms, urging them to help the Texans support the standard of federation.²

In the meantime, General Mexia, returning from his disastrous D, file 14, No. 1406; and Austin to Provisional Government (copy), December 2, 1835, in Volume 3 of Records, pp. 157-59.

¹*Journals of the Consultation*, 41-42. For the hopes that Austin and Fannin entertained of the ability of Gonzales to cause the disaffection of the garrison at Bexar, see Austin to Dimit and Austin to the provisional government, November 18, 1835 (in Austin's Order Book, pp. 65, 69, Austin Papers, K 64) and Fannin to Houston, same date, archives of Texas, D, file 6, No. 557. Also Johnson to Williamson, November 18, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 10, No. 926.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 79, 87; Committee to Gonzales, December 3, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 15, No. 1492. Filisola, in *Memorias para la Historia de la Guerra de Tejas*, II 171-173, prints Gonzales's proclamation.

expedition to Tampico, reached the mouth of the Brazos, December 3, and asked the government to inform him how he could best use the men under his command to the advantage of the federal cause. Almost simultaneously came Capt. Julian Miracle from Mier, saying that the Liberals of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León were ready to join the Texans, if they were fighting to sustain the federal system and not for independence. Canales, a lawyer of Mier, was already at Palo Blanco, he said, within two days' march of San Patricio, with two hundred men; and the Mexican garrison at Lipantitlán was ready to join Canales or Gonzales at any time. In reply to General Mexia the council first instructed William Pettus and Thos. F. McKinney to help him in any way necessary to enable him to proceed to the interior and carry the war into the enemy's country; but on the 10th it asked him to go to Bexar and reinforce the besieging army there. For the information of the Liberals whom Captain Miracle represented a committee was appointed to prepare an address to the Mexican people. Their report was adopted on the 11th, and Miracle, with five hundred copies printed in Spanish, was returned post haste to his friends. In substance it was about the same as the declaration of November 7: Texas was defending herself and the constitution, she had no intention of declaring independence, and offered her assistance to the opponents of Centralism everywhere.¹

Lack of Confidence in the Liberals.—But the government was not agreed on a policy toward the Mexicans. Governor Smith said that he had no faith in them. He vetoed on the 9th an ordinance for the relief of Mexia, and wrote the same day to Burleson, saying that the council had fitted out Gonzales without his knowledge or consent. "You will keep a strict eye on him," he admonished, "and if he should seem not to act in good faith I now order you to arrest him and his men, disarm them and hold them as prisoners of war subject to my order." The council, too, without just cause, it appears, lost confidence in Mexia. He did not go to Bexar, as

¹Mexia to Viesca, December 3, and to Governor of Texas, December 7, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 13, Nos. 1256 and 1252; report of information given by Julian Miracle, December 5, 1835, archives of Texas, A, file 2, No. 15 (Most of the document has been printed in the QUARTERLY, V 299-300); *Proceedings of the General Council*, 112, 115, 134, 141-42, 159, 166. See also Austin's draft of the declaration, Austin Papers, L 8.

requested, though most of his men—all of whom were Americans—did, and he sent with them a proclamation to the Mexicans of the garrison, some of whom he had once commanded, asking them to join the Texans. Mexia himself returned to New Orleans; Miracle is not again heard from, though reports arrived from time to time of the movements of his patron, Canales, on the Rio Grande; Gonzales, also, after the fall of San Antonio, drifted toward the Rio Grande frontier, and is several times mentioned as being at the head of two or three hundred Mexican troops south of San Patricio.¹

Thus the hope of Mexican co-operation, at best rather exotic, faded away. By the middle of January even Austin was urging the declaration of independence, which the convention made on March 2. And this, of course, quashed any sentiments of sympathy that the extremely small party of Liberals in Mexico may have felt.

7. *The Volunteer Army of the People.*

Formation and Organization.—While the consultation and the provisional government were thus trying to organize the regular army, with its divisions of infantry, artillery, and rangers, and the auxiliary force, with its 5000 volunteers, its legion of cavalry, and its army of reserve, and making overtures to the United States and to the Mexican Liberals, the “volunteer army of the people” was already facing the enemy at San Antonio de Bexar. This force was first gathered at Gonzales. At break of day, October 2, when the battle of Gonzales occurred, it numbered less than 175 men. By the 6th it had increased to 300, and resolved to march on Bexar. On the 11th Stephen F. Austin, who had been called from San Felipe, was elected commander-in-chief. He immediately appointed a staff, consisting of an adjutant and inspector general, an assistant adjutant and inspector general, and an aid-de-camp, and issued an address to the soldiers, saying that the march to Bexar would begin the next day, and emphasizing the necessity for

¹Concerning Mexia see my paper on “The Tampico Expedition,” in the QUARTERLY, VI 169-86. On Gonzales, see Smith to Burleson, December 9, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 16, No. 1581; Johnson to the General Council, January 30, 1836, archives of Texas, D, file 10, No. 943; and Fannin to Robinson, February 4, 1836.

strict obedience and discipline. "It is expected," he said, "that the army of the people, altho hastily collected, will present an example of obedience that will do honor to the cause we are engaged in, and credit to the patriots who are defending it."¹

As the little band proceeded westward it slowly increased. When the start was made from Gonzales, October 12th, Austin wrote that it still did not exceed 300 men; in camp on the Cibolo, five days later, there were eight companies, with a total of 366; at the Salado (October 21) there were eleven companies with a total of 453; and Royall wrote that from twenty-five to forty men were passing San Felipe daily on their way to the front.²

On the 28th, after the sunrise battle of Fannin and Bowie (battle of Concepcion), the army advanced to mission *Concepción*, and here the main division remained until November 15, when it moved up to join the second division at the Old Mill. Austin retained the command until November 24, when he resigned to accept the appointment of commissioner to the United States. Col. Edward Burleson was elected to succeed him, and remained in more or less nominal command until the surrender of the town. On the 6th there were about 600 men in camp, on the 24th 405 pledged themselves to remain in the field until the fall of Bexar, and on December 3 William G. Cooke says that the army numbered about 700.³

¹Grayson *et al* to Austin, October 6, 1835, Austin Papers, K 26; General Order No. 1, in Austin's Order Book, Austin Papers K 64. For the numbers at Gonzales see Coleman to the citizens of San Felipe, September 30, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 3, No. 270; Moore to same, October 6, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 13, No. 1248; and the statement of David B. Macomb in Foote's *Texas and the Texans*, II 99.

²Austin to General Council, October 11, 1835, in *Telegraph and Texas Register*, April 11, 1837; company reports, October 17, and 21, 1835, Austin Papers, K 7; Royall to Commandant at Goliad, October 11, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 15, No. 1459.

³On the movements of the army and the election of Burleson see Austin's Order Book, pp. 49, 59, 77, Austin Papers, K 64. On the numbers of the army, Fannin to President of Consultation, November 6, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 6, No. 559; list of volunteers pledged to remain before Bexar, Austin Papers, K 53; and Cooke's letter in the QUARTERLY, IX 212. Bryan says (to Perry, Austin Papers, K 30) that there were 800 men in camp on the 7th, and Rusk (to Robinson, archives of Texas, D, file 15, No. 1466) that there were only 350 on the 25th. The first is perhaps an over-estimate and the second is undoubtedly an under-estimate.

Lack of Discipline.—But the size of the army is not a fair indication of its strength. The organization was very loose. Companies varied in size from thirteen to seventy privates, some of them officered by a captain and three lieutenants, and some commanded by a sergeant. The men were entirely undrilled and almost entirely without discipline. Time and again Austin was forced to issue orders against promiscuous shooting in and out of ranks, and when food was becoming scarce for both men and beasts the most stringent measures were needed to prevent its reckless waste. And it is significant that the commander-in-chief felt constrained to preface his orders with the apology that he had "no higher ambition than the interests of the country and the safety and honor of the army," which he thought required that "order and discipline should be observed as far as possible." New men were arriving daily, and others were daily leaving. "Desertions" were frequent, as many as ten occurring in one small company in a single day.¹ Officers and men alike had their own opinions of what should and should not be done, with the result that the commander-in-chief had to content himself with a policy of inaction, and was reduced to the painful position of simply trying to hold his men together, hoping for a rather hopeless something to happen and unite them on a common plan, or for Bexar to fall of its own accord. Time after time he held councils of war and submitted the question of storming the town, but the proposal was always rejected. On the 21st he gave orders to prepare for an assault at daybreak the next morning, but his two division commanders informed him that their men refused to follow them, and the order was withdrawn.² The strain upon Austin, sick, as he was when he

¹It should be understood that enrollment in a company was entirely voluntary. In general there was no regular enlistment—certainly no oath. Therefore the men considered themselves at liberty to withdraw from the army whenever they chose. They often left openly, with no effort at concealment. They were called deserters by those who remained, but were not such in the usual sense, and certainly did not consider themselves such.

²Austin himself soon came to the conclusion that his plan of storming Bexar was inadvisable, for, writing to the council, November 30 (see Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, II 161-164), he said: "The most of them [in the army] are men of families, whose loss would have made a fearful void in our thin community. They might have been precipitated upon

joined the army, was too great. On the 22nd he wrote to his brother-in-law, James F. Perry, "I have done the best I could. This army has always been composed of discordant materials, and is without proper organization. The volunteer sistem will not do for such a service. I have had a hard and difficult task to perform, and am *really so worn out that I begin to require rest.*" Farnin was "fully convinced that with 250 men, well chosen and properly drilled, so as to rely on each other" the place could be taken by storm, "and not much loss to the party." And Travis was no doubt reminded of his experiences at Bexar when he wrote Governor Smith that "a mob can do wonders in a sudden burst of patriotism or passion, but cannot be depended on as soldiers for a campaign." Nevertheless, Austin had only sympathy for the army. "It deserves great credit," he wrote to the council, November 18, "for its sufferings and perseverance. I have every confidence that a short time will end this campaign."¹

the fortifications at Bejar, which were defended by seven or eight hundred men, and a number of cannon, and taken the place by storm, against superior numbers; and Texas might, and in all probability would have been covered with mourning in the hour of victory. On consultation with the officers in councils of war, . . . the system was adopted of wasting away the resources, and spirits, and numbers of the enemy by a siege, the ultimate success of which appeared to be certain, without any serious hazard on our part."

¹Company reports, Austin Papers, K 7; General Orders, Order Book, pp. 53, 55, 57, 62, 68, 69, Austin Papers K 64; Minutes of Councils of War, Austin Papers, K 52, and Order Book, pp. 70-71; Austin to Perry, November 22, 1835, Austin Papers; Fannin to Houston, November 18, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 6, No. 557; and Travis to Smith, December 3, 1835, file 18, No. 1757. For additional light on conditions at Bexar, see Johnson to Williamson, November 18, 1835 (archives of Texas, D, file 10, No. 926): "We have had considerable desertion in our lines since we arrived, which has been remedied in part by the recruits from different parts of the country who are coming almost daily. The camp is only kept together by the patriotism of the men and the unremitting exertions of the officers;" Rusk to Robinson, November 25, 1835 (archives of Texas, D, file 15, No. 1460): "We have had difficulties which none but those that have been engaged in them could well know;" James Cheshire and H. McHanks to Provisional Government, November 30, 1835, archives of Texas, D, file 3, No. 299; Mercer to Smith, December 25, 1835 (archives of Texas, D, file 13, No. 1264): "Our people met in a very disorganized manner and rather pr chance succeeded in taking San Antonio."

The Garrison at Goliad.—At the same time a rather migratory garrison in much the same state of discipline was holding the fortress of La Bahía or Goliad. The place was captured from its small garrison of Mexican soldiers by Capt. G. M. Collinsworth with a company of fifty-two men on the night of October 9. At first it was feared that General Cos would make a strong effort to retake it, and Collinsworth was rapidly reinforced, so that his command by noon of the 11th numbered 180. But this fear soon subsided and the garrison melted away to a mere handful, some of the men returning home and others going to join the army that was gathering at Gonzales for the march on Bexar. Only Austin's positive orders prevented all the men from leaving. They wanted to get into the active campaign, they said, and the conduct of Captain Dimit, who had succeeded Collinsworth, and was inclined to be something of a martinet, increased their restlessness. October 21st Dimit wrote desperately to Austin, "How shall I keep the men together? Or shall I permit them to go & come as they please?" And when Austin sought to help him by issuing another order, saying that men who left without permission would be published as deserters, Dimit declared that on some it had "no effect, or, if any, a very different one from that desired." It was considered an important post, however, securing communication between San Antonio and the Gulf, and the Texans managed to retain control of it till the advance of Urrea in the spring."¹

Relations with the Provisional Government.—Members of the consultation did not consider the "army of the people" as in any manner subject to them. Their attitude toward it was, in fact, very deferential. Resolutions were adopted, November 3, commending Austin, Fannin, and Bowie for their success in the battle of Concepcion. On the 12th General Houston offered a resolution thanking the army on general principles for "perseverance, firmness, patriotism, and courage in defending the liberties of Texas." And again, on the 13th, Collinsworth's capture of Goliad was remembered, and in order to forestall possible jealousy a resolution of thanks was voted to him and his men. The military committee

¹Ingram's report of the capture of Goliad, in *Telegraph and Texas Register*, October 24, 1836; Austin to Smith, Collinsworth, and Alley, October 12, 1835, in Austin's Order Book, Austin Papers, K 64; Dimit to Austin, October 21, and 30, 1835, Austin Papers.

defined their relations with the army in these words: "This force is composed of volunteers from every rank of citizens in the country, whose services generally commenced before the assembling of this house, and as their movements have hitherto been regulated by officers of their own choice, no obligation can be imposed upon them to submit to the control of the provisional government; advisory communications are all that can be made to them."¹

With respect, therefore, to the people's army the consultation confined itself mainly to the effort to secure reinforcements. Districts that had not contributed their quota of men were urged to do so at once, and the temptation to shirk was removed by a resolution of November 11 to the effect that persons leaving the country to avoid participation in the present struggle should forfeit all their land and property to the government.²

To this task and the equally difficult one of supplying the men already in the field the general council fell heir. An ordinance of November 19 provided for the immediate purchase of quantities of food, clothing, tents, surgical supplies, soap, candles, and cooking utensils, and axes, spades, and shovels. Medicine had already been forwarded, it was said, in sufficient quantity for the present. Mr. John W. Moore was appointed "contractor" to carry this law into effect, with authority to pledge the public faith for the payment of such debts as he might incur. The same day a proclamation was issued, calling for more volunteers, and announcing that "all the supplies . . . suited to the necessities of this inclement season have been procured and are procuring through the people's agents appointed for that purpose." This was a trifle premature, perhaps, but the council was determined to "make good," if possible. So Mr. Millard was appointed on the 22d to obtain supplies for a company on the way to the army, and on the 27th an ordinance was rushed through, creating a commissary at San Felipe to look after volunteers passing there. John B. Johnson was chosen for this responsible position, and he began his duties at once by issuing eighty rations to a company from Mobile. At the same time an appropriation of \$1500 was made for the benefit of the army at Bexar, and a few days later (November 28) John Dunn also was

¹*Journals of the Consultation*, 9, 39, 41, 50.

²*Ibid.*, 33, 34, 35.

appointed a commissary and ordered to buy for it at Matagorda or the nearest point possible a quantity of flour, bread, and beans. December 1st, having received news of the "grass fight," the council avowed itself deeply grateful to the men engaged in that "brilliant affair," and seized the occasion to assure them that no means would be omitted to aid, comfort, and assist them in their important investment of Bexar. Before the army received this gratifying assurance, however, Colonel Burleson had grown impatient and appointed William Pettus contractor for the volunteers. This appointment the council ratified on the 5th, but before Pettus had an opportunity to prove his efficiency Bexar had capitulated and most of the army dispersed.¹

The council had made little effort to reinforce the army, relying upon the work already done by the "permanent council" and the consultation and upon the general excitement aroused by the battle of Gonzales, the capture of Goliad, and the subsequent march on Bexar. A letter from Milam and Burleson, received on the 9th, and announcing the beginning of the assault on Bexar and the need of ammunition and reinforcements, created, therefore, a prodigious stir. One committee was appointed to gather up and dispatch to the army all the powder and lead in town, another to employ expresses to scour the country for volunteers and additional ammunition, and still another to procure horses for these expresses. Most of the members being thus on special duty, the council adjourned. The next day an address was issued, explaining to the people the straits of the army, and pleading for reinforcements. J. W. Fannin and Thomas J. Rusk were appointed recruiting agents,—the one to operate east and the other west of the Trinity—to enlist volunteers for thirty days. In the meantime Dimit was increasing the strain by calling for reinforcements at Goliad. But on the 15th came the news that Bexar had fallen, and the joy of the council was unconfined.²

As to the pay of the volunteers, the consultation had decreed that such as remained in the service until the fall of Bexar, or until honorably discharged, should receive \$20 a month and such dona-

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 24, 25, 29, 33-34, 45, 59, 69, 74, 75, 87-89; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 14, 30-31, 32-34, 37, 50, 54.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 33-34, 130-31, 133, 137-138, 139-40, 160-62.

tions of land as the government should vote them. For some reason, however,—perhaps to create an incentive to enlistment in the regular army or the auxiliary corps—the council did not admit these volunteers to the benefit of the bounty laws. Only those,—so reads the ordinance,—“their heirs or legal representatives, who have been or may hereafter be killed in battle, or come to death by sickness or accident in going to or returning from the volunteer army,” shall be entitled to one mile square, or 640 acres of land.¹

The Army after the Fall of Bexar.—In his message of the 19th the governor declared that it was now time, since Bexar had capitulated, for “the government to bring everything under its own control, and pursue the organic system in place of confusion and desultory warfare.” And in this, at least, the council was agreed with him. It had already tactfully suggested to the volunteers that they could now best serve the country by retiring to their homes until called out again in the spring, but on Christmas day there were still 400 men at San Antonio, 70 at Washington, 80 at Goliad, and 200 at Velasco—an aggregate of 750. The expense of maintaining so many men was great. Certainly Texas could not in her weak financial condition afford to keep them idle. To do so, moreover, the military committee thought, would be inadvisable for two reasons, in the first place, it would create the impression abroad that Texas needed no more soldiers, and in the second place, it would give the enemy time to fortify the Rio Grande frontier at Laredo and Matamoras. Partly, therefore, because it would furnish the means of keeping the troops employed; partly, perhaps, because it might further the plan of securing the co-operation of the Mexican Liberals; and partly because it seemed to offer some other advantages on its own account, the committee recommended an advance against Matamoras. The plan was adopted by the council, and on the 27th the governor was requested to have his proper officers concentrate all the troops at Copano and San Patricio in preparation for the expedition.²

¹*Journals of the consultation*, 29; *Proceedings of the General Council*, 85, 96, 146, 149; *Ordinances and Decrees*, 78. By an act of the convention, in March, all the volunteers from the United States who participated in the siege of Bexar also became entitled to 640 acres of land. See below, page 256. Also page 261, note.

²*Proceedings of the General Council*, 160-62, 185, 202-3, 217.

Into the tangle of the Matamoras expedition it is, fortunately, not necessary to enter very deeply. Governor Smith had already conceived the plan, and by his order General Houston had provisionally instructed James Bowie to undertake it on the 17th. Bowie did not go, and Houston was opposed to going himself. The council being determined, however, appointed, at his own request, F. W. Johnson to lead the expedition (January 3). He had already started 200 men to Copano under his aid, Dr. Grant, for this very purpose, and the council was surprised to receive a letter from him on the 6th, saying that he had decided not to go. Fannin was then appointed to collect volunteers and lead the expedition, and he entered upon his duties immediately. But on the 7th Johnson announced that he had changed his mind again, and would go after all, and he forthwith issued his proclamation calling for volunteers. The council, seeing that he meant business, ratified his acts on the 14th, but at the same time specifically declared that no authority was withdrawn thereby from Fannin. To make matters worse, Colonel Bowie had appeared on the 6th and "exhibited to the Council orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the army to proceed against Matamoras, and took leave of the Council for his departure." And now Governor Smith, acting under the council's resolution of December 27, ordered Houston to take charge of all the troops, and direct the expedition himself. Houston departed immediately, and found a number of men at Goliad and Refugio. He made addresses at both places, and succeeded in convincing most of the men that he alone had the right to command them. Johnson's force was thereby too much reduced for him to proceed to Matamoras, so he moved on down to San Patricio with about a hundred men, and there remained until surprised by Urrea, February 27. Houston's force was also too small, so he left the men in camp and returned to San Felipe, when Governor Smith gave him a furlough until March 1, and he went to East Texas to arrange a treaty with the Indians. Fannin's forces gathered too slowly to enable him to make the expedition, and the early part of February he went into quarters at Goliad.¹

¹*Proceedings of the General Council*, 230, 250, 265, 270, 273-74, 287, 304, 315-17. For a detailed description of the confusion of the Matamoras expedition, see the QUARTERLY, V 312-45, in W. Roy Smith's "The Quarrel between Governor Smith and the Council," etc. See also Houston to Smith, January 30, 1836, in Yoakum, II 460-70.

8. *The Convention and the Army.*

The Regular Army.—The situation, then, when the constituent convention assembled on March 1st, was about this: The little garrison at Bexar, left in a very destitute condition by Johnson and Grant in December, had been reinforced by Travis and Bowie to 150 men, Fannin was at Goliad with something more than 400, and a few detached companies were scattered in different places, while new arrivals from the United States were becoming more frequent. One of the first of the convention's military acts was to re-elect General Houston commander-in-chief of all the land forces—"regulars, volunteers, and militia, when in service." A committee of five had been appointed March 1 to ascertain the condition of the army in the field, the number and grades of the officers, with the size of their commands and where stationed. A report, showing the situation as we already know it, was made on the 10th. Fannin, it was pointed out, held the rank of colonel in both the regular army and the auxiliary volunteers. Tentative measures were taken to provide for the immediate necessities of the men, and the bounty of auxiliary volunteers from the United States who should remain in service until the end of the war was increased to 1280 acres of land. Those who had already served or should hereafter serve six months were entitled to 640 acres, and those who had served three months were to have 320 acres. Those, also, who had participated in the siege of San Antonio were granted 640 acres. This was in addition to what claims they might acquire under the colonization laws.¹

The Militia Bill.—But the convention had come to realize, with Travis and Fannin, that the only hope of the country now lay in a draft of the militia; consequently much time was spent in framing a bill for that purpose. The law, as reported on the 7th and passed on the 11th, declared all citizens between the ages of seventeen and fifty subject to militia duty—persons under and over those ages had the privilege of volunteering. Officers to be appointed by the convention were required to list the names of those subject to draft in each municipality, send one copy of the list to the president, another to the commander-in-chief, and post another

¹*Proceedings of the Convention at Washington*, 19, 23-24, 27, 33, 38, 57, 59, 70, 74, 77, in Gammel's *Laws of Texas*, I 823-98, *passim*.

in a prominent place in the municipality. In Nacogdoches, where there was a considerable Mexican population, the "natives" were to be organized separately. Only two-thirds of the militia could be employed at the same time, and for a term not exceeding six months. When a call should be made those to be drafted would be determined by lot, and each man mustered in was required "to prepare himself with a rifle or musket, one pound of powder, one pound lead, a shot pouch, powder horn, and knapsack, unless he will swear he is unable to do so without injury to his family." Persons drafted and refusing to serve were to be arrested, tried by courtmartial, and punished in accordance with the laws of the United States concerning deserters in time of war. Officers were appointed to prepare the lists in some municipalities, and on the 15th the president was requested to call out one-third of the militia, but before this could be done the enemy was upon them, and the government was bound to seek safety in a wild flight to Harrisburg. All thought of an orderly levy was then abandoned, and the citizens, left to their own inclinations, rushed to support Houston on the Colorado or joined the fugitives to the East and swelled the panic of the "runaway scrape."¹

9. *The Army of the Campaign of 1836.*

Distribution of the Forces at the Opening of the Campaign.—At the beginning of the campaign of 1836 there was a little band of regulars and volunteers under Travis and Bowie in the Alamo, about a hundred men under Johnson and Grant, with headquarters at San Patricio,² and Fannin's division of a little more than four

¹*Ibid.*, 29, 68-69, 79.

²It is hard to determine just what was the status of Johnson's command. Some of his men—they were nearly all from the United States—had undoubtedly enlisted regularly as volunteers before going to Bexar (See *Proceedings of the General Council*, 74). After the surrender of Bexar they claimed that they had volunteered with the express stipulation that they were not to be commanded by an officer of the regular army nor subject to regular discipline (see above, page 237). The military committee of the general council, considering the matter, January 14, reported that while they could not advise a departure from the laws adopted by the Government regulating the volunteer service," yet they thought the question was "quite immaterial in effect." The auxiliary

hundred at Goliad. The fate of the first two has been noted, and of the last it is only necessary to say, in brief, that Fannin began, on March 19 his retreat from Goliad, surrendered to Urrea on the 20th, and was murdered with most of his men on the 27th.¹ It now remains to trace the story of the citizen army that won the battle of San Jacinto.

The San Jacinto Army.—Drawn by the repeated calls of Travis for aid, a handful of citizens began early in March to gather at Gonzales. On the 8th there were 275 of them, and when General Houston, who had left the convention on the 6th, took command on the 11th, there were 374. But many were without arms, and others were without ammunition. The force, increased to more than 400, was formed into a regiment on the 13th. Edward Burleson was elected colonel, Sidney Sherman lieutenant colonel, and Alexander Somervell major. At midnight of the 13th, after having the news of Travis's defeat confirmed, the army began a retreat to the Colorado. There were some twenty desertions immediately—so Houston reported,—the men probably going to look after their families. As the army marched it received numerous reinforcements, some in companies and others arriving singly. Many of the latter left again, which, as one of the veterans of the campaign wrote, "they could do with impunity, as they were careful not to attach themselves to any organized company." By the 26th the number of Texans had increased to between 1200 and 1400, but when in the afternoon of that day the retreat was resumed from the Colorado to the Brazos many withdrew from the ranks—presumably to care for their families. On the 31st General Hous-

volunteers were subject to the governor and general council, and so were Johnson's volunteers, therefore your committee "advise that Colonel Johnson have the approbation of this Government to conduct the volunteers" under his command "as the officer of the Government" (*Proceedings of the General Council*, 316). It appears, then, that this was an independent force subject only to Johnson and the government. When Houston was elected by the convention (March 5) to command all the forces to be called into service it had perished.

¹The most satisfactory account of Fannin's movements and plans from February 7 to the massacre is to be found in Foote's *Texas and the Texans*, II 201-18, 224-60, where many of Fannin's letters are printed. Read also the letters of John Sowers Brooks, in the QUARTERLY, IX 169-195.

ton again halted, at Groce's on the Brazos, where the army remained until April 13, and was strengthened by fresh arrivals. Here a second regiment was formed, of which Sherman was elected colonel. An effort was also made to drill the men, but with little result. On the 13th Santa Anna crossed the Brazos and dashed on Harrisburg. On the same day Houston crossed the river, and began on the 14th his march for the same place. He reached the smoking ruins of the town on the 18th, left there his baggage train and from 225 to 275 men, most of them sick and inefficient, and pressed on. He encountered Santa Anna's advance guard at Lynch's Ferry on the San Jacinto River, April 20. The next day was won the battle of San Jacinto. Houston reported his strength in this battle at 783 men; Santa Anna's can not have exceeded 1300.¹ During the battle General Houston was wounded, and soon afterward had to go to New Orleans for treatment. His place in the army was taken by Thomas J. Rusk, the recently elected secretary of war *ad interim*. The citizen soldiers in general soon dispersed and began the planting of corn, but the army was rapidly filled up by new volunteers from the United States. Within two months after the battle of San Jacinto it was nearly 2500 strong, and was becoming rather hard to manage, but into this story it is not necessary to go.

10. *Summary and Conclusion.*

When the revolution began Texas was unprepared. This was nowhere more evident than in the military department. As soon as the consultation could meet steps were taken to organize the militia and to raise a regular army. A general plan was adopted and passed on to the provisional government, which succeeded the consultation, to carry into effect. The effort to organize the militia failed. The effort to enlist the regular army also practically failed. The provisional government planned to augment the regular army with (1) 5000 auxiliary volunteers, (2) a legion of cavalry, and (3) Chambers's army of reserve. It was found that few were willing to enlist in the first corps—though ultimately it probably num-

¹For a detailed study of the San Jacinto campaign see my article in the QUARTERLY, IV 238-60, with the documents which follow, pp. 260-346. Read also Houston's letters in Yoakum, II 470-502.

bered as many as 500,—the cavalry could not be organized, and Chambers's soldiers nearly all reached Texas too late to be of important assistance. Great dependence was placed throughout upon help from the United States, and, in fact, great aid was received in both men and money from that source. A tentative advance was made to the Liberals of Mexico, but mutual lack of confidence and the early declaration of Texan independence prevented co-operation. While the provisional government was taking these measures, the volunteer army of the people was besieging Bexar. The organization of the volunteers was loose, and they practically refused to submit to discipline, but in the capture of Bexar they accomplished their object. Most of the citizen volunteers then went home, and those who remained in the field, along with several companies from the United States, became so disorganized by the confusion arising from the contemplated Matamoras expedition that they fell an easy prey to the enemy when he advanced the next spring. The advance of the enemy also prevented the constituent convention from effectively taking hold of the military situation, so that General Houston and another citizen army became the country's sole hope for defense, but, as the event proved, they were sufficient.

This, truly, is one side of the picture. The Texas Revolution was not a spontaneous outburst of patriotic indignation against Mexican oppression. Few of the colonists, perhaps, were satisfied with all features of Mexican rule; but few, also, were those who were ready to go the length of armed rebellion. A small party of radicals and the Latin distrust of the Saxon forced the war. It came suddenly, and was soon over—lasting less than seven months. The pacific majority were dazed by its sudden development, and before some of them recovered it was past. For some of them, too, there were other enemies besides the Mexicans. Fear of the Indians they had always, and on the plantations of the Brazos there was added the threat of a slave uprising. With their families in danger, men heard only faintly the calls of the stricken country. Some, too, who would have joined the army were prevented by the wrangle between the Governor and the council, which paralyzed the government. But, when all is said, it really was the "old settlers" who did, almost unaided, all the effective fighting of the Texas Revolution. They captured Goliad and

Lipantitlán in the fall of 1835; assisted by a few companies from the United States they captured Bexar in December; and practically alone they won the battle of San Jacinto.

NOTE.—By an act of the Fifth Congress, December 30, 1840, it was provided that all soldiers who entered San Antonio between the 5th and 10th of December, 1835, and actually assisted in the capture of the place, should be entitled to 320 acres of land, "the same as though they had served out their time of three months." The preamble assigns as a reason for this law, that all but a very few claimants had received their lands by authority of previous secretaries of war, and it was not considered just that these few should be deprived of their claims.—Gammel, *Laws of Texas*, II 478.

THE KU KLUX KLAN.

W. D. WOOD.

The publication by Thomas Dixon of a sketch of the origin, organization, dissolution, and ritual of the Ku Klux Klan, or the Invisible Empire, in the *San Antonio Daily Express*, of September 4, 1905, brings vividly to the recollection of people who lived in Texas during the period from 1867 up to 1870 the reconstruction legislation of the Federal Congress, which for a time handed over the people of the several Confederate States to Negro rule and domination, with all of its humiliation and attendant horrors. The effect of this legislation was to disarm and disfranchise the Confederate white man, and place the ignorant Negro, the rapacious carpetbagger, and the camp-follower, in control of the government of each of the several Confederate States, and these, too often, under the thin disguise of law, proceeded at once to organize a saturnalia of robbery and crime that threatened to pauperize the people of the Confederate States, disrupt all social order, and destroy the just end and aim of government. What could be more repugnant to the instincts of an intelligent Southern man than to be ruled, robbed, and insulted by his former slave? It was during this troublesome period that the Ku Klux Klan was an important factor in many, if not all, of the late Confederate States.

That the humiliation, pauperizing, and ruin of the people of the South was the aim of many of the fanatic leaders of the North, who forced through Congress the reconstruction legislation, there can be no doubt; and though they failed in their purpose, it was not for the want of a desire to succeed. As evidence of this may be cited the actual introduction into Congress by Thaddeus Stevens of a bill confiscating the property of the Confederate people. It is well known that the Negro had been promised, as his share of the spoils, forty acres of land and a mule. Though Congress balked at the actual confiscation, it authorized the Freedman's Bureau, with its numerous agents scattered in every neighborhood of the South, and sent out an army of 35,000 soldiers, whose business it was to uphold the Bureau and the lawless and arbitrary acts and decree of its agents, and to maintain the supremacy and

domination of the Negro over the Southern white man; while the camp-follower and the active carpetbagger organized the Negroes into camps of the Loyal League, firing their zeal by the promise of forty acres of land and a mule, and by inflammatory appeals to their ignorance and cupidity, instilling into their minds a hatred of the Confederate white man and a desire for revenge against him.

The great wrong done the people of the South by the reconstruction legislation was the result of passion aroused by the inflammatory appeals of Northern fanatics, predicated, to a great extent, on the assassination of Lincoln. It was not the result of calm and deliberate purpose, nor of a wicked and cruel heart. It had been loudly proclaimed in the North, and the people generally believed, that the Confederate high officials instigated Lincoln's murder, and that the Confederate people approved it. This stirred the minds of the Northern people into such a frenzy of passion that they did not hesitate, at the time, to indorse the most drastic and unjust legislation for the humiliation and punishment of the Confederate people. In the murder of Lincoln the Confederate people lost their best and most powerful Northern friend; and no one now pretends to believe that the Confederate officials instigated his murder, or that the people of the South approved it.

Such were the conditions that surrounded the people of the Confederate States, and seemed to afford them no loophole of escape. They were beaten, broken, and depressed, with no hope of relief. They had no cloud by day, nor pillar of fire by night, to show them the way; but, dark as the prospect was, deliverance came in an unexpected manner, and this deliverance emphasizes and illustrates the fact that Divine Providence interferes in the affairs of men and nations, and that "He moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform."

The Ku Klux Klan, or the Invisible Empire, was the madcap fancy of schoolboys in Pulaski, Tennessee. Gotten up in boyish sport, in older hands it proved to be the fulcrum on which the lever worked that freed the Confederate people, and tore from the hands of the fanatics the fruit they expected to gather from the reconstruction legislation, towit: the domination of the Confederate

States by the Negro, the humiliation and pauperizing of the Southern whites, and the erection of their territory into solid black Republican satrapies.

The Negro, in his native African wilds, was the subject of the grossest superstition; and, notwithstanding his long contact with the Southern white man, he has lost little or none of the superstitious belief of his African ancestor. He feels conscious that the earth, the air, and the water are peopled with invisible spirits, some of which are malignant and harmful, and some of which are friendly and kind; but that all of them exercise a deep and mysterious influence over his life and being he does not doubt. He further believes that those spirits or beings manifest and make themselves visible to human ken by assuming the shape and form of a dead man or woman, a dog, or cat, or some other animal; or that they enter into and take possession of some man or woman, usually of some old and toothless hag, and transform them into witches, voodooes and sorcerers. In this way, if malignant and unfriendly, they bring disease, death, disfigurement, and bad luck upon a man or woman, sickness and death to stock, blight and failure of crops; if of a kind and friendly nature, they bring health and strength, good crops, and good luck.

The paraphernalia of the Ku Klux Klan was of such nature as to fill the superstitious soul of the Negro with the most abject fear and terror. He fully believed that they were visitors from the under world, come to call him to judgment for his desertion and cruel treatment of his old master and his master's family, and that swift destruction would follow unless he repented and made amends.

These silent night riders, or walkers, of the Invisible Empire, were enveloped in long robes or gowns of various colors, and ample dimensions, which fully concealed the person. Some of them wore hideous masks, and some of them had false heads supported by a rod, which, when rested on the ground, placed the head in proper position. This false head was made by hollowing out a gourd or pumpkin. By raising the rod on which the false head rested, it would apparently stretch the neck, which was surrounded by the gown, arranged to lengthen out, presenting to the beholder a man

some twelve or fourteen feet high. The false head was so arranged on the rod that it could be detached and made to hang down and dangle on the breast, presenting the appearance of a man with his head cut off and carried loosely on his breast. The false head had holes cut for eyes, and a mouth cut so as to display enormous teeth. The inside of the head was arranged to hold a candle or taper, which could be lighted when desired; and when lighted showed to the beholder a head with eyes of fire and red-hot teeth; indicating that the man had just arrived from the dominion of his Satanic Majesty.

The riders of the Invisible Empire knew how to impress the Negro and to utilize to the fullest extent his superstitious belief. Often in the night, when passing a Negro cabin, they would halt, and one of them would call upon a headless trunk and say: "Bill, where war you killed?" "Well," Bill would say, "I was killed at Gaines's Mill." "What you come here for?" "Well, I cum here to see about my folks, and see how the Niggers ar behavin'." "When ar you agwine back to yer grave?" "When dese crazy Niggers gets out of de Loyal League, and de Freedman's Bureau, its agents, and de thieving carpetbaggers is run outen de country." "Hello, Sambo, fotch me a bucket of water! I hain't had a drop since I was buried, and I'm mighty dry." When the bucket was brought, it was eagerly seized, and without stopping the headless soldier drained from the bucket the last drop and called for more. The water passed unobserved to the ground under his gown.

The dress, the silent and mysterious maneuvers of the Klan, the fact that no one knew where they came from or where they went to, made such an awesome and fearful impression upon the mind of the superstitious Negro, threatened him with such awful portents, and seemed to him so big with danger, that the promise of the forty acres of land and the mule became stale and uninteresting; the Loyal League lost its charms; he turned a deaf ear to the Siren song of the carpetbagger and camp-follower; ceased to rely on the Freedman's Bureau and its thieving agents; and gave his allegiance once more to his old master and the Confederate white man and aided these in routing the official thieves and vampires that were, under the forms of law, destroying and pauperizing the people of the Confederate States.

The deliverance of the people of the Confederate States from Negro rule and dominion, considering the manner and means of its accomplishment, reads more like a fairy tale than sober reality. It stands without a parallel in the history of any nation or people. It was not accomplished by bloodshed or violence, but in a great measure by the silent, mysterious, and visible manifestations of the Ku Klux Klan, which appeared to the ignorant and superstitious Negroes as the messenger of a supernatural, irresistible force, opposition to which would be to encounter the awful power of the spirits that people the earth, air, and water; and from such an encounter they shrank, as they would from a visible hand to hand conflict with Old Satan himself.

The writer has no knowledge that the Ku Klux Klan of which General Nathan Forest was the chief, under the title of the Grand Wizard, included Texas in its organization. He only knows that there was one Klan organized, which was done in a local and independent way, having no official connection with any other Klan. Doubtless other Klans of the kind were organized in other counties in Texas, as the people of all of the Confederate States had speedily come to realize the efficiency of this organization to impress, control, and regulate the Negro.

In the village of Centreville, Leon county, Texas, the Negroes had become impudent, and were constantly prowling around the houses of the whites at night, to the great annoyance and alarm of the white women and children. Under these circumstances, and in view of the threatening aspect of the Negroes, especially a few of the leading ones in the town, it was deemed necessary by the whites, for the safety of their families, that something should be done to regulate the Negroes and curb their insolence.

The papers of the day contained descriptions of the dress and manner of operation of the Ku Klux Klan, so some eight or ten of the white citizens of the town got together and proceeded to prepare the regalia of the Klan along the lines of this description.

There were in the town two Negroes who seemed to be leaders in encouraging impudence towards the whites and in the night prowling. It was concluded to try the effect of the Klan in full

regalia on these two Negroes first. So, one night, having first ascertained that each one would visit a certain place, and knowing the road they would travel, the Klan waylaid them. When the first Negro got into the midst of the surrounding Klan, they arose. The Negro saw some men twelve or fourteen feet high, with fiery eyes and red-hot teeth, some with their heads dangling on their breasts, and some with hideous masks. As soon as he discovered these phantoms, he uttered an unearthly yell and broke for his cabin, screaming at every jump, until he reached his own gate, where he fell in a state of perfect collapse.

The second Negro, instead of fleeing, fell down where he stood, and with maniac screams called on the Lord for mercy in one breath, and in the next on the good Devil. He was so fearfully scared that it appeared that he would die on the spot; and the members of the Klan slipped off their regalia and rushed to his aid. With dashes of cold water and assurances of protection, after a time they brought him round sufficiently to be able to be conveyed to his employer's house; but so terribly was he demoralized that his employer was obliged to let him stay the remainder of the night in the room where he and his wife slept. Sometime afterwards the writer questioned this Darkey as to what it was he saw that scared him so badly that night. He said, "the Lord only knows what they were. I seed a lot of ghosts that looked like they was about twenty foot high; some with fiery eyes and teeth, some with their heads off and dangling on their breasts; and I saw the old Devil himself come sailing down through the air, and he lit right on top of me, and den I didn't know no more." I said to him, "Now, you know you didn't see the Devil." "Shore, I did; he was as black as your old dog Imp, and looked like him. Didn't see no Devil? Didn't I smell de brimstone, see his head, horns, tail, fiery eyes, and teeth?" Well, the dog Imp was one of the party, and when the Negro fell down and commenced to scream, the dog ran to him and commenced to bark loudly.

This experience settled Negro impudence and night prowling in the town. The news flew broadcast over the county that "de Klux had cum," and a quiet, humble, scared demeanor at once took possession of the colored population, and no more trouble was exper-

ienced. The regalia of the Klan was deposited between the ceiling and roof of an old stone house in Centreville, where it probably could now be found, unless it has fallen to decay and dust from the tooth of time.

The Ku Klux Klan, or the Invisible Empire, was a phenomenal and unique organization, and so far as the writer knows, history discloses nothing like it. Conceived in fun, without any thought of benefiting a sorely-beaten and oppressed people, it became the chief instrument that achieved the political independence of the Confederate people of the South; and, out of the slough of humiliation and poverty, brought back to them their ancient freedom and pride of birth, and an era of unexampled material prosperity.

While General Forest, as the Grand Wizard of the Invisible Empire, perhaps, did not exercise any official jurisdiction over Texas, yet, the beneficial results of the workings of the Empire in the other Confederate States wielded a powerful influence in Texas in aiding her people to rid themselves from Negro rule and domination.

Considering the results achieved by the Ku Klux Klan for the Southern people, it deserves a prominent place in the history of the troublesome period of reconstruction, and explains, to a great extent, what would otherwise seem to be the miraculous deliverance of the Confederate people from the dangers and troubles that threatened to destroy them.



LEWIS AYERS.

LEWIS AYERS.

CHARLES H. AYERS.

Lewis Ayers was born at Morris Plains, a little village about two miles from Morristown, New Jersey, October 6, 1798. His father was Silas Ayers, a descendant of Obadiah Ayers, who with several others emigrated from Haverhill, Massachusetts, in 1667, and founded the town of Woodbridge, New Jersey. His mother was Mary Byram Ayers, a great-great-grand-daughter of John Alden and Priscilla.

There is but little information concerning the life of Lewis Ayers in possession of his descendants. His early boyhood was spent in the neighborhood of the place of his birth. On November 2, 1824, he married Rebecca Osborn. On May 11, 1834, he with his wife and five children and his brother David Ayers and his family left New York on the brig *Asia* for Texas. As to the part he took in the struggle for Texas independence, something can be seen from the documents published in connection with this sketch.

A Royal Arch apron which belonged to Lewis Ayers and a receipt for chapter dues paid by him in 1822 are in the hands of the writer. It is a tradition among the descendants of Mr. Ayers that this apron played a part in saving his life when he was captured by the Mexicans.

Of the children of Lewis Ayers, three died within one month of scarlet fever in Texas, and another died young. Three grew to maturity. One, a daughter, died unmarried. Cornelia Maria, born January 16, 1832, married Theo. P. Robinson. She is now living in Detroit and has five children: Miss Kate E. Robinson, Mrs. Clarence Hodges, Mrs. Charles Crockett, and Mrs. Charles Hastings, all of Detroit, and Charles Robinson, of Buffalo, New York. Lewis H. Ayers, the youngest of the children of Lewis Ayers, was born in Cincinnati, December 24, 1837, and is now living in Detroit. He has two children: Charles H. Ayers and Mrs. Katharine Ayers Holmes.

The life of Lewis Ayers subsequent to 1837 was spent mainly in the South, and most of it in Mobile, Alabama. He died in that city, October 11, 1866.

[The materials for this sketch and the documents printed with it have been furnished by Mr. Charles H. Ayers, of Detroit, who, as will appear from the reading, is a grandson of Lewis Ayers. Of the appended documents, No. 1 is a letter written by Lewis Ayers while on his way up the Mississippi River to Cincinnati. It was addressed to relatives of his who were living in Detroit. The Abram and Ann mentioned in the letter were the brother and sister of Mrs. Ayers. The original of the document is in possession of Mrs. Charles H. Hastings, of Detroit. Its abrupt termination is accounted for by the fact that the last page of it has been lost.

No. 2 is an extract from "The Jerseyman," which was published at Morristown, New Jersey, by a brother-in-law of Lewis Ayers. The paper from which the item is taken has been lost, and the date of the item, which was omitted in making the copy, can not be given.

No. 3 is a letter from Lewis Ayers to Governor Smith, of Texas, communicating some correspondence between Mr. Ayers and James McGloin, of San Patricio, relative to McGloin's appointment as militia organizer for that municipality. The oath referred to in the letters will be found in Gammel's *Laws of Texas*, I, 912. The latter part of it, which McGloin thought inconsistent with the spirit of the federal constitution of Mexico, pledged obedience to the declarations and ordinances of the Consultation and of the Provisional Government. This correspondence is of value for the light it throws on the attitude of the Irish settlers in McMullen and McGloin's Colony. The letters are printed from copies apparently made long since. The originals are probably not in existence.

No. 4 is the bond of Robert Carlisle as deputy of Lewis Ayers in the office of collector of the port of Lavaca. It is printed from the original.

No. 5 is from what seems to be the original of the passport mentioned in No. 1. It is signed by Guerra, but was doubtless obtained through Bradburn.

No. 6 is from the original of a letter from Isaac Domingo Marks to Lewis Ayers which was apparently written and delivered to Mr. Ayers while he was in Matamoros on his way to New Orleans.

No. 7 is a record copied from an old memorandum book which belonged to Lewis Ayers, and is now in possession of Mr. Charles H. Robinson, of Buffalo. It contains the dates of the birth of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Ayers and their children and of the death of four of their children who died in Texas. The remainder of the record is self-explanatory.

G. P. G.]

1.

On board Steamboat Kentuckian

Dec. 26—1836

Dear Father Sister and Brother,

I have a meloncholy account to render to you—but before giving it to you I will (under the impression that you probably have not heard from any of us in Texas since Abram left you) proceed to inform you that Abram and Ann was on their passage wrecked and taken to New Providence, one of the British Bahama Islands, and that they did not reach Matagordia in Texas until in the month of Jany.

Her, that is Anns husband, and his Father went on to that place with teams and took them to San Patricio a distance of more than 140 miles, before their arrival the Texas Revolution had broken out. I had taken an active part in the struggle, and had been a member of the General Council of the Provisional Government, had resigned that office and received the appointment of Collector of the Port of La Baca, these circumstances had procured for me the enmity of the whole body of the Mexican population, and among the rest of them the Father-in-law of Ann, Don Antonio Cabassas, although he professed great friendship for me. About this time I moved my family more in the interior of Texas by 45 miles to a place called the Mission del Refugio. The Texans had driven the Mexicans from out the County, not disturbing however any private families. It is not necessary for me to give you the particulars of several of the most extraordinary victorious actions by the Texans that perhaps ever occurred in the World, but you no doubt have seen the accounts of them published. I will therefore proceed to state what will be of more interest to you.

In the later part of February one division of the Mexican invading Army amounting to about 1500 men reached San Patricio another of 7500 men under the command of Santa Anna himself

reached San Antonio de Bexar When Abram and Ann reached the Mission, Abram had concluded to remain awhile with us, Ann went on to San Patricio with her husband, on her way there she learned that a great number of the Mexican rancheros had sworn to assassinate me and sent me word to that effect. I had been for some time endeavoring to move still more into the interior, but could not procure Teams, the Texan Army having pressed nearly all to haul provisions My wife being uneasy on account of the threats and known hostility of the common Mexicans, urged me to leave her for a place of safety, thinking that the family would be more secure without my presence than with it.

I therefore on the 2nd. of March left them with Abram as a protector who was on good terms with many who were hostile to me. I went to Goliad or Labahia and reported myself to Col. Fannin who then acted as Commandeer in Chief, I endeavored to procure teams to remove my family and got the promise of having them in 2 or 3 days. On the 10th. teams were sent to remove mine and other families from the Mission. I had the day before received the appointment of Asst. Quarter Master General, and the duties which devolved on me were such that I could not go with them. Capt. King a particular friend of mine took the command of the party to guard the families on their journey, and had he been satisfied with merely performing that duty, I have no doubt but that most of the meloncholy circumstances which I am about to relate would never have occurred, but Capt. King being desirous to punish some Mexican Rancheros who had been plundering at the Mission; went with a small party down to their ranches, but he found that with the addition of many Indians the enemy were too strong for him, he therefore made good his retreat to the Mission. My family were living about one mile from the village, my goods and furniture on two wagons and carts, my family and teams protected by Capt. King were taken to the Church they were fired at by the enemy on the way but fortunately escaped injury but some of our furniture was well cut by balls. After King had gotten all the families remaining in that place in the Church, he sent an express to Col. Fannin for more force to protect them all on the rout to Goliad.

At about 1 o'clock of the morning of the 12th. the express

reached Goliad and Col. Fannin immediately dispatched Lieu. Col. Ward with about 120 men to their assistance. I volunteered to make one of the party, we reached the Mission about 3 o'clock in the afternoon a distance of about 27 miles we found our friends in the Church safe, they were as you may well suppose very glad to see us. A few of us had a skirmish with the enemy that evening, but drove them off, this however was mere sport to what was to follow on the next day. A party of about 50 men went out in the middle of the night and attacked a party of the enemy, killing a number of them and making the remainder fly. At 5 o'clock on the 13th. I volunteered to go with about 100 men to hunt up the enemy. I placed myself under the command of Capt. King, who went in a different route from the remainder of the force, our party consisting of only 28 men after marching for several hours without seeing anything of the enemy, visiting several ranches which were deserted, and at about 12 o'clock came in sight of the Mission when to our utter surprise we discovered what proved to be the whole of Gen. Urrea's division of 1500 men in possession of the town. Our friends to the number of about 120 men were in the Church, my family and others were also in it. The moment we saw the enemy, we were discovered by them, and a party of Horsemen amounting to upwards of 100 men galloped to cut off our retreat to a piece of woods to which we hastened about 600 yds. when we reached there we found our number reduced to 22 men by the desertion of 6. We had time before attacked to choose a good fighting position, and for each man to have his station assigned to him, which was maintained by all throughout an engagement of about one half hour, when the enemy retreated with about 20 killed, and a large number wounded, after an interval of about one hour more, we were again attacked by about 200 of the enemy in two parties opening a cross fire upon us, we still maintained our ground and after an hours hard fighting we compelled them to retreat. One man of our party was killed, within 3 feet of me and four were wounded the number of the enemy killed and wounded was very large, but I have not been able to learn the number. Towards night we were attacked a third time from the opposite side of the river, Capt King then directed us to lie close, protecting ourselves as much as possible by the wood, and not to

fire again, holding ourselves in readiness for an expected attack on our side of the river, which however did not take place, the enemy after wasting as I suppose all their powder and ball without doing us any personal injury, went away. My life was saved in the second engagement by a ball glancing from one of a pair of pistols which I wore in front, they were given me by Capt. King. When night came on it was very dark, not a star to be seen, we crossed the river at the battle ground, where it was not considered fordable, the water reached my chin, there was a ford just above and one just below us but we expected the enemy would guard them, the banks were so steep that we had to assist each other in the ascent, the wounded accompanied us with much pain. We wandered about all night endeavoring to reach Goliad, but when day dawned on the 14th. we found ourselves only about 3 miles from the Mission, having lost our way, we hurried on about two miles further, when we were attacked by a party of Mexicans, and were compelled to surrender, our guns being most of them wet, and having no chance to retreat. We were then marched back to the Mission, tied together two by two, the rope at the same time connecting up all together, after which we were marched about one mile, where we found a body of the enemy drawn up to receive us, we also found a few of our friends, who had been picked up one by one, making in the whole 33 men. The Soldiers loaded their guns to shoot us but in consequence of there being two Germans among the prisoners the execution was postponed at the request of a Col in the enemy's service who was a German by birth. Our treatment during the next 24 hours was most brutal and barbarous.

I had not asked for neither did I expect any mercy at the hands of the enemy. My wife however with four children presented herself to Gen. Urea and excited his sympathy by their tears, she was aided by some Mexican officers who were opposed to the barbarous course pursued of murdering prisoners, and the General agreed to save my life, which was done, and I was given in some degree my liberty, after receiving a severe lecture on account of my hostility to Mexico and charging me to behave myself better in the future and let politics alone—I merely bowed and said nothing.

I learned from Rebeca that Lieu. Col. Ward after having defended the Church from several attacks made upon it and de-

stroying at least 50 or 60 of the enemy had made his retreat at night, the same night we were endeavoring to do the same. The enemy had for a number of hours fired a piece of Artillery at the Church, 17 balls had penetrated the roof the walls were too strong to be battered down. Several families besides mine were there but not injured.

According to the report made by the few survivors of Cols. Ward party who soon fell in the enemys hands, Mrs. Ayers manifested throughout the seige much courage and presence of mind, she encouraged the men and showed no fear. Abram (her brother) took an active part in the battle and was wounded in the breast by a spent ball. After the retreat of the party and possession taken by the Mexicans they were made to believe that Abram had received his wound from a Texan instead of a Mexican, and he was permitted to remain under the care of my wife. A Mexican Surgeon undertook to probe his wound but being ignorant and unskilled instead of extracting the ball pushed it into the chest from which of course it cannot be extracted. He soon recovered from the wound and has since received little uneasiness from it, for a short time it effected his lungs, but has not for some four months past. The Mexican officers were polite not only to my wife to whom more than ordinary respect and attention was shown, but to all the families. I should have mentioned that the two Germans and myself are the only survivors of the 33, one of these Germans soon after died from his wounds. The rest of our party were barbarously shot, stripped naked and left on the prairie about one mile from the Mission.

I must pass over many important events or my letter will take up many more sheets and perhaps after all will be uninteresting to you though to me of thrilling interest. It was required by the Mexicans that we should return to San Patrico, which we did with the remains of our furniture and goods, the Mexicans notwithstanding the efforts of the officers to prevent it having robbed us to a considerable extent although there had been a guard placed over them for protection. After our arrival there I remained with my family only one day and two nights, having been advised by the Mexican General to go to Matamoras. I procured a passport from Col. Bradburn an American by birth but in the service

of Mexico, to proceed to that place, he thinking I intended making arrangements to remove my family there, but I had no such intention. I was induced to go there for the double purpose of escaping from the murderous designs of the Rancheros and to get off to New Orleans, where I thought I would be enabled to do something for my family or at least get to my friends in Texas, my family feeling safer in my absence. On reaching Matamoras I found some American merchants with whom I had some acquaintance, I was received and welcomed not only by them, but by all the Americans in the place, more like a brother than a mere acquaintance. I procured a passport to the mouth of the river from the officers in command there and another passport to New Orleans from the Alcalda who was made to believe that I was an American citizen who had been trading from Matamoras to New Orleans.

2.

Letters from Texas recently received by the Editor announce the death of his brother-in-law, ABRAHAM H. ORSBORN, who was favorably known several years since among the citizens of the Town for his gentlemanly demeanor, and upright and honest course in life. He left this to accompany a younger sister to her home on the Nueces River, the boundary line between Texas and Mexico, and after the sailing of the vessel news arrived of the breaking out of the Texan Revolution. In one of the sanguinary battles a spent musket ball lodged in his breast, which could never be extracted, and which at times caused him serious inconvenience. Being of business habits, his wound never detained him from attending to his avocations. He left Houston, his place of residence, in the stage for Austin, at which place he arrived on the 12th of April, having been attacked by cholera on the road, and died on the 14th. The Ancient Fraternity held a meeting subsequently and passed the following Resolutions, for which his friends here at the North return their sincere thanks, as also for their kind attention on the melancholy occasion in attending to his bed of sickness and interring him with Masonic honors. He left no family but a large number of connexions and friends to mourn his decease far from his place of nativity. The Editor will ever bear in grateful remembrance this kindness of his Brethren of the Order,

and sincerely hope that we may all hereafter meet on a level in presence of our Grand Master.

“The following preamble and resolutions were adopted by Austin Lodge No. 12, upon learning of the death of Brother Orsborn:

Whereas, It having pleased an all-wise God, to whose inscrutable decrees we bow in meek and humble submission, to call from this warm and breathing life of time, to that undiscovered mystery, cold and dark beyond, our worthy and esteemed Brother, ABRAHAM H. ORSBORN, of Houston, Harris county; deeply sympathizing with his bereaved family for the irreparable loss they sustain by his untimely end, and tenderly feeling the deep wound, the mandate of Him who giveth and of Him who taketh away, has inflicted on our hearts and on our Order, in suddenly calling our worthy and beloved Brother from the scene of his earthly labors to that Lodge not made with hands, eternal in the heavens,

1st. Be it resolved by this Lodge, That the members of the same offer their heartfelt condolence to the family of the deceased in their sore bereavement in this unforseen visitation of Providence that has removed from their bosom the brother and affectionate counsellor, and has taken forever from our Order an able and efficient member,—one whose zealous devotion to the interests of the craft must long be pleasingly remembered.

2d. Resolved, That the members of this Lodge will wear the appropriate badge of mourning for the space of thirty days, in token for our high regard for the worthy and esteemed character of our deceased Brother.

3d. Resolved, That the Secretary of this Lodge forward to the relatives of the deceased a copy of these resolutions, and also to Holland Lodge No. 1.

4th. Resolved, That the foreging resolutions be published in the Texas Democrat.

J. M. W. Hall,
John Hancock,
J. M. Swisher,
Committee.

A true copy.

Tho. P. Cartmell, Sec'y. A. L. No. 12.

3.

San Patricio Jan, 1835

His excellency

Henry Smith Governor of the Provisional Govt of Texas—

Sir On my arrival at this place Dec 25th. I made known to the individuals commissioned as 1st & 2d Judges and also to two of the three persons commissioned to organise the militia of their appointment. On the 26th. John Turner the 2d Judge recd his commission after taking the oath prescribed by the organic law as likewise did John Turner and John McGloin take the oath and recd the Commission as Commissioners to organise the militia. Mr Danl. O Boyle one of the Commissioners was and is yet absent from this place. James McGloin Esq was informed of his appointment as 1st Judge on the evening of the 25th. I saw him on the 26 several times without ascertaining whether he would accept or reject his appointment on the evening of that day I addressed him a note of which the following is a copy

James McGloin Esq

Sir

In the name and in behalf of the People of Texas I call upon you for your acceptance or rejection of the appointment of 1st Judge of the municipality of San Patricio hereby informing you that I am ready to administer to you the oath of office prescribed by the organic law and to deliver into your hands the Commission signed by the Gov. and Sec. provided you accept the appointment.

Dec 26.

L. Ayers
Commissioner of the Executive

I have just recd. his answer dated as you will observe on the 27th The tenor of which is such that I think it my duty to enclose it with his Commission to your Excellency without Comment

I have the honour to be with the greatest respect your most obt.
Svt.

L. Ayers

Copy of J. McGloins
letter referred to
worded and spelt as
the original

San Patricio Dec 27, 1835

Lewis Ayers Esq

Sir I have recd yours in name and in behalfe of the People of Tejas calling on me to *accept* the office of *Judge of 1st of this municipality* that you are ready to administer the oath of office *Pricribed* in the organic law and *deliver into me* my Commission signed by the Governor and Secretary *provide I accept the same.*

Sir in answer to yours I beg to inform you that I *accept* of that office Particularly as being in conformity with an election made by the late Ayt who elected me one of the Judges for the following year however I decline taking the oath untill I hear an explanation of the last paragraph of said oath which seems to me not to accord with the Spirit of the federal constitution and forthwith I will write to Mr. McMullen who is now sitting in council to hear from the Govr and Council their explanation of the said Paragraph yours Sincerely,

a true Copy

James McGloin

L. Ayers,

P. S.

I should be pleased
to hear from you from the mouth of
the river, also on your arrival at New Orleans.

I. D. M.

4.

Know All men by these presents that I, Robert Carlisle am held and firmly bound unto Lewis Ayers collector of the District of Jackson (Labaca) and to his successors in office in the penal sum of Three Thousand dollars

The Condition of this Obligation is such that if I, Robert Carlisle shall well and Truly pay over to the said Ayers or his successors in Office on demand by said Ayers or his

successors in office all sums of money or notes of hand received by me as Deputy Collector and faithfully perform all the duties of the said appointment during the absence of the aforesigned Ayers —according to the Laws regulating duties on Imports and Tonnage then in that case this obligation to be null and void otherwise to be of full force and effect

Robt. Carlisle

Guadalupe Victoria Dec 22, 1835

Witnesses

L. W. Gates

Ira Westover

\$3000.

We the undersigned hereby bind ourselves and property to the amount of Three Thousand dollars each for the faithful performance by Robert Carlisle of the duties of his appointment as deputy Collector during the absence of Lewis Ayers the principal Collector and to whom we hold ourselves bound in the above amount for any violation of his duty

Robt. P. Heam
Ge Benson

Guadalupe Victoria Dec. 22, 1835

Ira Westover

L. W. Gates.

5.

Camanda. Militar

Pasa al Brazo de Santo. Dn. Luis
Ayers con destino de embarcarse. Ma
tamoroz 2. de Mayo /836.

Guerra.

[Rubric.]

6.

Matamoros May 12th 1836

L. Ayres Esqr.

Dr. Sir

I herein enclose you a letter of introduction to the house of Godfrey, Blessman & Co confident, that they will render you assistance in N Orleans,

I likewise enclose you Seven letters, which you will please take the utmost care of (as they are of great importance to me) and, deposite them in the post office immediately on your arrival at N Orleans Our mutual friend Mr. Potter will give you all the political news—wishing you a speedy and pleasant passage

I remain

yours truly

Isaac Domingo Marks

7.

Lewis Ayers Oct. 6-1798

Rebecca Osborn Jan. 6, 1804.

Charles Augustus Sept. 12-1825

Mary Elizabeth 27th Aug. 1827

Helen Louisa 12 Nov. 1829.

Cornelia Maria 16 Jan. 1832

Charlotte Sophia 8 do 1834.

Delia Caroline 16 May 1836

Lewis Henry 24 Dec. 1837

L. A. & R. O. was married Nov. 2 1824 at Geneva, N. Y. by the Rev. Mr. Axtell.

[On the first second and third pages is written the following]: I, the undersigned do here by testify that I have baptized according to the rite of the Catholic Church the following children the legitamate offspring of Lewis Ayers and Rebecca Osborn his lawful wife, viz. *Mary Elizabeth* aged 8 years last Aug, sponsors, Patrick Faddin and Mary Haley. *Helen Louisa*, aged 6 yrs. the 12th of Nov. last, sponsors, Raymond Cabassas and Mary O'Boyle. *Cornelia Maria*, aged 4 yrs. the 16th of Jan. last, sponsors Don Antonio Cabassas and Maria Petra, his wife. *Charlotte Sophia* aged 2 yrs. the 8th of Jan. last, sponsors John Cabassas and Elizabeth Mary Ann McGloin. *Delia Caroline*, born of the 16th inst. sponsors Don Lucian Cabassas and Rose Relelia. In testimony of which I have herewith subscribed my name this 24 day of May 1836,

Jas. Keily, P.

Charles Augustus died June 22 1826

Mary Elizabeth died Oct. 7-1836

Charlotte Sophia died Oct. 19-1836

Delia Caroline died Oct. 26-1836

NOTES AND FRAGMENTS.

GOVERNOR HOGG'S SERVICE IN THE CAUSE OF TEXAS HISTORY.— Governor Hogg was a real lover of Texas history and an indefatigable collector of books and documents relating to Texas. He was one of the few lawyers that succeeded in getting up for his library a complete set of the original edition of the Laws of the Republic and of the early State in the Union. The State Library was burned with the Capitol in 1881, and practically nothing had been done for its rehabilitation up to 1891, when Hogg was inaugurated as Governor. Governor Roberts, indeed, had in his message of January, 1881, recommended a salary for a competent history and statistical clerk to be State Librarian and to devote himself to history and statistics, and also the creation of a contingent fund to be used in defraying the expenses of procuring records, documents, and other papers relating to the history of Texas. But nothing came of his recommendations, and nothing was done on these lines till ten years later when Hogg came in as Governor. The Library at that time had next to nothing outside of the public documents, that is, publications of the several States and of the Federal Government; the miscellaneous books did not exceed seventy-five and the Texas books numbered less than forty, with but one newspaper of the early Union, purchased by special appropriation. One of the first acts of the Hogg administration was the creation, not by enactment, but by the appropriation bill, of a historical clerk who was *de facto* State Librarian, and who was charged specially with looking after the things pertaining to the history of the State. Governor Hogg manifested quite an interest in the Library, visiting it often while I was in charge. He suggested the policy, which was at once adopted, of making the Library outside of the public documents a collection of Texas books primarily, and secondarily a collection of reference works on history and literature. Later his influence put in the appropriation bill an item of \$500.00 per annum for necessary expenses in collecting historical data relating to Texas. On this fund the Historical Clerk or State Librarian traveled over the State, carrying out the

purpose of the appropriation. In Hogg's administration more than nine-tenths of the newspapers of the Republic and of early Texas in the Union now in the State Library were acquired and brought in by the State Librarian as a result of his personal researches for data amid the historic spots of the Republic. Besides these, many exceedingly rare and valuable Texas books and documents were added to the Library in this way. It may be added, in this connection, that all the old newspapers of the Republic and State in the Library, with one exception, noted above, have been acquired under this fund, which has been used since then exclusively for purchasing historical data and as a supplementary book-purchasing fund. The appropriation for buying books for the State Library was increased under Hogg's influence from \$300.00 per annum to \$1000.00 per annum. It is a matter for keen regret that subsequent administrations have not seen fit to continue this liberal policy.

C. W. RAINES.

THE OLD STONE FORT AT NACOGDOCHES.—The question as to who built the historic landmark known as the "Old Stone Fort," which till recently stood at Nacogdoches, though of little importance, has a popular interest of the antiquarian sort, and it will not down until satisfactorily answered. The erection of the building has usually been attributed by tradition to Gil Ybarbo, who occupied the site of old mission Nacogdoches after it had been deserted by the Spaniards about six years. But some persons have supposed that the building was standing there when Ybarbo occupied the place, the most extraordinary conjecture of this sort being that the "Fort" was the work of De Soto's men who went through northeast Texas in 1542. I cannot say whether Gil Ybarbo erected it or not, but the evidence given below establishes a very strong presumption that it was not built before he settled there, and thus helps to narrow by some centuries the range of the unknown in the matter.

In 1768 Father Gaspar José de Solis, of the Franciscan College of Zacatecas, inspected the missions supported by that College in Texas. The entry in his diary for June 1 tells us that the most

substantial building at the Nacogdoches mission at that time was the adobe church, the other buildings all being of wood. He says: "The location of the mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Albuquerque de los Nacogdoches is in a moderate-sized plain, which is surrounded by a permanent *arroyo* having an abundance of water, but no ditch to irrigate the crops. . . . The church, although small, is of adobe, roofed with *taxamanil* (some kind of shingles), and is entirely surrounded on the outside by a palisade of stakes. The living-place of the ministers is of wood, very regularly put together, and has a roof of *taxamanil* which affords good protection. It is surrounded on all four sides by a palisade of stakes, and has a kitchen, granary, and rooms for the soldiers. Besides this house there are other separate ones of the same material [wood], well made, capacious, and decent."

The "Fort" was made of good-sized stones. This material could not conceivably have been called "adobe" by a Mexican. The building was too large and too substantial to escape mention by Solis in so minute a description as the above, had it been one of the mission buildings when he wrote. And since the mission was the only authorized establishment there at the time, we can not suppose that such a building as the "Fort" existed on the site unconnected with the mission.

The mission had long languished near the point of extinction, and now, soon after Solis's visit, it was abandoned, hence the "Fort" could not have been erected between Solis's visit and Ybarbo's settlement at Nacogdoches in 1779. The only buildings mentioned by Ybarbo in telling of his entry into the place were the same church and priests' house described above. He writes that he and his people journeyed "until there were seen the site of the Téxas Indians, and, three leagues beyond, the old mission of Nacogdoches, where there was a small chapel in which the reverend father may perform the holy sacraments and a house where he may live."

Solis's description of these buildings sets aside the conjecture made in the QUARTERLY (IX, 129) that one of those mentioned by Ybarbo might possibly have been the "Fort"; and the mention

of the church and the priests' house by both Solis and Ybarbo as the only buildings worthy of note make it improbable that any structure corresponding to the "Fort" existed.

HERBERT E. BOLTON.

IMMIGRATION TO TEXAS AND THE DOMESTIC SLAVE TRADE.—The following letter, the original of which has been presented to the Association by Mr. R. A. Hanrick, of Waco, is especially interesting for the illustration it gives of the movement of immigration towards Texas and the working of the domestic slave trade in the United States:

Montgomery Decr 2d 1832

Robt M Williamson Esqr

Dr Sir Your esteemed favour of Novr 1st has come to hand. It gives me great pleasure to find that you are so faithful to your promise of detailing the various affairs of our adopted Country— Such is the difficulty in winding up a ten years unsettled business that it will be impossible for me to leave the United States before September next I allso will have to make a trip to Virginia for the purpose of adding to my Stock of Slaves which will take up so much of my time that I cannot start sooner than the period mentioned You may look with a great deal of certainty for many of your old acquaintances in Texas next Spring the Spirit for emigration to that country is very great and thousands would go but for the terrors of a Mexican government these idle fears I have endeavored as much as possible to allay and I believe with much success except with some of the more timid. You mentioned in your last letter that you beleved Mexican grants of Eleven leagues could be procured for a reasonable sum if so you will perceve by the enclosed proposition that Mr Edward Hanrick George Whitman and myself are disposed to procure some of them the selections of which will be left entirely to your own discretion and should you be disposed to take up with the proposition I feel satisfied that we will be well pleased with your selections In consequence of the disturbances in Texas the Messrs Prichards have declined their journey untill another year Mr. Beard & Thompson have started to Texas and no doubt will arrive ere this

The Political news of the United States is that Jackson has been reelected President by an overwhelming majority—South Carolina has nullified the Tariff acts; which is to take place in February next, provided congress does not abandon the protective system by

that time and in case of any interference on the part of the united States to enforce the laws she has declared her determination to secede we expect stormy times in the United States. perhaps civil war which God avert

Your brother Micheal Williamson died a few weeks ago and Col Peacock has taken home his widow & children

With great respect I remain
your friend

Asa Hoxey

THOMAS J. PILGRIM.—A letter recently received from Judge W. S. Fly, of San Antonio, contains some valuable items concerning the life of Thomas J. Pilgrim, a well-known pioneer of Texas. Since they are of general interest, and for the purpose of recording them, permission to publish these facts has been secured from Judge Fly. They are printed here as excerpts from the letter:—

“Thomas J. Pilgrim was born in Connecticut in 1807, and in the fall of 1828, he left New York on a vessel, which was tempest-tossed, and which, after the passengers had suffered greatly from lack of food and water, landed at Matagorda, Texas. He made his way from that place to the headquarters of Stephen F. Austin’s Colony at San Felipe, on the Brazos river. There it was that he organized the Sunday School of which he writes in the article referred to [in *A Texas Scrap Book*, 69-76]. He learned the Spanish language, and for a long time acted as interpreter and translator for Austin’s colony. He was very frail and delicate and was not a participant in the battles of 1836. After that war he settled at Gonzales, where he married Sarah J. Bennet, the daughter of Major Valentine Bennet, who was in Houston’s army at San Jacinto and who was a member of the Santa Fé expedition. He is mentioned a number of times in Kendall’s account of that expedition.

“In 1846 or 1847, Mr. Pilgrim organized a union Sunday school at Gonzales, of which he was superintendent until his death on October 29, 1877, with the exception of the time he spent in Austin, from 1871 to 1874. He was buried in the old cemetery at Gonzales, and although feeble efforts, at times, have been made to erect a monument to his memory nothing has been done.

"He was highly educated, and had in the day schools that he taught boys who afterwards became prominent men in Texas, among the number being Judge James H. Bell, and perhaps Judge McCormick, now a Circuit Judge of the United States. Of the latter I am not positive. He was a warm friend of Stephen F. Austin, and the Bryans of Matagorda and Brazoria Counties.

"Mr. Pilgrim was a prominent and useful citizen of Gonzales, and all of the old settlers there remember him with the highest regard and respect. He has two grand-daughters, Mrs. Hildebrand and Mrs. Hoskins, residing in that historic little city at this time, and has one daughter, Mrs. Eastland, residing in Dallas, and another, Mrs. W. S. Fly, residing in San Antonio."

PROCEEDINGS OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL.—In the QUARTERLY for April, 1904 (Vol. VII, No. 4), there was published the Journal of the Permanent Council of Texas, which was in session, October 11 to 31, 1835, with a number of accompanying documents. Not all of the resolutions and communications referred to in the Journal could be found, but to those published should be added the two which follow. They are taken from the *Telegraph and Texas Register*, October 26, 1835:

[October 18, 1835]. The council received a resolution from General Samuel Houston, presented by Mr. Garrett, and adopted the same so far as the words "null and void."

Whereas, certain extensive grants of land have been made by the Congress of Coahuila and Texas since 1833, and the same has been purchased by certain individuals under the most suspicious circumstances, therefore be it

Resolved, that we recommend to the Consultation, at their meeting, the consideration of this matter, and that they declare all the said grants null and void; which

On motion of Mr. Perry, was adopted, and one thousand copies ordered to be printed, with the report of the committee to day.

R. R. Royal, *President.*

J. G. W. Pierson, *Secretary.*

The committee to whom were referred the resolution of A. Houston, and the amendment to those resolutions by Daniel Parker, on

the subject of the Cherokee, Shawnee, and other tribes of Indians, beg leave to report.

That whereas several of the Indian chiefs were invited by the Consultation of Texas to convene with them for the purpose of having their claims to their land properly adjusted by that body.

And whereas it has become necessary for that body to adjourn their session until the 1st day of November next, and as all the power of transacting business is vested in the hands of the general council of Texas, the committee are of opinion that it is the duty of this council to appoint three commissioners, whose duty it shall be to repair immediately to the villages of the said Indians, with full power to hold a consultation with them, for the purpose of ascertaining their grievances, and for giving them full assurances that their case will be properly attended to, as soon as the consultation meets.

This committee are of the opinion that there have been unwarrantable encroachments made upon the lands occupied by the said Indians; therefore be it resolved by the permanent council of Texas now in session, that Peter J. Menard, Jacob Garrett, and Joseph L. Hood be appointed commissioners for the purpose of holding consultations with the different tribes of Indians, and giving them such assurances as may be necessary for the advancement of their rights and privileges as citizens of Texas, and for the purpose of transacting such other business as may be necessary to promote the cause of the people of Texas.

It shall be the duty of the commissioners to cooperate with the committees of vigilance and safety in the different municipalities of Texas, in carrying the above resolution into effect.

A. Houston,
A. G. Perry,
Peter J. Menard,
J. L. Hood,
Daniel Parker,
Committee.

The first resolution should be inserted on page 265 (Vol. VII.), after line 17; and the second on the same page, after line 22.

EUGENE C. BARKER.

AFFAIRS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

In this issue of the QUARTERLY appears a memorial page in commemoration of the services of John Files Tom. His death removes one of the last survivors of the battle of San Jacinto.

The tenth annual meeting of the Texas State Historical Association was held at Austin in the main University building on March 2d at 3 p. m. The Association now meets regularly on Independence Day, because of the special fitness of this day for the occasion. At this meeting two interesting papers were read. That presented by Mr. Eugene C. Barker was entitled "The Texan Revolutionary Army," and that by Mr. E. W. Winkler, Archivist of the State Library, was on "William Barrett Travis." Mr. Barker's paper is published in this number of the QUARTERLY.

At the business meeting the Recording Secretary gave an interesting report on the growth of the Association, recent accessions to the library, and the growing circulation of the QUARTERLY. The Treasurer's report shows that, in spite of the increased expense, the Association's finances have materially improved within the last year.

The chairman of the committee appointed for that purpose presented the following resolutions on the death of Judge John H. Reagan :

WHEREAS, Since the last meeting of the Association, death has ended the long and notable career of its President, Judge John H. Reagan ; therefore, be it

Resolved that, while the advanced age of Judge Reagan and his duties as an official of the State of Texas interfered greatly with the active discharge of his functions as President of this organization, the Association is deeply indebted to him for his cordial support and sympathy with its purposes.

Resolved that the memory of Judge Reagan should be held in the highest honor for his distinguished public services, whether given to Texas, to the South, or to the United States.

Resolved that the character of Judge Reagan, who always valued

right above expediency, to whom no adviser spoke so impressively as his own conscience, and who thought no sacrifice too great to make on behalf of his convictions, offers a splendid example for those who are to make the history of the future.

Respectfully submitted,

George P. Garrison.

Beauregard Bryan.

C. W. Raines.

In the election of officers, Dr. David Franklin Houston, president of the University of Texas, was chosen to succeed Judge Reagan. Other officers elected were as follows: Vice presidents, Judge W. D. Wood, of San Marcos; Judge Beauregard Bryan, of El Paso; Prof. W. J. Battle, of Austin, and Dr. Milton J. Bliem, of San Antonio; corresponding secretary and treasurer, Mr. E. C. Barker, of Austin; fellows to serve as members in the council, Judge John C. Townes, of Austin; Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, of Austin, and Judge Z. T. Fulmore, of Austin; members to serve on the same council, Mrs. Bride Neill Taylor, of Austin; President S. P. Brooks, of Waco; Dr. W. J. Battle, of Austin; Prof. S. H. Moore, of Georgetown, and Mrs. Dora Fowler Arthur, of Austin. At the meeting of the fellows, a new publication committee, of which the president and secretary are ex-officio members, was constituted by the election of Mrs. Bride Neill Taylor, Judge C. W. Raines, and Judge Z. T. Fulmore. The business management continues to be conducted by Dr. H. E. Bolton and Mr. Luther E. Widen.

The following new members were recommended by the executive council and elected to full membership by the Association: From Austin, Carl Hartman, Walter Bremond, Judge F. A. Williams, Luther E. Widen; from Houston, Miss Frances Hogan, Mrs. M. T. Morris, Clarence R. Wharton, A. P. Root, Mrs. Lelia E. Akin, W. Jack Bryan, J. M. Cotton, Frank Templeton; from San Antonio, Miss Nannie Dawson, Miss Sarah Schofield, W. J. Spillman, Mrs. W. J. Woodhull, Fred Fries, Edward W. Heusinger, Hon. E. H. Terrell, William Negley, John C. Sullivan, Judge C. A. Keller, E. B. Chandler; from Dallas, R. A. Goldstein; from Fort Worth, Rev. T. H. Sturgis; from El Paso, Albert C. Read; from Waco, William L. Prather; from San Angelo, Dr. E. L. Batts; from

Killeen, William E. Bouchelle; from Gatesville, J. D. Brown, Jr.; from Cresson, W. H. Crook; from Rayner, Prof. D. M. Oldham; from Hartford, Conn., W. H. Gocher; from Cleveland, Ohio, A. H. Clark; from Moscow, S. Bergman; from Weimar, John C. Hubbard; from Palestine, J. M. Fullenwider; from Georgetown, Lee J. Rountree, Judge W. K. Makemson; from Howe, William H. Bean; from Galveston, E. G. Littlejohn; from Clyde, W. W. Slater; from Louisville, Ky., Judge R. T. Durrett; from Livingston, Judge T. F. Meece; from Owensboro, Ky., Mrs. James C. Redd; from Hillsboro, Judge N. J. Smith.

Mr. R. A. Hanrick, of Waco, has presented the Association several very interesting documents, among which are a certificate signed by President Jackson for 79.83 acres of land in Alabama, issued January 3, 1832, to Jonathan G. Shaw, under authority of the act of Congress of April 24, 1820; a like certificate of the same date for 79.89 acres; a Texas treasury warrant dated March 11, 1862, issued under authority of the act of the State Legislature of January 3, 1862; a Confederate States bond for five hundred dollars, issued under authority of an act of the Confederate States Congress, approved December 24, 1861, to T. Sanford, dated January 1, 1863; and a letter from Asa Hoxey to R. M. Williamson. The last of these, because of its special interest and value, is printed in full in the department of Notes and Fragments.

John Files Tom

Member of the Texas Veterans Association

Honorary Life Member of the
Texas State Historical Association

Born, April 22, 1818
Died, March 26, 1906

Treasurer's Report from March 1, 1905, to March 1, 1906.

RECEIPTS.

Balance on deposit in City National Bank at last report, bearing 4 per cent interest.....	\$ 700 00
Balance subject to check at last report.....	325 40
By membership dues.....	\$ 1,158 60
By fellowship dues, E. T. Miller.....	5 00
By sale of Quarterlies.....	41 50
By advertising.....	32 50
By donations:	
Ira H. Evans.....	\$ 10 00
W. D. Wood.....	10 00
W. G. Newby.....	5 00
F. Groos.....	5 00
Gerard Huston.....	5 00
G. G. Keiley.....	5 00
J. F. Etter.....	2 00
Malone Duggan.....	1 00
Yale Hicks.....	1 00
By interest.....	44 00
	72 00
Total.....	1,353 60

	\$ 2,379 00

EXPENDITURES.

Vouchers.	
No. 81 \$100 00	
85 250 00	
86 147 12	Von Boeckmann-Jones Co., printing and sta-
91 19 15	tionery..... \$ 844 79
92 176 26	
95 152 26	
82 10 00	
83a 2 00	
87 10 00	U. S. Postoffice, stamps..... 33 70
89 7 00	
93 4 00	
96 70	
79 Advance to O. W. Finley, draughtsman \$ 5 00	
80 Payment on University Bulletin No. 51... 40 00	Herbert
83 For indexing Volume VIII of Quarterly. 10 00	E. Bolton
94 Advance to Miss Hibbs for assistance..... 1 57	56 57
91a \$ 12 00	
93a 22 65	L. E. Widen, commissions, clerical help, and
95a 21 75	advances for express and freight charges..... 158 85
96a 102 45	
84 \$ 8 00	
88 3 00	Miss Edith Weeden, clerical help..... 11 00
76 W. L. Cook, typewriting.....	1 50
77 Sam T. Hill, half-tone plate.....	10 00
78 Collection agency, commission.....	1 50
90 George P. Garrison, purchase of a note for \$250, with ac- crued interest of \$17.20.....	267 20
89a Austin National Bank, exchange on collections.....	26 00
Balance on deposit in Austin National Bank, bear- ing 4 per cent interest.....	750 00
Balance in Austin National Bank, subject to check.....	217 86

Total.....	\$ 2,378 97

RESOURCES OF THE ASSOCIATION.

Deposit in Austin National Bank, bearing 4 per cent interest.....	\$ 750 00
Deposit in Austin National Bank, subject to check.....	217 86
Note of E. P. Schoch's, bearing 8 per cent interest.....	250 00

Approved:

C. W. Raines } Auditing Committee.
Z. T. Fulmore }

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

We quote the following item of interest from the preface of the Trinity College *Historical Papers*, Series V:

"The Historical Papers of the Trinity College Historical Society were discontinued in 1902 when *The South Atlantic Quarterly* was established. Recently, however, it has been decided that there ought to be some ready receptacle for really worthy papers prepared by members of the Society aside from a journal like *The Quarterly*, and for this reason it has been deemed advisable to revive the Historical Papers. The present series—the fifth—will be followed by annual installments in the future, till the Society is able to begin the publication of a quarterly journal of its own, for which enterprise it is making plans."

THE LAMAR GENEALOGY.—Some interesting details of this genealogy will be found in the *Publications of the Southern History Association*, I, 203-210.

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
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